LiBRAW 

OSJT=6RWA 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS 


OF 


RICHARD   BURTHOGGE 


EDITED  WITH  INTRODUCTION  AND  NOTES 
BY 

MARGARET  W.  LANDES 

HALLO  WELL  FELLOW  AT  WKLLESLKT  COLLEGE,   1913-14 


CHICAGO  LONDON 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 
1921 


COTTUCHT  BY 

THE  OPEN  COUKT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 
1921 


PRIMTED  IN   AMEBICA 


PREFACE. 

THIS  book  is  published  in  the  hope  of  securing  for 
Richard  Burthogge  the  place  which  he  deserves  yet 
has  never  held  in  the  history  of  British  thought.  Its  editors 
wish  to  share  with  other  students  the  rediscovery,  which 
they  owe  to  Georges  Lyon,  of  a  seventeenth-century  English 
philosopher  so  free  from  the  prepossessions  of  his  Platonist 
contemporaries  that  he  "grounds  notions"  in  sense  and  so 
far  advanced  in  the  path  which,  a  century  later,  Kant  trod 
that  he  says:  "The  immediate  objects  of  humane  cogitation 
are  all  appearances,  which  are  not  properly  in  the  things 
themselves." 

All  the  writings  collected  in  this  volume  are  reprints 
from  first  editions  in  the  possession  of  the  Harvard  Uni- 
versity Library.  All  are  printed  entire  save  the  Essay  upon 
Reason,  of  which  the  greater  part  and  (it  is  believed)  the 
essential  part  is  given  including  the  chapter  and  section 
headings  of  the  omitted  chapters.  The  old  orthography  of 
English,  Greek  and  Latin  has,  for  the  most  part,  been  re- 
tained. Bracketed  numbers  are  the  page-numbers  of  the 
original  editions.  The  kindness  of  the  Harvard  Library,  in 
allowing  the  use  of  the  texts,  is  gratefully  acknowledged. 

This  volume  is  the  third  contribution  to  the  study  of 
seventeenth-  and  eighteenth-century  English  philosophical 


iy       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

texts  by  graduate  students  of  Wellesley  College.1  The  im- 
mediate incentive  to  its  study  of  Burthogge  is  Prof.  A.  O. 
Lovejoy's  reference  to  him  in  an  essay  on  "Kant  and  the 
English  Platonists."  The  editors  take  this  opportunity  to 
express  their  appreciation  of  Dr.  Lovejoy's  generous  and 
expert  counsel  in  the  preparation  of  the  book.  Warm 
thanks  are  due  also  to  Professor  Rufus  M.  Jones  of  Haver- 
ford  College,  and  to  Professors  Charlotte  F.  Roberts  and 
Alice  Robertson  of  Wellesley  College,  for  Notes  attributed 
to  them. 

The  editor  of  this  volume  illuminates  the  text  of  Bur- 
thogge by  biographical  and  philosophical  Notes  and,  in  her 
Introduction,  calls  attention  to  the  anticipations  both  of 
Locke  and  of  Kant  which  give  the  writings  of  Richard 
Burthogge,  though  hitherto  all  but  unknown,  their  genuine 
historical  significance.  Miss  Landes  compares  Burthogge's 
doctrine  with  that  of  his  contemporaries  and  successors 
and,  in  an  Outline,  summarizes  and  combines  the  teachings, 
not  always  consistent  with  each  other,  of  his  different  meta- 
physical works. 

To  her  philosophical  comments  may  be  prefixed  a  brief 
remark  about  Burthogge's  literary  style.  Readers  of  the 
Organum  and  the  Essay  will  find  those  works  marked  at 
many  points  by  a  directness  and  a  simplicity  and  by  an  occa- 
sional touch  of  humor  which  strongly  distinguish  them  from 
most  of  the  philosophical  treatises  by  Burthogge's  contem- 
poraries. His  predilection  for  plain  language  and  for  log- 
ical statement  is  indicated  by  his  attitude  of  kindly  scorn 
toward  discourses  "wherein  Words  are  sensible  but  not  the 
Propositions  and  yet  are  taken  by  those  that  make  them  for 
High  Sence." 

It  is  hardly  to  be  hoped  that  the  reader  of  this  book  will 
"make  sense"  of  all  that  Burthogge  says.  The  attentive 

1  Earlier  volumes  are :  an  edition  of  Arthur  Collier's  Clavis  Uni- 
versalis,  with  Introduction  and  Notes  by  Ethel  Bowman  (Open  Court 
Publishing  Co.,  1909)  ;  and  a  study  of  The  Philosophy  of  John  Norris, 
by  Flora  I.  MacKinnon  (Psychological  Review  Publications,  1910). 


PREFACE.  V 

reader  cannot,  however,  fail  to  profit  both  by  his  keen  and 
sympathetic  comment  on  his  immediate  predecessors  and 
contemporaries  and  by  his  first-hand  introspection,  sound 
argument  and  independent  thinking. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 
WELLESLEY  COLLEGE. 

November,  1920. 


CONTENTS. 

FACT 

INTRODUCTION « 

A.  The  Life  of  Richard  Burthogge xi 

B.  Burthogge's  Place  in  the  History  of  Philosophy xiii 

L  Burthogge's  Relation  to  the  Cambridge  Platonists  . . .  xiii 

2.  Burthogge's  Relation  to  Locke  and  Kant xv 

THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE 

Organum  Vetus  et  Novum,  or  A  Discourse  of  Reason  and  Truth, 

1678.     (Complete)    3 

An  Essay  upon  Reason  and  the  Nature  of  Spirits,  1694.     (With 

omissions)   '. 53 

Of  Human  Reason.    The  First  Part 55 

Chap.  I.  Of  Reason  in  General  55 

Chap.  II.  Of  Apprehension 65 

Chap.  III.  Of  Notion,  the  Immediate  Object  of  Apprehension  70 
Chap.  IV.  Of  the  Distribution  of  Notions  in  the  Restrained 

Sense  of  the  Word  89 

Chap.  V.  Of  Substance 96 

Chap.  IV  [VI].    Of  Mind  in  Matter 118 

Chap.  VII.  Animals  are  Either  Invisible  or  Visible 132 

Chap.  VIII.  Another  Essay  About  the  Nature  of  Animals  and 

Spirits 134 

Chap.  IX.  Of   Substance   in  the   Scholastical   Consideration 

of  It 136 

Of  the  Soul  of  the  World  and  of  Particular  Souls,  1699 139 

OUTLINE  OF  BURTHOGGE'S  PHILOSOPHY  179 

NOTES 185 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 225 

I.  Complete  List  of  the  Works  of  Burthogge 227 

II.  Other  Works  to  which  Reference  is  Made  230 

INDEX  .                                                                                            .  233 


INTRODUCTION. 


INTRODUCTION. 

A.   THE  LIFE  OF  RICHARD  BURTHOGGE. 

THERE  are  not  many  sources  for  the  life  of  Richard 
Burthogge.  The  meager  accounts  by  his  biographers 
are  based  for  the  most  part  on  the  short  sketch  of  his  life 
quoted  anonymously  by  Anthony  Wood  in  the  Athenae 
Oxonienses. 

Burthogge  was  born  in  Plymouth,  England.1  The  dates 
of  his  life  are  not  definitely  known,  but  are  usually  given 
as  1638-94.2  As  Georges  Lyon3  points  out,  however,  the 
date  of  his  death  must  have  been  later  than  1694.  It  might 
be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  Christianity  a  Revealed  Mys- 
tery was  not  published  until  1702,  that  the  date  has  been 
placed  too  early.  This  work,  however,  may  have  been 
posthumous.  But  the  fact  that  Of  the  Soul  of  the  World, 
a  letter  to  Locke,  is  dated  1698,  shows  conclusively  that 
the  date  of  Burthogge's  death  must  have  been  at  least  four 
years  later  than  that  given  by  his  biographers. 

Of  Burthogge's  parents  we  are  told  only  that  his  father 
was  a  gunner.4  And  of  his  early  life  nothing  is  recorded 
but  the  fact  that  he  received  his  early  education  at  the  Ex- 
eter Grammar  School.2  In  1654  he  "became  either  a  serv- 

1  Anthony  a  Wood,  Athenae  Oxonienses,  Vol.  IV,  p.  581.   Georges 
Lyon,  L'idealvsme  en  Angleterre  an  XVIII.  siecle,  p.  72. 

2  Leslie  Stephen,  Dictionary  of  National  Biography.  Georges  Lyon, 
loc.  cit.    Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy  from  Tholes  to  the  Pres- 
ent Time,  Vol.  II,  p.  365. 

8  Loc.  cit. 

4  Anthony  a  Wood,  loc.  cit.    Cf.  Georges  Lyon,  loc.  cit. 


xii      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

itor  or  chorister  of  All-s.  coll."  He  "took  one  degree  in  arts 
4  years  after,  completed  it  by  determination  as  a  mem- 
ber of  Line,  coll."  He  then  studied  medicine  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Leyden  and  in  1662  "was  doctorated  in  physic." 
On  his  return  to  "his  native  country,  [he]  married,  buried 
his  wife,  took  to  him  a  second  wife  who  was  a  widow  of 
the  parish  of  Totness  in  Devonshire,  on  whose  joy nture  he 
lives  in  Bowden  near  to  that  place,  as  he  hath  done  above 
20  years,  practises  physic,  and  by  that  and  wiving  he  hath 
obtained  a  pretty  foul  estate.  This  person,  who  always 
kept  pace  with  the  fanatics,  temporiz'd  with  the  papists  in 
the  reign  of  King  James  II  and  therefore  was  made  a  justice 
of  peace  for  Devonshire,  which  office  he  kept  under  Will. 
Ill  as  being  a  favourer  of  fanatics.  He  is  look'd  upon  as 
a  person  of  considerable  learning,  and  of  no  less  pride  and 
ambition."  The  biographer  is  here- quite  evidently  not  free 
from  personal  feeling  in  sketching  the  facts  of  Burthogge's 
life.  It  is  possible  that  he  speaks  with  just  scorn  of  Bur- 
thogge  as  one  who  diplomatically  "kept  pace  with  the  fa- 
natics," and  at  the  same  time  "temporiz'd  with  the  papists." 
Since,  however,  he  furnishes  no  evidence,  it  is  more  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  what  he  looked  upon  as  diplomacy  in 
Burthogge  was  only  evidence  of  more  advanced  religious 
views.5  Religion  in  England  in  the  seventeenth  century  was 
still  dominated  by  tradition  and  dogma,  and  men  of  liberal 
religious  views  were  rare. 

In  the  years  following  his  course  at  Leyden  Burthogge 
was  apparently  finding  time,  aside  from  his  professional 
duties,  for  philosophic  reading  and  writing.  Between  the 
years  1671  and  1702  he  published  some  eight  or  nine  reli- 
gious essays  and  three  philosophical  works.  Of  his  philo- 
sophical writings  the  Organum  Vetus  &  Novum  appeared 
in  1678,  the  Essay  upon  Reason,  and  the  Nature  of  Spirits  in 
1694,  and  Of  the  Soul  of  the  World  in  1699. 

•  Cf.,  however,  Organum,  Sect.  41,  p.  35. 


INTRODUCTION.  Xlll 


B.    BURTHOGGE'S  PLACE  IN  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOS- 
OPHY." 

Burthogge  is  one  of  those  individuals,  appearing  now 
and  again  in  history,  whose  merit  is  unrecognized  in  his 
own  day  not  only  because  his  teaching  is  premature,  but 
also  because  it  is  so  pervaded  by  the  dominating  thought 
of  the  time  that  its  element  of  originality  is  lost.  As  a 
philosopher  Burthogge  cannot  be  placed  either  with  the 
idealists  of  his  own  time  or  with  those  of  the  following 
century.  He  holds  a  unique  place  between  the  two.  All  his 
writings  bear  in  some  measure  the  stamp  of  the  Platonic 
idealism  of  the  seventeenth  century.  His  most  significant 
teaching,  however,  is  more  closely  allied  to  the  idealistic 
philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century.  But  for  its  Lockian 
strain  of  sensationalism  his  theory  of  knowledge  is  essen- 
tially that  of  Kant. 

1.  Burthogge' s  Relation  to  the  Cambridge  Platonists. 

The  influence  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists  is  obtrusively 
evident  in  Burthogge's  writings.  His  method,  except  in  the 
Organum  and  in  the  Essay,  is  the  same  uncritical  method  of 
the  Platonists.  His  theological  works  are  full  of  the  elo- 
quent exhortations,7  and  long  quotations  from  the  Bible8  and 
the  classics9  which  make  the  writings  of  Cudworth,10  More10 
and  Culverwel10  the  most  tedious  of  reading.  And  again, 

•  TJeberweg  alone,  of  the  writers  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  makes 
mention  of  Burthogge  in  a  single  short  paragraph. 

7  See  Christianity  a  Revealed  Mystery  and  A  Brief  Discourse  con- 
cerning Perseverance  in  Grace. 

'Of  the  Soul  of  the  World,  pp.  21-24;  Christianity  a  Revealed 
Mystery,  pp.  26ff ;  Causa  Dei,  p.  43.  The  page  references,  throughout, 
are  to  the  original  editions.  The  writer  is  indebted  to  the  Harvard 
University  library  for  the  use  of  its  Burthogge  texts. 

8  Of  the  Soul  of  the  World,  pp.  11,  18,  24ff;  TAP  AGON;  Causa 
Dei,  pp.  250f,  256,  395,  et  al. 

10  See  Cudworth,  True  Intellectual  System ;  More,  Antidote  against 
Atheism;  Culverwel,  Discourse  of  the  Light  of  Nature. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


with  the  exception  of  the  two  works  mentioned  above,  Bur- 
thogge's  writings  like  those  of  the  Platonists,  are  drenched 
with  the  theological  views  of  the  time.11  And  even  the 
Organum  and  the  Essay  do  not  escape  the  religious  bias  of 
the  seventeenth  century.12  But  more  specifically,  Burthogge 
holds  in  common  with  the  Cambridge  Platonists  at  least 
two  of  their  important  tenets.  His  doctrine  of  the  superior- 
ity of  mind  over  matter  is,  with  unimportant  differences. 
the  same  as  that  taught  by  More  and  by  Cudworth.  And 
one  of  his  doctrines  of  truth  is  in  agreement  with  that  of 
the  Platonists,  although  he  has  a  second  teaching  about  truth 
which  contradicts  his  own  first  doctrine  as  well  as  that  of 
the  Cambridge  Platonists. 

More  and  Cudworth,  basing  their  teaching  on  Plato's 
Timaeus,  held  that  not  man  alone,  but  nature  as  well,  is 
dominated  by  a  soul.  They  did  not  identify  the  soul  of 
the  world  with  God  himself,  but  conceived  it  as  an  instru- 
ment in  God's  hands,  made  and  used  by  him  to  manifest 
himself  in  the  world.13  Burthogge,  on  the  other  hand, 
seems  to  identify  the  "Mosaical  Spirit"  with  the  Spirit  of 
God14  diffused  throughout  the  world,  although  he  holds  at 
the  same  time,  that  God  is  "Pure  Mind,"  independent  of 
all  matter.14  Burthogge's  teaching  also  about  the  nature 
of  the  human  soul  is  essentially  that  of  the  Platonists. 
More  and  Cudworth  held  that  particular  souls,  i.  e.,  souls 
of  men  and  animals  and  even  of  plants,  are  "sprigs  of  the 
common  Soul  of  the  world,"  not  "that  very  Soul  it  self,"15 
though  it  is  unreasonable,  Cudworth  adds,  to  suppose  that 
every  plant  and  blade  of  grass  has  "a  Particular  Plastick 

11  See  Causa  Dei  ;  TAFAGON  ;  Christianity  a  Revealed  Mystery. 

12  Organum,  Sect.  41  ;  Essay,  Ch.  VII. 

"Cudworth,  True  Intellectual  System,  edition  of  1678,  p.  ISO; 
More,  Antidote  against  Atheism,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  II,  Sects.  4ff. 

"Essay,  Ch.  IV  [VI],  Sect.  1,  pp.  124ff.    Cf.  Ch.  V,  Sect.  2,  pp. 

10  More,  Antidote  against  Atheism,  Appendix,  Ch.  XI,  Sect.  9; 
cf.  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  Bk.  Ill,  Ch.  XVI,  and  Cudworth,  op 
eit.,  p.  171. 


INTRODUCTION.  XV 

Life."  Similarly  Burthogge  calls  the  soul  "a  certain  De- 
terminate Vital  Energy ....  a  certain  Portion  of  the  Spirit 
of  the  Universe,  Vested  in  a  Body.  . .  ,"16 

Again,  in  teaching  that  by  intuition  truth  is  attained, 
Burthogge  is  in  agreement  with  the  thought  of  his  time 
To  the  Platonists  truth  always  meant  religious  truth,  which 
is  known,  they  believed,  by  intuition.  The  more  completely 
a  man  can  get  away  from  "meer  speculation"  and  enter  the 
realm  of  "spiritual  sensation,"  the  more  certain  is  he  of  at- 
taining a  knowledge  of  truth.17  And  Burthogge  likewise 
teaches  that  apart  from  all  sensuous  experience  we  know  the 
form  of  truth,  which  enables  us  to  distinguish  truth  from 
error  just  as  immediately  as  we  distinguish  sense-qualities.18 
Burthogge,  however,  holds  an  empirical  theory  of  truth 
which  contradicts  this  view.  The  criterion  of  truth,  accord- 
ing to  this  second  theory  is  based  not  on  intuition,  but 
rather  on  the  objective  harmony  of  things  among  themselves. 
Truth  is  not  necessarily  that  which  we  "clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly" apprehend,19  nor  that  which  is  in  accord  with  our 
faculties,20  but  that  which  fits  in  with  the  whole  objective 
scheme  of  things.21 

2.  Burthogge 's  Relation  to  Locke  and  Kant. 

In  spite  of  the  abundant  evidence  in  all  Burthogge's 
writings  of  the  influence  of  seventeenth-century  thought,  it 
is  true  that  his  theory  of  knowledge,  his  most  important 

18  Essay,  Ch.  IV,  Sect.  3,  p.  ISO.    Cf.  Of  the  Soul  of  the  World, 

p.  6:  "....particular  Souls are  Portions  of  that  Spirit  [Mosaical 

Spirit]  acting  in  the  several  particular  Bodies  in  which  they  are." 


17 


Smith,   Discourse   concerning Divine   Knowledge,    Sect.    1. 

Culverwel,  Discourse  of  the  Light  of  Nature,  especially  Chaps.  IX 
and  XI. 

18  Organum,  Sects.  63,  69. 

19  Ibid.,  Sects.  18,68,  69. 

20  Ibid.,  Sects.  7,  72. 

21  Ibid.,  Sects.  75,  78.    Cf.  Sect  17. 


i     PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


philosophical  teaching,  remains  singularly  free  from  Pla- 
tonist  influence.  It  will  be  noted  that  in  the  Organum 
there  are  scattered  passages22  in  which  Burthogge  closely 
resembles  his  Platonist  contemporaries  in  his  estimate  of 
sense,  reason,  and  revelation.  But  these  occasional  pas- 
sages, inconsistent  as  they  are  with  his  usual  teaching, 
form  no  integral  part  of  Burthogge's  doctrine  of  knowl- 
edge, which  stands,  untouched  by  Platonist  influence,  as  a 
remarkable  anticipation  of  Kant. 

Far  from  holding  that  sense  is  a  hindrance  to  knowl- 
edge, Burthogge  teaches,  like  Kant,  that  it  is  one  of  the 
only  two  sources  of  knowledge.  The  essentials  of  Kant's 
epistemology  are  found  in  the  well-known  words  :  "Thoughts 
without  contents  are  empty)  intuitions  without  concepts  are 
blind....  The  understanding  cannot  see,  the  senses  cannot 
think.  By  their  union  alone  can  knowledge  be  produced."23 
And  this  is  exactly  Burthogge's  teaching:  "The  Under- 
standing converses  not  with  things  ordinarily  but  by  the 
Intervention  of  the  sense."24 

Sensation,  according  to  both  Burthogge  and  Kant,  is 
the  passively  received  in  knowledge,  that  which  is  given  in 
experience  :28  "  .  .  .  .  the  impressions  of  things  without  upon 
the  Sensories,  produce  or  occasion  in  them  the  Cogitations 
which  we  call  Sentiments,  as  Colours,  Sounds,  Sapours  &c."28 
And  as  objects  can  be  perceived  only  through  sensation,  so, 
Burthogge  teaches  like  Kant,  they  can  be  thought  only 
through  concepts  or  "notions."  The  mind  knows  nothing, 
he  says,  apart  from  its  particular  "manner  of  conceiving 
things."  "The  Understanding  conceives  not  anything  but 
under  the  Notion  of  an  Entity,  and  this  either  a  Substance 
or  an  Accident  ;  under  that  of  a  whole  or  a  part  :  or  of  a 

22  Sects.  30,  32,  34,  35,  50. 

28  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  A  (1st  ed.),  p.  51;  B,  p.  75. 

2«  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  60. 

26  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  A  51  ;  B  75. 

28  Organum,  Sect.  24.    Cf  .  Sect.  74. 


INTRODUCTION.  XV11 

Cause,  or  of  an  Effect  or  the  like.''27  And  again  Burthogge 
is  in  agreement  with  Kant  in  his  most  important  teaching 
that  in  order  to  have  knowledge  of  the  object  the  percept 
and  the  concept  must  unite.  Neither  alone  is  sufficient  to 
give  complete  knowledge.28 

The  parallelism  between  Burthogge  and  Kant  may  be 
carried  further.  Burthogge  holds  not  only  that  the  object 
of  knowledge  involves  both  the  sensational  and  the  notional 
factor,  but,  like  Kant,  he  teaches  that  it  has  no  existence 
independent  of  thought.29  Both  teach  that  the  object  of 
knowledge  is  phenomenal,  not  real.  That  the  sensuous  con- 
tent of  knowledge  has  no  objective  existence  was  not  an  ab- 
solutely new  doctrine  even  in  Burthogge's  time.  Locke, 
like  Descartes,  had  already  taught  the  ideality  of  the  "sec- 
ondary" sense-qualities.  But  that  the  mind  itself,  indepen- 
dent of  sense-experience,  actively  contributes  to  the  make-up 
of  its  own  object  is  a  doctrine  which,  according  to  the  usual 
view,  was  promulgated  for  the  first  time  by  Kant.  Yet  in 
the  light  of  the  teaching  of  the  Organum  and  the  Essay  it 
is  clear  that  Kant's  own  "Copernican  revolution"  had  an 
instigator  at  least  a  century  older  than  Kant. 

To  hold,  however,  as  Professor  Lovejoy  holds,30  that 
Kant's  theory  was  the  common  property  of  the  Cambridge 
Platonists  seems  hardly  justifiable  even  in  the  light  of  the 
quotations  given  in  support  of  this  belief.  What  these  quo- 
tations from  Cudworth  and  More  show  is  rather  the  tena- 
cious belief  in  the  superiority  of  mind  over  matter,  and  thus 
in  the  superiority  of  thought  ( in  which  matter  is  subservient 
to  mind)  over  sensation  (in  which  the  mind  is  affected  by 
matter).  Nothing  was  more  abhorrent  to  the  Platonists 

27  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  57.    Cf.  Organum,  Sects.  14-15. 

26  Organum,  Sects.  9-10.  Cf.  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  59:  Cri- 
tique, A  50,  100,  109,  116;  B  74,  145. 

29  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1 ;  Organum,  Sects.  8-13. 

80  Essays  Philosophical  and  Psychological  in  Honor  of  Wm.  James, 
pp.  272-78. 


xviii  PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

than  the  idea  that  matter  could  in  any  way  assist  mind.  The 
passage  quoted  from  Cudworth81  is,  by  his  own  confession, 
simply  an  outburst  against  the  "atheistic  argument"  that 
since  matter  exists  in  its  own  right  without  need  of  any 
creative  mind,  our  knowledge  of  things  depends  merely  upon 
"passive  receptivity."  This  teaching  was  an  outrage  to  the 
Platonists  merely  because  it  belittled  the  mind,  making  it 
appear  of  so  much  less  importance  than  matter,  and  not  be- 
cause it  ignored  the  necessary  conceptual  element  in  knowl- 
edge as  taught  by  Kant  and  Burthogge.  "But  sensible  things 
themselves ....,"  says  Cudworth,32  "are  not  known  and 
understood  either  by  the  passion  or  the  fancy  of  sense,  nor  by 
anything  merely  foreign  and  adventitious,  but  by  intelligible 
ideas  exerted  from  the  mind  itself,  that  is,  by  something 
native  and  domestic  to  it."  These  words  of  the  quotation, 
italicized  by  Professor  Lovejoy33  to  emphasize  their  agree- 
ment with  the  Kantian  teaching,  seem  rather  to  show  plainly 
that  Cudworth  is  simply  falling  back  on  the  familiar  "innate 
ideas"  theory  in  order  to  prove  to  the  atheist  that  the  mind 
is  quite  capable  of  getting  on  without  any  assistance  from 
matter;  that  it  would,  in  fact,  fare  much  better  could  it  be 
rid  of  sensuous  perception  altogether. 

Burthogge,  like  Kant,  falls  short  of  idealism.  He  could 
not  escape  the  influence  of  the  traditional  dualism  of  the 
seventeenth  century  any  more  than  Kant  could  shake  off  the 
influence  of  Wolff's  dualistic  teaching.34  Neither  Burthogge 
nor  Kant  ever  denied  the  existence  of  reality  external  to 
mind.  But  since  they  find  that  the  object  of  knowledge  has 
no  independent  existence,  they  are  forced  to  hold  that  reality, 
conceived  as  the  thing  independent  of  consciousness,  is  un- 
known. This  teaching  about  the  unknown  thing  is  empha- 

91  Ibid.,  pp.  272-74. 

32  True  Intellectual  System,  op.  cit.,  p.  731. 

33  Essays in  Honor  of  Wm.  James,  pp.  273f. 

84  See  M.  W.  Calkins,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  p. 


INTRODUCTION.  XIX 

sized  by  Burthogge  in  both  the  Organum**  and  the  Essay 
upon  Reason.50  And  Kant  not  only  includes  it  in  "Paralog- 
isms" and  "Antinomies""  of  the  "Dialectic,"  but  anticipates 
it  in  all  the  other  divisions  of  the  Critique  ;38  in  the  chapter 
on  "Phenomena  and  Noumena"38  of  the  "Analytic,"  and  in 
the  "Esthetic."40 

Burthogge's  teaching  about  the  nature  of  the  thing  is 
essentially  the  same  as  that  of  Kant.  The  "thing"  is,  in 
the  first  place,  unlike  the  "object,"  non-mental  and  wholly 
independent  of  thought.41  In  the  second  place,  the  thing 
really  exists.  The  object,  Burthogge  teaches  with  Kant,  is 
only  appearance  or  phenomenon,  without  reality.41  And 
finally  the  thing,  for  Burthogge  as  well  as  for  Kant,  is  un- 
known.41 Thus  does  Burthogge,  like  Kant,  unquestioningly 
and  tenaciously  hold  to  an  external  reality,  a  reality  robbed, 
however,  of  all  positive  character  save  that  of  existence. 

There  is  in  Burthogge  no  explicit  proof  for  the  exist- 
ence of  the  thing.  That  there  exists  independent  reality  was 
not  questioned  in  the  seventeenth  century.  And  Burthogge, 
like  his  contemporaries,  takes  the  "thing"  for  granted  though 
he  suggests  the  argument,  later  used  by  Kant,  for  the  exist- 
ence of  it.  Our  sensations,  he  says,  must  have  a  cause ;  we 
know  that  we  ourselves  do  not  cause  them ;  they  must  there- 
fore have  an  external  cause.42  Kant  several  times  in  the 
Critique  implies  this  causal  relation  between  the  phenom- 
enon and  the  thing.43  "The  understanding,"  he  says,  " .  . .  . 
forms  the  thought  of  an  object  by  itself,  but  as  transcenden- 

88  Sect.  9. 

»«  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  2,  pp.  71,  73. 

37  A  357,  359,  361,  368,  378,  477ff;  B  SOSff. 

88  See  M.  W.  Calkins,  op.  cit.,  p.  237,  footnote. 

88  A  250,  253,  258;  B  300,  303. 

40  A  26ff,  42,  44f,  49;  B  42ff,  59,  61  f,  67. 

41  Organum,  Sects.  9-10. 

"Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  2,  p.  73,  cf.  pp.  74f. 
48  A  252,  288;  B  344. 


XX      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

tal  only,  which  is  cause  of  phenomena."4*  This  doctrine  is 
formulated  even  more  explicitly  in  the  Prolegomena:  "I  grant 
.  . .  .that  there  are  bodies  without  us,  that  is,  things  which, 
though  quite  unknown  to  us  as  to  what  they  are  in  them- 
selves, we  yet  know  by  the  representations  which  their  in- 
fluence on  our  sensibility  procures  us."45  That  the  thing  or 
reality  is  unknown  seems,  however,  to  Burthogge  to  require 
no  proof.  On  the  basis  ( 1 )  of  his  view  that  external  reality 
unquestionably  exists,  and  (2)  of  his  previous  teaching 
that  the  object  of  knowledge  has  no  independent  existence, 
it  follows  inevitably  that  the  external  reality  is  unknown.  If 
what  is  known  is  not  external  and  if  such  external  reality 
nevertheless  exists,  it  follows  that  this  reality  must  be  un- 
known.48 

The  agreement  of  Burthogge's  teaching  with  that  of 
Kant  is  not  complete.  Marked  as  the  likeness  is  between 
the  two,  Burthogge's  epistemology  seems  to  diverge  from 
the  Kantian  at  one  important  point.  Along  with  his  teach- 
ing that  the  mind  independent  of  all  external  impression 
actively  contributes  part  of  its  own  object,  Burthogge  at 
the  same  time  holds  a  sensationalistic  doctrine.  While  agree- 
ing with  Kant  in  teaching  that  the  notional  factor  is  sub- 
jective in  source,  Burthogge  seems  to  deny  to  the  notion 
any  a  priori  validity  by  holding,  like  Locke,  that  sense- 
impressions  enter  the  mind  directly,  independent  of  a  priori 
subjective  conditions.  "The  senses,"  says  Locke,  "at  first 
let  in  particular  ideas,  and  furnish  the  yet  empty  cabinet."47 
And  again :  "Let  us  suppose  the  mind  to  be,  as  we  say,  white 
paper,  void  of  all  characters,  without  any  ideas ;  how  comes 
it  to  be  furnished  ? ....  To  this  I  answer  in  one  word,  from 

44  A  288,  B  344. 

48  Sect.  13,  Remark  II.  Cf.  M.  W.  Calkins,  op.  cit.,  p.  240,  foot- 
note. 

46  For  Kant's  arguments  in  defense  of  the  view  that  external  reality 
must  be  unknown,  see  Critique,  A  128f,  244,  378. 

47  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  II,  par.  15. 


INTRODUCTION.  XXI 

experience."48  And  there  are  passages  in  Burthogge  which 
give  the  same  sensationalistic  account  of  the  origin  of  our 
knowledge:  "....the  impressions  of  things  without  upon 
the  Sensories,"  he  says,  "produce  or  occasion  in  them  the 
Cogitations  which  we  call  Sentiments,  as  Colours,  Sounds, 
Sapours  &c.  And  Sentiments  (again)  impressing.  ..  .the 
Minde  and  Understanding,  beget  or  occasion  in  it  those 
higher  Cogitations  which  we  call  Notions,  Apprehensions  of 
Reason  or  Ideas .... "*•  This  agreement  of  Burthogge's 
teaching  with  that  of  Locke,  and  the  added  fact  that  Bur- 
thogge's Essay  upon  Reason,  dedicated50  "To  the  Learned 
Mr.  John  Lock,  Author  of  the  Essay  upon  Humane  Under- 
standing," appeared  four  years  after  Locke's  Essay,  would 
suggest  that  Burthogge  borrowed  from  Locke.  A  further 
consideration,  however,  proves  the  suspicion  unwarranted. 
The  Organum,  in  which  Burthogge's  complete  doctrine  of 
knowledge  is  given,  was  published  twelve  years  before 
Locke's  Essay.  Moreover,  it  will  be  noted  that  of  Bur- 
thogge's two  works  the  later  shows  less  evidence  of  agree- 
ment with  Lockian  teaching  than  the  earlier.  It  is  true  that 
Burthogge  insists  in  the  Essay*1  as  in  the  Organum,5-  that 
all  knowledge  comes  through  sense-experience.  But  the 
point  of  emphasis  has  been  shifted  in  the  later  work.  In  the 
Organum  Burthogge,  like  Locke,  lays  stress  upon  the  fact 
that  sense  is  the  fundamental  source  of  knowledge  from 
which  the  notional  is  derived.  In  the  Essay,  on  the  other 
hand,  Burthogge  seems  no  longer  chiefly  concerned  in  show- 
ing that  all  knowledge  begins  with  sense-experience  but 
rather,  like  Kant.53  in  emphasizing  the  fact  that  since  all 

48  Ibid.,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  I,  par.  2. 

49  Organum,  Sect.  24. 

60  Preface,  p.  [1]. 

61  Ch.  I,  Sect.  1,  pp.  3,  6f,  9ff ;  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  pp.  58ff ;  Sect.  2. 
pp.  67f,  70ff ;  Ch.  IV,  Sect.  1,  p.  80;  Ch.  IV  [VI],  Sect.  2,  p.  138; 
Sect.  3,  p.  152. 

"  Sects.  9,  24,  26,  27,  32,  74*,  92. 

§3  Critique,  A  104.    Cf.  the  section  on  Phenomena  and  Noumena. 


ii   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


knowledge  comes  through  sense  the  object  of  knowledge 
must  be  phenomenal,  not  real.54 

But  granting  that  Burthogge  seems  to  combine  incon- 
sistently a  quasi-Kantian  category  doctrine  with  a  Lockian 
sensationalism,  the  apparent  inconsistency  is  not  impossible 
of  explanation.  The  explanation  lies  in  two  facts:  in  the 
first  place,  Burthogge  does  not  include  in  his  teaching  an 
important  part  of  the  Kantian  doctrine;  and  in  the  second 
place,  his  sensationalism  is  not  of  the  thoroughgoing  Lock- 
ian type.  Burthogge  never  attributes,  as  Kant  does,  a  priori 
validity  to  notions.  While  holding  that  notions  are  sub- 
jective and  that  they  actively  contribute  to  the  make-up  of 
the  object,  he  never  positively  admits  the  Kantian  teaching 
that  these  notions  constitute  the  a  priori  condition  under 
which  alone  sense-experience  is  possible.  And,  on  the  other 
hand,  Burthogge  does  not  hold  with  Locke,  that  sense- 
impressions  enter  the  "empty  cabinet"  unaccompanied.  Bur- 
thogge's  teaching  seems  to  be  rather  that,  though  sense- 
impressions  are  the  beginning  of  knowledge,  they  never 
appear  in  the  mind  by  themselves.  Upon  the  occasion  of 
sense-experience  there  are  inevitably  aroused  in  the  mind 
certain  notions.  These  notions  are  not  derived  from  sense, 
but,  lying  dormant  in  the  mind,  are  made  operative  upon  the 
occasion  of  sense-experience.  In  other  words,  Burthogge 
holds  neither  the  Kantian  view  that  notions  are  the  neces- 
sary condition  for  sense-experience,  nor  the  Lockian  view 
that  they  are  merely  an  outgrowth  from  sense-experience. 
He  seems  to  hold  rather,  that  they  are  the  inevitable  ac- 
companiment of  sense-experience,  giving  to  it  meaning. 

But  this  reconciliation  between  Burthogge's  sensation- 
alism and  his  doctrine  of  subjective  notions  leaves  still  un- 
explained another  apparent  inconsistency  in  his  teaching. 

84  Cf.  Burthogge  on  the  advantage  of  knowing  that  the  object  of 
knowledge  is  phenomenal  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  2,  pp.  68-69)  with 
Kant  (Critique,  2d  ed.,  Pref.,  p.  xxi)  and  Locke  (Essay,  Bk.  I,  Ch. 
I,  pars.  4-6). 


INTRODUCTION.  XX111 

The  form  of  apriorism  against  which  Burthogge  argues  is 
the  same  widespread  "innate  ideas"  theory  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  later  attacked  by  Locke.85  In  spite  of  this 
denial  of  original  ideas  independent  of  sensation  ("Con- 
natural and  Ingrafted  Notions;  Principles  designedly  im- 
planted in  the  Minde,  to  be  a  rule  to  it. . . .")»"  Burthogge 
apparently  admits,  in  the  Organum,  the  validity  of  intui- 
tion in  judgments  of  truth  and  falsity.  This  teaching  seems 
to  be  directly  opposed  not  only  to  his  epistemological  sen- 
sationalism, but  also  to  his  teaching  that  the  criterion  of 
truth  is  empirical.  Burthogge  indeed  asserts  both  that  the 
"form"  or  "notion"  of  truth  must  be  known  beforehand,67 
i.  e.,  independent  of  sense-experience,  in  order  that  it  may 
be  applied  as  the  test  of  truth  when  the  object  is  presented 
sensuously,  and  (in  apparent  contradiction)  that  truth  is 
external  harmony,  something  in  the  object58  which  is  per- 
ceived empirically  only. 

These  two  teachings  about  the  criteria  of  truth  certainly 
seem  to  be  diametrically  opposed,  and  yet  it  is  possible  once 
more  to  interpret  Burthogge's  meaning  in  such  a  way  as 
to  reconcile  his  intuitionism  with  his  empiricism.  If  the 
account  of  Burthogge's  epistemology  as  an  intermediate  form 
between  the  Kantian  category  doctrine  and  the  Lockian  sen- 
sationalism is  correct,  we  need  only  apply  this  interpretation 
to  his  teaching  about  truth  in  order  to  explain  the  apparent 
inconsistency.  In  other  words,  Burthogge's  empirical  criter- 
ion of  truth  can  be  reconciled  with  his  intuitionism  in  much 
the  same  way  in  which  his  sensationalism  was  reconciled 
with  his  doctrine  of  subjective  notions.  Burthogge  ap- 
parently means  that  the  "form"  or  "notion"  of  truth,  like 
all  other  notions  is  an  actual  part  of  the  object,  but  that  it 

68  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  I. 

"  Organum,  Sect.  73. 

"  Ibid..  Sects.  63,  64,  69,  74s. 

"Ibid.,  Sects.  68,  69,  72,  74*,  75,  78ff,  83,  84.    Cf.  Sect.  17. 


XXIV  PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

is  a  part  contributed  by  the  mind.  According  to  this  view, 
although  the  mind  alone  contributes  the  notion  of  truth,  it 
does  so  only  on  the  occasion  of  sense-experience.  The  mind 
never  even  becomes  aware  of  its  possession  of  the  "notion" 
of  truth,  until  the  sensuous  percept  provides  the  opportunity 
for  the  application  of  the  notion. 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM 


Organum  Vetus  &  ttovum  . 
OR, 

A  DISCOURSE 

REASON 

AND 

TRUTH. 

WH  ER  E  1  N 

The  Natural  Logick  common 
toMankinde  is  briefly  and  plain- 
ly defcribed. 

ByRlCHARDBuRTHOGGEMIX 

In  a  Letter  to  the  mod  Honou- 
red Andrew  TreviS  Efq.  of  Ethe 
in  the  County  of  CornwaL 

Marc.  Ant.  •&&{  otwlb.  1.  7.  s.  12. 


LONDON: 

Printed  for  ^^r.  Crouch^  at  the  Prin- 
ces Arms  a  Coraer-fhop  of 
bead  aQy  in  Cornhll.  1678. 


ORGANUM  VETUS  &  NOVUM 

OR 

A  DISCOURSE  OF  REASON  AND  TRUTH. 

FOR  THE  MOST   HONOURED  ANDREW   TREVILL1*   ESQ ; 

AT  ETHE  IN  THE  COUNTY  OF  CORNWALL. 

SIR, 

That  of  making  many  Books  is  no  End,  was 
truly  said  by  the  wisest  man  that  ever  was :  Not  in 
this  sense  only,  that  multitudes  of  Books,  begetting 
in  the  mindes  of  those  that  read  them  infinite  Dis- 
tractions, deprive  them  of  the  Benefits  they  might 
receive  from  fewer;  but  in  another,  that  there  is  a 
Prolifickness  in  Books,  that  one  produces  another, 
and  this  a  third,  and  so  on  &]  without  End;  and 
consequently  that  the  labour  men  are  at  in  making 
them,  is  not  only  Useless,  but  Endless. 

You  will  have  reason  to  believe  this  second  Sense 
to  be  as  just  and  true  as  the  first,  when  you  consider 
that  I,  who  lately  wrote  an  Apology  for  the  Deity,2 
am  obliged  by  the  Reflexions  made  upon  it,  now  to 
write  Another  to  defend  it:  and  no  question  (but) 
the  Latter  may  be  as  obnoxious  to  Unjust  Excep- 
tions as  the  Former:  So  that  if  Occasion  given,  be 

*  This  index  and  those  which  follow  refer  to  the  Notes,  pp.  185-224. 


6         PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

also  taken,  there  will  never  be  an  End  of  writing, 
but  by  what  gives  End  to  the  Writer. 

However,  having  received  an  Invitation  to  adde 
something  to  the  former  Essay,  I  am  (at  last)  re- 
solved, both  in  justice  to  myself  and  to  my  Book, 
to  comply  with  it,  and  to  enter  into  thoughts  of  the 
Causes  that  not  irrationally  may  be  presumed  to  have 
had  an  Influence  on  the  Objectors,  and  into  most  of 
the  Objections ;  and  then  to  offer  to  I3J  them  (by  way 
of  Obviation)  such  Considerations  as  (it  may  be) 
will  not  prove  unuseful  to  Rectifie  Mistakes  in  other 
Matters,  as  well  as  in  this. 

And  the  Main  Causes  I  intend  to  touch  on  (not 
to  mention  Envy,  &c.)  are  Three:  Proud  Ignorance, 
Ignorant  Zeal,  and  Impertinent  Reasoning. 

i.  PROUD  IGNORANCE  consists  in  a  mans  pre- 
sumption of  his  own  Omniscience,  (for  the  Sciolist 
is  ever  most  conceited)  so  that  he  presently  and 
peremptorily  condemneth  that  for  Errour,  which 
himself  hath  never  learnt  for  Truth;  as  if  there 
were  no  growth  in  Knowledge,  or  that  any  Humane 
Understanding  were  adequate  to  Verity:  Whereas 
Capacities  of  the  largest  size  are  yet  but  narrow; 
and  they  that  know  most,  do  but  the  better  know 
how  little  it  is  they  know,  and  how  much  they  are 
to  seek.  The  most  the  Wisest  know,  is,  that  their 
own  and  others  Ignorance  is  M  the  surest  Object 
of  Knowledge.  True  Knowledge  is  not  conceited; 
it  is  humble,  and  aspireth  after  more.  If  any  man 
think  that  he  knoweth  any  thing,  he  knoweth  noth- 
ing yet  as  he  ought  to  know. 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  7 

2.  IGNORANT  ZEAL,  (a  cause  of  very  general 
influence  into  many  Mistakes,  not  onely  in  matters 
of  Religion,  but  also  in  points  of  Philosophy)  what 
is  it  but  a  Horse  of  high  metal  without  eyes?  In- 
deed, nothing  is  more  commendable  in  Religion,  or 
administers  a  better  Argument  of  Sincerity  in  its 
Professors,  than  fervency  of  Zeal ;  but  then  it  must 
be  Zeal  according  to  Knowledge,  and  managed  with 
discretion,  or  else  it  is  but  Rage  and  Fury,  not  Zeal. 
Zeal  regulated  by  the  Holy  Scriptures,  that  is,  Zeal 
according  to  Knowledge,  and  governed  with  Wis- 
dom, is  Fire  from  the  Altar:  but  then  Irregular 
Zeal,  Zeal  without  Knowledge,  Zeal  without  Wis- 
dom, is  Wild-fire,  which  (as  the  corruption  of  the 
best  is  I5!  worst)  hath  nothing  more  pernicious  than 
it  self  to  Church  or  State. 

Zeal  without  Knowledge  may  be  stiled  Blinde 
Zeal,  and  is  that  when  men  are  passionately  con- 
cerned for  or  against  an  Opinion  and  Practice,  from 
a  strong,  but  groundless  and  unwarranted  perswa- 
sion,  that  what  they  do,  and  what  they  are  for,  is 
highly  to  the  honour  and  glory  of  God,  and  what 
they  oppose,  is  against  it :  as  if  they  knew  abstractly 
of  themselves,  and  by  their  own  discoursings,  what 
is  for  God's  Glory,  or  what  is  otherwise,  further 
than  it  hath  pleased  God  himself  in  his  Word  to  re- 
veal it.  That  onely  is  for  God's  Glory,  which  is 
grounded  on  God's  Word.  The  Word  of  God  is 
able  to  make  the  Man  of  God  perfect.  The  Corin- 
thians had  a ,  Zeal  for  God,  but  not  according  to 
Knowledge:  and  so  had  the  Jews,  who  persecuted 


8         PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

and  murther'd  the  Christians,  but  thought  they  did 
God  good  service.  161  What  manner  of  men  they 
were,  who  among  them  call'd  themselves  the  Zeal- 
ous, Josephus3  hath  left  on  Record.  Yes,  the  Dis- 
ciples of  Christ,  in  Zeal  too,  they  would  have  Fire 
from  Heaven,  and  cite  an  Example;  but  our  meek 
and  blessed  Saviour  tells  them  they  knew  not  the 
Spirit  they  were  of.  They  took  it  to  be  a  Spirit  of 
Zeal,  but  He  knew  it  to  be  a  Spirit  of  Passion.  A 
persecuting  furious  Spirit  is  none  of  Christ's;  it  is 
Antichrist's.  The  Wrath  of  man  worketh  not  the 
Righteousness  of  God. 

Zeal  without  Wisdom  may  be  call'd  Imprudent 
Zeal,  and  is  Zeal  unseasonably  and  unfitly  shewn 
in  circumstances  of  time,  place,  and  persons  that 
will  not  bear  it ;  as  when  men  shall  take  their  Pearls. 
their  Reprehensions,  Counsels,  Instructions,  or 
whatever  other  instances  a  Zeal  is  shewn  in,  and 
cast  them  before  the  Swine;  and  that  though  they 
have  a  Prospect  themselves,  or  an  Advertisement 
from  o^thers,  of  the  probable  ill  success,  both  that 
the  Pearls  shall  be  trodden  under  foot,  and  they 
themselves  be  rented ;  This  is  not  to  employ  and  use 
Zeal,  but  to  lose  it.  There  is  a  time  for  every  Pur- 
pose, and  every  thing  is  beautiful  onely  in  that  time. 
Pearls  so  cast,  are  cast  away. 

3.  IMPERTINENT  REASONING,  (the  third  Cause 
I  mention'd,  and  a  Cause  of  all  others  of  most  gen- 
eral influence  into  Errours  and  Mistakes)  I  call  not 
onely  that  which  of  the  Logicians  is  named  Jiapd- 
cig  cftlo  y£vog,  a  passing  and  arguing  from 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  9 

one  thing  to  another,  when  yet  there's  no  Agree- 
ment, no  Connexion  between  them;  but  that  also 
which  is  bottomed  on  single  Mediums,  and  runs  on 
in  a  long,  but  simple  line  and  train  of  Consequences, 
from  thing  to  thing ;  or  else  is  founded  but  on  second 
Notions,  and  inlaid  with  them:  which  way  of  Rea- 
soning must  be  shewed  to  be  Impertinent,  and  that 
by  shewing  a  better,  pertinent  one.  ^ 

Thus,  Sir,  I  am  arriv'd  to  what  I  principally  de- 
sign'd ;  and  I  crave  your  pardon  if,  for  my  Readers 
satisfaction  as  well  as  for  mine  own,  I  now  enlarge, 
and  take  the  boldness  to  let  him  understand  my  ap- 
prehensions of  Reason,  both  as  to  its  nature,  and 
the  interest  it  hath  in  Religion,  and  how  (I  think) 
it  must  be  circumstanced  and  condition'd,  to  assure 
us  of  Truth.  By  which  Performance  if  I  gain  no 
more,  I  shall  this;  that  as  well  the  persons  that 
approve  my  former  Essay,2  as  those  that  cavil  it, 
will  know  the  Rule  and  Method  I  proceeded  by  (in 
framing  it;)  which,  to  the  former  will  afford  a 
greater  Confirmation,  if  it  be  Right;  and  to  the 
latter,  a  fairer  rise  of  assaulting  (me)  if  it  be  not. 

1.  Before  I  can  proceed  to  shew  what  Reason 
is,  I  am  first  to  shew  the  many  sences  the  Word  is 
taken  in;  which,  not  done  by  most,  is  one  occasion 
of  the  great  Confusion  in  their  talks  about  it.    And 
Rea^son  (to  omit  some  other  sences  not  so  neces- 
sary here)  is  in  ordinary  Language  taken  either 
largely,    or    strictly,    or    appropriately    and    most 
strictly. 

2.  Reason  largely  taken,  is  the  same  with  Minde 


JO      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

or  Understanding,  and  so  is  commonly  affirmed  to 
exert  it  self  in  three  Acts;  the  Apprehension  of 
simple  Terms,  the  Composition  of  those  Terms  by 
way  of  Affirmation  and  Negation,  and  Discourse, 
or  illation  of  one  thing  from  another.  Reason 
strictly  taken,  is  the  Understanding  as  it  issues  out 
in  its  third  Act,  not  in  the  Apprehension  of  simple 
Terms,  nor  in  the  Composition  of  them,  but  in  Dis- 
course and  Illation;  and  so  Reason  is  the  Under- 
standing as  it  argues,  discourses,  infers.  But  Rea- 
son is  appropriately  taken,  or  most  strictly,  as  it  is 
oppos'd  to  Faith  and  Revelation,  of  which  hereafter. 

3.  Reason  taken  for  the  MINDE  or  Understand- 
ing, is  that  Faculty  whereby  a  man  is  said  to  be 
Reason  t10]  able,  Intelligent,  Understanding ;  as  Sight 
is  that  Faculty  whereby  an  Animal  is  said  to  be 
Seeing:  or  'tis  that  Faculty  whereby  a  man  is  said 
to  Elicite  Acts  of  Reason,  or  to  Understand;  as 
Sight  is  that  Faculty  whereby  an  Animal  is  said 
to  See.     I  so  define  it  by  the  Act,    for  that  the 
Act  is  better  known  than  the  Faculty.    To  Under- 
stand (as  well  as  to  see)  is  a  first  Notion,  and  he 
must  be  very  simple  that  understands  not  what  is 
meant  by  it ;  nor  are  there  any  Notions  more  intelli- 
gible, whereby  to  mark  Faculties,  than  those  01 
their  Acts.     Acts  we  see,  being  conscious  of  them 
when  we  exert  them;  but  Faculties  we  see  not,  we 
know  not  but  by  their  Acts. 

4.  The  Acts  of  Reason  in  this  large  sence  (as 
the  same  with  Minde  or  Understanding)  to  speak 
of  them  as  they  offer  and  present  themselves  to 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  II 

mine  (without  confining  of  my  self  to  Notions  of 
the  Schools,  or  common  Logicians)  are  Two;!11! 
Apprehension  and  Judgement. 

5.  APPREHENSION  is  that  Act  of  Understanding 
whereby  it  is  said  to  See  or  Perceive  things,  and  is 
the  same  in  relation  to  the  Minde,  that  Seeing  is  in 
relation  to  the  Eye. 

6.  Apprehension  is  Conversant  with  things  either 
as  in  themselves,  or  as  they  are  noted ;  and  they  are 
noted  either  by  simple  words,  or  else  by  Proposi- 
tions, which  are  words  joyned  by  way  of  Affirma- 
tion or  Negation;  both  which  the  Minde  sees  or 
apprehends  but  as  it  hath  the  Sense  of  them.    Sence 
or  Meaning  is  the  Motive  and  immediate  Object  of 
Apprehension,  as  Colour  is  of  Seeing.     The  Eye 
sees  nothing  but  under  Colour;  the  Minde  appre- 
hends nothing  but  under  Sense. 

7.  I  know  well  that  Truth  is  usually  affirmed  the 
proper,  adequate,  immediate,  formal  Object  of  the 
Intellect;  but  (it)  is  not  so.    Not  Truth,  but  Sence 
or  Meaning  is  the  proper,  adequate,  immediate  Ob- 
ject of  the  Minde,  as  to  its  first  Act  H2]   [that  of 
Apprehension ;]  Truth  is  onely  the  proper,  adequate, 
immediate  Object  of  it  as  to  another,  which  is  called 
Assent,  and  is  a  kind  of  Judgement.    I  understand 
and  apprehend  a  Proposition  which  is  false,  that  is, 
I  have  a  Sence  and  Meaning  of  it,  though  when  I 
Understand  or  Apprehend  it,  I  refuse  my  Assent. 
So  that  it  is  not  Verity  that  is  the  Motive  and  im- 
mediate Object  of  Understanding  in  its  Acts  of 
Apprehension,  but  Sence  or  Meaning. 


12       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

8.  Sence  or  Meaning  is  that  Conception  or  No- 
tion that  is  formed  in  the  Minde,  on  a  proposal  to  it 
of  an  Object,  a  Word,  or  Proposition ;  as  Colour  is 
that  Sentiment  begotten,  and  caused  in  the  Eye, 
upon  the  impression  of  its  Object  on  it. 

9.  To  understand  this,  we  are  to  consider,  That 
to  us  men,  things  are  nothing  but  as  they  stand  in 
our  Analogic;  that  is,  are  nothing  to  us  but  as  they 
are  known  by  us;  and  t13^  they  are  not  known  by  us 
but  as  they  are  in  the  Sense,  Imagination,  or  Minde ; 
in  a  word,  as  they  are  in  our  Faculties;  and  they 
are  in  our  Faculties  not  in  their  Realities  as  they 
be  without  them,  no  nor  so  much  as  by  Picture  and 
proper  Representation,  but  onely  by  certain  Appear- 
ances and  Phaenomena,  which  their  impressions  on 
the  Faculties  do  either  cause  or  occasion  in  them. 

10.  Every  Faculty  hath  a  hand,  though  not  the 
sole  hand,  in  making  its  immediate  Object;  as  the 
Eye  makes  the  Colours  it  is  said  to  see,  the  Ear 
the  Sounds,  the  Fancy  the  Idols,  and  so  the  Under- 
standing4 the  Conceptions  or  Notions  under  which 
it  apprehends  and  sees  things.     So  that  all  the  im- 
mediate Objects  of  Humane  Cogitation  (to  use  the 
word  in  its  largest  sence)  are  Entia  Cogitationis, 
All  Appearances;  which  are  not  properly  and  (may 
I  use  a  School-term)  formally5  in  the  things  them- 
selves conceived  under  them,  and  consequently  con- 
ceiv'd  as  if  H4]  they  had  them,  but  so  onely  in  the 
cogitative  Faculties.    No  such  thing  as  Colour  but 
in  the  Eye,  nor  as  Sound  but  in  the  Ear,  nor  as 
Notion,  Sense,  or  Meaning,  but  in  the  Minde.  These, 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  13 

though  they  seem  in  the  Objects,  and  without  the 
cogitative  Powers,  yet  are  no  more  in  them  than 
the  Image  that  seemeth  in  the  Glass  is  there  indeed. 

1 1.  So  that  all  immediately  cogitable  beings  (that 
is,  all  immediate  Objects  of  Humane  Cogitation) 
are  either  Entities  of  Sense,  as  the  immediate  Ob- 
jects of  Sense,  Colour,  Sound,  &c.  or  of  Imagina- 
tion, as  the  Images  therein,  the  Idols  it  frames;  or 
of  Reason  and  Understanding,  Mental  Entities,  the 
Meanings  or  Notions  under  which  the  Understand- 
ing apprehends  its  Objects;  which  (Notions)  though 
they  seem  to  the  Understanding  to  be  without  it, 
and  to  be  in  the  things  understood,  yet  (as  I  said 
before)  are  no  more  without  it  or  in  the  things 
themselves,  than  Colours  are  tisl  without  the  Eye, 
or  Sounds  without  the  Ear,  or  Sapours  without  the 
Tongue,  although  they  seem  so  to  Sense. 

12.  Faculties  and  Powers,  Good,  Evil,  Virtue, 
Vice,  Verity,  Falsity,  Relations,  Order,  Similitude, 
Whole,  Part,  Cause,  Effect,  &c.  are  Notions;  as 
Whiteness,  Blackness,  Bitterness,  Sweetness,  &c. 
are  Sentiments:  and  the  former  own  no  other  kind 
of  Existence  than  the  latter,  namely,  an  Objective6 
(one.)  A  Notion  that  will  free  the  Minde  of  much 
Intanglement  in  framing  Notions.  We  generally 
conceive  Faculties,  Good,  Evil,  and  other  Notions 
(under  which  the  Minde  apprehends  things)  to  be 
Realities,  and  to  have  an  Existence  of  their  own 
without  the  Minde,  and  though  there  were  no  Minde 
to  think  of  them,  when  indeed  they  are  but  Noemata, 
Conceptions,  and  all  the  formal  being  any  of  them 


14      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

have,  is  onely  in  it.  And  no  wonder  if  he  that  takes 
Noemata  to  be  Realities  t16!  findes  himself  con- 
founded by  that  mistake,  in  forming  his  Conceptions 
about  them.  Notions  therefore  are  very  aptly, 
though  somewhat  barbarously,  stiled  by  the  School- 
men, Conceptus  Objectivi;  Notions  of  the  Minde, 
but  yet  seeming  to  be  in  the  Object.  He  that  looks 
for  Notions  in  Things,  looks  behinde  the  Glass  for 
the  Image  he  sees  in  it. 

13.  Such  Cogitable  Beings  as  have  no  founda- 
tion, no  ground  in  Realities,  that  is,  in  things  with- 
out the  Cogitative  Faculties,  but  are  mere  effects  of 
the  Faculties,  are  call'd  Chimerical  (Entities;)  and 
in  the  Imagination  are  Fictions,  in  the  Understand- 
ing mere  Notions ;  as  in  the  former  a  Golden  Tree, 
in  the  latter  a  Philosophical  Romance,  or  Ground- 
less Hypothesis.     But  such  as  have  Foundation  in 
Realities,  are  called  Real,  [Real  Notions]  not  that 
in  their  own  nature  they  are  in  Realities  themselves, 
but  that  they  have  their  Grounds  in  those  that  are ; 
f1?]  they  are  real  (as  a  School-man  would  express 
it)  not  formally,6  but  fundamentally;  they  are  in- 
choately  and  occasionally  in  the  things,  but  not  con- 
summately and  formally  but  in  the  Faculties;  not 
in  the  things,  but  as  the  things  relate  to  our  Facul- 
ties; that  is,  not  in  the  things  as  they  are  Things, 
but  as  they  are  Objects. 

14.  Those  Words  or  Propositions  any  one  hath 
a  sence  of,  those  things  to  which  the  Words  or  Prop- 
ositions relate,  he  hath  a  Notion  of.     Sence  is  No- 
tion; onely  it  is  called  Sence  as  it  relates  to  the 


ORGAN UM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  15 

Words  or  Propositions,  and  Notion  as  it  relates 
to  the  Things;  but  indeed  Sence  is  Notion,  and  to 
have  the  sence  of  a  Word  or  Proposition,  is  to  frame 
a  Notion  of  it,  or  of  the  things  signified  by  it. 

15.  'Tis  as  impossible  to  apprehend  a  Word  or 
Proposition  one  hath  no  notion,  no  sence  of,  as  to 
see  an  Object  that  maketh  no  impression  of  Colour 
on  the  Eye;  for  f18!  what  Colour  is  to  the  Eye,  that 
Sence,  Meaning,  or  Notion  is  to  the  Minde. 

1 6.  Sence,  Meaning,  or  Notion  arises  from  a 
Congruity  in  the  Object  to  the  Faculty;  so  that  to 
enquire  why  one  cannot  understand  or  apprehend 
a  Non-sensical  Proposition  or  Word,  is  to  enquire 
why  he  cannot  see  or  hear  Tastes,  or  taste  and  smell 
Sounds,  or  taste,  hear,  and  smell  Colours,  or  see  an 
Object  hath  none. 

17.  That  Congruity  in  the  Object  to  the  Faculty, 
whereby  it  either  actually  moves  it,  or  is  capable  to 
move  it  to  frame  a  Notion  or  Sence,  ought  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  that  Congruity  which  is  in  the  Ob- 
ject within  it  self,  or  with  other  Objects :  The  former 
(for  distinction  sake)  I  call  a  Congruity  to  the  Fac- 
ulty; the  latter  a  Congruity  in  Things.    The  har- 
mony of  Objects  to  their  Faculties,  and  that  of  them 
within  themselves,  or  one  to  another,  are  distinct 
Harmonies.    I  H9]  can  make  sence  of  a  Proposition 
that  is  not  true,  so  that  'tis  Congruous  to  the  Fac- 
ulty, it  moves  that;  when  yet  (it  being  false)  the 
Parts  of  it  are  Incongruous  one  with  another. 

1 8.  To  understand  and  apprehend  a  Proposition 
or  Discourse,  it  sufficeth  not  to  have  a  Perception 


1 6      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

of  the  sence  and  meaning  of  the  words ;  those  words 
as  in  Conjunction,  and  ty'd  together,  ought  to  make 
such  an  impression  on  the  Minde,  as  moveth  it  to 
make  a  Notion  of  them  in  that  Relation.  One  may 
have  a  sence  of  the  words  in  a  Discourse,  when  yet 
he  cannot  make  any  of  the  Discourse  it  self,  because 
he  cannot  frame  a  Conception,  a  Notion  of  them  in 
the  Composition  that  is  given  them  in  it.  He  cannot 
see  how  they  are  joyn'd. 

19.  There  are  a  thousand  Instances  of  Discourses 
of  this  kinde  in  Jacob  B'ehmenf  but  I  need  not  go 
so  far  as  Germany  to  seek  some ;  I  might  have  many 
neerer  home  with[20Hn  the  compass  of  our  own  time 
and  observation;  but  I  decline  them  as  Invidious; 
I  will  onely  point  to  one  in  Dr.  Fludd?  a  person  that 
could  speak  as  good  Sence  (if  he  listed)  as  another, 
but  I  could  never  make  any  of  many  Passages  I 
finde  in  him,  and  of  one  particularly,  namely,  that 
in  his  Mosaick  Philosophy,  Book  ?.  Sect.  i.  Chap.  4. 

20.  Those  Discourses  in  which  nor  Words  nor 
Propositions  are  sensible,  or  wherein  the  Words  are 
sensible  but  not  the  Propositions,  and  yet  are  taken 
by  those  that  make  them  for  High  Sence,  may  be 
called  Enthusiasm.    Of  the  former  sort  I  apprehend 
the  Whims  of  Basilides,  of  Valentinus,    and   the 
Gnosticks  ;8  and  of  the  latter,  those  of  the  Familists.* 
and  of  others  of  late. 

21.  Enthusiasm10  either  may  proceed   from  a 
Spirit,  or  from  Complexion  and  a  certain  temper 
of  Minde;  the  former  I  call  Demoniacal,  the  latter 
Complexional ;  and  not  unlikely  but  in  most  Enthu- 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  IJ 

siasts  t21J  it  comes  from  both:  whereof  an  Upstart 
Sect"  among  us,  in  its  first  appearing,  afforded 
strong  Evincements. 

22.  That  there  are  Philosophical  Enthusiasts,  is 
as  certain  as  that  there  are  Theological ;  Enthusiasts 
in  matters  of  Philosophy,  as  well  as  Enthusiasts  in 
Matters  of  Divinity.    Paracelsus,12  Helmont,13  and 
many  other  Chymists,  are  Examples  of  the  first  sort : 
as  H.  Nicolls9  the  Father  of  the  Familists,  and 
others,  are  of  the  second:  Jacob  Behmen*  and  Dr. 
Fludd1  may  pass  for  Examples  of  both. 

23.  When   Enthusiasts  think  they  understand 
one  another,  (as  they  All  pretend  to  do,  and  that 
seriously,  and  therefore  must  have  some  impression 
to  justifie  that  Pretension,  whereas  yet  no  sober 
man  can  understand  Any  of  them;)   I  conceive  it 
not  to  be  by  Apprehension,  but  Sympathy,  not  In- 
tellectually, by  Apprehending,  that  is,  by  framing 
just,  steady,  distinct  Notions  of  f22!  what  is  said; 
but   Sympathetically,  by  having    excited    in  their 
minde  on  such  Expressions,  Motions,  conformable 
to  theirs  that  use  them;  for  they  all  being  of  the 
same  frame  and  temper  of  Minde  or  of  Imagination, 
whatever  touches  One  agreeably,  also  moves  the 
Rest;  as  in  Unison-Lutes,  or  other  Instruments 
fitly  tuned,  but  to  strike  One,  is  (at  once)  to  move 
All. 

24.  Notions  of  the  Minde  are  bottomed  on  Senti- 
ments of  Sense;  so  that  as  Realities  are  Grounds 
to  Sentiments,  so  Sentiments  are  Grounds  to  No- 
tions: the  impressions  of  things  without  upon  the 


l8      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Sensories,  produce  or  occasion  in  them  the  Cogita- 
tions which  we  call  Sentiments,  as  Colours,  Sounds, 
Sapours,  &c.  And  Sentiments  (again)  impressing 
of  the  Fancy,  and  so  the  Minde  and  Understanding, 
beget  or  occasion  in  it  those  higher  Cogitations 
which  we  call  Notions:  Apprehensions  of  Reason, 
or  Ideas.  Idols  or  Fantoms  are  in  the  Fancy,  Ideas 
in  the  Minde.  (23J 

25.  The  neerer  our  Sensories  are  unto  the  Ob- 
jects impressing  them,  (if  not  too  neer)  the  clearer 
and  distincter  is  the  Sensation  made  by  them ;  as  we 
more  cleerly  and  distinctly  see  an  Object  at  a  neerer 
than  a  remoter  distance:  so  the  nearer  the  Minde 
and  Understanding  is  to  Sentiments,  the  more  cleer, 
distinct,  and  evident  its  Perceptions  are;  I  mean, 
the  more  sensible  Notions  are,  and  the  neerer  to 
their  Grounds,  the  more  effective,  more  impressive 
and  consequently  clearer  and  more  evident  they  be. 

26.  Hence    Knowledge   and   Apprehension   of 
things  is  better  both  acquired  and  conceived  by 
first  Notions,  which  are  next  to  Sentiments,  than 
by  second  which  are  more  remote :  The  Knowledge 
which  is  had  of  things  by  first  Notions,  is  more  real, 
evident,  cleer,  distinct,  than  that  which  is  by  the 
second.    First  Notions  are  founded  immediately  on 
things ;  Second  Notions  are  Notions  concerning  No- 
tions :  t24!  These  are  not  so  impressive  and  effective 
as  the  first.     By  first  and  Second  Notions,  I  both 
understand  Terms  or  Words,  and  the  Notions  sig- 
nified by  them. 

27.  So  much  for  the  OBJECT  of  Apprehension, 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  19 

which  is  Sense  and  Notion ;  and  for  the  Grounds  of 
that  Object,  which  is  Sentiment:  Now  for  the  AF- 
FECTIONS of  Apprehension  (if  a  good  one)  and  they 
are  two,  namely,  Cleerness  and  Distinctness. 

28.  Cleerness  of  Apprehension,  which  is  in  the 
Minde  the  same  that  Cleerness  of  Seeing  is  in  the 
Eye,  is  opposed  to  Obscurity  and  Darkness,  and 
presupposes  Light. 

29.  Light  is  that  which  manifests,  and  conse- 
quently Intellectual  Light  is  that  means  whereby 
the  Understanding  comes  to  See  and  Apprehend  its 
Objects;  or  that  which  manifests  them  to  it:  and  is 
either  Light  of  Revelation,  which  is  also  called  Light 
of  Faith;  or  Light  of  Nature,  which  is  also  called 
Light  of  Reason  ;14  where  Reason  is  ApproV^priately 
taken,  and  most  strictly. 

30.  The  Light  of  Revelation  is  that  Discovery  or 
Manifestation  God  himself  is  pleased  to  make  of 
things  by  his  Spirit,  and  is  chiefly  in  the  Holy 
Scriptures.     The  Light  of  Nature1*  is  All  other 
Light  whatever  but  that  of  Revelation,  whereby  we 
See  and  Apprehend  things,  and  is  that  we  have  by 
Sense  and  Discourse. 

31.  Some  things  there  are  that  may  be  seen  in 
both  Lights,  in  that  of  Nature,  and  that  of  Revela- 
tion, though  more  cleerly  in  the  latter  than  in  the 
former;  as  that  God  is  Good,  and  that  he  is  the 
Maker  and  Conserver,  and  supreme  Director  of  All 
things:  Other  things  are  onely  to  be  seen  in  the 
Light  of  Revelation,  being  of  a  nature  not  to  be 
discovered  but  in  and  by  it;  as  the  Mysteries  of 


2O      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Christian  Religion,  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  the 
Incarnation  of  God,  &c. 

32.  The  Lights  of  Faith  and  Nature,  of  Revela- 
tion and  Reason,  t26!  though  they  be  not  the  same, 
yet  are  not  contrary ;  I  mean,  that  what  is  shewn  or 
seen  to  be  true  in  one  Light,  can  never  be  shewn 
or  seen  to  be  false  in  the  other:  What  is  Appre- 
hended by  Sense  rightly  circumstanced  and  condi- 
tion'd,  to  be  This  or  to  be  That,  or  else  by  Reason 
rightly  acting  to  be  so,  or  so,  it  is  never  contradicted 
by  Revelation.  Things  are  nothing  to  a  man  but  as 
they  stand  in  his  Analogic :  for  him  to  believe  against 
his  Faculties,  is  to  believe  a  Contradiction.  If  in  the 
Holy  Sacrament  of  the  Lord's  Supper,  the  Elements 
first  and  last  are  Bread  and  Wine  to  Sense,  and  to 
Reason  judging  according  to  Sense,  I  cannot  hold 
my  self  obliged  by  (any)  Revelation  to  believe  them 
Flesh  and  Blood,  but  in  a  Notion  consistent  with 
the  judgment  Sense  and  Reason  make  of  them ;  that 
is,  not  flesh  and  blood  substantially,  but  sacramen- 
tally ;  not  flesh  and  blood  really,  but  only  by  signifi- 
cation. Else  Truth  might  t27!  be  Incongruity,  In- 
consistency. Transubstantiation  is  to  me  a  Mystery ; 
I  am  so  far  from  making  truth  of  it,  that  I  cannot 
make  any  sense  of  it;  I  might  as  well  believe  that 
two  and  two  make  not  four,  or  three  and  three  six. 
as  that  it  is  not  Bread,  or  Wine,  which  to  my  Eye, 
my  Taste,  my  Touch,  in  a  word,  which  being  an 
Object  of  Sense,  to  all  Examinations  ot  my  bense 
is  so.  What  is  against  Sense,  is  against  Knowledge. 

33.  An  Object  onely  to  be  seen  by  the  Light  of 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  21 

Faith,  may  be  said  to  be  seen  by  Reason  above  Rea- 
son, by  Reason  assisted  with  the  light  of  Revelation, 
above  Reason  not  so  assisted,  but  acting  onely  by 
the  Aids  of  Nature;  but  still  it  is  Reason  sees  in 
both:  As  I  can  see  an  Object  with  a  Tube,  that 
with  my  naked  and  unarmed  Eye  I  cannot:  or  see 
in  the  Sun-light  an  Object  that  I  cannot  by  Moon- 
light; but  still  it  is  the  Eye  that  sees  in  both;  the 
Organ  is  the  same,  although  the  t28]  Lights  be  not 
It  is  the  same  Reason  and  Understanding,  the  same 
Faculty  that  sees  in  the  Light  of  Revelation,  as  it 
is  that  sees  by  the  Light  of  Nature;  and  the  same 
that  Argues  and  Discourses  in  the  one,  as  by  the 
other. 

34.  The  great  Designs  of  God  in  all  the  Doc- 
trines, and  even  in  the  highest  and  most  sublime 
Mysteries  of  our  Religion,  is  to  affect  the  hearts 
of  men:  and  therefore  as  (i.)He  represents  and 
reveals  them  in  first  Notions;  so  (2.)  He  also  doth 
it  in  sensible  and  comparative  ones;  and  usually 
(3.)  He  representeth  one  thing  by  many  Notions. 
(i.)  To  make  it  more  Affective;  and  withal  (2.)  to 
signifie,  that  no  one  Notion  he  represents  the  thing 
in,  is  adequate  and  just  to  it.  Thus  he  represents 
the  great  Mystery  of  our  Union  unto  Christ,  and 
our  Communion  with  him,  by  that  between  the  Vine 
and  Branches,  between  the  Husband  and  Wife,  be- 
tween the  Head  and  Members :  As  f29!  also  the  great 
work  of  Conversion  that  passes  upon  Men  in  the 
change  he  makes  on  them,  from  their  Darkness  into 
his  most  marvellous  Light,  He  compares  it  to  Gen- 


22      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

eration.  to  Adoption,  to  Creation:  In  fine,  the  New 
Covenant  is  not  only  stiled  a  Covenant,  but  also  a 
Testament,  and  a  Promise.  All  which  resembling 
and  comparative  expressions  way  and  ought  to  be 
employed  and  used  for  the  apprehending  of  the 
things  they  are  designed  to  signifie,  and  the  making 
of  them  more  affective;  but  neither  of  them  so  (to 
be  insisted  on)  as  if  it  were  adequate,  or  just. 

35.  The  Light  of  Faith  and  Revelation,  must  not 
be  confounded  with  that  of  Reason  and  Nature;  I 
mean,  we  ought  not  to  consider  points  of  mere  Reve- 
lation in  the  light  of  mere  natural  Reason :  Spiritual 
things  cannot  be  discern'd  but  spiritually,  and  there- 
fore must  not  be  compared  but  with  Spirituals.    In 
Points  of  (mere)  Revelation,  we  t30!  ought  entirely 
to  confine  our  selves  to  the  Notions,  Comparisons, 
Similitudes  and  Representations  God  himself  hath 
made  of  them,  without  pretending  to  be  wise  above 
what  is  written,  and  to  say  or  understand  just  how 
in  themselves  the  things  are,  abstractly  from  the 
Dresses  Revelation  puts  them  in. 

36.  He  that  pretends  to  understand  the  Mys- 
teries of  Christian  Religion,  or  any  Point  of  meer 
Revelation  stript  of  those  Notions,  Resemblances, 
and  Comparisons,  when  they  be  not  revealed  or  dis- 
covered but  in  them;  as  he  looketh  not  on  these 
things  in  the  Light  of  Faith  and  Revelation,  but  in 
that  of  Reason  or  Nature;  so  not  looking  on  them 
in  their  own  Genuine  and  Proper  Light,  no  wonder 
if  he  either  erre  or  trifle  about  them. 

37.  Justly  liable  to  this  Reproof  I  judge  them 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  23 

that  are  not  content  to  think  and  speak  of  God  ( the 
proper  Object  as  well  as  Author  of  Revelation)  in 
that  manner  that  he  f31!  speaks  of  himself;  who 
Reveals  himself  to  us  men  in  Analogous  and  Com- 
parative Notions,  not  in  such  as  adequate  and  ad 
just  him,  but  such  as  do  proportion  and  suit  with 
us ;  as  if  he  had  an  Understanding,  Will,  and  Affec- 
tions ;  and  did  purpose  Ends,  and  elected  Means  to 
compass  them;  did  consult  and  decree,  and  weire 
touched  with  the  Affections  of  Joy,  Grief,  Love, 
Hatred,  Anger,  Revenge,  &c. 

38.  They  that  tell  us  that  he  is  not  angry,  that 
Revenge  is  an  Imperfection  not  to  be  imputed  to 
him,  and  pretend  to  tell  us  just  what's  meant  by  it, 
they  might  as  well  tell  us  that  he  doth  not  love  nor 
hate ;  that  he  doth  not  propose  Ends  to  himself,  nor 
designe  Means ;  that  he  doth  not  consult  nor  decree ; 
that  he  hath  no  Providence,  no  Foresight,  there 
being  Imperfection  in  all  those  Notions;  and  yet 
without  them,  and  the  like,  you  can  nor  Think,  nor 
Speak  of  God.    Abstract  the  Deity  from  these  and 
other  Compa Curative  Notions,    Notions  of   Him, 
which  are  not  in  Him,  and  yet  wherein  He  pleases 
to  Reveal  Himself,  and  you  will  soon  make  Him 
such  an  one  as  Epicurus16  fanci'd,  an  Infinite  Ex- 
cellency, but  unknown,  not  concerned,  nor  concern- 
ing of  Himself  with  things  below  Him. 

39.  It  seems  to  me,  that  he  that  would  abstract 
God,  or  any  matter  of  Religion,  from  the  Notions 
or  Comparisons  which  He  or  That  is  represented 
in,  would  do  like  one  that  world  consider  the  World 


24      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

onely  in  its  Realities  of  Matter,  Figure,  Texture, 
and  Motion,  abstractly  from  those  Phaenomena  and 
Appearances  occasion'd  by  them  in  our  Senses  and 
Mindes :  And  if  .the  latter  may  be  thought  to  have 
but  an  Empty,  Dry,  and  Barren  Notion  of  the  World, 
the  former  would  not  have  a  much  better  of  God 
(whom  now  we  cannot  know  as  He  is)  or  of  any 
Subject  of  Revelation,  that  should  so  consider  it. 

40.  Whoever  well  attends,  will  t33J  finde  that  all 
the  Notions  under  which  we  apprehend  God,  are 
Notions  of  Him,  like  those  we  have  of  the  World, 
not  as  He  is  in  Himself  (for  so  we  know  him  not;)16 
but  as  He  stands  in  our  Analogy,  and  in  that  of  the 
World;  which  Notions  are  very  fitly  stiled  Attri- 
butes, not  Accidents,  as  not  speaking  things  In- 
herent Really  in  Him,  but  things  ascribed  by  the 
Minde,  or  attributed  to  Him;  as  Colours,  which 
but  in  the  Eye,  are  yet  ascribed  to  the  Object;  and 
Sounds,  that  indeed  exist  but  in  the  Ear,  are  attrib- 
uted to  the  Air :  For  we  regarding  God  in  that  Re- 
lation that  He  bears  to  the  world,  and  to  our  selves, 
and  so  considering  Him,  have  excited  in  us  such 
Notions  by  the  impressions  the  things  we  look  on, 
and  God  himself  as  interested  in  them,  make  upon 
us.    The  Attributes  of  God  are  but  (as)  so  many 
Aspects.     Much  Obscurity  and  many  Errours  in 
forming  Notions  about  God  and  his  Attributes,  are 
owing  to  an  Unacquaintance  with  this  Truth.  C341 

41.  Having  spoken  of  Clearness  of  Apprehen- 
sion, and  of  the  Lights  that  make  it,  I  will  onely 
adde  a  Consideration,  which  though  obvious  enough, 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  25 

is  not  reflected  on  as  it  should;  namely,  that  the 
Lights  are  gradual',  [even  that  of  Revelation]  and 
that  all  things  are  not  equally  clear  (in  them:)  so 
that  we  ought  to  put  a  difference,  as  between  Philo- 
sophical and  Theological  Points,  and  Points  unre- 
vealed  and  revealed]  so  in  those  revealed  between 
Fundamental  Points  (which  are  but  few  and  plain) 
and  Superstructures  upon  them;  between  what  is 
in  Scripture  in  express  Terms,  and  what  is  there 
but  by  Consequence;  and  in  Consequences,  between 
those  that  are  immediate  and  next  to  Principles, 
and  those  that  are  remote  and  further  off.  As  there 
are  weighty  Points  of  the  Law,  so  there  are  Tythe- 
mint,  Anise,  and  Cummin ;  he  that  makes  iio  differ- 
ence, takes  not  his  measures  by  Jesus  Christ's.  As 
it  is  inept  and  foolish,  so  it  is  inhumane  f35!  and 
bloudy,  not  to  distinguish  Errours  from  Heresies. 
Heresie  in  Religion,  is  as  Treason  in  the  Law,  a 
subversion  of  Fundamentals ;  and  it  must  be  plainly 
and  directly  so,  and  not  by  Consequences  and  far- 
fetcht  Deductions:  For  Heresie,  it  must  be  eradi- 
cated; but  as  for  Errours,  he  that  is  exempt  from 
them,  let  him  throw  the  first  stone  at  the  guilty.  But 
this  is  not  intended  as  a  Plea  for  Errour,  God  for- 
bid !  but  for  Humanity. 

42.  I  proceed  to  the  second  Affection  of  Appre- 
hension, which  is  Distinctness.    And  to  apprehend 
a  thing  distinctly,  is  to  form  such  a  Notion  and  Con- 
ception of  it,  and  to  have  such  a  sence  as  doth  dis- 
tinguish it  from  all  things  else. 

43.  Distinctness  of  Apprehension  is  acquired  by 


26      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Distinction,  and  by  Definition.  Distinction,  as  1 
take  it,  is  of  Words ;  Definition  of  Things.  To  make 
a  Distinction  is,  when  a  Word  hath  many  Signifi- 
cations, to  determine,  fix,  or  define  t36^  the  Sence  it 
is  taken  or  us'd  in,  and  by  certain  Marks  and  Tokens 
to  distinguish  it  and  circumscribe  it  from  all  the 
others  (it  hath.)  Definitions  of  things  are  prop- 
erly Descriptions.  To  describe,  is  to  notifie,  mark, 
and  represent  a  thing  in  and  by  its  Attributes,  that 
is,  according  to  the  impressions  that  it  makes  upon 
our  Faculties,  and  Conceptions  it  occasions  in  them. 
Essential  Definitions  are  Non-sence.  Things  are  not 
Explicable,  but  as  they  are  to  us  in  our  Faculties. 

44.  The  more  particularly  any  thing  is  marked, 
the  more  distinct  is  the  knowledge  we  have  of  that 
thing. 

45.  Most  Errours  in  Divinity  as  well  as  in  Phi- 
losophy, owe  their  being  to  confused  Apprehensions, 
and  confused  Apprehensions  their's  to  the  Ambi- 
guity of  words,  and  the  uncertainty  of  their  Signi- 
fication.   He  that  uses  words  of  many  Significations 
without  distinctly  marking  them,  and  without  par- 
ticularly not37! ting  what  Sence  he  takes  the  word 
in  when  he  uses  it,  may  easily  be  apprehended  to 
take  it  sometimes  in  one  Sence,  sometimes  in  an- 
other, that  is,  to  take  one  Sence  for  another;  and 
he  that  takes  one  Sence  of  a  word  for  another,  mis- 
takes, and  confounds  things.    To  confound  things, 
is  to  take  one  for  another.     Confusion  of  things 
comes  from  Ambiguity  of  words.    A  Word  in  one 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  2.J 

of  its  Sences  may  belong  to  a  thing,  when  in  all  it 
cannot. 

46.  Caution.     Take  heed  of  being  abused  with 
the  Agreement  of  Words,  into  a  belief  of  answer- 
able Agreement  in  Things. 

47.  Direction.     To  avoid  confusion  of  Appre- 
hension, the  best  way  is  to  look  beyond  the  words 
we  hear  or  read,  or  have  in  our  mindes,  unto  their 
Sences  and  Meanings :  for  Words  may  be  uncertain 
and  equivocal,  whereas  Sence  and  Notion  is  not  so, 
but  certain  and  fixt. 

48.  Having  treated  of  Apprehension  in  the  gen- 
eral, of  its  Object,  and  I38!  of  its  two  Affections, 
Clearness  and  Distinctness,  it  remaineth  to  speak 
of  those  CONDITIONS  which  are  requisite  to  the 
forming  of  a  clear  and  distinct  Apprehension;  and 
they  are  four :  a  Due  Illumination  or  Illustration  of 
the  Object;  a  Right  Disposition  of  the  Faculty;  a 
Due  Distance  from  the  Object;  and  a  Due  Atten- 
tion to  it.     The  same  Conditions  in  Apprehension 
as  in  Vision. 

49.  A  Due  Illumination  of  the  Object ;  by  which 
I  mean  here  but  Perspicuity  of  Expression:  a  Rep- 
resentation of  things  unto  the  Minde  in  plain,  apt, 
and  significant  Words,  and  in  a  plain  and  instruc- 
tive order  and  method.     Plainness  of  Expression 
and  Method  is  the  Light  of  a  Discourse ;  he  that  uses 
it  is  Didactical,   [apt  to  teach,]   but  he  that  will 
clearly  and  methodically  express  his  Thoughts  to 
others,  must  first  conceive  them  so  himself:  so  that 
here  I  might  say  over  again  what  I  have  already 


28       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

about  Clearness  and  f39^  Distinctness  of  Apprehen- 
sion. 

50.  A  Right  Disposition  of  the  Faculty ;  a  Right 
Temper  of  Mind,  [Rectitude  of  Minde]  consists  in 
a  full  and  perfect  Exemption  of  it  from  all  the 
prejudices  that  either  Education,  Custom,  Passion, 
or  false  Reasoning  have  imbibed  it  with.     Preju- 
dices are  erroneous  (or  false)  Anticipations,  and 
are  in  the  Minde  as  Tinctures  in  the  Eye,  which 
falsifie  its  Vision.     Other  Diseases  of  the  Minde 
there  are  besides  Prejudice,  as  Levity,  Curiosity, 
Scepticism,  &c.  in  an  Exemption,  from  which  also 
Sanity  of  Minde  consists ;  but  the  principal  is  Preju- 
dice.    And  besides  Sanity  of  Minde,  there  is  (for 
the  apprehending  of  some  particular  Objects)  neces- 
sary also  a  Sanctity  of  Minde.    The  pure  in  heart 
[onely]  see  God. 

51.  A  Due  Distance  from  the  Object;  not  to  look 
too  neer,  nor  at  too  Remote  a  Distance. 

52.  Not  too  near.    Too  near  looking  is  a  cause 
of  much  entanglement  I4°]  and  errour,  both  in  form- 
ing of  Philosophical  and  Theological  Notions;  he 
that  looks  too  near,  doth  either  see  nothing  at  all, 
or  but  confusedly :  he  looks  too  near  to  things,  that 
not    contented    with    common    Notions    of    them, 
wherein  all  the  world  agrees,  will  have  more  exact 
ones;  or  that  not  contented  with  the  knowledge  of 
things  according  to  appearances,  as  he  may  see 
them,  is  always  attempting  to  know  them  in  their 
Realities,  in  which  he  cannot;  As  in  Quantity  the 
common  Notion  of  it,  how  evident  is  it !    'Tis  evident 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  2Q 

to  all  men,  and  none  but  knows  what  is  meant  by 
it;  and  he  that  looks  on  Quantity  but  so,  observes 
a  due  distance;  but  whosoever  looks  nearer,  looks 
too  near,  and  is  confounded  with  the  composition  of 
the  Continuum"  [and  well  he  may  that  takes  a 
Phaenomenon,  a  Spectrum,  an  Appearance  for  a 
Reality.] 

53.  Not  at  too  remote  a  distance.    He  considers 
Objects  at  too  remote  f41^  a  distance,  that  looks  on 
them  but  in  second  Notions,  or  contents  himself 
with  general  ones,  which  at  best  are  but  confused 
and  uncertain;  and  being  so,  no  wonder  if  they 
cause  mistakes :  the  more  particular  and  distinct,  the 
surer  the  knowledge  is :  we  are  often  deceived  with 
appearances,  and  take  one  thing  and  person  for  an- 
other, when  we  only  see  them  afar  off. 

54.  Due  attention  is  a  fixed  and  steady  beholding 
of  the  Object,  in  order  to  a  framing  clear  and 
distinct  conceptions  about  it;  and  'tis  opposed  to 
Inadvertency,  or  a  precipitate  and  hasty  skipping 
from  thing  to  thing,  without  a  due  considering  of 
any:  A  Distemper  of  Minde,  to  which  Youth  and 
warm  Complexions  are  subject,  which  though  they 
may  be  more  ingenious  and  witty,  and  more  prompt 
and  ready,  are  yet  for  that  reason  seldom  so  judi- 
cious, prudent  and  weighty,  as  those  of  cooler  Tem- 
pers and  of  more  Age.  t42! 

55.  So  much  for  Apprehension,  the  first  Act  of 
Understanding ;  I  now  pass  on  to  the  second,  which 
is  Judgement. 

56.  Judgement  is  that  Act  of  the  Understanding 


3O      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

whereby  it  having  compared  and  considered  things 
(presented  to  it,  and  apprehended  by  it,)  comes  in 
the  end  and  upshot,  either  to  Assent,  or  Dissent. 
So  that  Judgement  is  a  compounded  Act,  and  (as  it 
were)  made  up  of  two;  one  of  which  is  Mediate  and 
Inchoate,  the  other  Ultimate  &  Compleat;  the  first 
is  Comparing  and  Considering;  the  second,  Resolv- 
ing and  Decreeing:  That  the  Premisses;  this,  the 
Conclusion.  The  former  properly  is  Reasoning ;  the 
later,  Resolving  according  to  Reason. 

57.  Reasoning  is  (a)  producing  or  shewing  of 
(a)  Reason.     (A)  Reason  is  the  Ground  of  Intel- 
lectual Judgement;  or  the  Cause  why  the  Under- 
standing either  assents,  or  dissents.    Assent  is  the 
Approving  Judgement  of  the  Understanding;  C431 
Dissent  is  the  Disproving  Judgement  of  the  Under- 
standing.   To  shew  Reason  for  a  thing,  is  to  prove 
it :  to  shew  Reason  against  a  thing,  is  to  disprove  it. 
Plain  Reason  is  that  which  convinceth :  Forced  Rea- 
son is  that  which  only  confutes.    To  confute  is,  so 
to  entangle  a  person  that  he  cannot  answer :  To  con- 
vince is,  so  to  shew  him  Reason,  that  he  cannot  deny 
it  to  be  so.    A  man  is  often  confuted,  when  yet  he 
is  not  convinced. 

58.  Method  of  Reasoning  is  called  Logick;  and 
is  either  Artificial  or  Natural.     Artificial    is  the 
Logick  of  Schools,  of  which  the  chief est  is  Aris- 
totle's:18   and  is  useful  many  waies,    but  among 
others,  mainly  (as  a  Whetstone)  to  acute  and  shar- 
pen the  Wit;  and  to  render  it  more  sagacious,  cir- 
cumspect and  wary,  both  in  making  and  admitting 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  3! 

Deductions  and  Consequences.  Natural  Logick, 
that  of  plain  and  illiterate  men,  of  which  I  designe 
to  discourse,  is  the  natural  method  I44!  of  Reason- 
ing; in  relation  whereunto  the  Scots  are  said  to 
have  a  Proverb,  That  an  Ounce  of  Mother-wit  is 
worth  a  Pound  of  Clergy. 

59.  Natural  Logick  is  universal,  a  Logick  of 
the  whole  kinde ;  so  that  what  in  Natural  Logick  is 
reason  to  one  man,  is  so  to  all;  for  all  having  the 
same  Faculties,  and  using  them  in  the  same  Method, 
must  needs  come  to  the  same  issue,  and  by  the  same 
Principles  arrive  to  the  same  Conclusion. 

60.  As  one  naturally  by  often  seeing  and  attend- 
ing to  his  own  acts,  acquires  a  method  how  to  look 
to  see  to  the  best  advantage,  as  also  Optical  Rules 
by  which  he  judges  of  Objects ;  which  Method  and 
which   Rules   are  [to   speak  generally]  the   same 
among  all  men :  So  may  he  by  frequent  reasoning, 
and  attending  to  his  own  and  others  reasonings, 
easily  and  insensibly  acquire  a  Method  [which  as 
reasoning  it  self  will  for  the  general  be  the  t4^]  same 
with  all  men]  how  to  use  his  Reason  to  the  best 
advantage,  to  reason  out  things.      This  common 
method  of  Reasoning,  (which  because  common,  and 
in  some  measure  acquired  without  assistance  of  Art, 
I  call  natural)  is  natural  Logick. 

61.  All  Reasoning  is  either  Speculative  or  Prac- 
tical.   Speculative  Reasoning  is  shewing  a  thing  is 
true  or  false:  Practical  Reasoning  is  shewing  a 
thing  is  to  be  done,  or  not  to  be  done.     (A)  Specu- 
lative Reason  is  the  ground  of  Speculative  Judg- 


32       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

ment.  (A)  Practical  Reason,  the  ground  of  Prac- 
tical Judgment.  Speculative  Judgment  is  judg- 
ment that  a  thing  is  true  or  false:  Judgment  that 
it  is  true,  is  Speculative  Assent;  that  'tis  false. 
Speculative  Dissent.  Practical  Judgment  is  Judg- 
ment or  Decree  that  a  thing  is  to  be  done,  or  not  to 
be  done.  Judgment  that  a  thing  is  to  be  done,  is 
Judgment  for  it,  or  practical  Assent:  Judgment 
that  a  thing  I46!  is  not  to  be  done,  is  Judgment 
against  it,  or  practical  Dissent. 

62.  SPECULATIVE  REASONING  is  either  Proving 
or  Disproving.    To  prove,  is  to  shew  a  thing  to  be 
true ;  to  disprove,  is  to  shew  a  thing  to  be  false.  So 
that  in  natural  Logick,  [as  to  speculative  Reason- 
ing,] there  are  but  two  Topicks,  or  principal  places 
of  Arguments,  and  those  are  Verity  and  Falsity: 
The  one  affords  us  a  medium  of  Proving,  the  other 
a  medium  of  Disproving:  I  prove  what  I  say,  by 
shewing  the  Truth;  I  disprove  what  another  says, 
by  shewing  the  Falsity  of  it. 

63.  Truth  and  Falsity  are  to  the  Minde,  as  white 
and  black  to  the  Eye ;  as  these  are  kinds  of  Colours, 
and  so  the  objects  of  the  Eye;  so  the  former  are 
kinds  of  Sense,  and  consequently  objects  of    the 
Minde:  And  as  the  Eye  rightly  circumstanced  and 
conditioned  sees  white  to  be  white,  and  black  to  be 
black;  so  the  Understanding  sees  Truth  rightly 
shewn  to  be  Truth,  and  Falsity  to  be  Falsity,  t47! 

64.  Wherefore  to  prove  a  Truth  to  be  one,  is 
but  in  a  right  method  to  shew  it  to  the  Minde,  the 
Understanding  apprehending  a   thing  to  be  true 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  33 

when  rightly  shewed,  as  the  Eye  doth  see  the  shew 
to  be  white  that  is  duely  held  before  it.  A  Notion 
may  be  true,  yet  not  acknowledged  to  be  so,  because 
not  rightly  apprehended,  or  seen;  and  it  is  not 
rightly  seen  or  apprehended,  because  not  rightly 
shewed:  Then  Truth  is  rightly  shewed,  or  shewed 
to  be  Truth,  when  'tis  shewed  Systematically,  or 
Harmonically.  The  like  is  to  be  said  of  Falsity. 
But  to  enlighten  this  Point,  I  am  to  shew  at  large 
what  Truth,  and  consequently,  what  Falsity  is. 

65.  TRUTH,  in  the  apprehensions  of  some  of  the 
School-men  and  of  others,  is  that  conformity  which 
is  in  things  to  their  original  Ideas  in  the  Divine 
Intellect.    All  second  Beings  are  but  Copies  of  the 
Minde  of  the  first,  in  which  they  have  their  Exem- 
plars: and  wherein  doth  t48!  the  verity,  the  truth 
of  Copies  consist,  but  in  a  conformity  to  their  Origi 
nals? 

66.  But  this  notion  of  Truth  (however  true  it 
may  be)  is  not  pertinent  to  us;  'tis  Metaphysical 
Truth  that  it  relates  unto;  a  Truth  of  things  as 
standing  in  the  Analogy  of  God ;  but  the  Truth  we 
treat  of,  and  whose  notion  we  are  enquiring  after, 
is  Logical,  a  Truth  of  things  as  standing  in  our 
Analogy,  and  which  is  the  ground  of  Assent.    Cer- 
tain it  is,  this  notion  that  the  Schools  afford  us,  is 
not  (nor  can  it  be  to  us)  a  Medium  of  Reasoning; 
since  we  cannot  say  what  is  conformable  or  what  is 
not  unto  the  divine  Exemplars.     He  must  see  the 
Original,  and  compare  the  Copy  with  it,  that  or 
Knowledge  will  affirm  this  to  be  true. 


34      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

67.  Of  late  the  old  Catalepsis  has  seen  the  light 
again,  that  comprehension  discoursed  of  by  Cicero 
in  his  Lucullus.™    The  meaning  of  which  is,  that 
there  is  no  other  Crtierium,  t49^  no  other  judicial 
note  of  Truth,  no  other  Rule,  Mark,  or  Measure 
whereby  to  know  a  thing  to  be  true,  than  clear  and 
distinct  Perception.    And  thus  also  the  Cartesians.™ 

68.  But  on  the  contrary,  clear  and  distinct  Per- 
ception is  not  the  Cause  and  Ground  of  Assent,  but 
onely  a  Condition  of  causing',  Truth  is  the  onely 
Adequate  and  effectual  Motive  or  Reason  of  Assent ; 
but  to  be  so,  it  must  be  clearly  and  distinctly  per- 
ceived. Truth  (as  whiteness)  is  something  in  the  Ob- 
ject that  invites  Assent :  clear  and  distinct  Perception 
is  not  in  the  Object,  but  of  it;  and  consequently  is 
not  Truth,  but  conversant  about  Truth.     Sight  is 
not  Colour,  but  of  Colour;  so  neither  is  Perception 
Truth,  but  of  Truth.     Besides,  that  cannot  be  a 
certain  mark  of  Truth,  which  may  be  affirmed  as 
well  of  Errour  as  of  Truth.    I  may  as  clearly  and 
distinctly  perceive  a  thing  to  be  false,  as  to  be  true. 
A  thing  may  be  evidently  I5°]  false,  as  well  as  evi- 
dently true. 

69.  If  any  say  (as  doubtless  some  will)  that  by 
clear  and  distinct  Perception,  they  mean  nothing 
but  a  clear  and  evident  apprehension  of  the  truth 
of  things;  I  answer,  That  then  either  they  know 
what  Truth  is  by  its  mark  and  definition,  and  by 
the  impression  that  it  makes  on  the  Minde,  as  well 
as  what  Whiteness   (is)  by  the  impression  made 
thereby  on  the  Eye ;  or  they  do  not.    If  they  do  not, 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  35 

how  can  they  say  they  clearly  and  distinctly  perceive 
a  thing  to  be  true,  who  know  not  Truth?  They 
might  as  well  say,  they  clearly  and  distinctly  see 
a  thing  to  be  white,  when  they  know  not  whiteness. 
Or  if  they  know  what  Truth  is,  then  that  Impres- 
sion, that  Form,  that  Notion  of  Truth  they  have, 
ought  rather  to  be  insisted  on,  and  not  the  (bare) 
Perception.  They  should  say,  The  thing  is  true, 
we  see  clearly  the  Form  and  Notion  of  Truth  in  it. 
For  indeed,  nothing  t51!  makes  a  thing  true,  but  the 
Form  and  Notion  of  Truth  therein:  For  did  I  ap- 
prehend a  thing  to  be  true  never  so  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly, yet  if  I  did  but  apprehend  it  so  (as  I  may, 
and  many  do)  and  that  the  Notion  and  Form  of 
Truth  were  no  wise  in  it,  it  were  not  true  by  vertue 
of  the  Apprehension  I  had  of  it,  but  onely  seemed 
so.  As  I  clearly  and  distinctly  see  an  Image  in  the 
Glass,  when  indeed  it  is  not  there ;  or  an  Oar  in  the 
Water  bowed  and  crooked,  when  indeed  it  is  not  so. 
It  is  an  Errour  (and  a  most  dangerous  one  too)  to 
assert,  that  seeming  or  intellectual  sense  (for  clear 
and  distinct  Perception  signifies  no  more)  is  the 
measure  of  Truth :  There  are  so  many  ways  wherein 
a  thing  may  be  seen  clearly  and  distinctly,  that  is, 
may  seem  true,  and  yet  not  be  so.  No  convincing 
Hereticks,  or  opinionate  Philosophers,  if  Seeming 
be  the  mark  of  Truth. 

70.  To  this  Opinion,  I  am  now  I521  to  adde  an- 
other much  of  kin  to  it;  That  of  the  truly-Noble 
and  Learned  the  late  Lord  Herbert,29  namely,  That 
Truth  consisteth  in  the  Analogy,  Agreement,  Har- 


36      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

mony  of  things  to  our  Faculties,  inviting  a  most  free 
and  full  Assent :  Or,  in  his  own  Terms ;  Veritas  est 
Harmonia  inter  objecta  &  Facultates,  habens  sensum 
gratissime  &  lubentissime  sine  ulla  haesitatione  Re- 
spondentem. 

71.  All  the  difference  between  the  Former  and 
the  Latter  Opinion  is,  that  in  the  former  Apprehen- 
sion clear  and  distinct,  in  the  latter  Assent  Free 
and  Full,  is  made  the  Mark  and  Measure  of  Truth. 
Of  this  (Latter)  Opinion,  as  that  eminent  Person 
(last  mentioned)  among  the  Moderns;  so  among 
the  Antients  were  a  many  noble  Philosophers;  in 
Tully  it  is  called  ovYxava.feoi$,  and  as  described  by 
him,  it  hath  the  same  Foundation  that  his  Lordship 
builds  on,  namely  the  oimoTng  of  Truth.  That  Truth 
is  so  Domestical  and  t53!  Congruous  to  the  Faculty, 
so  Analogous  and  fit  to  it,  that  the  Inclination  of 
the  Minde  thereto,  in  Nature  and  Necessity,  resem- 
bles that  of  a  Stone,  or  whatever  or  other  heavy 
Body  you'll  imagine,  to  the  Center. 

72.  But  ( i )  a  bare  Congruity  between  the  Ob- 
ject and  the  Understanding  is  not  the  ground  of 
Truth,  but  of  Sense  or  Intelligibility;  and  though 
there  be  a  Congruity  in  all  Truth,  because  there  is 
a  sense  in  it,  and  happily  more  Congruity  because 
a  more  agreeable  Sense;  Yet  since  that  Congruity 
is  unobservable,  unremarkable  but  by  Assent,  and 
Assent  (of  it  self)  is  no  sufficient  Evincement  of 
Truth ;  I  lay  it  by  as  Illogical  and  useless.    (2)  Nor 
doth  the  Understanding  blindly  incline  to  Truth, 
and  as  it  were  by  Sympathy,  or  a  natural  Motion 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  37 

of  Aggregation;  its  Assent  is  (an  act  of)  Judge- 
ment: The  Minde  proceeds  therein  judicially  upon 
Allegations  and  Proof;  judging  a  t54^  thing  to  be 
true,  that  is,  assenting  to  it,  onely  because  it  sees 
therein  the  Form,  Notion,  and  Mark  of  Truth,  as 
it  judges  a  thing  to  be  white  wherein  the  Eye  as- 
sures it  there  is  the  form  of  Whiteness.  And  (3) 
one  may  readily  and  chearfully  assent  to  Falsities 
and  Errours,  and  mistake  them  for  Truths;  and 
therefore  free  and  full  Assent  is  no  sufficient  evince- 
ment  of  Truth.  Not  to  urge  that  chearfulness  of 
Assent,  that  readiness  and  promptness  we  many 
times  observe  in  it,  is  oftner  an  effect  of  a  Passion 
bribing  of  the  Understanding,  than  of  a  pure  clear 
impartial  Reason. 

73.  Wherefore,  others  of  the  Antients,  as  well 
as  of  the  Moderns,  abundantly  convinced  of  the 
insufficiency  both  of  Perception  clear  and  distinct, 
and  of  Assent  free  and  full  to  ascertain  them  of 
Truth,  and  yet  unwilling  to  have  Nature  ( so  liberal 
in  other  matters)  exposed  to  the  reproach  of  De- 
ficiency in  One  so  important  as  intellectual  (551 
Judgement;  They  have  conceited  humane  under- 
standing furnish'd  by  her  with  certain  [jiQoA,rji|)ei<;] 
Anticipations,  that  is,  with  Connatural  and  In- 
grafted Notions;  Principles  designedly  implanted  in 
the  Minde,  to  be  a  rule  to  it  to  direct  it.21  Thus  in 
the  speculative  Understanding  they  have  set  up  a 
habit,  which  they  call  Intelligence;  in  the  Practical 
another  which  is  called  Synteresis;  in  both,  a  Con 
stellation  of  Principles,  shining  with  their  own  Light 


38       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

and  imparting  it  to  others  that  want  it;  not  much 
unlike  to  what  is  affirmed  of  Dionysius22  in  his 
Celestial  Hierarchy  concerning  Spirits,  that  those 
of  superiour  Orders  enlighten  all  beneath  them  in 
the  inferiour. 

74.  But  were  there  really  such  a  System  of  No- 
tions and  first  Principles  ingrafted  in  the  Minde  by 
Nature,  in  whose  Light  all  others  were  to  shine  and 
to  be  seen,  it  would  follow  that  Contemplation  of 
our  own  mindes,  acquainting  us  with  the  Chain. 
Concatenation,  and  So £561  rites  of  the  Principles 
therein,  and  Propositions  deducible  therefrom,  would 
more  import  to  the  rendring  us  Philosophers  (not 
to  say  Divines  also)  than  observation  of  the  World 
and  Experience;  and  so  the  greatest  School-men 
(those  Metaphysical  Alchymists)  that  insisted  much 
on  this  Method,  and  spun  out  all  their  notions  of 
their  own  Bowels,  should  have  been 'the  wisest  and 
most  fruitful  of  men.  Whereas  we  know  the  men, 
and  the  manner  of  their  Communication;  all  their 
Discourses  are  indeed  subtle  and  acute;  but  also 
empty  and  barren,  and  no  more  agreeing  with  Real- 
ities (and  in  our  Analogy)  than  Light  with  Dark- 
ness. 

Again,  the  Soul  in  its  state  of  Union  and  Con- 
junction with  the  Body,  is  so  dependent  on  it  in  all 
its  Operations,  that  it  exercises  none  without  the 
Aids  of  it.  Ratiocination  it  self  it  is  an  Animal 
act ;  not  an  abstract  Action  of  the  Soul,  but  a  (  Con- 
crete) act  of  the  Animal;  it  f57!  is  the  Man  reasons.21 
And  in  the  ordinary  method  of  Nature,  we  receive 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  39 

into  our  Mindes  no  Impressions,  no  Images,  but 
what  are  handed  to  them  by  our  Senses.  I  am  apt 
to  think  that  person  who  should  never  have  seen, 
nor  heard,  nor  tasted,  nor  smelt,  nor  felt  any  thing, 
would  have  his  minde  as  little  furnish'd  with  Idea's 
or  Notions,  as  his  Memory  with  Images,  and  would 
understand  as  little  as  he  had  sensed.  Besides, 
those  very  Principles  themselves  we  call  First  ones, 
or  Anticipations  shining  with  their  own  lustre  and 
light,  Propositions  which  we  cannot  but  assent  to 
as  soon  as  we  hear  them,  or  minde  them;  It  will 
appear,  if  we  reflect  warily  on  what  doth  pass  in 
our  Mindes,  that  even  these  are  not  assented  to, 
but  on  the  Evidence  they  bring ;  I  mean  not  assented 
to  naturally,  but  (as  other  Propositions  are)  judi- 
cially. For  instance,  that  the  whole  is  greater  than 
the  part,  we  assented  not  unto  it  on  the  first  hearing, 
but  first  [58J  considering  what  was  meant  by  Whole, 
what  by  Part,  what  by  Greater,  what  by  Lesser; 
and  then  having  sensibly,  either  by  Eye-sight,  or  by 
Imagination,  compared  one  unto  the  other,  we  evi- 
dently saw  it  to  be  so;  that  the  Notion  of  Greater, 
even  to  Sense,  ever  agreed  to  the  whole;  and  that 
of  Less,  to  the  Parts.  The  like  that  Two  and  Two 
make  Four.  This  is  the  way  we  first  admitted  to 
belief  the  Propositions  which  are  called  Principles ; 
and  it  is  no  other  than  that  wherein  we  admit  all 
others.  Onely  the  Propositions  (which  are)  call'd 
Anticipations,  or  first  Principles,  are  Propositions 
of  so  easie,  sensible,  and  plain  an  evidence,  and  so 
obvious,  that  we  early  admitted  them,  so  early,  that 


4O      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

we  cannot  well  remember  when  we  first  did  so ;  and 
therefore  they  are  stiled  Anticipations,  or  proleptick 
Notions:  for  being  of  so  early  an  admission  and 
existence  in  our  Mindes,  they  preceded  all  our 
(after)  knowledges,  whose  acquirement  we  well 
remember.  I591 

Further,  Beings  are  not  to  be  multiplied  without 
Necessity,  and  there  is  none  of  faigning  such  An- 
ticipations and  Habits  of  Principles  to  direct  the 
Minde  in  inquisitions  after  Truth,  since  all  acknowl- 
edge there  are  no  such  principles  in  the  Eye,  the 
Ear,  the  Nose,  the  Tongue  to  direct  them,  and  why 
then  in  the  Minde  ?  Besides  Reflection  on  our  ordi- 
nary reasonings,  evinces  that  in  them  we  seldom 
attend  to  such  Principles,  but  to  the  Object  dis- 
coursed of;  nor  need  we  to  do  otherwise,  if  it  can 
be  evidenced  that  there  is  a  certain  Notion,  Form, 
Ground  of  Truth  that  runs  through  all  things  true ; 
which  Form  or  Notion  of  Truth,  assoon  as  the 
Understanding  rightly  circumstanced  and  condi- 
tioned, apprehends  in  an  Object,  it  cannot  but  ac- 
knowledge it  to  be  true,  as  it  would  another  to  be 
white  or  black,  wherein  it  is  assured  by  the  Eye 
rightly  circumstanced  and  conditioned,  that  there 
is  the  Form  of  Whiteness  or  Black^lness.  As  for 
Anticipations,  they  are  too  particular,  and  not  of  a 
nature  so  large  and  comprehensive  as  to  be  the 
Rules  and  Measures  of  Truth,  which  is  infinite. 
Let  those  Anticipations  be  reckoned,  and  then  Ex- 
periment be  made  upon  comparison  with  the  im- 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  4! 

mense  Latitude  of  Questions,  and  of  Truth  relating 
to  them. 

75.  Thus  I  have  shewn  the  Indications,  Marks, 
and  Notions  of  Truth  that  (in  my  judgement)  are 
not  proper,  adequate,  or  useful;  it  now  remaineth 
that  I  shew  one  (that)  is.    And  Truth,  as  it  is  the 
Ground,  Motive,  and  Reason  of  Assent,  is  objective 
Harmony,  or  the  Harmony,  Congruity,  Even-lying, 
Answerableness,  Consistence,  Proportion,  and  Co- 
herence of  things  each  with  other,  in  the  Frame  and 
Scheme  of  them  in  our  Mindes.    Truth  is  universal 
and  exact  Agreement  or  Harmony. 

76.  On  the  other  hand,  Falsity  (as  the  ground, 
motive,  and  reason  f61]  of  Dissent)  is  Objective  Dis- 
harmony, or  the  disharmony,  incongruity,  inequal- 
ity, unanswerableness,  inconsistence,  disproportion, 
and  incoherence  of  things,  in  the  Frame  and  Scheme 
of  them  in  our  Mindes.    Any  Disagreement  or  Dis- 
harmony is  Falsity. 

77.  Probability  or  Likelihood  of  Truth,  is  an 
appearance  of  Congruity.  A  thing  is  probable,  when 
it  hath  some  consistence  and  agreement;  it  Quad- 
rates and  lies  even  with  what  we  do  know;  but  in 
regard  there  are  particulars  relating  to  the  same 
Systemes  and  Frames  of  Thoughts  which  yet  we 
do  not  know,  therefore  we  know  not  if  it  will  lie 
even  and  square  with  them.    Improbability  is  appar- 
ent Incongruity. 

78.  That  Truth  is  Harmony  and  Proportion,  and 
consequently  that  Probability  is  apparent  Harmony, 
apparent  Proportion ;  and  Falsity,  Disharmony,  Dis- 


42      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

proportion  cannot  be  but  very  evident  to  him  that 
I62!  shall  consult  with  Nature  and  common  sense. 

79.  In  Nature  it  is  plain:  For  Harmony,  it  is 
the  Reason  of  the  World ;  the  World  was  made  by 
it,  cannot  be  known  but  by  it.    The  rule  of  Propor- 
tion is  the  King-Key,  unlocking  all  the  Mysteries 
of  Nature.     The  Great  Creator  framed  all  things 
in  the  Universe  in  Number,  Weight,  and  Measure : 
Extremes  in  it  are  united  by  participating  Middles ; 
and  in  the  whole  System  there  is  so  admirable  Uni- 
formity as  ravishes  every  one  that  beholds  it :  every 
thing  in  its  place  is  aptly  knit  with  what  is  next  it ; 
and  all  together  into  one  most  regular  Frame  of  most 
exact  Proportions.    Every  thing  we  look  on  affords 
Examples;  and  Galen2*  in  his  Books  of  the  use  of 
Parts,  has  a  Thousand,  to  whom  (if  in  so  plain  a 
matter  it  be  necessary)  I  remit  the  Learned  Reader. 

80.  And  'tis  a  common  sense,  that  what  is  con- 
gruous is  true,  and  what  I63J  is  true  is  congruous; 
so  common,  that  none  ever  fancied  any  notion  of 
Truth  but  in  Congruity :  some  School-men,  in  Con- 
gruity  to  the  Divine  Intellect ;  Others  in  Congruity 
to  our  Faculties;  and  all  men  (though  they  speak 
not  out,  and  it  may  be  minde  not  that  they  do  so) 
in  Consistence  and  Congruity  of  things  with  one 
another;  all  generally  concluding  that  Narration 
(for  instance)  to  be  probable,  which  seems  consis- 
tent; and  Probability  being  appearance  of  Truth, 
if  what  seems  consistent  be  probable,  what  is  so  is 
true.    But  to  give  a  Mechanical  instance ;  one  that 
would  repair  a  broken  C/rma-dish,  or  make  up  a 


ORGAN UM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  43 

Watch  or  other  Engine  taken  abroad,  what  Meas- 
ures doth  he  naturally  take  to  do  so?  what  Rule 
proceeds  he  by?  None  verily,  but  by  that  of  Con- 
gruity ;  he  makes  no  question  but  that  when  he  hath 
found  a  place  for  every  part  wherein  it  lies  consist- 
ently and  aptly  with  others,  so  that  in  the  whole  I64! 
there  is  exact  Coherence  and  Congruity,  no  Flaw, 
no  Unanswerableness,  it  is  truely  set  together,  and 
every  part  in  its  place.  Truth  is  Harmony. 

81.  And  seeing  Truth  is  Harmony,  and  the  Uni- 
verse it  self,  as  it  consists  in  our  Analogy,  is  but 
one  System ;  it  follows  that  properly  there  is  but  one 
Science  (which  some  will  call  Pansophy)  one  Globe 
of  Knowledge,  as  there  is  of  Things :    As  also  that 
the  partition  of  Sciences,  or  rather  the  crumbling 
of  them  into  so  many,  hath  been  a  great  impediment 
of  Science;  the  dependency  of  Things,  and  their 
Relations  one  to  another,  thereby  becoming  unob- 
served and  unconsidered.  And  in  fine,  that  the  more 
large,  general,  and  comprehensive  our  Knowledge 
is,  the  more  assured  and  evident  it  is.     It  is  in 
Science  as  it  is  in  Arch-work,  the  Parts  uphold  one 
another,    and    mutually    contribute    strength    and 
beauty.    The  confinement  of  the  Understanding  t63! 
to  particular  Knowledges,  as  also  the  limiting  of  it 
in  any  unto  certain  Methods  and  Terms  of  Art,  is 
like  too  straight  a  swathing  of  the  Childe,  and  spoils 
its  growth. 

82.  So  much  for  the  two  Topicks  of  natural 
speculative  Reasoning,  namely,  Truth  and  Falsity. 
It  now  lies  on  me  more  expressly  to  describe  How 


44      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Reasoning  is  performed  in  reference  to  them,  and 
so  what  the  Nature  of  it  is.  And  natural  speculative 
Reasoning  is  Systematical,  and  Harmonical;  it  is 
a  shewing,  an  evincing  the  Truth  or  Falsity  of  a 
thing,  by  conferring  and  comparing  thing  with 
thing;  it  is  a  shewing  a  Notion  to  be  true  or  not  true, 
by  representing  of  it  in  a  Frame,  a  Scheme  of  real 
Notions,  with  all  its  Relations  in  it ;  and  so  by  Com- 
paring, Evidencing  how  it  squares,  agrees,  and 
harmonizes,  or  otherwise. 

83.  That  Natural  Reasoning  is  Harmonical,  Sys- 
tematical, that  it  is  conferring,  comparing,  is  evident 
1641  in  the  Natural  Reasonings  of  Plain  and  Illit- 
erate, but  Understanding  men;  who  not  having 
other  Logick  but  that  of  kinde,  to  verifie  their  Tales, 
desire  but  to  have  them  heard  out  from  end  to  end ; 
and  who  no  otherwise  confute  their  Adversaries, 
than  by  telling  over  again  in  their  own  way  the 
whole  Relation,  that  so  both  may  be  compared.  Be- 
sides, the  comparative  method  of  Reasoning,  used 
by  the  Minde  in  intelligible  Objects,  is  no  other  than 
that  we  naturally  use  in  those  that  are  sensible: 
For,  be  it  a  visible  Object  we  enquire25  into,  and 
examine  the  truth  of,  we  turn  it  every  way,  and  into 
all  postures,  so  to  make  a  certain  judgement  of  it; 
and  Circumspection,  (which  is  Cicero's  word  for  it) 
or  the  Mindes  comparing  and  conferring  of  things 
is  no  other.  And  if  Truth  indeed  be  Harmony, 
Proportion,  Congruity,  an  Object  cannot  be  evinced 
true,  but  by  being  evinced  Harmonical,  Congruous, 
Proportionable ;  and  f65!  it  cannot  be  evinced  Har- 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  4$. 

monical,  Congruous,  Proportionable,  but  by  being 
conferred  and  compared,  and  upon  collation  and 
comparison  shewn  to  be  so. 

84.  To  prove  Harmonically,  is  in  a  Scheme  and 
Frame  of  Notions  bottomed  on  things,  to  shew  the 
thing  to  be  proved,  to  quadrate,  lie  even,  and  to  be 
entirely  congruous  and  answerable.    To  disprove  a 
thing  Harmonically,  is  in  a  Frame  and  Scheme  of 
Notions  bottomed  on  things,  to  shew  it  not  to  quad- 
rate, but  to  be  incongruous,  unanswerable,  and  un- 
adequate. 

85.  The  best  way  of  Confuting  Err  our,  is  to  do 
it  by  shewing  the  Truth :  There  is  so  great  a  delicacy 
in  Proportions,  that  a  Scheme  of  Thoughts  may 
seem  congruous  and  agreeing  by  it  self,  which  com- 
pared with  another,  is  observed  no  longer  so ;  as  two 
pieces  of  fine  Cloath  looked  on  at  a  distance,  and 
not  compared  together,  may  be  judged  equally  fine, 
and  one  no  better  than  t66!  the  other ;  whereas  when 
put  together  and  felt,  and  so  compared,  the  differ- 
ence is  plain  and  discernible. 

86.  The  Effect  of  Reasoning,  (and  as  it  were  the 
Conclusion)    is   Assent,   or   Dissent,   according  to 
evidence.     Evidence  is  the  Assurance  we  have  a: 
thing  is  true  or  false,  and  so  is  either  of  Truth  or  of 
Falsity,  and  answerably  bottomes  either  Assent  or 
Dissent. 

87.  Assent  is  the  judgement  of  the  Minde  upon 
evidence  of  Truth,  that  the  thing  is  true.    Dissent 
is  the  judgement  of  the  Minde  upon  evidence  of 
Falsity,  that  the  thing  is  false. 


46      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

88.  Evidence  of  Truth  is  either  certain  or  prob- 
able.    Certain  Evidence  is  full  Assurance.    Prob- 
able  Evidence   is   good   Assurance,   but  not   full. 
Certain    Evidence   is   evidence   of   certain   Truth. 
Probable  Evidence  is  evidence  of  probability.  Prob- 
able Evidence  is  now  a-days  termed  a  Motive  of 
Credibility.  [67] 

89.  In  Proportion,  as  the  Evidence  is,  so  is  the 
Assent.  If  the  Evidence  be  certain,  that  is,  indubi- 
table and  unquestionable,  [and  that  is  to  be  under- 
stood to  be  so,  of  which  there  is  no  cause  to  doubt, 
or  make  any  Question]  then  the  Assent  is  firm  and 
certain,  and  without  doubting;  (but)   if  the  Evi- 
dence be  but  probable,  the  Assent  then  is  infirm, 
and  with  doubting  more  or  less,  as  the  Evidence 
is  lesser  or  greater.    To  Doubt,  is  to  fear  lest  the 
thing  to  which  Assent  is  given  should  not  be  true. 

90.  Evidence  of  Certainty,  is  to  the  Minde  (as 
to  its  Assent)  all  as  much  as  Evidence  of  Infalli- 
bility: For  the  Minde  as  firmly  adheres  to  what  it 
hath  all  reason  for,  and  no  reason  against;    all 
reason  to  believe  it  to  be  so  or  so,  and  no  reason 
to  believe  it  to  be  otherwise,  as  to  what  it  appre- 
hends impossible  to  be  otherwise;   seeing  it  were 
unreasonable  and  contradictious  for  Reason  any 
wise  to  doubt,  when  it  I68!  hath  no  reason  at  all  to  do 
so.    I  am  as  sure  that  once  there  were  such  persons 
as  William  the  Conquerour  and  Henry  the  Eight, 
and  that  there  are  or  lately  were  such  Cities  as 
Rome  and  Constantinople,  as  I  am  that  Two  and 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  47 

Two  make  Four,  or  that  the  Whole  is  greater  than 
the  Parts. 

91.  Firm  Assent  in  matters  in  themselves  mutable 
and  of  a  contingent  nature,  may  be  called  Confi- 
dence; but  in  matters  of  a  necessary,  firm,  and  im- 
mutable nature,  it  is  Science.     Infirm  Assent,  or 
Assent  with  Dubitation,  is  called  Opinion.     Suspi- 
tion  is  a  beginning  Assent,  or  an  inclination  to 
believe  a  thing,  and  is  short  of  Opinion.    Suspition 
on  grounds  is  called  just  suspition.     Suspition  on 
no  grounds  is  mere  suspition.     Probability  is  ap- 
pearance of  Truth :  And  ground  of  Suspition  is  Ap- 
pearance of  Probability.  Suspition  is  also  called  Pre- 
sumption. 

92.  Assent  on  Evidence  by  the  [69]  testimony  of  our 
own  Senses  rightly  circumstanced  and  conditioned, 
is  as  firm  as  firm  can  be,  and  is  called  Knowledge. 
Assent  to  a  thing  upon  anothers  knowledge  and 
not  our  own,  is  called  Belief.    To  Believe,  is  to  take 
a  thing  upon  anothers  word;  and  if  that  word  be 
divine,  the  belief  is  called  Faith ;  or  if  but  humane, 
it  is  called  simply  Belief  or  Credit.  Belief  is  grounded 
on  the  wisdom  and  veracity  of  the  person  believed : 
for  he  that  believes  another,  believes  him  to  have 
wisdom  enough  not  to  be  imposed  upon  or  deceived 
himself;  and  Veracity  or  Truth  ( which  among  men  is 
called  Honesty)  enough  not  to  impose  upon  or  to  de- 
ceive him.    The  Word  of  God  therefore  is  the  most 
proper  object  of  belief,  God  being  so  wise  he  cannot 
be  deceived,  and  so  true  he  cannot  deceive.  Notoreity 
of  a  thing   [of  a  fact]   is  the  certainty  of  it  on 


48      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Common  Knowledge:  It  is  not  Presumption,  nor 
Probability,  but  Certainty.  I7°l 

93.  Assent  to  Falsity  under  the  notion  of  Truth, 
if  it  be  firm,  is  called  Errour:  If  infirm,  and  with 
dubitation,  it  is  erroneous  Opinion. 

94.  Ratiocination  Speculative,  is  either  Euretick 
or  Hermeneutick,  Inventive  or  Interpretative;  and 
this  latter  again  is  either  interpretative  of  the  World, 
the  Book  of  Nature ;  or  of  the  Scriptures,  the  Book 
of  God.    But  of  these  perhaps,  another  time,  as  also 
of  the  method  of  Reasoning  which  I  called  Practical, 
and  is  either  that  of  Prudence  (i.  Humane,  or  2. 
Christian)  or  of  Conscience. 

Now  on  the  whole  Matter,  who  seeth  not  the 
share  and  interest  (that)  Reason  hath  in  matters 
of  Religion?  Men  are  reasonable  Creatures,  and 
therefore  their  Religion  must  be  reasonable :  Every 
Tree  must  bring  forth  Fruit  in  its  kinde.  Faith  it 
self  it  is  a  rational  Act  [If  I  have  any  reason  to 
believe  Men,  I  have  all  reason  to  believe  God]  and 
f71!  Ratiocination  is  as  much  imploy'd  in  points  of 
Revelation,  as  in  points  of  mere  Reason.  Truth  is 
the  immediate  reason  of  Assent  in  matters  of  Reve- 
lation as  well  as  in  others ;  and  there  is  an  Analogic 
of  Faith  as  well  as  of  Nature;  the  Mediums  are 
different;  but  Ratiocination  is  the  same  in  both: 
We  are  as  well  obliged  to  compare  Spiritual  things 
with  Spiritual  in  the  one,  as  Natural  things  with 
Natural  in  the  other.  Thus  are  the  Bereans  ap- 
plauded as  persons  of  nobler  and  more  generous 


ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.  49 

Mindes  than  those  of  Thessalonica,  because  they 
took  not  all  on  trust  as  these  did,  but  examined  the 
things  were  told  them,  and  compared  them  with  the 
Scriptures. 

It  is  easie  also  to  infer,  that  if  any  person  shall 
give  himself  the  trouble  of  disproving  what  in  my 
Apologie  I  presented  to  the  World ;  to  do  it  to  Con- 
viction, he  must  produce  a  frame  and  Scheme  of 
Thoughts  more  Congruous  and  Harmonical  I72! 
than  mine,  and  must  account  for  those  Phaenom- 
ena  which  I  therein  essay'd  to  solve,  in  a  method 
more  perspicuous  and  natural,  and  with  more  agree- 
ableness  and  uniformity  of  Notions  than  I  have ;  or 
else  he  will  not  Confute,  but  confirm  it. 

I  say  this,  to  shew  the  fairer  play  to  those  that 
undertake  to  answer  me,  if  after  I  have  said  it  any 
shall  resolve  to  do  so;  and  I  say  no  more,  to  shew 
the  Opinion  I  yet  avow  to  be  mine  of  all  the  Objec- 
tions whispered  up  and  down,  that  in  themselves 
they  have  as  little  force  and  evidence,  and  as  little 
conviction,  as  those  that  make  them  have  yet  had 
either  Courage  to  own  them  to  the  world,  or  Can- 
dour to  own  them  to  me. 

Thus,  Sir,  I  have  performed  what  I  principally 
designed.  I  have  shew'd  the  nature  of  Reason:  I 
have  shewed  the  true  method  of  Reasoning ;  as  also 
the  nature  of  Truth,  and  (up  and  down  my  Dis- 
course dispersedly)  the  causes  of  t73!  Errour:  and 
I  have  shew'd  the  extent  of  Reason.  In  which  per- 
formance, whatsoever  other  Incongruity  or  Errour 
I  may  have  been  guilty  of,  sure  I  am  I  have  com- 


5O      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

mitted  none  in  dedicating  it:  For  to  whom  could  I 
address  a  discourse  of  Reason  and  of  Truth  more 
properly,  than  to  a  Person  who  is  so  great  a  Lover 
and  owner  of  both?  and  withal  who  is  so  perfectly 
honoured  as  you  are  by  all  that  have  the  happiness 
to  know  you :  But  by  none  more  than 

Sir, 
Your  most  humble 

Servant  and  Son, 

Richard  Burthogge. 
Bowdon,  Aug.  14.  1677. 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON. 


AN 


ESSAY 


UPON 


REASON, 


AND    THE 


Nature  of  Spirits. 


By  Richard  Burtkogge,    M.  D. 


LONDON: 


Printed  for  gjoljn  ©WTtOtt  at  the  Raven 
in  the  Poultrey.     1694. 


OF  HUMAN  REASON. 

THE  FIRST  PART.      CHAP.  I.  OF  REASON  IN  GENERAL. 

SECT.  I. 

In  what  sense  Reason  is  taken  and  discoursed  of  here. 
A  double  account  of  it;  the  first,  more  Notional; 
the  second,  more  Real.  Of  the  Agreements  of 
Reason,  Sense,  and  Imagination,  (i.)  That 
all  three  are  Cogitative  and  Conceptive  Powers. 
Cogitation  what.  Monsieur  des  Cartes,  and 
Honoratus  Faber,  their  Opinion,  that  Sensation 
is  not  Cogitation,  considered.  (2. )  That  Sense, 
Imagination,  and  Reason  are  Mental  and  Spir- 
itual, and  not  meerly  Mechanick  and  Material 
Powers.  The  Differences  of  those  Powers; 
that  all  Sensation  is  Imagination,  and  what  is 
commonly  called  Imagination,  is  but  Internal 
Sensation.  Intellection  or  Reasoning,  is  Know- 
ing without  Imagination.  Instances,  setting 
out  these  several  Notions.  The  power  of  Know- 
ing without  Imagining,  why  called  Reason.  W 

Reason  taken  for  Human  Mind,  or  Understand- 
ing (which  is  the  sense  I  take  it  in  now)  is  defined 


56      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

by  most,  the  faculty  whereby  a  Man  is  said  to  be 
Reasonable,  or  Understanding;  in  like  manner  as 
Sight  is  defined,  the  faculty  whereby  a  Living  Crea- 
ture is  Denominated  Seeing,  or  Visive,  or  Reason 
is  that  faculty  whereby  a  Man  does  Exercise  the 
acts  of  Reason,  or  doth  Understand;  as  Sight,  the 
faculty  whereby  a  Man  or  any  other  Animal  doth 
see,  or  discern  Objects. 

Nor  are  they  altogether  without  Reason,  who  do 
so  define  and  explicate  it;  for  Acts  of  Perception 
properly  so  called,  are  not  Known,  or  Knowable, 
but  in  and  by  themselves;  we  Know  not,  nor  are 
capable  of  Knowing,  what  the  Act  of  Seeing  is,  but 
by  seeing;  nor  what  that  of  Hearing  is,  but  by 
Hearing;  or  what  the  Act  of  Understanding  is,  but 
by  Understanding.  And  again,  Perceptive  faculties 
are  not  Known,  or  Knowable,  but  by  their  Acts: 
We  Know  not  what  the  faculty  or  power  of  Seeing 
is  but  relatively,  with  relation  to  the  Act  of  Seeing : 
Nor  what  the  faculty  or  Power  of  Hearing  is,  but  by 
the  Act  of  Hearing ;  nor  what  the  faculty  or  power 
of  Understanding  or  Reasoning  is,  but  by  Acts  of 
Understanding  or  Rea^soning:  In  a  word,  no  Fac- 
ulties, no  Powers  are  Known,  or  Knowable,  but  by 
their  respective  Acts  or  Exercises,  and  therefore 
they  cannot  be  defined  or  set  out  but  by  them.  All 
this  is  certain. 

However,  since  this  is  but  a  notional  fruitless 
way  of  Explicating  Reason,  and  too  short,  too  nar- 
row to  satisfie  a  Curious  and  Inquisitive  Mind ;  there- 
fore to  settle  an  Idea  of  it,  that  may  be  more  to  pur- 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  57 

pose,  more  real,  and  more  edifying ;  I  will  show,  in 
the  first  place,  the  Agreements  it  hath  with  other 
Conceptive  Cogitative  faculties,  what  it  holds  in  com- 
mon with  them ;  and  afterwards,  set  out  the  Differ- 
ences that  do  discriminate  and  divide  these  several 
faculties,  each  from  other,  and  this  particularly  from 
the  Rest. 

The  Conceptive  Cogitative  Faculties  that  are  in 
Man,  (for  so  I  call  the  Faculties  by  which  he  makes 
acquaintance  writh  external  Objects)  are  his  exter- 
nal Sense,  Imagination  (as  it  is  called)  and  Reason 
or  Understanding:  Three  Faculties  which  do  all 
Agree  and  Concur  in  this,  that  they  are  Conceptive 
and  Cogitative,  and  consequently  Mental  and  Spir- 
itual, and  not  meerly  Mechanick  and  Material 
Powers. 

First ;  All  three  are  Conceptive,  Cogitative  Pow- 
ers ;  Sensation  and  Imagination,  as  well  as  Reason- 
ing or  Intellection,  are  W  Cogitations.  Cogitation 
is  conscious  Affection;  Conscious  Affection,  is  Af- 
fection with  Consciousness  of  that  Affection;  and 
by  another  name  is  called  Knowledge.  Knowledge, 
as  it  has  a  double  relation,  so  it  may  be  considered 
two  ways,  to  wit,  either  in  reference  to  the  Object, 
which  is  Known,  and  so,  properly,  it  is  Apprehen- 
sion or  Conscious  Perception;  or,  as  it  respects  the 
Image  and  Idea,  by  means  of  which  we  do  perceive 
or  know  that  Object,  and  so  it  may  be  called  Con- 
ception. Conception  properly  speaking,  is  of  the 
Image,  or  Idea ;  Apprehension,  Knowledge,  or  con- 
scious Perception  is  of  the  Object,  by  means  of  that 


58       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Idea,  or  Image :  It  is  as  proper  to  say,  that  the  Sense 
and  Imagination  do  conceive,  as  that  the  Reason 
or  Understanding  doth;  the  former  does  as  much 
conceive  Images  and  Sentiments,  as  the  latter  does 
Ideas  and  Notions. 

Conception  and  Cogitation,  really  are  but  one 
Act,  and  consequently,  all  Conceptive  are  Cogitative 
Powers,  and  Cogitative  Powers  Conceptive.  Only, 
to  clear  the  Notion  of  Consciousness,  by  which  Cogi- 
tation or  Knowledge  is  distinguished,  tho'  never  divi- 
ded, from  Conception,  we  must  further  consider  the 
Way  and  Manner  how  Consciousness  Arises.  And 
it  seems  to  me  to  arise,  ordinarily,  from  the  distinc- 
tion fsl  and  difference  that  is  in  Conceptions;  for, 
should  any  person  have  his  Eye  perpetually  tied  to 
one  Object,  without  ever  closing  of,  or  turning  it 
to  another,  he  would  no  more  be  sensible  that  he 
saw  that  Object,  or  know  any  more  what  it  was  to 
see,  than  if  he  had  been  blind  from  his  Birth.  For 
since  Consciousness  of  Seeing  is  nothing  but  a  per- 
ceiving by  the  Eye,  that  one  is  Affected,  or  other- 
wise Affected  than  he  was,  with  the  appearance  of 
Light,  or  Colour.  If  a  person  had  never  seen  but 
one  thing,  and  never  but  seen  it,  he  could  have  no 
perceivance  (that)  he  is  so  Affected,  that  is,  he 
could  not  be  sensible  or  conscious  (that)  he  did  see. 
Thus,  tho'  in  our  Members  the  parts  that  do  com- 
pose them  are  contiguous  one  to  another,  and  do 
always  touch,  yet  we  do  not  feel  them  touch,  that  is, 
they  touch,  but  we  are  not  sensible  they  do,  because 
no  difference  being  in  the  Affection,  there  is  no 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  59 

Sense,  no  Consciousness  of  it:  But  Dislocation  is 
soon  perceived ;  as  also  it  is  when  any  part  is  pressed 
unusually.  I  conclude,  that  as  difference  of  Concep- 
tion arises  from  different  Affections  of  the  Faculties 
by  Objects,  so  Consciousness,  or  Sense  of  Concep- 
tion, arises  from  the  difference  of  Conceptions.  Did 
we  know  but  one  thing,  or  had  but  one  Act  of  Con- 
ception, we  should  not  know  W  that  we  did  know 
that  one,  that  is,  that  Conception  would  not  properly 
be  Cogitation,  but  would  be,  as  touching  without 
feeling.  However,  since  there  is  so  great  a  diver- 
sity of  Objects  in  the  World,  all-around  us,  and  con- 
sequently, so  many  various  Impressions  made  upon 
the  Mind,  by  those  Objects,  so  that  its  Conceptive 
Power  cannot  but  be  diversly  Affected,  and  moved, 
and  the  Mind  also  have  a  perceivance  of  that  diver- 
sity; hence  it  comes  to  pass,  that  Conception  is  al- 
ways Cogitation.  In  short,  Conception  is  Modifica- 
tion of  Mind,  and  Cogitation  is  Conception  with 
Consciousness  of  it.  Consciousness  of  Conception 
is  a  sense  of  the  Alteration  made  in  the  Mind  by  that 
Conception  (of  which  it  is  conscious;)  si  nihil  (says 
Cotta  apud  deer.  I.  i.  de  Nat.  Dear.)2*  inter  Deurn 
&  Deum  differt,  nulla  est  apud  Decs  cognitio  nulla 
perceptio, 

I  know  very  well  that  Monsieur  Des  Cartes" 
the  ingenious  Honorato  Fabri28  and  many  others  do 
differ  from  me,  for  denying  (as  they  do)  that  Sen- 
sation is  Knowledge,  and  consequently,  excluding 
both  Conception  and  Consciousness  from  the  Idea 
of  it,  they  must  also  deny,  that  Sense  is  a  Cogitative 


6O      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

or  Conceptive  Power.  But  then,  it  is  hard  to  say, 
what  that  Idea  is,  that  they  have  of  Sensation.  Be- 
sides, 'tis  171  most  certain  that  in  Men,  Sensation  is 
Conscious  Perception,  for  whatever  Impression  is 
made  upon  our  Eye  by  any  Object,  we  do  not  for 
all  that,  discern,  or  see  the  Object,  if  we  do  not  attend 
unto,  as  well  as  receive,  the  Impression ;  that  is,  we 
do  not  discern  or  see,  but  when  we  Know  we  do. 
Then  only  we  have  a  Sensation  of  Objects,  when  we 
are  Conscious  that  they  do  Impress  us ;  that  is,  when 
our  Organs  being  Impressed,  there  arise  and  spring 
up  in  us,  by  means  of  those  Impressions,  certain 
Images  or  Conceptions,  that  (many  of  them)  by  a 
Natural  delusion  do  seem  as  really  to  Exist  without 
us,  in  the  Objects  themselves,  as  if  they  were  indeed 
so  many  real  Affections  of  them,  or  Inherent  Acci- 
dents in  them.  And  those  Images  being  but  Modi- 
fications of  Mind,  arise  not  in  us  upon  any  Im- 
pressions but  when  the  Mind  Attends  to  them,  for 
else  they  cannot  Affect  it. 

But  happily  it  will  be  told  me,  that  this  Con- 
sciousness of  Impressions,  which  is  in  men,  when 
they  do  see,  or  hear,  or  otherwise  perceive  Objects, 
by  the  Affections  of  their  External  Organs,  Arises 
in  them  only  from  the  Concomitance  of  the  Under- 
standing; because  in  men,  whatever  Affects  the 
Sense,  is  also  perceived  by  the  Understanding;  but 
that  there  neither  is,  nor  W  can  be,  any  such  thing 
in  other  Animals,  which  are  as  void  of  Conscious- 
ness of  any  Impression  made  upon  their  Organs,  as 
they  are  of  that  Reason  and  Understanding  that 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  6l 

makes  it  in  Men.  But  as  this  may  be  said,  so  it  may 
be  as  easily  Replyed  to;  for  'tis  as  impossible,  that 
Men  should  have  any  clear,  or  indeed  any  Idea,  at 
all  of  Sensation,  in  other  Species  of  Animals,  but  by 
that,  which  they  have  of  their  own ;  as  it  is  certain, 
that  Sensation  in  Men  cannot  be  understood  to  be 
without  Conception,  nor  Conception  without  Atten- 
tion of  Mind.  Attention  of  Mind,  is  the  Application 
of  it  unto  Objects,  and  therefore  in  Men,  is  called 
Minding:  Without  Attention  no  Conception,  and 
without  Conception  no  Consciousness;  Conscious- 
ness being  (as  I  have  said)  nothing  but  a  Sense  of 
Alteration  made  in  the  Mind,  by  some  new  Affec- 
tion of  it,  that  is,  by  a  new  Thought  or  Conception. 
Besides,  there  are  many  other  things  that  do  make 
for  this  Opinion,  that  all  Animal  Sensation  is  Cogi- 
tation; particularly,  that  great  Sagacity  that  is  in 
some  Animals,  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  with 
any  clearness,  but  by  allowing  to  them  a  great  de- 
gree of  Knowledge  and  Consciousness. 

And  hence  it  follows,  that  Sense  and  Imagina- 
tion, as  well  as  the  Under  stand  I9Hng  and  Reason, 
are  Mental  and  Spiritual,  not  meerly  Mechanick 
and  Material  Powers.  By  Mechanick  and  meerly 
Material  Powers  I  understand  such  as  do  result 
from  Matter  only,  and  the  Modes  of  Matter;  from 
Local  Motion  and  Rest,  and  from  Size,  Figure  and 
Texture.  By  Mental  Spiritual  Powers,  I  under- 
stand such  as  cannot  be  conceived  to  arise  from 
Matter  only,  and  the  Modes  of  Matter,  without  the 
Influence  of  Mind;  and  in  the  number  of  these  I 


62       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

reckon  Sense,  and  Imagination,  as  well  as  the 
Understanding  or  Reason.  It  is  true,  the  term 
[Mind]  is  Appropriated,  by  way  of  excellency,  to 
the  Understanding  or  Reason,  this  being  a  faculty 
that  hath  the  participation  of  Mind  in  a  higher  de- 
gree than  the  others  have:  But  yet,  there  is  Mind, 
and  as  much  of  Mind  in  all  the  Conceptive  Cogita- 
tive Acts  of  Sense  or  Imagination,  as  there  is  of 
Conception  and  Cogitation  in  them.  Thus  I  have 
shewed  how  Sense,  Imagination,  and  Reason  do 
agree,  now  I  am  to  shew  how  they  differ. 

Sense,  (by  which  I  mean  the  power  of  Seeing, 
of  Hearing,  of  Tasting,  of  Smelling,  and  of  Feel- 
ing,) is  that  by  which  we  make  acquaintance  with 
External  Objects,  and  have  Knowledge  of  them  by 
means  of  Images  and  Apparitions,  or  HO]  (which  is 
a  better  expression,  as  being  more  General  and 
Comprehensive,)  by  Sentiments  excited  in  the  Ex- 
ternal Organs,  through  Impressions  made  upon 
them  from  Objects.  Imagination  is  internal  Sense, 
or  an  (After)  Representation  of  the  Images  or 
Sentiments  (that  have  been)  excited  before  in  the 
Sense :  This  is  the  Basis  and  Foundation  of  it ;  Com- 
position, Division,  and  Enlargement  of  Images,  is 
but  Accessory,  but  Superstructure,  and  an  Improve- 
ment of  Sense.  Reason  or  Understanding,  is  a 
faculty  by  which  we  know  External  Objects,  as  well 
as  our  own  Acts,  without  framing  Images  of  them ; ; 
only  by  Ideas  or  Notions.  In  short,  Sensation,  prop- 
erly, is  Imagination,  for  every  Sense  Imagines; 
and  that,  which  commonly  is  called  Imagination,  is 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  63 

but  Remembrance,  or  Recollection  of  Sensation. 
Imagination,  is  Repetition  of  Sensation  made  from 
within,  Sensation,  is  Imagination  occasioned  by  im- 
mediate Impressions  from  without  us.  Reason  or 
Understanding,  is  refined,  Sublimated  Sensation, 
that  is,  a  conscious  preception  of  things  by  Notions 
or  Ideas,  and  not  by  Images,  or  sensible  Representa- 
tions. And  thus,  all  the  cogitative  powers  that  are 
in  Man,  may  be  reduced  to  Two,  to  Sense  and 
Reason;  the  former  comprehending  the  Imagina- 
tion, which  is  but  f11!  the  power  of  Remembering 
Sensations,  and  of  Amplifying  them ;  and  the  Letter 
comprehending  Intellectual  Remembrance,  which  is 
only  a  recollection  of  Ideas  or  Notions. 

But  to  make  a  Reflection  of  more  light,  it  may 
be  minded,  that  when  we  look  on  a  Book,  (to  In- 
stance in  a  thing  that  is  next  to  hand,)  and  read 
any  Sentence  in  it,  as  this,  God  is  a  Spirit,  we  have 
at  that  time  in  our  Eyes  the  Figures  of  the  Letters 
that  compose  the  Words,  and  so  do  know  by  them, 
what  the  words  are ;  and  this  is  Sense.  But  if  put- 
ting aside  the  Book  we  will  endeavour  to  Recollect 
those  words,  we  must  do  it  one  of  two  ways ;  either 
by  Retrieving  in  our  thoughts  the  very  Figures  and 
Images  of  the  Letters  and  Words  before  presented 
to  our  Eyes;  or  (which  we  oftnest  do)  by  recalling 
the  Words  and  Sentence,  and  saying  to  our  selves, 
or  unto  others,  God  is  a  Spirit,  without  thinking  in 
the  least,  of  any  Figures  of  the  Letters  that  do  make 
the  Words,  or  of  the  Images  of  the  Words  that 
compose  the  Sentence.  In  the  former  we  do  Imag- 


64      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

ine  the  Sentence,  as  raising  again  the  Images  of  the 
Words  that  make  it,  and  this  is  Sensible  Remem- 
brance ;  but  in  the  latter,  though,  when  we  Recollect 
the  Sentence,  we  must  withal  (some  way  t12!  or 
other)  mind  again  the  words  that  compose  it,  yet  we 
do  it  without  Imagining  them,  and  this  is  Intel- 
lectual Remembrance,  or  the  act  of  the  Reason 
Add,  that  at  the  same  time  that  we  do  see  the 
Schemes  and  Figures  of  the  Letters,  and  have  the 
portraictures  and  draughts  of  the  words  presented 
to  our  Eyes,  which  is  Sense,  we  have,  or  may  have, 
in  our  minds  the  sense  and  meaning  of  those  words, 
of  which  sense  or  meaning  however,  we  have  nei- 
ther Picture  or  Figure ;  and  this  is  Understanding : 
In  the  former  we  have  Images,  in  the  latter  only 
Ideas ;  we  See  the  words,  but  understand  the  mean- 
ing. This  power  of  the  Mind,  (of  perceiving  with- 
out Imagining,)  is  called  Reason,  because  in  those 
Acts  in  which  it  does  converse  with  things  by  means 
of  words  (and  those  are  most  of  the  Acts  exerted 
by  it)  the  sense  and  meaning  of  the  words  is  (as  it 
were)  Inferred  and  Reasoned  from  them.  What  I 
have  said,  suffices  to  make  the  Notion  or  Idea  of 
Reason  or  Understanding  conceivable,  by  men  who 
use  Attention,  and  do  think,  but  nothing  will  be 
enough  to  explicate  and  set  it  out  to  such  as  cannot 
endure  that  trouble,  but  will  swallow  all  things  with- 
out chewing — f13! 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  65 


SECT.   II. 

Of  Reason  as  taken  for  Contrivance,  Contrivance, 
what,  Sagacity  what.  Reason  taken  but  for 
Contrivance,  not  Char  act  eristical  to  Man.  Of 
the  Imaginative  Contrivance  in  Irrational  Ani- 
mals. An  Instance  of  it  in  a  certain  Hen.  Ap- 
prehension, Composition,  Illation,  Acts  of  the 
Imagination,  as  well  as  of  the  Reason  or  Under- 
standing. Composition  of  Phantasms,  how  Il- 
lustrated by  Mr.  Hobbs.  That  Reason  taken 
for  the  Understanding  (in  the  Notion  of  Under- 
standing set  led  before)  agrees  to  no  other  Ani- 
mal but  Man.  Of  Prince  Maurices  Parrot.  The 
Acts  of  Reason  as  taken  for  the  Understanding, 
reduced  to  two,  to  wit,  Apprehension  and  Judg- 
ment. 

************ 
************ 

CHAP.  II. 

Of  Apprehension. 
SECT.  i. 

Apprehension,  the  first  Act  of  Reason.  Of  Words, 
the  ordinary  Means  of  Apprehension.  The 
Ends  and  Uses  of  Words,  i.  To  distinguish 
things  as  they  are  in  the  Mind,  in  which,  words 
do  stand  for  things. ,  Why  Mind  is  called  Un- 
derstanding. 2.  To  express  our  Thoughts  and 
Conceptions  one  to  another.  The  Importance  of 


66      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Words  unto  Knowledge,  in  this  second  Use  of 
them.  Of  the  Sense  of  Words.  Of  Canting. 
All  Use  of  New  Words,  not  Canting.  The 
Sense  of  Words  twofold;  Verbal,  and  Reall. 
This  distinction  of  the  Senses  of  Words  Il- 
lustrated, and  the  Usefulness  thereof  explained. 
Why  the  Meaning  of  Words  is  called  Sense. 

Apprehension,  or  that  Act  of  the  Reason  or  Un- 
derstanding, in  respect  of  which  it  is  said  to  see  or 
perceive  things,  is  the  same  in  reference  to  this  fac- 
ulty, that  seeing  is  unto  the  Eye:  for  the  mind  to 
apprehend,  perceive,  or  know  any  Object,  is  the 
same  (to  speak  by  way  of  allusion  and  similitude) 
as  for  the  Eye  to  see,  or  discern  one.  t24l 

What  I  have  said  in  the  former  Chapter,  does 
cast  some  Light  on  this  Subject ;  but  yet  to  set  it  out 
more  fully,  I  will  consider,  First,  the  Ordinary 
Means  the  Understanding  uses  in  its  Acts  of  Appre- 
hension, and  those  are  Words.  Secondly,  The  im- 
mediate Object  of  Apprehension,  and  that  is  Notion, 
or  Intellectual  Sentiment;  Sentiment  of  the  Mind. 
Thirdly,  The  two  chief  Affections  of  Apprehension, 
and  those  are  clearness  and  distinctness;  of  which 
three  considerations ;  the  Second  properly  is  a  Sub- 
ject of  Metaphysicks ;  the  Third  of  Logick ;  and  the 
First  is  common  to  both. 


A  Distinction  then  there  is  ( and  that  a  remark- 
able one  too)  between  the  verbal,  and  real,  meaning 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  67 

of  words;  which  to  set  out  more  fully,  I  will  show, 
First f  The  Occasion,  and  Rise  of  it,  and  then 
Secondly,  The  Use  and  Benefit  of  it. 

First  then,  this  distinction  Arises  from  the  Im- 
perfection and  Inadequacy  of  Human  Knowledge; 
we  Knowing  little  of  things  but  under  words,  and 
words  being  (immediately)  the  signs  but,  of  our 
Conceptions,  which  are  always  short  and  narrow, 
and,  too  often,  indistinct  and  confused.  Now  if  the 
sentiments  we  have  according  to  the  Vulgar  and 
Ordinary  way  of  conceiving,  which  is  but  general 
and  confused,  do  cohere  and  hang  together,  when 
one  of  them  is  affirmed  or  spoken  of  another,  so  that 
the  Notions  are  compossible  in  common  acceptation, 
we  call  it  sense,  though  really  the  things  themselves 
(for  which  those  words  are  understood  to  stand)  be 
Incompossible,  and  repugnant  each  to  other,  and 
therefore  indeed  it  is  Nonsense.  This  is  to  be  better 
understood  in  Examples.  Such  Propositions  as 
these,  that  Colours  (even  as  to  their  Images)  are 
in  the  Objects  in  which  they  do  appear ;  that  Odours 
are  in  the  things  smelled;  that  Sapors  are  in  the 
things  that  are  tasted ;  these  and  the  like  Assertions 
are  not  com^lmonly  understood,  or  said,  to  be  Non- 
sense, because,  Knowing  in  the  general  and  con- 
fusedly, what  is  meant  by  colour,  what  by  Odor,  and 
what  by  Sapor,  as  likewise  what  is  meant  by  the 
thing  seen,  by  the  thing  that  is  tasted,  and  by  the 
thing  which  is  smelled;  nothing  appears  in  those 
confused  general  Notions  (which  we  have,)  to 
hinder  us  from  thinking  that  Colours,  Sapors,  and 


68      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Odours  do  as  really  Inhere  in  those  external  objects, 
as  they  seem  to  do.  And  yet  to  a  Person  that  hath 
distinct,  real,  and  just  conceptions  of  the  several 
subjects  and  predicates  in  those  propositions,  it  is 
evident,  that  'tis  as  gross  and  palpable  Nonsense  to 
affirm  that  Colours,  Sapors,  Odours,  and  other  Ac- 
cidents, (which  are  but  Phaenomena  and  Intentional 
beings)  do  really  exist  in  the  Subjects  where  they 
seem  to  be,  as  to  say,  that  there  are  Notions  and 
Cogitations  in  a  Wall,  in  a  Figg,  or  in  a  Rose,  than 
which  there  cannot  be  a  greater  Bull  or  absurdity. 

The  Usefulness  of  this  distinction,  is  greater 
than  most  will  think;  since  from  the  want  of  mak- 
ing, or  of  observing  it,  it  comes  to  pass,  that  so  many 
do  run  into  great  mistakes  and  errours,  in  their  dis- 
courses; Do  skirmish  one  with  another,  to  no  pur- 
pose, and  without  end;  and  oft37Hen  do  differ  from 
themselves,  as  much  as  each  from  other.  For  few 
there  are  that  do  fix  and  settle  even  the  verbal  Sense 
of  words,  (which  often  have  a  doubleness  of  mean- 
ing, and  then  are  called  Ambiguous;)  and  fewer 
that  do  think  of  the  real,  without  which  yet,  they 
can  never  come  to  any  certainty;  so  that,  (as  Mr. 
Hobbs  has  ingeniously  said;  words  that  are  Wise 
Mens  Counters,  become  Fools  Mony.29 

The  meaning  of  words,  as  well  the  verbal,  as 
the  real,  is  called  Sense,  because  the  Perception  of 
it  ought  to  be  as  Clear,  and  distinct,  and  as  steady 
and  fixt,  as  that  of  Sense  is :  For  words,  to  be  under- 
stood as  they  ought,  must  have  their  meanings  be 
as  clearly  and  distinctly  perceived,  by  the  mind,  as 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  69 

objects  of  Sense  when  they  are  Seen,  or  Heard,  or 
Tasted,  or  Smelled,  are  by  the  Senses.  I38! 

SECT.   II. 

All  Falsity  is  not  Nonsense;  but  all  impossible  Fal- 
sity is.  Repugnance  in  the  mind  to  yield  assent 
to  propositions  that  are  Nonsence.  Whence 
it  arises.  Of  Enthusiasm,  as  it  is  a  kind  of 
Nonsence.  What  Enthusiasm  is.  The  dis- 
tributions of  it.  Examples  of  the  several  Kinds 
of  Enthusiasm,  out  of  Dr.  Fludd,  and  in  the 
Magick  Aphorisms  of  the  Rosy-crusians.  That 
Enthusiasts  where  they  seem  to  understand 
one  another,  do  so  by  Sympathy  only,  and  not 
by  way  of  Apprehension  and  Judgment.  How 
this  may  be,  set  out  in  a  story  very  Remarkable. 


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***** 
*        *        *        *        * 


SECT.  III. 

Of  Questions,  their  Nature,  and  their  distribution. 
That  a  Question  is  neither  true,  nor  false; 
neither  Affirmative  nor  Negative.  An  Objec- 
tion removed.  That  proceeding  by  way  of 
Question,  or  as  it  were  of  Inquiry,  in  Common 
Discourse,  is  very  useful,  as  well  as  Civil.  Judg- 
ment required  in  putting  Pertinent  Questions. 

************ 
************ 


7O      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


CHAP.  III. 

Of  Notion,  the  immediate  Object  of  Apprehension. 

SECT.  i. 

That  Notion  may  be  considered  tivo  ways.  ist.  In 
general;  and  2\y.  more  specially.  Of  Notion  in 
the  general  sense  of  the  Word.  No  Original 
Native  Notions.  Why  it  seems  as  if  there  were. 
The  Notion  of  Apprehension  cleared.  Of  No- 
tion in  the  special  and  limited  Sense  of  the 
Word,  what  it  is.  That  the  understanding  ap- 
prehends things  but  inadequately,  and  under 
Notions  in  the  limited  sense.  This  evidenced 
by  several  considerations.  An  Objection  against 
it  removed. 

I  have  spoken  of  words  the  ordinary,  but  insti- 
tuted, means  of  Apprehension;  I  am  now  to  speak 
of  Notion,  the  immediate  Object  (some  would  call 
it  the  natural  means)  of  Apprehension. 

The  word  Notion,  may  be  considered  two  ways, 
either  as  it  does  signifie  more  generally  and  largely, 
or  as  it  is  taken  in  a  more  restrained,  special  and 
particular  sense,  f52! 

A  Notion  in  the  general  and  larger  aceptation 
of  the  word,  is  any  conception  formed  by  the  Mind 
in  reference  to  Objects;  and  so  taken,  is  the  same 
with  a  thought,  or  that,  in  respect  of  the  Mind,  that 
a  Sentiment  largely  taken,  is,  in  respect  of  the  sense. 
I  say  a  Sentiment  largely  taken ;  for  instance ;  when 
Sentiment  is  taken  in  respect  of  the  Visive  Power, 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  "J\ 

not  strictly  and  properly  for  light,  or  colour  only; 
but  largely,  for  any  perception  that  the  Eye  has,  by 
way  of  sight,  of  things,  or  of  their  relations  and 
habitudes.  And  since  there  is  so  great  an  Analogy 
between  the  Eye  and  the  Understanding,  and  be- 
tween the  Sentiments  of  the  one,  and  of  the  other, 
it  will  be  an  easy  inference,  that  no  reason  can  be 
given  why  there  should  be  Original  Innate  Notions 
in  the  Understanding  (as  some  imagine  there  must") 
that  it  may  be  able  to  apprehend,  which  will  not 
equally  argue,  that  there  should  be  the  like  original 
Figures  and  Images  in  the  Eye,  which  should  enable 
it  to  see ;  and  yet  none  will  Allow  of  these. 

But  to  show  how  It  comes  to  pass,  that  there  are 
(as  there  are)  appearances  as  if  the  mind  had  some 
original  innate  Notions,21  which  for  that  reason  are 
called  Prolepses  and  Anticipations,  and  withal  to 
bring  some  light  to  the  business  of  Apprehension, 
[S3]  which  (as  to  the  way  of  it)  is  obscure  enough, 
and  but  seldom  touched  to  any  purpose :  I  will  offer 
an  Observation  very  common,  but  (as  it  may  be 
applied)  very  luciferous  in  reference  to  this  Subject. 

Everybody  observes,  that  if  a  Blow  is  aimed  at 
the  Head  of  any  person,  he  will  hold  up  his  Arm  to 
receive  it,  and  keep  it  from  his  head,  without  think- 
ing either  that,  or  why,  he  does  so;  and  this  is  said 
to  be  done  Naturally,  and  by  instinct;  because,  in 
truth,  it  is  done  without  premeditation,  and  so,  at 
that  time,  without  any  actual  conceived  design. 

And  yet  again  it  is  certain,  that  an  Infant  will 
not  do  so,  or  any  Child  before  it  has  been  taught  and 


72      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

instructed  to  do  it;  which  makes  it  plain,  that  the 
doing  so  in  those  who  are  come  to  reason,  is  no  effect 
of  natural  instinct,  but  of  use;  only  the  Child  was 
taught  to  do  it  so  early  that  by  the  time  he  comes  to 
the  Age  of  Discretion,  having  forgotten,  or  rather, 
having  made  no  observation,  when  it  was  first 
taught,  or  first  did  it,  and  upon  what  Motives,  and 
doing  it  now  without  deliberation  it  hath  the  aspect 
of  a  thing  effected  by  Nature,  and  not  of  a  custom 
or  habit. 

In  the  same  manner  in  the  business  of  Reason, 
we  may,  and  often  do  proceed  up^on  Principles 
instilled  into  us  very  early,  and  are  Acted  by  them, 
without  Knowing  how,  or  why,  it  being  no  Effect 
of  present  consideration.  Experience  confirms  this, 
since  we  may  be  certain,  if  we  do  but  attend  to  our 
own  Actions,  that,  many  times,  we  are  carried  to 
the  Affection,  or  Disaffection  of  things,  and  the  Ap- 
probation or  Disapprobation  of  them,  we  Know  not 
why,  and  yet  all  the  passions  and  Motions  of  our 
Mind,  have  Reasons  for  them ;  for  all  Effects  must 
have  Causes;  but  these,  sometimes,  are  so  early 
graffed  in  us,  and,  at  other  times,  so  unawares,  that 
we  remember  not  they  were  so ;  and  then  the  Effects, 
only  being  observed,  and  the  causes  lying  deep,  hid- 
den and  secret,  we  do  call  it  Nature,  or  Instinct, 
though  in  truth,  it  be  Reason,  and  habit,  as  much  as 
any  thing  else  is. 

Again,  much  the  same  way  we  do  compute  or 
reckon;  for  when  we  use  any  greater  numbers, 
either  in  Addition,  or  in  Substraction,  or  in  any 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  73 

other  Arithmetical  operation,  we  do  it  without  any 
actual  consideration  of  what  the  lesser  particular 
numbers  are  that  make  the  greater,  for  that  we  have 
done  before,  (perhaps  long,)  and  consequently  are 
possessed  of  the  Ideas  (may  I  so  express  it)  without 
the  Images  of  them.  But  at  first,  we  had  I55!  a  par- 
ticular Knowledge.  As,  when  we  Multiply  and  say, 
Six  and  Six  is  Twelve,  and  Twelve  and  Twelve  is 
Four  and  Twenty,  we  do  it  without  considering 
actually  at  that  time,  that  six  is  so  many  unites, 
though  at  first  (but  possibly  so  long  ago  that  we  do 
not  remember  it)  we  did  so,  and  must  (do  so)  to 
Know  the  particular  value  of  that  number;  and  the 
like  is  of  others. 

And  thus  also  with  an  easie  Application  may  it 
be  conceived,  how  words  come  to  stand  in  the  mind 
for  things,  and  that  when  we  have  the  word,  we 
think  we  have  the  simple  Idea  of  the  thing;  it  is  just 
as  the  Figure  [6]  doth  stand  for  the  number  [Six]. 
And  that  when  once  we  have  had  a  distinct  Idea  or 
Notion  of  the  Number,  afterward,  (without  actual 
thinking  thereof,)  we  use  the  Figure  instead  of  it, 
and  that  as  well,  or  better  than  if  we  did  distinctly 
consider  the  Number  it  self.  Now,  words  do  carry 
the  same  Relation  unto  things,  that  Figures  do  unto 
Numbers,  and  both  Words  and  Figures  seem  to  de- 
rive the  power  which  they  have  of  standing  in  the 
Mind  as  Representatives,  from  the  connexion  they 
have,  Figures  with  Numbers,  and  Words  with 
Things;  after  the  same  manner  as  we  hold  up  our 
Arm,  or  a  Stick,  to  save  our  Head,  with^out 


74      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE.  •, 

thinking  of  saving  it.  For  though  the  Action  pre- 
vents all  actual  thought  of  the  End  of  it,  yet  'tis 
done  for  an  End,  in  vertue  of  its  first  Direction 
and  Use.  This  Discourse  attended  to,  and  well  di- 
gested, will  open  a  great  light  into  the  way  in  which 
the  Understanding  comes  to  have  Apprehension  of 
things  by  the  means  of  Words;  and  to  form  its 
Ideas  and  Notions,  taking  Notions  largely  for  any 
Thoughts  or  Conceptions. 

But  besides  the  former  Sense  of  the  Word  [No- 
tion,] there  is  Another  which  is  more  Restrained 
and  Limited;  in  which  a  Notion  is  Modus  Con- 
cipiendi,  a  certain  particular  manner  of  conceiving ; 
a  manner  of  conceiving  things  that  corresponds  not 
to  them  but  only  as  they  are  Objects,  not  as  they  are 
Things  •  there  being  in  every  Conception  some  thing 
that  is  purely  Objective,  purely  Notional ;  in  so  much 
that  few,  if  any,  of  the  Ideas  which  we  have  of 
things  are  properly  Pictures;  our  Conceptions  of 
things  no  more  resembling  them  in  strict  Propriety, 
than  our  Words  do  our  Conceptions,  for  which  yet 
they  do  stand,  and  with  which  they  have  a  Kind  of 
Correspondence  and  Answering;  just  as  Figures 
that  do  stand  for  Numbers;  yet  are  no  wise  like 
them.  [57] 

To  make  this  clearer,  it  must  be  considered  that 
the  Eye  has  no  perception  of  things  but  under  the 
Appearance  of  Light,  and  Colours,  and  yet  Light 
and  Colours  do  not  really  exist  in  the  things  them- 
selves, that  are  perceived  and  seen  by  means  of 
them,  but  are  only  in  the  Eye.  Likewise  the  Ear 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  75 

has  no  perceivance  of  things,  as  of  a  Bell,  of  a  Lute, 
or  of  a  Viol,  but  under  sounds,  and  yet  sound  is 
only  a  sentiment  in  the  Ear  that  hears,  and  is  not, 
or  any  thing  like  it,  in  the  Bell,  or  Viol,  or  Lute 
that  is  heard.  For  as  the  Eye  has  no  Perceivance 
of  things  but  under  Colours  that  are  not  in  them, 
(and  the  same  time  with  due  alteration,  must  be 
said  of  the  other  Senses.)  So  the  Understanding 
Apprehends  not  things,  or  any  Habitudes  or  Aspects 
of 'them,  but  under  Certain  Notions  that  neither 
have  that  being  in  Objects,  or  that  being  of  Objects, 
that  they  seem  to  have ;  but  are,  in  all  respects,  the 
very  same  to  the  mind  or  Understanding,  that 
Colours  are  to  the  Eye,  and  Sound  to  the  Ear.  To 
be  more  particular,  the  Understanding  conceives  not 
any  thing  but  under  the  Notion  of  an  Entity30  and 
this  either  a  Substance  or  an  Accident;  Under  that 
of  a  whole,  ore  of  a  part;  or  of  a  Cause,  or  of  an 
Effect,  or  the  like;  and  yet  all  these  and  the  like, 
are  only  Entities  of  Reason  conf^ceived  within  the 
mind,  that  have  no  more  of  any  real  true  Existence 
without  it,  than  Colours  have  without  the  Eye,  or 
Sounds  without  the  Ear.  Every  person  that  hath 
the  least  Understanding  of  the  way  in  which  we  do 
apprehend  things,  will  yield  this  to  be  true  as  to 
Whole  and  Part,  to  Cause  and  Effect,  and  to  all  the 
Notions  which  are  commonly  termed  by  Logicians 
the  Second;  and  it  is  as  certainly  true  in  reference 
to  Substance  and  Accident,  to  Quantity,  Quality, 
and  those  other  General  Notions  under  which  the 
Understanding  apprehends  its  Objects,  though  com- 


76      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

monly  they  are  called  First  ones,  and  in  comparison 
of  the  others  are  so. 

I  have  laboured  the  more  to  make  the  Notion 
that  I  have  in  this  business  plain  and  easie,  because 
much  of  what  is  to  be  said  hereafter  will  depend 
upon  it;  and  now  taking  it  for  granted  that  my 
meaning  is  Intelligible,  what  remains,  is  to  evince 
true;  and  this  I  shall  do,  from  the  very  Nature  of 
Cogitation  in  general,  (as  it  comprehends  Sensa- 
tion as  well  as  Intellection,)  since  that  the  Under- 
standing doth  Finn  its  Notions  upon  Objects,  arises 
not  from  its  being  Such  a  particular  Kind  of  Cogi- 
tative Faculty,  but  from  its  being  Cogitative  at 
large;  let  us  then  reflect  f59!  again  on  the  Nature 
of  Cogitation  at  large. 

It  is  certain  that  things  to  us  Men  are  nothing 
but  as  they  do  stand  in  our  Analogy  that  is,  in  plain 
terms,  they  are  nothing  to  us  but  as  they  are  known 
by  us;  and  as  certain,  that  they  stand  not  in  our 
Analogy,  nor  are  Known  by  us,  but  as  they  are  in 
our  Faculties,  in  our  Senses,  Imagination,  or  Mind ; 
and  they  are  not  in  our  Faculties,  either  in  their  own 
realities,  or  by  way  of  a  true  Resemblance  and 
Representation,  but  only  in  respect  of  certain  Ap- 
pearances or  Sentiments,  which,  by  the  various  im- 
pressions that  they  make  upon  us,  they  do  either 
Occasion  only,  or  Cause,  or  (which  is  most  prob- 
able) concur  unto  in  Causing  with  our  Faculties. 
Every  Cogitative  Faculty,  though  it  is  not  the  Sole 
Cause  of  its  own  immediate  [apparant]  Object,  yet 
has  a  share  in  making  it:  Thus  the  Eye  or  Visive 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  77 

Faculty  hath  a  share  in  making  the  Colours  which  it 
is  said  to  see;  the  Ear  or  Auditive  Power,  a  share 
in  producing  sounds,  which  yet  it  is  said  to  hear; 
the  Imagination  has  a  part  in  making  the  Images 
stored  in  it;  and  there  is  the  same  Reason  for  the 
Understanding,  that  it  should  have  a  like  share  in 
framing  the  Primitive  Notions  under  which  it  takes 
in  and  receives  Objects:  In  I60!  summ,  the  imme- 
diate Objects  of  cogitation,  as  it  is  exercised  by  men, 
are  entia  cogitationis,  all  Phaenomena;  Appear- 
ances that  do  no  more  exist  without  our  faculties 
in  the  things  themselves,  than  the  Images  that  are 
seen  in  water,  or  behind  a  glass,  do  really  exist  in 
those  places  where  they  seem  to  be. 

But  as  this  is  a  truth  that  Many  will  admit  with 
more  facility  in  reference  to  the  Objects  of  Sense, 
and  Imagination,  as  Colours,  Sapors,  Sounds,  &c. 
Than  to  those  of  the  Mind  or  Understanding,  such 
as  Substance,  Accident,  Quality,  Action,  &c.  So  I 
find  my  self  obliged  to  give  a  farther  demonstration 
that  it  holds  in  these,  as  well  as  in  those;  which  I 
hope  to  do  by  the  following  Considerations. 

First,  the  understanding  converses  not  with 
things  ordinarily  but  by  the  Intervention  of  the 
sense,  and  since  sentiments  of  sense  are  but  Ap- 
pearances, not  Pictures,  or  proper  Representations, 
it  is  hard  to  conceive  how  such  conceptions  are 
framed  only  by  their  occasion,  and  only  wrought 
out  of  them,  should  be  portraits  of  the  things  them- 
selves, and  made  just  and  exact  to  them. 


78      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Secondly,  The  understanding  is  a  power  t61^  of 
that  nature  that  many  think  it  doth  not  immediately 
Attinge  (as  they  call  it)  or  reach  particular  singular 
beings,  which  yet  are  the  only  beings  that  compose 
the  Universe,  as  members  or  parts  of  it ;  and  really, 
it  uses  to  proceed  by  way  of  Abstraction,  and  there- 
fore doth  more  Connaturally  converse  with  Uni- 
versals,  that  are  not  of  Mundane  existence,  than 
with  singulars  that  are.  Now,  since  things  as  they 
are  in  the  mind,  do  undergo  an  Abstraction  and 
sublimation,  certain  it  is, 'they  must  put  on  another 
dress  there,  and  so  appear  in  quite  another  shape 
than  that  they  have  in  the  World.  In  short,  All 
Agree  that  our  conceptions  of  things  are  but  inade- 
quate, as  indeed  they  must  needs  be,  since  things 
have  much  Refraction  (may  I  so  express  it)  both 
before  they  come  and  after  that  they  come,  to  the 
mind ;  and  if  they  are  inadequate,  they  cannot  be 
commensurate,  that  is,  they  cannot  be  so  just  and 
exact,  to  things,  as  to  show  them  as  they  be.,  and  in 
their  own  existences. 

Thirdly,  It  may  be  Argued  from  the  very  nature 
of  an  Idea  or  notion ;  since  this  after  a  sort  is  a  senti- 
ment of  the  mind,  as  a  sentiment  (properly  so 
called)  is,  after  a  sort,  an  Idea  or  Notion  of  the 
sense;  the  ^621  immediate  objects  of  the  sense  are 
sensible  sentiments,  and  those  of  the  understanding 
are  Intellectual  ones;  which  they  must  needs  be,  be- 
cause the  understanding  it  self  is  a  kind  of  sense, 
only  a  more  sublimed  and  raised.  Mens  ipsa  (says 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  79 

Cicero,  1.  4.  Academ.  Quaest.)  quae  sensuum  fons 
est,  etiam  ipsa  Sensus  est,  &c.31 

In  fine,  this  is  so  certain  a  truth,  that  whosoever 
reflects,  tho'  never  so  little,  cannot  chuse  but  ob- 
serve that  as  he  takes  in  nothing  by  his  sense  but 
under  sentiments,  which  are  the  notions  of  sense,  so 
he  receives  in  nothing  in  his  understanding,  but 
under  certain  notions,  which  are  the  sentiments  of 
the  mind ;  since  he  knows  nothing  Intellectually  but 
either  in  general  only,  under  the  notion  of  a  thing, 
or  more  specially  under  that  of  a  substance,  or  else 
of  an  Accident;  and  what  are  all  these  but  Objective 
Notions?*  as  will  appear  in  particular  upon  the  ex- 
amination and  Tryal  of  them. 

Let  us  then  inquire  first  into  the  thing,  (for  we 
shall  shew  it  of  Substance  and  Accident  hereafter) 
and  what  is  thing  but  modus  concipiendif  a  notion 
or  sentiment  that  the  mind  has,  of  whatsoever  any 
wise  is,  because  it  is?  Thing  indeed  is  the  most 
general  notion,  but  then  it  is  but  a  notion,  because  it 
is  general;  and  has  the  most  of  f63!  a  notion,  because 
it  is  the  most  general.  To  be  more  particular;  If 
the  Question  be  asked,  what  thing  is?  or  what  is 
meant  by  that  word  ?  Some  have  no  other  Answer 
but  this,  that  a  thing  is  that  which  hath  essence.  But 
then  it  may  be  farther  demanded,  what  is  meant  by 
essence,  which  is  said  to  be  had?  What  it  is  to  have 
essence  ?  And  what  is  meant  by  that,  which  hath  it  ? 
Or  if  it  be  said,  that  a  thing  is  that,  which  is,  (as  it 
is  by  others;)  the  same  difficulties  again  occur:  for 
it  may  be  demanded,  what  that  is,  which  is?  And 


8O      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

what  is  meant,  when  it  is  said  to  be  ?  And  whether 
Existence  be  Essence?  especially  since  Existence 
seems  not  the  first  conception  of  a  thing;  but  is  a 
second,  or  after-conception ;  as  not  being-  that,  which 
makes  a  thing  to  be  what  it  is,  [a  thing;]  but  what 
only  makes  it  a  thing  in  being. 

By  this,  it  plainly  appears,  that  the  meaning  of 
the  word  [thing,]  is  but  an  inadequate  conception, 
arising  in  the  mind  upon  its  conversing  with  Ob- 
jects, and  so  doth  speak  a  certain  particular  senti- 
ment, which  the  mind  has  of  them;  a  sentiment 
better  understood,  than  defined  by  words;  but  a 
sentiment  too,  that  doth  not  enter  us  into  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  Reality  it  self  (may  I  so  express  it,) 
of  that  which  is;  zvhich  we  only  apprehend  inade- 
quately, f64}  under  the  Disguise  and  Masquerade  of 
notions.  As.  that  it  is  that,  which  is ;  or  that  which 
has  essence;  or  the  like;  but  not  by  any  adequate 
exact  conception.  And  as  for  Substance  and  Acci- 
dent, which  yet  are  the  first  steps  we  make  toward 
a  distinct  Perceivance  and  knowledge  of  things; 
what  are  they,  but  likewise  Modi  concipiendiJ 
Entities  of  Reason,  or  notions,  that  (it  is  true)  are 
not  without  grounds,  but  yet  that  have,  themselves, 
no  Formal  being  but  only  in  the  Mind,  that  frames 
them ;  there  being  no  such  thing  in  the  World  as  a 
Substance,  or  an  Accident,  any  more  than  such  a 
thing  as  a  Subject,  or  an  Adjunct;  and  yet  we  ap- 
prehend not  any  thing  but  as  one  of  these,  to  wit, 
as  a  Substance,  or  as  an  Accident;  so  that  we  ap- 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  8l 

prehend  not  any  at  all,  just  as  they  are,  in  their 
own  realities,  but  only  under  the  Top-knots  and 
Dresses  of  Notions,  which  our  minds  do  put  on 
them. 

But  here  it  will  be  told  me,  that  plain  unlearned 
men,  who  yet  do  exercise  the  Acts  of  Reasoning  well 
enough,  and  perhaps  in  the  best  manner,  as  doing  it 
without  Art,  and  in  a  way  the  most  agreeable  to 
Nature,  do  conceive  and  speak  of  things  without 
conceiving  or  minding  of  Notions,  such  as  I  have 
mention'd;  for  they  conceive  and  speak  of  man,  of 
good  and  f65!  evil,  of  vertue  and  vice,  and  the  like, 
without  conceiving  or  minding  of  Substances,  or 
Accidents.  But  this  is  easily  got  over.  For  tho' 
unlearned  plain  men  do  not  explicitly  and  in  terms 
denominate  goodness,  vertue,  vice,  &c.  Accidents, 
yet  since  they  do  conceive  them  (as  All  do)  all 
things  that  are  in  a  man,  or  in  some  other  thing, 
tho'  they  do  not  call  them  Accidents,  yet  do  they 
conceive  them  a^  Accidents:  And  when  they  do 
conceive,  or  say  of  a  man,  for  instance,  that  he  is 
vertuous  or  vicious,  or  the  like,  they  do  conceive 
him  to  have  vertue  or  vice  in  him ;  that  is,  tho'  they 
do  not  think  of  the  name  substance,  yet  they  do 
really  conceive  that  person  to  be  one;  since  a  sub- 
stance is  nothing  but  a  subject,  or  a  thing  that  has 
other  things  in  it  as  Accidents;  whereas  in  truth, 
neither  Accident,  nor  Substance  hath  any  being  but 
only  in  the  mind,  and  by  the  only  vertue  of  cogita- 
tion or  thought.  I66! 


82       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


SECT.   II. 

Inferences  from  the  former  Discourse;  first,  that 
human  knowledge  for  the  most  part  is  but  in- 
tentional, not  real.  The  usefulness  of  this  In- 
ference; an  Objection  against  it  removed.  (And 
yet)  Secondly,  That  the  immediate  Objects  of 
the  cogitative  Powers  are  somewise  external  to 
those  powers;  and  this,  both  as  to  appearances, 
(which  is  sensibly  demonstrated)  and  as  to 
their  grounds.  Two  other  Inferences  added; 
the  first  in  reference  to  the  grounds  of  the  Doc- 
trine of  the  old  Academy;  the  second  concern- 
ing the  obligation  we  are  under  ordinarily  to 
conceive  and  speak  of  things  as  they  are  in  out 
Analogy,  and  do  appear  to  our  faculties. 

I  infer  from  the  former  Discourse;  First,  that 
human  knowledge  (at  least  for  the  most  part)  is 
but  Intentional,  not  Real ;  and  that  we  have  no  Per- 
ception of  any  thing,  (in  any  degree  to  speak  of,) 
just  as  it  is  in  its  own  Reality  and  being.  For  all 
our  notions  and  conceptions  of  things,  are  of  them 
under  sentiments',  the  understanding  it  self  (as  I 
argued  before)  t67!  being  but  a  higher  and  more 
sublimated  sense;  and  sentiments  (as  such)  are  in 
their  own  formalities  but  apparently  only,  not  ex- 
istently,  without  the  faculties  that  do  conceive  them. 
To  be  particular,  we  have  no  perception  or  knowl- 
edge of  any  thing  but  as  it  is  a  Substance,  or  an 
Accident,  or  a  Quality,  &c.  And  these  are  only 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  83 

notions:  for  example,  as  to  Water",  we  have  no 
knowledge  of  it  by  all,  or  any  of  our  senses,  what 
really  it  is  in  it  self,  just  as  it  is,  and  absolutely 
speaking;  for  we  are  utterly  ignorant  (otherwise 
than  by  Conjecture)  of  the  Magnitude  and  size  of 
the  little  parts  that  compose  it;  Ignorant  of  their 
figure  and  shape ;  and  Ignorant  also  of  the  kind,  and 
degree  of  motion  they  have ;  all  this  we  are  Ignorant 
of,  and  yet  this  is  all  that  is  Real  in  Water.  But  as 
Ignorant  as  we  are  of  what  it  really  is,  in  it  self,  and 
absolutely  considered,  we  have  much  Comparative 
Relative  Knowledge  of  it;  for  we  know  it  by  sense 
to  be  fluid ;  to  have  some  degree  of  tenacity  or  vis  - 
cosity ;  to  be  moist ;  in  a  word,  to  have  so  many  Qual- 
ities (for  so  we  conceive  and  speak)  that  all  put  to- 
gether, do  give  the  mind  a  sufficient  rise  to  distin- 
guish it,  as  a  different  substance,  from  Earth,  or 
Fire ;  So  that  a  person  that  has  at  any  time  had  t68! 
the  perception32  of  them  all,  will  not  mistake  them 
afterward,  one  for  the  other. 

But  here  it  must  be  remembred,  that  (as  I  have 
shewed  before)  tho'  we  do  not  see  the  reality  of 
things  immediately,  and  just  as  it  is  in  the  things 
themselves,  yet  by  means  of  sentiments  and  notions, 
we  do  somewise,  perceive  it;  as  the  Eye  that  sees 
not  anything  immediately  but  Light  or  Colours,  yet 
by  means  of  Light  and  Colours,  discerns  Gold,  Sil- 
ver, Stones,  Wood,  as  also  the  Magnitudes,  the 
Figures,  the  motions,  the  distances  of  things;  with 
a  thousand  other  Realities,  so  the  understanding 
discerns  infinite  Realities,  infinite  habitudes  of 


84      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

things;  not  indeed  immediately,  but  either  under 
the  sentiments  of  sense,  or  by  means  of  its  own, 
which  I  call  notions ;  as  of  Substance,  Quality,  Cause, 
Effect,  Whole,  Part,  &c. 

I  have  been  somewhat  longer  in  the  Explication 
of  this  Inference,  because  to  know  the  nature  of  our 
Knowledge,  must  needs  be  of  great  advantage  unto 
us;  and  much  relieve  us  in  our  Inquiry  after  the 
nature  of  Things :  since  it  frees  us  from  the  confu- 
sion, that  our  mind  must  necessarily  be  in,  should  it 
take  the  Apparitions  of  things  ( for  such  sentiments 
and  notions  are)  to  be  external  and  real  Existences. 
Would  not  a  thinking  man  be  much  per^plexed, 
to  make  a  satisfying  conception,  what  that  Image 
is,  that  he  sees  in  a  glass,  or  in  water,  if  he  was 
perswaded  of  its  being  a  Reality  (of  Existence,) 
and  not  a  meer  Apparition?  The  like  must  he  be, 
who  takes  Objective5  Notions  for  real  Existences, 
and  who  confounds  Attributes  that  are  only  Objec- 
tive, and  that  do  belong  to  things  but  as  they  are 
Objects  with  those  that  do  belong  unto  them  as  they 
are  Things,  and  that  are  Real, 

However,  it  will  not  follow,  as  some  have  weakly 
objected,  that  then  nothing  is  Real;  for  tho'  the 
Images  themselves  of  Whiteness,  Blackness,  Red- 
ness, Greenness,  that  do  seem  inherent  in  visible 
Objects,  are  not  really  so,  yet  really  there  are  Dis- 
positions and  textures  of  particles  in  those  Objects, 
that,  by  the  various  Modifications  which  they  give 
the  Light,  do  occasion  in  the  Eye,  to  which  the  Light 
is  reflected,  all  that  diversity  of  sentiments  (which 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  85 

we  call  colours)  that  does  appear  in  those  Objects. 
The  same,  mutatis  mutandis  must  be  said  of  sounds, 
sapors,  odors,  and  of  Tangible  qualities,  and  in  pro- 
portion will  hold  also  in  mental  notions.  For  tho' 
the  very  Notions  of  Entity,  Substance,  Accident, 
Whole,  Part,  Cause,  Effect,  and  the  like,  do  not 
really  exist  without  the  mind;  yet  as  they  do  seem. 
Real,  and  some  f7°]  more  Real  than  others,  so  really 
they  have  in  things  without  us  certain  grounds  or 
Foundations,  that,  upon  our  converse  with  these 
things,  do  naturally  Occasion,  or  Excite,  such  no- 
tions and  sentiments  in  us.  But  I  will  speak  to  this 
matter  more  particularly,  because  it  is  of  importance. 

First  then,  the  immediate  Objects  of  Cogitation, 
both  the  Sensitive,  and  the  Intellectual,  are,  in  ap- 
pearance, external  to  their  several  faculties ;  that  is, 
such  Objects  do  so  seem  to  be  without  their  several 
faculties  to  which  they  correspond,  that,  in  appear- 
ance, they  are  either  the  very  ultimate  Objects  them- 
selves of  those  faculties,  or,  at  least,  do  Exist  in 
them,  and  upon  this  account  are  called  Objects;  for 
Whiteness  seems  to  the  Eye  to  be  in  snow,  or  in  a 
white  wall ;  and  sound  to  the  Ear,  to  be  in  the  Air ;  a 
Man  doth  seem  to  the  understanding,  to  be  really  a 
Substance,  or  a  thing  that  is  invested  with  Accidents. 

If  it  be  Inquired  how  it  comes  to  pass,  that  senti- 
ments and  notions,  which  really  are  not  in  the  things 
that  are  without  us,  do  yet  appear  as  if  they  were, 
and  consequently  that  they  seem  to  be  Objects?  it 
must  be  Answered,  that  this  arises  from  the  very 


86      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

nature  of  cogitation  it  self,  and  of  I71!  the  cogitative 
faculties ;  and  that  both  Reason  and  Experience  do 
evidence,  it  must  be  so. 

First,  Reason  sheweth  that  it  must  be  so;  for  as 
we  are  conscious  that  we  have  a  perceivance  of  Ob- 
jects under  certain  Images,  and  Notions,  so  we  are 
not  conscious  of  any  Action  by  which  our  faculties 
should  make  those  Images  or  Notions;  and  there- 
fore being  sensible  that  we  are  Affected  with  such 
Images,  and  Notions,  so  long  as,  and  no  longer  than 
we  do  Attend  to  things  without  us,  (which  things 
are  therefore  called  Objects;)  and  not  being  sensible 
that  we  are  so  by  any  Action  from  within  our  selves, 
it  cannot  but  appear  unto  us  that  we  are  Affected 
only  from  the  things  without  us,  and  so,  what  really 
is  only  in  our  selves,  must  seem  to  come  from  those 
things,  and  consequently  to  be  really  in  them. 

Experience  also  shews;  (to  wit,  that  what  is 
really  but  in  the  cogitative  faculty,  does  yet  seem 
without  it;)  for  if  the  Eye  by  any  accident  becomes 
infected  with  Colours,  as,  (to  instance  in  a  more  re- 
ceived, than  often  experienced,  Matter,)  with  yel- 
low, by  the  yellow  Jaundice,  or  with  Green,  (as  I 
have  sometimes  observed,  before  the  coming  of  Con- 
vulsions;)83 that  is,  1721  (for  this  is  the  Reality)  if 
the  Visive  Spirits,  or  whatever  other  parts  of  the 
Eye,  that  are  immediately  concerned  in  the  Act  of 
Vision,  be  Preter-naturally  put  into  the  same  mo- 
tions with  those,  which  by  the  Impressions  of  Yellow 
or  Green  Objects  they  are  naturally  put  into,  in 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  8~ 

either  of  these  Cases,  the  Object  beheld  by  that  Eye, 
will  appear  as  yellow,  or  green,  tho'  to  every  bodies 
else,  it  is  but  White,  or  Red,  or  of  some  other  colour 
And  whence  comes  this,  but  hence  ?  that  the  Images 
conceived  in  the  Eye,  (for  in  the  Instances  alledged, 
the  Images  of  yellow  and  green  are  no  where  else, ) 
are  naturally  pinned  upon  the  Object.  As  is  farther 
evident  in  Dazling;  which  is,  when  an  Impression 
made  upon  the  Eye  by  one  Object,  becomes  trans- 
lated to  another ;  thus,  coming  out  of  a  bright  Sun- 
shine, on  a  Summers  day,  into  a  darkish  room,  one 
sees  a  splendor  in  every  corner,  and  upon  every  Ob- 
ject. The  like  Appearance  there  is,  upon  the  behold- 
ing of  Objects  thro*  tinctur'd  Glasses:  So  that  it 
must  be  concluded,  that  the  immediate  Objects  of 
cogitation,  I  mean  the  very  Images  and  sentiments 
that  are  perceived,  do,  to  all  appearance,  seem  as  ex- 
ternal to  the  cogitative  powers,  as  even  the  ultimate 
Objects  themselves,  that  are  (73J  perceived  under 
them ;  which  was  the  first  thing  to  be  shewed. 

The  second  point  to  be  shewed  is,  that  the  im- 
mediate Objects  of  cogitation  are  external  in  their 
grounds,  as  well  as  in  appearance,  and  in  truth,  are 
therefore  external  in  appearance,  because  they  are 
so  really  in  their  grounds.  And  this  is  as  certain, 
as  that  every  Effect  must  have  a  Cause.  For  things 
without  us,  are  the  Causes  that  do  excite  such  Im- 
ages and  Notions  in  us :  In  the  order  of  Nature,  we 
do  see  a  thing  so  long  as,  and  no  longer  than,  we 
keep  our  Eye  upon  it ;  and  therefore  that  we  do  see 
it,  must  come  from  some  impression  from  the  Thing : 


88       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

and  since  to  see  a  thing,  is  nothing  but  to  have  some 
Image  from  it,  and  so  of  it,  in  the  Eye,  and  the 
Image  is  as  the  Impression,  and  the  Impression  as 
the  Thing  that  makes  it,  it  follows  that  the  grounds 
of  the  Image  is  in  the  Thing  without  us.  And  since 
the  Image  (by  which  I  mean  Light  or  Colour)  is 
the  immediate  object  of  Vision,  and,  that  what  is 
instanced  in  one  Act  of  cogitation,  will  equally  hold 
in  all,  it  follows,  that  the  immediate  Objects  of  all 
other  cogitations,  as  well  as  of  vision,  are  ordinarily 
and  naturally  as  external'  in  their  grounds,  as  in 
appearance;  that  is,  are  fundamentally  external,  as 
well  as  apparently.  t74! 

I  thought  once  to  have  ended  this  Chapter  here, 
but  now  before  I  do  so,  I  will  add  an  Inference  or 
two  from  the  former  Doctrine;  the  first  is,  that  we 
learn  from  it  the  Foundation  of  that  Opinion  the 
Academicks  of  old  were  in,  That  no  judgment  could 
be  made  of  Truth;  that  things  do  seem  to  us,  but 
cannot  be  perceived  by  us;  and  that  no  certainty, 
but  great  probability  only,  is  to  be  Attained  unto  by 
men.  For  as  this  Opinion  had  all  the  Phaenomena 
of  cogitation  to  give  it  countenance,  so  those  Philos- 
ophers saw  it ;  for  they  evidently  perceived,  that  they 
saw  not  the  Realities,  but  only  the  Appearances  of 
things;  Plato  the  chief  of  them,  one  of  the  most 
penetrating,  as  well  as  the  most  elegant,  of  all  that 
ever  were,  affirmed  that  the  present,  was  a  word,  of 
Veri  similitude  only,  and  not  of  Truth  and  Reality ; 
That  the  beings  in  this  World  were  only  Shadows 
but  that  the  Substances  themselves  were  in  the 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  89 

Ideal.*4  How  far  herein  he  went  with  the  Truth, 
may  easily  be  perceived  by  what  I  have  discoursed 
before,  concerning  the  Nature  of  Cogitation;  as 
also,  where  he  strikes  out. 

The  Second  Inference  is,  That  since  Sentiments, 
and  Notions  bottomed  upon  the  Realities,  do  seem, 
the  former  to  the  Sense,  the  latter  to  the  Under- 
standing, to  be  Realities ;  and  since  we  are  obliged  to 
conf75^ceive,  and  speak,  of  things,  ordinarily  and 
popularly  (for  all  are  not  Philosophers)  in  that 
way  and  manner  that  they  seem  to  be;  it  follows, 
that  we  are  obliged  to  conceive,  and  speak  of  Senti- 
ments and  Notions  in  Common  Conversation,  and  to 
the  people,  as  if  really  they  were  the  things  them- 
selves that  are  perceived;  or  at  least  were  in  them: 
And  so  may  say,  the  Snow  is  white,  the  Emerald 
is  green,  and  the  like,  t76! 

CHAP.  IV. 

Of  the  distribution  of  Notions  in  the  Restrained 
sense  of  the  Word. 

SECT.   I. 

Notions  are  either  the  Notions  of  things,  or  Notions 
about  things.  Of  the  Notions  of  things.  And 
first  of  Entity  or  Thing.  The  Pinax  Entium,  or 
general  Table  of  things.  Things  are  either 
Real,  or  Cogitable.  And  these  either  meer 
Cogitables,  or  real  Cogitables.  A  Reality,  what 
A  Cogitable  what.  Of  Real  Cogitables.  Real 
Cogitables,  either  Proper,  or  Reductive.  Proper 


9O       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Real  Co  git  able  s  of  two  sorts:  of  the  Sense, 
or  of  the  Mind.  These  of  the  Sense,  of  two 
kinds;  Connatural,  or  Preternatural.  Appar- 
ent colours,  are  real  Connatural  Cogitables. 
Real  Cogitables  of  the  Mind,  like  those  of  the 
Sense,  of  two  Kinds;  Connatural,  or  Preter- 
natural. Real  Cogitables  Reductive,  subdi- 
vided into  those  of  sense  (External,  Internal) 
and  those  of  the  Understanding. 

Notions  taken  in  the -limited  Sense  of  the  word, 
for  Objective  Ideas,  by  t77!  and  under  which  the 
Understanding  apprehends,  and  conceives,  of, 
things,  and  which,  for  this  reason,  may  be  called 
Fundamental  (as  being  essential  to  the  business  of 
Knowledge,)  are  either  Notions  of  things;  such  as 
Entity,  Reality,  &c.  Or  Notions  about  Things, 
such  as  whole,  part,  cause,  effect,  &c.  of  which  the 
former  are  conceived  as  absolute,  the  latter  more 
as  relative  Notions. 

The  Notions,  (or  Modi  concipiendi,  that  I  call 
Notions)  of  things,  may  be  reduced  to  four,  to  En- 
tity or  thing,  Reality,  Substance  and  Accident. 

Entity  or  thing  is  taken  in  several  senses ;  either 
first,  in  the  largest,  in  which  it  is  the  same  with 
something,  or  Aliquid.  Or  2dly.  more  strictly,  as 
it  comprehends  but  substances,  Accidents  and 
Modes.  Or  3dly.  Most  strictly,  as  it  stands  for 
Substances  only.  I  take  it  not  at  this  time  in  the 
largest  Sense. 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  9 1 

Thing  in  the  largest  Sense,  is  that  which  any 
wise  is,  or  that  is  Knowable,  directly :  for  Nothing, 
no  wise  is,  nor  is  Knowable,  but  indirectly,  and  by 
means  of  thing,  of  which  it  is  a  Negation ;  Nothing 
is  Not  a  thing.  I78! 

And  thing,  or  Entity,  taken  in  the  largest  sense 
for 

A  liquid 

some-      ( r> 
thing       I  Real 


is 
Either- 


Cogi- 
table, 

and         f  Meer  Co- 

this  gitable,  f  Substance, 

Either-  \  Real  Cogi-      [  A  Thing-  -J 

table,  [  Accident. 

[  Cogitabel.As  {  Some  thing  about 
I  Thing ;  As 
[  Cause,  Effect,  Src. 

For  that  which  any  wise  is,  is  either  without  the 
thinking  of  any  one  upon  it ;  or  it  is  no  longer  than 
while  one  is  a  thinking,  and  because  he  is  a  thinking, 
on  it. 

That  which  is  without  the  thinking  of  any  one  up- 
on it,  and  whether  it  be  minded  or  no,  is  a  real  Thing, 
or  a  Reality;  a  thing  that  so  is  in  the  world,  as  that 
it  is  a  part,  or  Appurtenance  of  it,  and  such  a  thing 
is  matter,  and  every  Affection,  and  every  System  of 
matter;  and  such  a  thing  also  is  Mind. 

That  which  no  longer  is  than  while  one  is  a 
thinking,  and  because  he  is  a  thinking,  on  it ;  [so  that 
tho  it  have  that  which  is  I791  called  in  the  Schools 
an  objective  being,5  a  being  in  the  Cogitative  Facul- 
ties, yet  hath  none  without  them  in  the  World:] 


92       PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

this  I  name  a  Cogitable',  a  Cogitable  thing,  or  En- 
tity. And  thus,  all  the  Sentiments  of  Sense,  those 
of  the  Mind,  and  even  meer  Objective  Notions,  are 
Things,  not  things  of  Mundane  and  External  Ex- 
istence, but  of  Cogitation  and  Notion;  Intentional, 
not  Real  things.  For  such  are  Colours,  Sounds. 
Sapors,  Time,  Place,  Substance,  Accident,  Cause, 
Effect,  &c.  they  are  Intentional  things,  things  that, 
as  such,  have  only  an  esse  Objectivum,  an  esse  Cog- 
nitum,  as  the  Schoolmen  phrase  it. 


SECT.  ii. 

Of  meer  Cogitables,  or  Fictions.  What  a  Fiction 
is.  That  all  Fictions  are  Creatures  either  of 
the  Mind,  or  of  the  Internal  Sense;  None  made 
by  the  External  Senses.  The  Reason  of  it.  Two 
Philosophical  Doctrines  observed,  one  concern- 
ing meer  Cogitables,  the  other  about  Real  Cogi- 
tables  Reductive.  Why  the  Representations  of 
things  in  Prophetical  Dreams,  are  always  made 
as  if  they  were  present. 

************ 
************ 


SECT.  III. 


35 


Of  Thing  strictly  taken,  and  of  the  Difference  be- 
twixt the  Notions  of  things,  and  those  that  are 
only  about  things.  Of  the  Idea  of  Substance, 
and  that  of  Accident.  Spinosas  Notion  of  Sub- 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  93 

stance,  and  that  of  an  Accident  considered. 
Maxims  of  Thing  in  general. 

Thing  taken  strictly,  as  it  comprehends  but  Sub- 
stances, Modes  and  Accidents,  is  whatever  seems 
External  to  any  Faculty,  and  consequently,  seems  to 
have  Being  in  the  World,  as  a  Part,  or  an  Appurte- 
nance, of  it,  whether  it  be  really  so  or  no.  And  in 
this  sense  of  the  Word,  as  Real  Things  themselves, 
(which  are  eminently  called  Things.)  So  likewise 
the  Sentiments  we  have  of  these  things,  as  Colours. 
Sounds  Sapors,  &c.  are  Things ;  and  thus  also,  No- 
tions are  (92J  Things,  both  the  more  general  and 
common  Notions,  those  of  Substance  and  Accident, 
and  the  more  special,  the  Notions  of  the  several 
Species  of  Quality,  and  those  of  Relations,  &c. 

But  when  I  say,  that  not  only  things  themselves, 
but  the  Sentiments  and  Notions  we  have  of  them, 
are  Things,  it  must  be  understood  with  distinction ; 
for  the  Things  themselves,  (so  I  call  the  grounds 
of  Sentiments  and  Notions)  are  Realities  of  True 
Existence;  but  Sentiments  and  Notions  being  only 
Real  Cogitables,  are  only  seeming  Realities ;  Reali- 
ties of  Apparition  only,  not  of  Existence :  Thus  the 
Notion  of  Substance  is  a  Reality  of  Appearance 
only,  but  the  things  that  we  apply  it  to,  are  Realities 
of  Existence. 

By  the  Notion  of  thing  as  taken  strictly,  we  have 
a  Rise  afforded  us  to  apprehend  the  difference  be- 
tween the  Notions  the  Understanding  hath  of  things, 
and  those  it  hath  only  about  things ;  for  the  Notions 


94      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

that  I  call  the  Notions  of  things,  appear  to  the  Under- 
standing as  Things  External  unto  it;  for  (not  to 
mention  Substances)  even  some  Relations,  and  In- 
telligible Qualities  do  seem  to  the  Understanding, 
as  really  Inherent  in  the  things  they  are  Attributed 
to,  as  the  sentiments  of  f93!  Colours,  Odors,  and 
Sounds  do  unto  the  Senses.  But  for  Notions  that 
are  only  framed  by  the  Mind  about  Things,  such  as 
Cause,  Effect,  Measure,  Measured,  &c.  they  seem 
not  to  it  to  have  being  in  the  things  themselves,  but 
to  arise  from  its  own  Reflexions,  upon  comparing 
and  considering  of  Things.  Thus,  at  the  same  time 
that  the  mind  conceives  of  Almighty  God,  that  he 
is  the  Cause  of  all,  as  it  does  conceive,  that  the  word 
[God]  is  the  name  of  a  Real  Being,  so  it  conceives 
also,  than  the  term  [Cause]  is  not,  but  that  it  only 
signifies  a  certain  Kind  of  Relation  between  God 
and  Things,  as  these  do  spring  from  him,  and  so  is 
only  the  name  of  a  certain  Objective,  and  not  of  a 
Real,  Being. 

Of  the  things  that  do  Appear  unto  our  Faculties 
to  have  a  Reality  of  being,  some  are  perceived  by 
them  immediately,  in  their  own  proper  Formal  Na- 
tures, and  those  are  either  Modes,  or  Compleat  Acci- 
dents; Others  are  not  perceived  by  them  imme- 
diately, in  their  own  proper  Formal  Natures;  but 
only  by  means  of,  and  under,  those  that  are  per- 
ceived so;  and  these  are  called  Substances:  Com- 
pleat Accidents  and  Modes  are  Appurtenances,  Sub- 
stances are  the  things  to  which  they  do  Apper- 
tain. t94] 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  95 

It  is  true,  Spinosa  is  in  another  perswasion; 
who  tells  us,  that  he  understands  by  Substance, 
that  which  is  in  it  self,  and  is  conceived  by  it  self, 
that  is,  as  he  expresses  it,  a  thing  in  whose  concep- 
tion that  of  another  is  not  involved.  Adding,  that 
by  Attribute  he  understands  the  same  that  he  means 
by  Substance,  to  wit,  a  thing  conceived  in  and  by  it 
self,  in  whose  conception  that  of  another  is  not  in- 
volved. Thus  says  he,  Extension,  in  as  much  as  it 
is  capable  of  being  conceived  in  and  by  it  self,  is  an 
Attribute;  but  Motion  that  cannot  be  conceived  but 
as  something  in  another  thing,  is  None.  Only  he 
says  too,  to  prevent  Objections ;  that  a  Xotional  dis- 
tinction may  be  made  between  a  Substance  and  an 
Attribute,  in  this  manner,  that  a  thing  may  be  called 
an  Attribute  in  respect  of  the  Understanding,  which 
doth  Attribute  such  a  certain  Nature  to  a  Substance ; 
and  then  a  Substance  is  the  thing  that  the  Under- 
standing doth  Attribute  that  Nature  unto. 

But  as  what  this  Philosopher  says  on  this  occa- 
sion is  not  very  clear,  so  it  is  certain,  that  the  Notion 
of  Substance,36  as  also  that  of  an  Attribute,  is  Rela- 
tive ;  nor  are  the  Instances  he  puts  so  well  adjusted, 
but  that  some  exceptions  may  be  brought  against 
them.  I  can  no  more  conceive  f95!  any  Real  Exten- 
sion, than  I  can  any  Motion,  but  as  a  thing  that 
belongs  to  another ;  Extension  to  the  thing  extended, 
as  Motion  to  the  thing  moved.  And  tho'  I  do  not 
believe  my  Understanding,  the  measure  of  other 
mens;  yet  I  cannot  but  think,  it  will  be  found  on 
tryal,  as  hard  a  task  for  any  other,  as  it  is  for  me. 


96      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

to  think  otherwise;  For  what  is  meer  Extension, 
but  an  Extension  that  belongs  to  nothing?  And 
what  is  Extension  that  belongs  to -nothing,  but  an 
Extension  of  nothing?  and  certainly,  an  Extension 
of  nothing,  is  nothing  really,  whatever  it  may  be  in 
Imagination;  but  more  of  this  in  another  place. 

Maxims  concerning  Thing  in  general 

1.  Nothing  can  be,  and  not  be  at  once. 

2.  Things  that  but  Appear,  do  equally  Affect 
the  Mind  as  those  that  really  are. 

3.  Things  are  not  to  be  Multiplied  Unnecessar- 
ily ;  as  they  are,  when  the  Fictions  of  Men,  are  made 
to  pass  for  the  Creatures  of  God.  t96! 

CHAP.  v. 
Of  Substance. 

SECT.  I. 

The  Idea  or  Notion  of  Substance..  Self  Subsistence, 
how  in  the  Idea  of  it.  The  Idea  of  Substance 
only  Relative.  Neither  Extension  nor  Exist- 
ence the  Idea  of  it.  Substances  are  either 
Principles,  or  Principiates.  The  Grounds  of 
this  Division.  Substance  that  is  a  Principle, 
is  either  Mind  or  Matter.  Considerations  prem- 
ised for  the  better  Understanding  of  this  Dis- 
course. The  Ideas  of  Mind  and  Matter.  The 
Grounds  of  the  distribution  of  Substance  into 
Mind  and  Matter.  Abstracted  Mind  is  as  con- 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  97 

ceivable  as  Matter,  under  the  Notion  of  Sub- 
stance.   Spinosa's  Notion  of  Mind  rejected. 

The  Primary  Notion  or  Idea  which  we  have  of 
Substance,39  is   (as  I  have  hinted  in  the  former 
Chapter)  that  of  a  thing  which  is  a  Subject,  or  an 
Ultimate  Object ;  that  is,  we  have  not  any  Real  im- 
mediate Conception  of  it,  but  only  a  Notional.    Or 
(to  speak  more  plainly,  f97!  according  to  the  Prin- 
ciples laid  before)  Substance  as  such,  is  not  a  thing 
conceived  just  as  it  is  in  its  own  Reality,  but  a  thing 
conceived  under  a  certain  notion ;  that  is,  a  substance 
is  a  thing  that  is  a  Subject.  For  when  the  Understand- 
ing does  think  of  the  things  we  call  Accidents  (which 
are  the  only  things  that  do  immediately,  and  at  first 
present  themselves  unto  us,)  for  example,  when  it 
thinks  of  Odours,  Colours,  sapors,  figures,  &c.  it 
doth  at  the  same  time  conceive,  that  besides  these 
there  must  be  other  things  that  have  them,  in  which 
those  odors,  colours,  sapors,  figures,  &c.  are.    And 
those  things  that  are  conceived  to  have  others,  we 
call  substances;  as  those  that  are  conceived  to  be  had 
of  others,  or  to  be  in  them,  we  call  Accidents:  but 
what  those  things,  which  we  do  Denominate  Sub- 
stances, Are,  in  themselves,  stript  of  all  their  Acci1- 
dents,  is  no  wise  known;  All  we  know  of  any  sub- 
stance is,  that  it  is  the  subject  of  such  and  such 
Accidents ;  or  that  it  is  Qualified  so  or  so ;  and  hath 
these,  and  the  other  Qualities. 

This  Notion  of  a  substance  [that  it  is  the  same 
with  a  subject,]    I  call  Primary,  because  though 


98      PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTIIOGGE. 

that  [of  subsisting  by  it  self,]  is  deemed  so  by 
others,  yet,  in  our  ordinary  way  of  Reasoning,  and 
Investigating  of  things,  this  [of  self  subsisting]  is 
a  consequent  one,  to  that  of  being  t98^  a  subject. 
For  conversing  with  things;  as  the  first  that  do 
present  themselves  to  our  consideration,  are  the 
Accidents  of  them ;  so  the  first  reflection  the  under- 
standing makes,  upon  these  Accidents,  is,  that  other 
things  are  under  them,  which  do  uphold  and  support 
them,  and  consequently,  that  are  subjects,  or  sub- 
stances. But  then  indeed,  when  it  comes  again  to 
consider,  whether  these  subjects  are  also  in  subjects, 
finding  in  its  self  a  certain  Reluctance  to  conceive 
(that)  they  are,  because,  if  they  were,  there  would 
be  no  end,  things  would  be  in  one  another  infinitely ; 
therefore  it  concludes,  that  that,  which  is  a  subject 
of  Accidents,  is  it  self  in  no  subject;  that  is,  it  is 
self-subsistent.  Thus  the  notion  of  being  self- 
subsistent,  arises  from  that  of  being  a  subject :  Nor 
is  the  notion  of  [being  self-subsistent]  a  more  Real 
one,  than  that  of  [being  a  subject.]  For  what  is 
Self-subsistence  but  an  Attribute  that  belongs  to 
something  else  ?  but  what  that  something  else  is,  to 
which  it  belongs,  I  am  willing  to  learn ;  and  will  ever 
honour  as  my  great  Master,  that  Person  who  will 
effectually  teach  me.  We  have  no  Ideas  of  any  sub- 
stances, but  such  as  are  Notional  and  Relative ;  that 
is,  such  as  do  arise  from  them  as  they  stand  in  our 
Analogy,  and  are  cloathed  with  Accidents.  t"l  A 
truth  that  might  be  made  to  appear  by  a  full  Induc- 
tion of  all  the  particulars;  But  I  will  instance  but 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  99 

in  some ;  but  those  the  most  obvious,  and  most  com- 
monly discoursed  of.  For  what  Idea  have  we  of 
Earth,  but  that  it  is  something  material,  that  it  is 
fixt  and  tastless  ?  What  of  Salt  ?  but  that  of  some 
thing  sapid,  and  easily  soluble  in  water  ?  And  what 
Idea  have  we  of  water?  but  that  it  is  something 
material,  moist,  and  fluid  in  such  a  degree,  and  the 
like?  So  that  the  Idea  of  a  substance  is  that  of  a 
thing  which  is  a  subject;  and  this  is  a  Relative 
Idea.38 

But  many,  who  cannot  satisfie  themselves  with 
the  former,  do  conceit  that  they  have  found  a  Better, 
a  Real,  a  Positive  Idea  of  Substance.  Of  these,  some 
do  hold,  Extension  is  that  Idea,  so  that  substance  is 
Extension;  and  accordingly  as  Extension  is  either 
Penetrable,  or  Impenetrable,  so  they  frame  the  No- 
tions of  Spirit,  and  Body;  or  the  species  of  sub- 
stance, as  it  is  immaterial,  or  material.44  Others 
hold,  that  Existence  or  Being  is  the  Idea  of  substance 
in  general,  and  that  substances  of  this  or  that  partic- 
ular species,  are  only  determinate  Talities  of  Being ; 
for  since  in  being  is  the  Idea  of  an  Accident,  being 
(say  they)  must  be  that  of  a  substance,  and  as  to 
be  is  to  exist,  so  being  is  nothing  but  existence^®*} 

I  shall  have  another  occasion  hereafter  to  con- 
sider the  first  of  those  Opinions  when  I  come  to 
Answer  a  certain  Objection,  touching  the  Idea  of 
God ;  but  will  say  of  it  now,  that  those  who  profess 
it,  cannot  make  out  (as  they  ought  to  do)  a  clear 
and  satisfactory  Idea  of  Extension  in  general,  that 
shall  agree  in  common,  both  to  that  which  is  Im- 


IOO   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

penetrable,  and  to  that  which  is  Penetrable.  Besides, 
it  is  not  conceiveable,  that  a  Spirit  should  be  only  a 
Penetrable  Extension,  since  (as  will  appear  more 
fully  hereafter)  Extension  has  but  little  to  do  with 
mind  or  thought,  which  is  Essential  to  a  Spirit :  and 
without  which  a  Spirit  cannot  be  a  Spirit :  and  Pene- 
trability, and  Impenetrability  has  all  as  little. 

Nor  is  the  second  Opinion  more  conceiveable. 
For  not  to  Insist,  that  Existence  properly  taken  is 
only  of  Causates,  (existere  properly  being-  [esse 
extra  causas,}  and  nothing  properly  is  [extra 
causas]  that  was  not  first  (in  causis-,}  I  will  take 
it  at  large,  for  any  being  in  act;  yet  even  so,  it  is 
not  of  the  Idea,  or  first  Conception,  of  substance: 
for  [being]  taken  not  as  a  Noun,  but  as  a  Participle 
(as  here  it  is  taken,)  is  in  the  very  sense  of  the 
term,  a  word  of  Relation ;  being  is  not  a  thing,  but 
of  a  thing;  not  a  thing,  but  a  mode  of  it,  HOi]  and 
consequently  presupposing  it;  and  that  which  pre- 
supposes thing  or  substance,  cannot  possibly  be  in 
the  Idea,  or  first  conception  of  it.  In  short,  Acci- 
dents have  being,  tho'  not  the  same  being  as  sub- 
stances ;  but  to  proceed. 

Now,  if  this  is  the  proper  notion  of  substance 
in  general,  that  it  is  a  thing  that  is  a  subject  of 
Accidents,  it  will  follow,  that  we  cannot  frame  any 
Notions  of  substances  in  particular,  or  make  any 
agreeable  Distributions  of  them,  but  according  to 
the  several  Accidents,  of  which  they  are  subjects. 
And  this  I  desire  mav  be  noted,  because  it  will  be 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  IOI 

of  very  great  use  in  clearing  what  I  shall  say  here- 
after, in  the  prosecution  of  this  Discourse. 

Of  Substances  some  are  Principles,  some  Prin- 
cipiates. By  Principles,  I  mean  substances  that 
are  causes  of  other  things,  but  are  themselves  un- 
caused. By  Principiates,  (give  me  leave  to  make  an 
English  word  of  one  not  very  good  Latin)  I  mean 
substances  that  are  caused,  or  composed  of  Prin- 
ciples. Principles  make,  Principiates  are  made  to  be. 

That  there  are  substantial  Causes,  and  substan- 
tial Effects,  in  the  World,  is  evident  to  sense;  For 
even  to  sense,  some  substances  begin  to  be,  and  some 
do  cease  being.  Now  that  which  begins  to  be,  is 
[102]  made  to  be  after  having  not  been,  must  of  ne- 
cessity have  Something,  (and  this  something  must 
of  necessity  be  another  thing,)  that  makes  it  to 
be;  that  is,  it  must  have  a  Cause.  So  that  Causes 
and  Effects  there  are;  else  nothing  could  begin  to 
be,  or  cease  being.  And  if  there  are  Causes,  either 
those  Causes,  all  of  them  have  Causes  also,  and  con- 
sequently, as  they  (as  Causes)  make  other  things 
to  be;  so,  (as  things  that  have  Causes)  themselves 
are  made  to  be  by  others;  or  else,  at  least  some  of 
them  have  no  causes,  but  are  self-subsistent  and 
uncaused.  If  all  Causes  have  Causes,  then  an  in- 
finite Progression  must  be  owned  in  the  account  of 
Causes,  than  which  nothing  can  be  more  repugnant 
to  the  mind  of  Man;  to  Science;  and  to  the  Order 
and  Unity  of  the  Universe.  And  indeed  then,  there 
must  be  a  number  actually  infinite,  since  all  Causes 
are  actual.  But  if  any  Causes  are  uncaused,  (as 


IO2    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

certainly  some  must  be,  for  the  reasons  Alledged) 
those  uncaused  Causes  are  Principles,  or  first 
Causes.  More  shortly,  either  something  in  the 
Universe  of  being  is  uncaused,  and  so  is  a  Principle, 
for  what  is  uncaused  is  a  Principle;  or  else,  every 
thing  is  Caused ;  but  every  thing  cannot  be  Caused ; 
for  if  every  thing  is  Caused,  Nothing  must  be  the 
cause  of  Something.  For  if  t103!  every  thing  is 
caused,  every  thing  was  once  nothing,  for  what  is 
Caused  was  nothing  before  it  was  Caused;  and  if 
every  thing  was  once  Nothing,  either  Nothing  must 
be  the  Cause  of  some,  or,  (which  in  effect  is  the 
same)  nothing  may  become  something  without  any 
cause,  than  which  No  thought  can  be  more  unrea- 
sonable. 

Again,  as  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  there 
is  some  Principle,  so  the  Stoicks  (the  Wisest  of  all 
the  Philosophers,  as  well  as  the  most  Devout)  af- 
firmed, that  there  are  two,  Mind  and  Matter.  Thus 
Seneca  in  his  Epistles  (Ep.  65. )37  Universa  ex  Ma- 
teria  &  ex  Deo  constant.  All  things  (says  he)  are 
composed,  or,  do  Consist  of  God  and  Matter.  And 
indeed,  we  cannot  be  more  assured  by  all  our  facul- 
ties, that  there  is  Action,  and  Passion  in  the  World, 
and  that  the  World  could  neither  be,  or  persevere  in 
being,  without  them,  than  we  are  to  speak  Philo- 
sophically, that  there  are  two  Principles,  one,  the 
Principle  of  all  the  Action ;  the  other,  the  Principle 
of  all  the  Passion  is  in  it;  the  former  the  Active 
Principle,  or  first  subject  of  Activity,  the  latter  the 
Passive  Principle,  or  first  subject  of  Passivity; 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON. 


of  which,  I  call  the  first,  Mind,  the  second,  Mat- 
ter. This  Assertion  Zeno  in  Laertius  fully  agrees 
unto,  when  he  tells  us,  that  the  Principles  of  H041 
things  are  two,  TO  JHHOVV  xal  TO  Tida/ov,38  the  Active, 
and  the  Passive  ;  Nor  doth  the  great  Originist  Moses 
say  much  less,  when  in  his  Genesis,  he  writeth  of 
the  Spirit  of  God  that  moved,  and  of  the  Abyss  and 
Waters  upon  which  he  moved  ;  and  methinks,  in  all 
Animal  Generations,  in  which  there  must  be  a  Male 
and  a  Female,  as  who  should  say,  an  Active  and  a 
Passive  Principle,  there  is  some  (and  this  no  very 
Dark  or  Obscure)  Adumbration  of  it. 

Before  I  do  proceed  to  a  more  particular  Con- 
sideration of  these  Principles,  I  would  have  it  ob- 
served, that  we  ought  to  Distinguish  what  is  mani- 
fest, certain,  and  of  undoubted  truth  concerning 
them,  from  that  which  is  but  doubtful  and  uncertain. 
Now  it  is  certain,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  we  do 
call  Matter;  such  a  thing  as  Mind,  such  a  thing  as 
Motion;  and  that  Matter  is  alter'd,  figured,  textur'd, 
and  infinite;  ways  wrought  upon  &  moulded  by  means 
of  motion.  Again,  it  is  certain  that  all  things  have 
not  Mind  in  equal  proportions,  but  that  some  exert 
the  acts  of  it  in  a  higher  way  and  degree,  and  some 
in  more  ways  for  kind  than  others  do  ;  and  also  cer- 
tain, that  the  exercises  of  Acts  of  Mind  in  all  the 
ways  and  all  the  degrees  of  them  in  Corporeal  Ani- 
mals, (for  we  are  not  so  well  acquainted  with 
others,)  do  much  depend  HOS]  upon  the  Nature  and 
Qualifications  of  their  Organs;  that  is,  upon  Tex- 
ture and  Disposition  of  matter.  These  things  we 


IO4   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

are  as  certain  of,  as  that  our  selves  be,  and  have 
a  true  use  of  our  faculties.     But  if  we  advance 
farther,  and  to  endeavour  to  Enter  and  Penetrate 
into  the  very  nature  of  Matter,  into  that  of  Mind, 
and  into  the  Nature  of  Motion ;  here  being  forsaken 
and  destitute  of  sense  to  hunt  for  us,  we  are  much 
at  a  loss,  and  as  unable  to  proceed  in  our  search  an 
inquiry  after  them,  as  to  their  just  Realities,  as  we 
are  in  that  of  things,  which  are  wholly  out  of  our 
view.    It  is  hard  to  conceive  just  what  matter  is  in 
its  own  Positive  Reality ;  also  whatMwd  is,  and  even 
what  Motion  is,  (as  taken  for  a  subordinate  Prin- 
ciple.)   Nor  can  it  be  Demonstrated,  that  (as  some 
will  have  it)  there  is  only  one  substance  in  the  Uni- 
verse, and  that  Matter  and  Mind  are  only  several 
Modifications  of  that  one  substance ;  nor  be  Demon- 
strated, that  Matter  ( for  this  I  think  they  mean  by 
substance)  is  in  its  own  Nature,  a  vital  Energetical 
thing ;  and  that  the  diverse  Gradations  of  Life,  that 
are  observed  in  the  several  species  of  Animals,  arise 
only  from  the  several  Modifications  of  Matter,  and 
of  that  life  of  nature  (as  those  Philosophers  call  it) 
which  is  Essential  thereto,  and  is  t106!  the  root  of 
those  Perceptive,  Appetitive,  and  Motive  Powers 
that  do  dress  up  being  in  all  the  Shapes  and  Forms 
in  which  it  appears  upon  the  Stage  of  the  World. 
I  will  not  build  upon  such  Hypothesis ;  which  be- 
ing unevident,  must  needs  be  doubtful  and  uncer- 
tain, if  not  false.    A  Philosophy  that  shall  be  solid. 
and  sound,  must  have  its  Ground-work  and  Foun- 
dations firmly  laid;  which  none  can  have,  but  that 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  IO5 

which  is  bottomed,  rais'd  and  built  upon  evidence; 
I  mean,  upon  the  certain  Testimony  of  our  faculties. 
And  therefore  since  our  faculties  do  rather  go  upon 
Notions,  than  on  Realities,  and  do  plainly  Distin- 
guish between  Mind  and  Matter,  and  (as  I  will  show 
in  the  Progress  of  this  Discourse)  do  Contradistin- 
guish them,  I  hold  my  self  obliged  to  treat  of  these 
distinctly,  but  still  in  the  Real  Notional  way. 

Mind  then  is  Cogitative,  thinking,  or  perceiving 
substance ;  or,  Mind  is  the  first  subject  of  Cogitation. 
Matter  is  Extensive,  spacious,  substance;  or,  the 
first  subject  of  dimensive  spacious  Quantity.  In 
other,  but  Equivalent  terms;  Mind  is  Active  sub 
stance,  Matter  Passive  substance.  I  affirm,  that 
these  latter  Definitions  are  equivalent  to  the  former, 
because,  in  effect,  it  is  the  same  to  say,  that  Mind 
is  Active,  as  to  say,  it  is  Cogitative;  and  the  same  to 
[107]  say  that  Matter  is  Passive,  as  to  say,  it  is  Spa- 
tious  Extensive  substance.  Nor  is  Mind  Cogitation, 
or  matter  extension,  as  Des  Cartes  makes  them: 
but  the  former  is  Cogitative,  the  latter  Extensive 
substance.39  We  find  a  Reluctance  in  our  minds  to 
conceive  that  Cogitation  is  a  substance,  as  also  to 
conceive  Extension  as  one ;  and  yet  we  cannot  con- 
ceive Mind  and  Matter  but  as  substances. 

The  main  Reason  why  I  do  distinguish  Sub- 
stance into  Mind  and  Matter,  as  into  first  Original 
kinds,  is,  because  (as  I  hinted  before)  Cogitation 
and  Extension,  that  do  Constitute  their  several 
Ideas,  are  of  no  Relation  one  to  another,  for  what 
hath  a  Thought  to  do  with  a  Cube,  or  a  Triangle? 


IO6    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

or  with  Length,  or  Breadth,  or  Depth?  Certainly 
Cogitation  and  Extension  are  quite  different  Acci- 
dents, without  any  thing  in  their  Ideas,  that  is  Com- 
mon to  both;  and  therefore  the  first  subject  of  the 
one,  cannot  be  conceived  the  first  subject  of  the 
other ;  their  subjects  must  be  substances  of  quite  as 
different  kinds  as  themselves  are,  at  least  to  us; 
since  all  the  diversity  we  can  conceive  in  substances, 
is  and  must  be,  taken  from  the  accidents  they  have, 
these  being  the  Characters  by,  and  under  which 
alone,  we  do  perceive  and  know,  and  by  consequence, 
can  only  distinguish  them,  t108] 

I  insist  herein  the  more,  for  that  many  think 
that  Mind  is  only  an  Accident,  and  that  taken  for  a 
substance,  it  is  unintelligible,  and  a  meer  Chimera: 
so  that,  tho'  Matter  is  acknowledged  (by  them)  to 
be  a  substance,  it  will  not  be  yielded,  that  Abstract, 
separate  mind  can  be  one.40  But  those  that  think  it 
so,  if  they  considered,  that  men  have  no  conception 
of  substance,  nor  can  have  any  of  it,  but  as  it  is  a 
subject  of  Accidents,  they  would  soon  change  their 
Opinion.  For  the  Accident  of  Cogitation,  or  of  Ac- 
tivity, that  Mind  is  the  subject  of,  is  as  distinctly 
and  clearly  conceivable,  as  that  of  Extension,  or  of 
Passivity,  which  matter  is  the  subject  of.  Nor  is 
the  thing  it  self  that  is  the  subject  of  Extension,  or  of 
Passivity ;  any  more  Conceivable  but  by,  and  under 
this;  that  is,  the  substance  of  mind  and  matter  are 
equally  conceivable,  and  equally  unconceivable.  They 
know  no  more  what  that  is  in  it  self,  that  is  extended, 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON. 


than  what  that  is.  that  is  Cogitative;  and  may  be  as 
sure,  that  they  do  think,  as  they  are,  that  they  are 
spacious,  ay,  they  cannot  know  that  they  are  spa- 
cious, but  by  thinking.  But  of  spatiosity  or  exten- 
sion. (the  Accident  that  constitutes  matter,)  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  discourse  hereafter,  when  I  come  to 
speak  of  quantity,  I  proceed  now  to  discourse  of 
mind.  [1W] 

The  Idea  I  have  given  of  Mind,  that  it  is  the  Im- 
mediate subject,  or  (as  others  perhaps  would  chuse 
to  say)  the  Immediate  Principle,  of  Cogitation, 
Energy,  or  Activity,  is  much  more  easie  to  be  con- 
ceived than  that  of  Spinosa,  when  he  defines  the 
human  mind  to  be  the  Idea  of  a  body,  or  thing. 
actually  existing:41  for  Mind,  even  the  human,  is  not 
so  properly  said  to  be  an  Idea,  as  to  be  the  Prin- 
ciple, our  Cause  efficient,  of  Ideas;  since  all  Ideas 
(even  in  common  sense)  are  conceived;  and  Mind 
is  that,  which  conceives  them.  Thus  it  is  in  our 
Refracted,  Inadequate,  Real-Notional  way  of  con- 
ceiving; and  for  an  Adequate  and  just  one,  as  it  is 
above  our  faculties,  so  I  do  not  find  that  Spinosa, 
or  Mai.  Branch  e  after  all  their  Ambitious  Re- 
searches in  that  higher  way  have  edified  the  World 
thereby  to  any  great  Degree.  This  way  of  seeing 
all  things  in  God,4"  and  in  their  own  proper  Reali- 
ties, is  a  way  much  out  of  the  way.  Otherwise, 
when  they  keep  the  lower  way  of  sense,  many  of 
their  thoughts  are  surprizing,  and  excellent. 


108    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


SECT.    II. 

A  two  fold  Consideration  of  Mind;  one,  as  it  is  Ab- 
stracted from  Matter;  the  other  as  it  is  Con- 
cerned with  Matter.  What  is  meant  by  Con- 
cernment of  Mind  zvith  Matter —  Of  Mind. 
That  is  the  Idea  of  God.  God  as  pure  Mind,  is 
in  himself,  and  directly  incomprehensible.  How- 
ever, he  is  knowable  as  it  were  by  Refraction, 
•  and  Reflection;  in  ,an  Hypothesis,  and  by  way 
of  similitude.  That  a  Parabolical,  Comparative 
way  of  knowing  God,  ought  to  content  us.  Of 
the  Divine  Attributes;  the  true  conception  of 
them.  The  vanity  of  those  who  talk  of  seeing 
all  things  in  God.  Spinosa's  Opinion  that  -God 
is  all  substance  Rejected,  for  several  Reasons. 
That  this  Opinion  seems  to  imply,  that  God  is 
no  singular  self -existent,  self-subsistent  Being. 
The  Ground  of  this  Opinion  touched.  Another 
sentiment  concerning  God,  that  he  is  infinite 
Extension  indued  with  Goodness,  V/isdom,  and 
Power,  considered.  The  Ground  of  this  under- 
minded,  and  the  nature  of  the  Divine  Omni- 
presence represented,  t111! 

Mind  may  be  considered,  either  in  it  self,  as  it  is 
Abstract  and  simple,  free  from  all  Concretion  and 
Composition  with  matter;  or  else  as  it  is  concreted 
or  concerned  therewith. 

By  the  Concretion  of  mind  with  matter,  I  mean 
nothing-  but  the  acting  of  Mind  in  this  or  that  par- 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  IOO, 

ticular  manner,  by  means  of  matter.  As  it  is  in  our 
selves,  who  do  not  see,  or  hear,  or  feel,  but  by  means 
of  Organs,  that  is,  of  matter. 

Mind  as  it  is  in  it  self,  Abstract  and  Simple, 
free  from  all  concretion  or  concernment  with  Mat- 
ter, I  call  Pure  Mind',  Mind  Concreted  with  Matter, 
I  term,  Mind  in  Matter. 

Pure  Mind,  is  the  Notion  or  Idea  of  God\  as  is 
implied  by  our  Saviour,  when  he  says,  John  4.  24. 
God  is  Spirit ;  he  does  not  say,  God  is  a  Spirit,  but 
God  is  Spirit ;  jrvevfia  6  fteo<;,  All  Spirit,  nothing  but 
Spirit.  In  like  manner  Seneca,  in  the  Preface  to 
his  natural  Questions,  first  demanding  what  God  is  ? 
Answers,  he  is  Mens  universi,  the  mind  of  the  Uni- 
verse; and  being  obliged,  for  the  cleering  of  his 
notion,  to  show  the  difference  between  the  nature 
of  God,  and  that  of  Man,  adds,  Mind  is  only  the 
Principal  part  of  our  nature,  but  the  whole  of  Gods, 
which  is  nol112lthing  but  Mind  God  is  pure  Mind, 
all  Reason.  In  his  own  terms  thus,  Quid  ergo  in- 
terest inter  naturam  Dei  &  nostramf  Nostri  meliot 
pars  Animus  est,  in  illo  nulla  pars  extra  animum. 
Again,  in  his  Epistles  (Ep.  65.)  He  has  this  ex- 
pression, Nos  mine  primam  &  Generalem  causam 
quaerimus,  haec  simplex  esse  debet;  nam  &  ma- 
teria  simplex  est;  now,  says  he,  we  seek  the  first 
Universal  cause,  which  ought  to  be  simple  (or  un- 
compounded)  for  even  matter  it  self  is  simple 
Only,  I  doubt,  he  (as  many  other  Philosophers  did) 
took  God  but  for  an  immanent  an  ingredient  Cause 


HO    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

of  all;  which  perhaps  is  only  true  of  the  Mosaical 
Spirit  of  God.43 

But  God  as  he  is  Pure  mind,  is  an  Inaccessible 
Light,  that  dazzels  all  the  eyes  that  behold  it;  and 
therefore,  we  can  hope  to  acquire  but  very  little  par- 
ticular knowledge  of  him,  or  acquaintance  with  him. 
under  this  notion.  But  then  again,  as  the  Sun  that 
cannot  be  beheld  directly,  in  its  own  proper  light, 
.may  yet  be  seen  by  Reflection;  so  may  the  Deity, 
in  an  Hypothesis,  and  by  way  of  Parable ;  by  speak- 
ing of  him  after  the  manner  of  men.  The  holy 
Scriptures  themselves  go  this  way.  They  Repre- 
sent God  as  an  Infinite  Almighty  Person,  (suppose 
a  man,)  that  hath  Understanding,  Will,  and  Affec- 
tions; that  t113!  consults  and  decrees;  and  that  is 
touched  (as  men  are)  with  the  motions  of  Love, 
Hatred,  Desire,  Aversion;  and  in  consequence  of 
this  Notion,  do  further  Represent  him,  sometimes 
as  a  Father,  sometimes  as  a  Lord,  or  as  a  great 
King,  that  Governs  the  Universe,  according  to  the 
Rules  and  Laws  that  he  himself  hath  set,  and  by- 
rewards  and  punishments.  Now,  all  this  is  Para- 
bolical, and  but  Comparative  Knowledge :  However, 
we  ought  to  satisfie  and  Content  our  selves  there- 
with ;  for  though  it  is  not  to  know  the  Deity  in  the 
Reality,  as  he  is  in  himself,  yet  it  suffices  for  the 
Principal  End  for  which  we  should  endeavour  to 
know  him;  which  is  to  Adore  and  Obey  him.  Be- 
sides, it  is  well  nigh  the  only  particular  Knowledge 
of  him  that  we  Mortals  are  capable  of,  in  this  Ter- 
restial  State;  and,  in  fine,  is  almost  as  much,  in 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  Ill 

effect,  as  that  which  we  have  of  any  thing  else,  even 
in  the  Corporeal  World. 

It  is  true  we  understand  that  Matter  and  Motion 
are  Real  things,  and  that  all  others  that  are  Cor- 
poreal, do  result  from  these;  but  this  (at  least)  is 
only  a  General  Confused  Knowledge,  and  no  more 
than  that  we  have  of  the  Abstracted  Pure  Mind. 
For,  as  to  the  particular  Natures  of  things,  their 
Internal  Fabrick  and  Texture,  H14]  and  that  degree 
of  Motion,  that  is  in  the  particles  which  compose 
them,  (of  this)  we  have  only  a  weak  imperfect  Con- 
jecture, without  certainty.  All  the  particular  Knowl- 
edge that  we  have  of  things  by  which  we  distinguish 
them  one  from  another,  both  in  reference  to  their 
Kinds,  and  to  the  Individuals  of  those  Kinds,  and 
by  which  we  resolve  their  Operations,  is  of  nothing 
(to  speak  of)  but  of  Accidents:  and  Accidents  are 
nothing  but  (as  I  have  touched  before,  and  shall 
shew  again  more  fully  hereafter)  the  Sentiments 
we  have  of  things;  they  being  not  so  much  as 
Grounds  or  proper  Representations  of  Grounds,  but 
only  certain  Appearances,  under  wrhich  our  several 
Senses  do  dress  up  things,  and  so  show  them  unto 
us:  and  this  is  enough  for  Use. 

As  therefore  any  person  would  know  but  little 
of  this  Corporeal  World,  and  nothing  usefully,  that 
would  not  take  it  in  by  his  Senses,  and  know  it  (as 
he  only  can)  under  the  Mascarade  of  Sentiments, 
that  are  not  without  him,  but  only  in  Appearances, 
and  in  their  Grounds ;  so,  he  shall  know  but  little  of 
God,  that  will  not  condescend  to  see  him  in  an  Hy- 


112    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

pothesis,  by  way  of  Analogy  and  Similitude.  What 
was  said  by  God  himself  unto  Moses,  will  t115!  hold 
true  in  every  Mortal ;  Thou  shalt  see  my  Backparts, 
but  my  Face  shall  not  be  seen :  All  our  Knowledge 
of  him  at  present,  is  but  ev  aivfyjMftt,  we  can  but 
Riddle  at  him;  the  Ideas  we  have  of  him,  are  only 
Attributes',  and  Attributes  are  not  Qualities  really 
Inherent  in  him,  but  only  Notions  of  his  Operations, 
and  of  the  various  Relations  and  Aspects  which 
they  bear,  to  one  Another,  and  to  Us,)  that  are 
excited  into  us,  upon  the  view  and  considerations 
which  we  take  of  his  works.  Thus  the  several  At- 
tributes of  God,  that  we  conceive  and  know  him 
under,  are,  in  reference  to  him,  just  as  the  Accidents 
of  things  Corporeal,  their  Colours,  their  Odors, 
their  Sounds,  their  Tangible  Qualities  are  unto 
them ;  we  see  him  but  (bg  ev  eaojitQco  as  in  a  Glass ; 
and  to  see  a  thing  as  in  a  Glass,  is  not  to  see  the 
thing  it  self,  but  only  by  Appearances ;  and  yet,  he 
that  will  look  behind  the  Glass,  to  see  more,  shall 
see  nothing  at  all. 

What,  then,  must  be  said  of  those,  who  think, 
they  See  all  things  in  God?42  When  God,  though 
in  himself  he  is  Pure  Light,  without  any  Mixture 
of  Darkness,  yet,  as  to  us,  in  respect  of  any  clear, 
just,  distinct  Knowledge  of  him,  He  dwells  in  the 
thickest  Darkness:  No  I116!  Windows  in  the  Sanc- 
tum Sanctorum,  where  the  Seat  of  God  was ;  and  the 
very  Heathen,  many  of  them,  Adored  him  with 
Silence,  as  one  that  was  Ineffable  and  Unconceiv- 
able: Methinks,  it  is  meer  Enthusiasm,  to  talk  of 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  113 

Seeing  All  Things  in  the  Original,  when  we  can- 
not so  much  as  look  upon  it ;  God  is  Pure  Mind,  and 
Pure  Mind  is  Pure  Light,  of  too  Transcendent  Glory 
to  be  immediately  beheld  by  us,  but  Blear-eyed, 
Weak-sighted  Mortals. 

There  are  tzvo  Opinions  in  reference  to  the  Na- 
ture of  God,  that  Differ  from  mine;  both  of  which 
I  will  consider. 

The  First  is,  that  of  Spinosa,  That  he  is  all 
Substance,  and  that  Particular  Beings  (even  for- 
mally taken)  are  but  Participations  of  his;  as  being 
only  so  many  several  Modifications  of  the  Divine 
Attributes.44  But  this  is  a  Notion  (of  the  Deity) 
that  I  cannot  receive,  as  for  other  Reasons,  so  for 
this  particularly,  that  it  makes  him  to  be  the  Uni- 
verse, and  to  be  Matter,  as  well  as  Mind ;  whereas, 
God  is  neither  Matter,  nor  the  World  or  Universe, 
but  only  Pure  Mind ;  for  t117!  the  Great  World  has 
a  Mind,  that  made,  and  Governs  it,  as  well  as  the 
Little.  Even  Mr.  Hobbs,  has  said,  He  that  thinks 
this  World  without  a  Mind,  I  shall  think  him  with- 
out a  Mind  :"  And  says  Seneca,  Nat.  Quasi.  Lib.  I.  C. 
45.  Eundem  quern  nos  Jovem  intelligunt,  Custodem, 
Rectoremq;  Universi;  Animum  ac  Spiritum,  Mun- 
dani  hujus  o peris  Dominum  &  Artificem,  cui  nomen 
omne  convenit,  &c.48  Which  I  would  Render  thus; 
God  is  the  Father  All-mighty,  All-wise,  All  good, 
the  Maker  of  Heaven  and  Earth,  Soveraign  Pre- 
server and  Governor  of  All. 


114    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTIIOGGE. 

For  my  own  part,  I  much  doubt  that  those  Phi- 
losophers, who  profess  themselves  in  this  Opinion, 
[that  God  is  all  Substance,  or  that  he  is  the  World,] 
do  really  believe  he  has  no  Being  at  all,  but,  only 
in  Fiction  of  Mind,  and  by  way  of  Prosopopaeia; 
and  that  as  Nature  Fortune,  Chance,  which  yet  are 
said  to  do  This,  and  to  do  That,  do,  really,  only 
signifie  Causes  so  or  so  considered;  so,  God,  with 
them,  is  only  a  Notion,  a  Name,  a  Mode  of  Expres- 
sion, by  which  they  mean  all  Causes  taken  together ; 
and  so  no  more  the  Name  of  a  Real  Individual 
singular  Being,  than  that  of  Nature,  or  Fortune. 
Sunt  (says  11181  Lucilius  in  Cicero  1. 2.  de  Nat.  Deor.} 
Old  oinnia  Naturae  nomine  appellant,  ut  Epicurus, 
&c.45 

The  unwary  Expression  of  some  Theologues. 
and  Theologizing  Philosophers,  who  Denominated 
God  Nature  Maturing,  might  give  occasion  to  this 
improper  conceit  of  him,  among  the  moderns;  as 
might  also  that  mistaken  Idea  of  Infinity  (as  an 
Attribute  of  God)  that  some  have  given,  which 
seems  to  shock  his  distinction  and  singularity  of 
Being.  For  thence  it  is  Argued,  how  can  God,  be 
Infinite  Being,  if  he  be  not  all  Beings?  And  if  he 
be,  how  can  he  be  One  by  himself  ?  be  a  Singular 
Individual  Being,  distinct  from  all  others?  These 
were  the  speculations,  that  obliged  Spinosa  to  con- 
ceive of  God,  that  he  is  the  Ingredient,  Immanent 
Cause  of  all  Things  ;44  and  the  speculations  too,  that 
tempt  others,  to  other  mistakes  concerning  him.  But 
when  I  come  to  discourse  of  the  Notions  of  Finite 


AN   KSSAY   UPON    KKASON.  115 

and  Infinite,  and  to  Represent  in  what  Sense  the 
latter  is  truly  Ascribed  to  God,  I  hope  to  manifest, 
that  there  is  great  Mistake  in  such  Speculations  and 
Arguings,  and  to  exempt  the  true  received  Notion 
of  Infinity  both  from  these,  and  from  all  the  like 
intangling  Embarrasments  and  Difficulties.  HW1 

The  Second  Opinion  is  that  of  Dr.  More  and  his 
Followers,  who  do  hold,  that  God  is  an  Infinite  Ex- 
tension ;48  that  he  is  indued  indeed  with  all  Goodness, 
Wisdom,  and  Power,  but  he  is  an  Extension  so  in- 
dued; and  of  this  they  are  so  confident,  that  some 
require  a  belief  thereof  as  of  an  Article  as  great 
as  any  in  the  Creed ;  an  Article  that  is  the  Founda- 
tion of  all  Religion ;  both  revealed  and  Natural.  But 
as  I  believe,  that  no  Alan  hath  known  the  Father 
except  the  Son,  and  he  to  whom  the  Son  hath  re- 
vealed him,  so,  since  among  all  the  Revelations  that 
the  Son  has  pleased  to  make  of  God  the  Father,  this 
is  none  [that  he  is  an  Extension]  I  cannot  admit  his 
being  so,  to  be  a  Notion  so  Essential  unto  all  Re- 
ligion, as  they  would  make  it;  Especially  when  I 
consider,  that  it  might  as  easily  have  been  said,  that 
God  is  Extension,  as,  that  he  is  a  Spirit ;  and  Christ 
hath  said  the  latter  but  not  the  former.  Besides,  I 
cannot  understand  how  Wisdom,  Goodness,  and 
Power  should  be  said  of  meer  Extension,  which  is 
but  space;  it  seems  to  me  a  lesser  incongruity 
(though  even  this  is  Incongruity  enough)  to  say 
that  God  is  Matter  so  indued,  that  he  is  Space  so 
indued ;  seeing,  even  in  common  sense,  there  is  more 


Il6   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

of  Reality  and  Being  in  meer  Matter,  t120!  than  there 
is  in  meer  Extension  or  Space.  But  to  urge  this 
Argument  more  home.  By  Extension,  (which  the 
persons  who  are  in  this  Opinion  do  Attribute  to 
God,)  they  must  mean  either  meer  Space,  or  else  a 
thing  that  in  the  Idea  of  it  is  Spatious.  If  meer 
space  is  intended;  As  this  does  in  no  ways  differ 
from  inane  or  vacuum,  so  one  may  think,  it  might 
as  well  be  said  (which  yet  its  hard  to  say)  that  God 
is  an  Infinite  inane  or  vacuum,  that  is,  in  plain  Eng- 
lish, an  Infinite  Nothing  indued  with  Wisdom, 
Goodness  and  Power,  as,  that  he  is  infinite  Exten- 
sion so  indued.  On  the  other  side,  if  by  Extension 
is  understood  a  thing  that  in  the  Idea  and  first  Con 
ception  of  it  is  Extensive,  that  is,  a  thing  that  does 
essentially  take  up  space  so  that  it  cannot  be  con- 
ceived, but  withal  space  must  be  Imagined,  as  an 
Appurtenant  of  it;  in  this  Sense,  I  cannot  see  how 
it  differs  from  Matter;  and  then  to  say,  that  God  is 
Extension,  is  to  say,  that  he  is  Matter ;  whereas,  God 
is  Pure  Mind,  not  Matter.  In  fine,  as  it  is  certain, 
that  God  is  Mind,  rather  than  Matter;  so  likewise 
it  is  certain,  that  in  the  Ideas  that  we  frame  of  Mind, 
and  of  all  the  things  that  properly  relate  to  it,  such 
as  Wisdom,  Goodness,  Thought,  &c.  We  never  do 
once  think  of  Extension  or  f121!  Space:  And  if  at 
any  time  we  do  endeavour  to  apply  Extension  or 
Space  unto  Mind,  or  to  any  thing  properly  mental, 
there  always  arises  a  Repugnance  in  us,  upon  but 
the  thoughts  of  it ;  an  Inch,  a  Foot,  a  Yard  of  Under- 
standing, or  Goodness,  is  a  Bull. 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  117 

I  know  it  is  Argued  from  the  Omnipresence  of 
God,  that  he  is  Extended;  and  in  truth  it  is  very 
hard  to  imagine  any  presence  with  things  that  are 
extended,  but  withal,  there  must  be  an  Imagina 
tion  of  some  Extension  in  the  thing  that  is  present : 
but  still,  this  is  but  Imagination,  which  is  apt  to 
impose  upon  us,  and  therefore  it  must  be  examined 
by  Reason.  And  Reason  tells  us,  that  we  cannot 
have  a  distinct  and  clear  conception  of  the  presence 
of  God,  if  we  have  not  (as  we  have  not)  such  an 
one  of  his  Essence,  since  the  presence  of  God  is  but 
a  Mode  of  his  Essence;  and  if  we  have  no  distinct 
and  clear  Conception  of  the  presence  of  God,  nor 
consequently  of  his  Omnipresence,  or  the  way  how 
he  is  present  with  all  his  Creatures,  where  ever  they 
are;  I  do  not  see  with  what  Cogency  or  Force  an 
Argument  can  be  Deduced  from  it,  in  this  business. 
In  short,  since  things  are  present  one  with  another 
very  differently,  in  proportion  to  their  several  Na- 
tures, it  will  follow,  that  11221  things  Mental,  must  be 
present  with  others,  in  much  another  way  than  those 
that  are  Material.,  and  Consequently  that  God  who 
is  pure  Mind,  must  be  present  with  Material  Beings, 
much  otherwise,  than  these  themselves  are,  one  with 
another.  Mind  can  no  more  be  present  the  same 
way  that  Matter  is,  than  be  the  same  thing  with 
Matter.  [123] 


I  J8    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


CHAP.    [V. 

Of  Mind  in  Matter. 
SECT,  i. 

Mind  as  concerned  with  Matter  comes  under  a 
double  consideration,  i  As  it  actuates  a  most 
subtle  and  more  than  Etherial  Matter,  that 
is  diffus'd  throughout  the  World.  2ly.  As  it 
actuates  some  particular  Vehicle  or  Body.  In 
the  first  Notion  of  it.  Mind  in  Matter  is  the 
Idea  of  the  Mosaical  Spirit  of  God.  This  Spirit 
according  to  the  Scriptural  Hypothesis,  is  the 
Immediate  cause  of  all  things  in  the  nrst  Crea- 
tion, and  ever  since.  The  Being  of  this  Spirit 
Evinced,  both  by  Authority  and  by  Argument. 
Dr.  Mores  Distinction,  betzueen  the  Spirit  of 
Nature  (which  he  calls  Principium  Hylarchi- 
cum)  and  the  Spirit  of  God,  considered. 


SECT.  II.  H29] 

An  Inquiry  into  the  Original  and  Rise  of  Motion. 
What  is  meant  by  Motion  in  this  Inquiry.  That 
Motion  comes  from  Mind  in  Matter,  or  the 
Mosaical  Spirit.  This  shewed  in  many  in- 
stances, by  the  Connexion  betzveen  Cogitation 
and  Motion.  How  Motion  comes  from  a  Prin- 
ciple at  Rest,  and  how  Matter  from  Mind  set 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  I IQ 

out  in  the  Metaphysical  Hypothesis,  and  by 
other  Illustrations. 


By  Finer  and  Delicater  Impressions,  I  mean 
such  as  have  less  of  Local  Motion.  By  Finer  and 
Delicater  Faculties,  I  mean  such  as  are  sensible  of 
Finer  and  Delicater  Touches,  or  Impressions. 

In  this  sense,  the  Imagination  must  needs  be  a 
finer  and  more  delicate  faculty  than  any  external 
sense,  for  as  much  as  it  receives  the  impressions  of 
External  Objects  but  by  Reflection,  or  Communica- 
tion from  the  Sensories,  but  these  have  them  directly 
from  the  very  Objects  themselves;  and  by  the  same 
Reason,  the  Understanding,  that  receives  impres- 
sions from  the  internal  sense,  f139!  must  needs  be  (as 
indeed  it  is)  a  much  finer  and  delicater  faculty  than 
That. 

Upon  the  whole,  it  is  evident,  that  there  is  a  near 
relation  between  actual  motion  and  cogitation,  and 
consequently,  that  it  is  no  unreasonable  thought  to 
think,  that  as  they  are  near  of  kin,  so  both  are  Off- 
springs of  one  Original  cause,  [mind  in  matter;] 
but  then  it  will  follow  also,  that  motion,  and  indeed 
all  Energy  whatever  in  the  Spring  and  Principle  of 
it  is  Rest,  for  so  mind  is.  But  this  is  the  difficulty. 
For  that  motion  should  come  from  a  Principle  that 
is  at  rest,  appears  as  unintelligible,  as  that  Frost 
should  come  from  Fire,  or  Darkness  from  Light. 

Wherefore  to  make  this  clear.  I  must  consider 
things  in  the  Metaphysical  Hypothesis,  as  all  are 


I2O   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

understood  to  come  from  one,  by  way  of  Emanation : 
and  thus,  all  Created  Being  is  compared  to  Light, 
that  flows  from  the  Sun ;  and  then  its  Emanation  is 
in  the  same  manner,  as  the  Radiation  of  Light,  which 
is  from  a  Center  into  an  Orb  or  Sphere,  in  Extenu- 
ating Lines.  Now  in  this  Hypothesis,  as  all  Beings 
(even  those  that  are  most  opposite)  do  come  from 
one,  so  they  come  from  it  in  this  way,  that  the  more 
Removed  any  is  from  the  Central  Being,  the  more 
Extenuated  it  is ;  that  is,  as  God  or  pure  mind  is  the 
Central  Being,  t14°l  that  Sun,  that  is  the  Father  of 
Lights ;  so  all  the  Being  that  proceeds  from  him,  has 
less  of  Light  and  more  of  Darkness,  in  proportion 
to  the  distance  it  has,  upon  the  Scale  of  Being,  and 
in  its  utmost  Elongation  or  Removal  from  him,  ter- 
minates in  that,  which  in  Appearance  has  nothing 
of  Resemblance  to  the  Original  Light;  but  (to  be 
compared  with  it)  is  only  Darkness  and  shadow; 
and  this  last  is  the  Idea  of  nieer  matter,  as  that  of 
the  Central  Light  is  of  pure  Mind.  God  is  Light; 
Matter  is  Darkness;  all  intermediate  Beings  are 
Light  and  Darkness,  in  several  proportions. 

What  I  have  said  is  sensibly  set  out  in  the  shades 
of  Colours,  and  in  Colours  themselves,  which  are 
but  shades  of  Light',  For  the  Extremes  of  any  Col- 
our, for  Example,  the  Brightest  Red,  and  the  Dark- 
est•;  or  the  Extreams  of  all  Colours,  as  White  and 
Black;  compare  them  each  with  other,  and  they  are 
so  contrary,  that  nothing  can  be  more,  especially  the 
two  latter;  and  yet  they  do  participate,  the  former 
not  only  of  Colour  in  general,  but  also  of  Red ;  and 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  121 

the  latter,  tho'  of  no  particular  Colour,  yet  of  Light, 
which  is  the  Ground  of  Colour  in  general ;  and  also 
the  Darkest  Red,  if  it  doth  not  come  from  the  Bright- 
est; and  the  Blackest  Cot141Hour  from  the  Whitest; 
yet,  by  the  Gradation  of  Shades,  or  Participle,  inter- 
mediate Colours,  they  are  so  continued  one  to  an- 
other, that  the  Ascent  and  Descent  from  one  unto 
the  other  is  most  Agreeable  and  Delightful,  as  made 
by  easie  steps,  without  any  Patches,  or  Chasms.  It 
is  true,  if  we  look  on  Contraries  in  their  Physical 
Consideration,  so  they  are  of  opposite  Natures,  op- 
posite Operations,  and  one  expels  the  other,  when 
they  are  immediately  set  together;  but  if  we  look 
upon  them  in  their  Metaphysical  Consideration,  so 
they  are  but  degrees  of  the  same  nature,  and  ca- 
pable of  being  United  and  Reconciled;  insomuch, 
that  One  in  a  right  sense  may  be  said  to  come 
from  Another;  as  Darkness  from  Light.  For 
however  contrary  Light  and  Darkness  are,  each 
unto  other,  as  to  Qualities  and  Physical  Operation, 
and  so  in  their  Physical  Consideration,  yet  as  to 
their  Metaphysical,  they  differ  but  in  degrees;  both 
have  the  same  grounds;  for  Shadow  really  is  but 
lesser  Light,  occasion'd  by  the  interposition  of  an 
Opaque  Body,  and  Darkness  is  but  a  great  Shadow. 
And  thus  a  Flat  and  a  Sharp,  tho'  contrary  sounds, 
as  to  their  Physical  Consideration,  yet  as  to  their 
metaphysical,  they  are  but  different  degrees;  the 
Sharp  a  greater,  the  Flat  a  lesser  def142lgree  of 
Celerity.  And  thus  as  Darkness  comes  from  Light, 
only  by  the  Lessning  or  Extenuating  of  it;  so  may 


122    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

matter  come  from  mind :  mind  is  pure  Light,  or,  all 
Being  in  Eminence ;  but  matter,  as  it  doth  Partici- 
pate nothing  at  all  of  mind,  but  only  by  meer  Exist- 
ence, so  it  is  meer  darkness,  without  the  least  degree 
of  Vitality  or  Life;  and  all  Beings  between  Mind 
and  Matter,  are  as  Colours,  in  respect  of  Light,  or 
as  Shades,  in  respect  of  any  particular  Colour. 

But  to  add  some  further  cleering  to  this  Subject, 
and  to  shew  how  actual  local  motion  may  come  from 
a  Principle  that  is  at  rest,  which  being  shewed,  will 
shew  withall  how  Matter  may  come  from  mind, 
since  there  is  no  greater  Repugnance  (even  to  com- 
mon sense)  in  the  one,  than  is  in  the  other,  I  will 
consider  the  Relation  that  the  Center  of  a  Circle 
has  unto  its  Circumference,  and  how  things  are  in 
the  one,  and  how  in  the  other-,  For  this  will  afford 
it  much  Illustration.  In  the  Center  then  of  a  Circle, 
or  of  a  moved  Sphere,  all  is  at  Rest,  and  out  of  it 
all  in  motion,  but  in  such  proportion,  that  that  por- 
tion of  a  Radius  which  is  at  a  farther  distance  from 
the  Center,  is  more  in  motion,  by  reason  of  that 
distance,  and  that  which  is  nearer  ^43]  js 


Well  then,  supposing  that  the  Principle  of  En- 
ergy and  Motion  is  in  the  Center  of  the  Orb  of 
Being,  (and  we  may  well  suppose  it,  since  even 
Nature  has  its  Sphere  of  Activity,  and  Acts  as  from 
a  Center  to  a  Circumference;  (so  Seeds  Act,  so 
Light  Acts  and  Diffuses  it  self;)  it  is  certain  that 
motion  must  come  from  something  not  in  Motion, 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON. 


but  at  Rest;  for  so  that  is,  which  is  in  the  Center: 
and  indeed,  else  there  must  be  infinite  progression 
in  Motions.  Again,  since  in  the  Orb  of  being,  Pure 
Mind  is  in  the  Center,  [146]  and  matter  in  the  utmost 
Circumference,  it  follows,  that  the  nearer  things 
are  unto  pure  mind,  and  the  more  they  do  partici- 
pate of  that,  the  more  they  have  of  Rest,  and  the  less 
of  motion;  but  the  farther  off  they  are  from  pure 
Mind,  and  the  nearer  to  matter,  the  more  in  motion 
they  are.  And  indeed,  all  Energy  in  matter  is  Local 
Motion.  Thus  all  the  Effects  of  Mechanism,  as  they 
are  purely  material,  so  they  are  performed  only  by 
Local  Motion;  but  the  business  of  Cogitation,  even 
in  the  lowest  step  of  it,  which  is  sensation,  as  it  is 
of  nearer  Relation  unto  mind  than  to  matter,  so  it  is 
performed  rather  by  way  of  mutation,  than  of  Local 
motion;  the  Eye  is  not  sensible  of  any  motion  im- 
parted to  it,  nor  is  the  Ear,  or  the  Nose,  or  any  other 
of  our  Sensories,  and  yet  each  is  sensible  of  a  muta- 
tion made  therein,  (or  rather  in  the  Faculty)  which 
comes  from  motion.  But  tho'  the  more  refined  any 
Beings  are,  and  the  nearer  that  they  are  to  the  Cen- 
tral Mind,  the  more  at  rest  they  be,  and  the  less  in 
motion  in  their  several  Actions;  and  consequently 
Abstract  Spirits  that  do  not  live  in  gross  Elementary 
Bodies,  are  more  at  rest,  and  have  less  of  motion,  in 
the  exercises  of  their  several  Powers,  than  Men 
have,  who  are  imbodied  in  Elementary  Vehin47]cies; 
yet  no  Spirit  whatsoever  but  only  God  himself,  who 
only  is  Pure  Mind,  is  so  wholly,  so  Absolutely  at 
Rest,  as  that  it  sees  all  Things  at  once,  by  one  Entire 


124    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

view  and  Intuition;  all  Principles  and  all  Conclu- 
sions in  them;  all  Ends  and  all  Means  and  Motives 
to  them;  without  the  least  degree  of  Succession,  or 
any  Addition.  Only  the  Central  Being  sees  so,  and 
he  doe's. 

For  seeing  all  the  Circumference  is  in  the  Cen- 
ter, so  that  all  the  Lines  however  divided  they  be  in 
the  former,  do  meet  together  in  the  latter ;  it  is  plain, 
that  an  Eye  placed  in  the  Center,  must  needs  see 
all  in  the  Circle,  as  clearly  as  any  thing  in  it;  and 
this  too  with  one  Individual,  single  Intuition,  with- 
out Succession,  or,  Addition ;  seeing  there  is  nothing 
of  Motion,  but  all  is  Rest  in  the  Center.  And  this 
properly  is  to  see  in  Eternity.  Thus  God  sees.  But 
all  other  Beings  beside  God,  as  they  are  not  God,  or 
Pure  mind,  so  they  are  not  in  the  Center,  and  not 
being  the  Center,  but  at  Distance  from  it,  some  at 
Greater,  some  at  Lesser,  but  All  at  some,  they  All 
have  something  of  Motion,  and  consequently  cannot 
Act,  or  See,  in  the  same  manner  as  Central  Pure 
Mind,  by  way  of  Absolute  Rest,  without  Succession, 
or  Addition,  f14g]  and  without  Distinction  of  past, 
present,  and  to  come :  For  tho'  all  the  Lines  do  meet 
in  the  Center,  yet  there  being  no  place  without  it  in 
which  they  do  so,  Creatures  cannot  see  as  God  sees, 
no  more  than  they  can  be  in  the  Center  as  God  is. 
It  is  too  short  and  Inadequate  a  way  of  Arguing 
to  Infer  that  any  Creatures  can  see  All  things  al 
once,  but  from  the  notions  (confused  enough)  that 
we  Mortals  have  of  Time  and  Eternity ;  as  that  Time 
is  Successive,  Eternity  a  Permanent  Duration;  to- 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  125 

gether  with  a  Conceit,  that  all  Spirits  (they  being 
things  Abstract  and  Separate  from  Bodies,)  both 
Are,  and  Act,  in  Eternity,  as  all  Imbodied  Beings 
Are,  and  do  Act,  in  Time.  Certainly  every  Being 
but  God,  is  in  Time,  tho'  not  in  the  same  Kind  of 
Time ;  for  as  God  only  is  in  the  Center,  so  he  only  is 
Absolutely  in  Eternity.  And  if  Time  is  taken  for  all 
Duration  that  is  not  Eternity,  God  only  is  without 
Time,  and  so  without  Succession  of  Actions.  But 
to  Return. 


SECT.   III. 

Of  Mind  as  it  Actuates  a  certain  Particular  Body; 
Mind  in  this  Notion  called  a  Soul.  Body  is  a 
System  of  Organs.  Soul  and  Body  an  Animal. 
Body  Considered  two  ways.  To  wit,  in  Ref- 
erence to  External  Objects,  and  in  Reference 
to  the  Internal  Principal  that  Acts  it.  In  the 
First  Consideration  of  Body,  the  Ends  and  uses 
of  Organs  are  shewed,  and  withal  the  Reason 
of  their  variety.  This  illustrated  by  several 
Instances  and  Observations.  The  use  of  Body 
in  Relation  to  the  Internal  Principle  that  Actu- 
ates it,  is  to  Individuate  and  Singularize  that 
Principle.  This  set  out  in  sensible  and  plain 
Resemblances.  A  Comparison  between  Vital 
and  Locomotive  Energy;  with  a  Recapitulation 
of  the  whole  Discourse,  as  it  unfolds  the  Mys- 
tery of  Animals. 


126    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

We  have  Considered  Mind  in  the  first  Step  of 
Relation  that  it  carries  unto  Matter,  Namely,  as  it 
doe's  Actuate  a  most  subtle  Matter  diffused  through- 
out the  Universe,  in  which  Notion  is  called  Spirit 
simply,  as  was  showed  from  Malachy,  Ch.  2.  v.  15. 
Come  we  now  to  Consider  ^50]  ft  m  the  next  place, 
as  it  Actuates  some  Particular  System  of  Matter, 
in  a  Particular  Manner;  and  so  it  is  called  a  Soul; 
and  that  Particular  System  of  Matter,  which  it 
doth  Actuate,  is  a  Body,  or  a  Particular  Vehicle; 
and  the  Result  of  both  an  Animal.  An  Animal  is 
nothing  but  Soul  and  Body  together;  or  a  Body 
Actuated  by  a  Soul.  A  Body  is  a  System  of  Organs ; 
an  Organ  is  Matter  framed  and  Contrived  after  a 
Particular  Manner  for  some  Animal  Use,  and  End ; 
some  Use,  End,  or  Action  of  a  Soul:  A  Soul  is  a 
certain  Determinate  Vital  Energy ;  or  a  certain  Por- 
tion of  the  Spirit  of  the  Universe,  Vested  in  a  Body, 
or  particular  Vehicle;  in  which  Notion  all  Souls 
are  Spirits;  as  indeed  they  are  stiled  in  the  Holy 
Scripture,  wherein  we  Read  of  the  Spirit  of  the 
Beast,  tho'  it  goes  Downward,  as  well  as  of  the 
Spirit  of  a  Man  that  goes  Upward. 


We  will  first  Consider  a  Body  in  the  Relation 
that  it  has  unto  External  Objects,  and  here  we  must 
set  out  the  Nature,  that  is,  the  Ends  and  Uses  of  the 
Organs  which  compose  a  Body,  as  also  the  Reason 
of  the  Variety,  and  number  of  those  Organs;  why 
any  Organs  at  all,  and  why  many :  both  which  will 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  I2J 

be  done  with  one  Performance.  An  Organ  properly, 
is  Matter  Particularly  Textured,  and  Framed  for 
some  Particular  use :  And  an  Animal  Organ  is  Par- 
ticularly Textured,  and  Framed  for  an  Animal  use : 
I  will  give  the  Example  in  only  Sensitive  Animals, 
and  in  the  Acts  of  Sensation,  as  being  best  under- 
stood; but  what  is  said  of  Sensation,  and  of  the 
Organs  of  it,  will,  by  Proportion,  hold  in  all  the 
other  Actions  of  Animals,  and  in  all  other  Organs, 
with  a  due  Alteration.  I1521 

In  all  Acts  of  Sensation  there  is  first  an  Affection 
of  the  Organ,  and  then  a  Perception  of  that  Affec- 
tion by  the  Soul;  or  rather,  a  Perception  Excited 
in  the  Soul  by  means  of  that  Affection ;  and  this  is 
the  End  of  the  Organ,  and  the  only  Use  of  it,  that 
the  Soul  makes,  to  wit,  to  come  by  means  thereof 
unto  a  Perception  of  External  Objects;  as,  to  see 
their  Colours,  to  hear  their  Sounds,  to  Relish  the 
several  Tasts  they  have,  and  the  like.  In  short,  a 
Soul  cannot  but  by  means  of  Organs,  take  any 
notice  of  External  Objects,  nor  the  Organ  be  a 
means  of  conveying  any  notice  to  the  Soul,  but  by 
being  first  Affected  it  self.  Now  the  Affection  of 
the  Organ  arises  from  a  Perception  (may  I  so  ex- 
press it)  or  a  Reception  of  the  Motions  Communi- 
cated to  it  by  Objects ;  and  a  Capacity  for  this  Re- 
ception from  the  Particular  Frame  of  the  Organ. 
For  since  all  Matter  indifferently  is  not  capable  of 
receiving  all  kinds  of  Motions  and  Impressions ;  but 
that  for  some  Particular  Motions  and  Impressions 
(of  which  sort  are  sensible  ones)  there  must  be  Par- 


128    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

ticular  Textures  and  Frames  of  Matter  to  Catch 
them;  it  follows,  that  there  must  be  Organs;  and 
these  too  in  such  Variety  and  Number :  there  must 
be  Organs,  to  Receive  the  Impression  and  Motions 
of  Objects,  which  t153!  without  a  Particular  Texture 
of  Matter  could  not  be  Received ;  and  there  must  be 
Variety  of  Organs,  to  Correspond  these  various 
Kinds  of  Motions  and  Impressions  that  are  in  Col- 
oured, in  Sonorous,  in  Sapid,  and  in  other  Species 
of  Objects. 


So  much  concerning  Body  in  its  Relation  to  Ex- 
ternal Objects;  come  I  now  to  consider  it  in  the 
Relation  which  it  has  to  the  Soul,  (the  Internal 
Principle  that  Actuates  it,  and  Acts  in,  and  by  it;) 
and  so,  the  Great  work  and  Business  of  the  Body  is 
to  Singularise  and  Individuate  the  General  Vital 
Principle  of  the  Universe,  that  it  may  become  a 
Soul,  or  a  Particular  Vital  Principle  of  a  certain 
Particular  Body.  To  understand  this  it  must  be 
[155]  Consider'd,  that  the  Mosalcal  Spirit  (the  Rise 
and  Principle  of  all  Created  Cogitation,)  as  it  is 
Extended  throughout  the  whole  Universe;  so,  to 
become  in  Particular  a  Soul,  of  any  Particular  Ani- 
mal, it  must  be  Singidarised,  and  Individuated,  that 
is,  it  must  be  Apportioned  (as  it  were)  to  that 
Particular  Animal,  which  it  comes  to  be  by  means 
of  the  Body.  To  Illustrate  this,  it  must  be  Remem- 
bred,  that  a  Voice  or  Sound  Diffused  throughout  the 
whole  capacity  of  the  Medium  (as  the  Mosaical 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  1 29 

Spirit  is  throughout  that  of  the  universe)  is  yet  in 
the  Phonocamptick  Center  or  object  (which  is  noth- 
ing but  a  place  conveniently  Disposed  for  this  Pur- 
pose,) so  Individuated  and  Singularized  (as  the 
Mosaical  Spirit  is  supposed  to  be  by  a  Congruous 
fit  Body,)  that  Really  it  has  other  Affections  and 
Properties,  than  those  it  owns,  in  all  the  rest  of  the 
Medium,  insomuch  that  by  Vertue  of  it,  this  place 
instead  of  being  a  Medium  of  Sound,  becomes  to  all 
Appearance  a  Principle  of  it,  and  so  a  Speaker,  and 
this  is  called  an  Echo.  It  may  also  be  set  out  in  a 
Speculum  or  Looking-Glass,  (for  a  Body  is  to  the 
Mosaical  Spirit,  what  a  Speculum  or  Looking-Glass 
is  to  the  Image  of  an  Object  in  the  Medium;)  A 
Speculum  Catches  the  Diffused  Image,  and  so  Sin- 
gularizes  it,  that  t156!  it  becomes  a  very  Different 
thing,  and  puts  on  other  very  Different  Properties 
than  those  it  has  in  the  Medium,  for  in  the  Looking- 
Glass  it  doth  appear  as  an  Object  which  it  doe's  not 
out  of  it.  But  what  doe's  set  it  out  most  naturally, 
is,  that  it  is  so  in  Man-,  For  the  Soul  or  Cogitative 
Principle  of  a  Man,  as  it  is  Extended  throughout 
the  whole  Capacity  of  the  Body,  in  like  manner  as 
the  Mosaical  Spirit  is,  throughout  that  of  the  Uni- 
verse ;  so  it  is  Singularized  and  Individuated,  in,  and 
by,  the  particular  Organs:  insomuch  that  the  Eye 
only  does  See;  the  Ear  only  does  Hear,  and  only 
the  Tongue  Tasts,  in  Vertue  thereof:  for  which 
Reason  these  are  owned  to  have  several  particular 
Faculties,  which  are  as  so  many  several  Souls  unto 
them.  Now  what  the  Organs  are  to  the  Soul  in 


I3O   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

any  Body  (that  is  but  a  System  of  Organs,)  Bodies 
themselves  are,  unto  the  Mosaical  Spirit,  the  great 
Soul  of  the  Universe,  of  which  all  particular  Bodies 
are  Organs.  But  since  this  Notion  is  of  so  much 
importance,  that  it  will  deserve  a  more  particular 
Consideration,  and  I  design  to  give  it  one  in  another 
Chapter,  I  shall  dismiss  it  at  present,  without  fur- 
ther Insisting  on  it;  and  now  will  only  add  some 
Improvement  to  the  former  Discourse,  by  making 
a  Comparison  bet157Hween  the  Vital  and  the  Me- 
chanical Energy. 

First  then  I  lay  it  down  as  certain,  that  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  a  Vital,  as  well  as  a  Mechanical 
Energy:  by  Vital  Energy  I  mean  all  that  is  not 
meerly  Mechanical;  and  therefore  do  comprehend 
in  that  Term  whatever  is  properly  Mental\  by 
Mechanical  Energy  I  mean  Impulse  or  Springines, 
the  nearest  Physical  Principle  of  Actual  Local  Mo- 
tion. Now  we  are  as  sure  by  our  senses,  and  by 
the  Reflection  that  we  make  upon  our  selves,  and 
upon  the  Notices  which  we  receive  from  Things 
without  us,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  Vital 
Energy,  as  we  are  that  there  is  a  Mechanical: 
Because  we  are  as  much  assured  of  the  Effects  of 
the  one,  as  we  are  of  those  of  the  other  \  as  much 
assured  that  there  is  life,  Sensation,  and  Intellection, 
that  come  from  a  Vital;  as  we  are  that  there  are 
Actual  Local  Motions;  Motions  of  Ascent  and  De- 
scent, Motions  Direct,  and  Motions  Circular,  &c. 
which  (as  Motions)  come  from  Impulse,  the  Me- 
chanical Energy. 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  131 

Again;  As  it  is  Certain  that  Local  Motion,  or 
that  Impulse  which  is  the  nearest  Physical  Principle 
of  it,  is  not  Matter,  or  Materiate,  but  yet  is  in  Mat- 
ter, as  United  unto  it :  so  by  this  Consideration  we 
may  £1581  become  as  certain,  that  Vital  Energy  and 
the  Effects  of  it,  though  they  be  Immaterial,  yet  they 
may  be  in  Matter;  since  there  needs  no  more  of 
Hooks  and  Crooks  to  make  the  Latter,  than  to  make 
the  Former,  to  stick,  and  hold  together. 

In  the  next  place;  As  the  Mechanical,  or  Loco- 
motive Energy  is  Diffused  throughout  the  World 
(for  there  is  nothing  in  this,  that  is  Entirely  at 
Rest;)  so  is  the  Vital:  Since  it  is  certain  that  wher- 
ever, and  whenever,  any  Matter  becomes  Disposed, 
the  Vital  Principle  is  always  at  hand  to  Actuate 
that  Matter,  and  Act  in  it,  according  as  the  Dis- 
positions of  .it  do  Invite  or  Permit :  All  Putrefac- 
tion or  Digestion  any  where,  determines  in  Insects, 
or  little  Animals,  (as  Experience  evinces,)  the  Spir- 
its being  Unfettered  and  let  Loose  thereby. 

And  yet  as  the  Mechanick  or  Loco-motive  Im- 
pulse is  not  Received  in  all  Textures  of  Matter  indif- 
ferently, but  that,  (as  I  have  showed  already)  there 
must  be  some  certain  Modifications  of  Local  Motion, 
be  certain  particular  Textures  of  Matter,  so  neither 
is  the  Vital  Energy  Catcht  and  Received  indiffer- 
ently by  all  Textures  of  Matter ;  but  as  all  Life  con- 
sists in  Motion,  or  in  something  Analogous,  so  for 
certain  Gradations  and  Exercises  of  (159J  Life,  there 
must  be  certain  particular  Fabricks  and  Textures 
of  Matter,  called  Organs,  and  also  certain  partic- 


132    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

ular  Dispositions  in  the  Mechanical  Spirits  (for  so 
I  call  the  subtle  Active  Corpuscles  in  every  Con- 
crete) that  are  the  immediate  instruments  of  the 
Vital  Principle  in  all  its  Actions  of  Life,  in  this 
Corporeal  World. 


CHAP.  vu. 

Animals  are  either  Invisible  or  Visible;  in  the  Former 
sort  I  reckon  Angels,  Good  and  Bad,  which  are 
Etherial:  As  also  the  Genii,  which  are  Aerial 
Animals.  Invisible  Animals,  ivhy  called  Spirits. 
That  they  are  Spirits  Evinced,  i  .  From  the  gen- 
eral Tradition  of  the  World.  Mr.  Hobbs'^ 
Evasion  of  this  Argument  Considered.  2.  From 
Operations  that  cannot  be  Accounted  for  but 
from  such  Causes.  3.  From  Intelligences  and 
Notifications  that  cannot  be  Resolved  but  upon 
this  Hypothesis.  4.  From  Spectra  or  Appari- 
tions. Of  the  way  and  manner  how  Spirits  do 
Appear,  that  it  is  twofold,  Real  and  Visional. 
That  Good  Angels  when  they  do  Appear  are 
called  jrv&ufiata  or  Spirits;  and  the  Bad  qpav- 
or  Fantomes. 


SECT.  II. 

That  there  are  Spirits,  proved  by  General  Tradition. 
Mr.  Hobb\?  Answer  to  this  Argument  shewed 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  133 

to  be  but  an  Evasion,  from  the  Evangelists 
Matthew  and  Mark,  &c. 


SUB.  i. 


Another  Argument  to  Prove  Spirits.  Of  the  Con- 
version of  an  Indian  Raja.  A  Remarkable 
Story  of  Witchcraft,  out  of  Mr.  Gage's  Survey. 


SUBS.   ii. 


The  Third  Argument  from  Supernatural  Adver- 
tisements. An  Instance  out  of  Simocatto.  An- 
other, of  a  strange  Omen  out  of  Sir  W.  Raw- 
leigh.  Of  the  Corps-Candles  in  Wales,  &c. 


SUBS.  in. 


The  Third  Argument  from  Apparitions.  Three 
Stories  of  them  from  the  Junior  Pliny,  in  his 
Epistles.  A  Recent  Story  of  an  Apparition. 


SECT.  in. 

The  Apparition  of  Spirits  twofold,  Real,  or  Visional; 
both  ways  Explained.  A  Conceit  about  the  Ap- 
pearing of  Ghosts  Rejected.  That  most  Appa- 
ritions of  Spirits  are  Visional,  not  Real,  Evinced 
by  several  Considerations.  Some  Phaenomena 


134    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

of  Apparitions  Salved.    Of  the  Distribution  of 
Spirits. 


CHAP.  VIII. 

Another  Essay  about  the  Nature  of  Animals  and 

Spirits. 

SECT.  i. 

The  Subject  farther  Illustrated,  by  a  Comparison 
of  the  Universe  with  a  particular  Animal.  The 
Universe  a  whole;  Particular  Animals  but 
Members  of  that  whole.  A  Particular  Animal 
is  as  an  Organ  with  its  faculty;  the  Universe, 
as  a  Body  composed  of  several  Organs,  with  a 
Soul  that  endues  these  Organs  with  several 
Faculties.  A  Demonstration  even  to  sense,  of 
a  common  Principle  that  penetrates  throughout 
the  Universe.  In  what  sense  a  Soul  is  a  faculty, 
and  in  what  a  Principle  of  Faculties.  Two 
senses  of  the  word  Soul,  and  how  in  both,  it 
may  be  conceived  as  a  Principle  of  Faculties. 
The  Soul  in  its  state  of  separation  becomes  a 
Spirit  properly.  Soul  is  the  name  of  a  part,  a 
Spirit  the  name  of  a  whole  Substance.  God  the 
Central  Sun,  and  Fountain  of  all  Souls  and 
Spirits.  The  Emanation  of  Souls  and  Spirits 
from  God,  or  from  his  Spirit,  set  out  in  the 
Comparison  of  Light  and  Colours.  Not  only 


AN  ESSAY  UPON  REASON.  135 

Philosophers,  and  Poets,  but  even  many  Chris- 
tian Doctors,  and  particularly  St.  Augustin, 
compared  God  in  respect  of  his  influence  in  and 
over  the  Universe,  unto  the  Soul  in  a  Man. 

************ 
************ 


SECT.   II. 

Several  Objections  against  the  Former  Hypothesis 
considered.  First,  that  it  makes  Souls  to  be 
Faculties  or  Powers,  whereas  indeed  they  are 
Actions,  or  Acts.  This  Objection  Answered. 
and  the  notion  of  the  Souls  being  a  Principle 
and  Faculty,  rather  than  an  Action,  cleared. 
The  Second  Objection,  that  in  this  Hypothesis 
the  Deity  is  considered  as  an  Immanent,  and 
not  (what  he  is]  as  a  Transient  cause  of  all 
things,  Removed;  and  how  he  is  both  the  one 
and  the  other,  shewed,  and  Confirmed  by  the 
Authority  of  St.  Austin,  and  other  Christian 
Fathers;  as  well  as  of  the  Chief  est  Philosophers. 
The  Third  Objection,  that  hereby  God  and  Na- 
ture are  Confounded;  Answered,  by  shewing 
how  God  and  Nature  are  Distinguished  in  this 
Hypothesis.  The  Last  and  strongest  Objec- 
tion, that  if  there  were  but  one  Original  Per- 
ceptive Principle  throughout  the  Universe,  alt 
Animals  would  have  the  same  Perceptions. 


136   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

which  they  have  not.  This  Objection  Removed, 
and  the  Reason  of  Different  Perceptions  in  Dif- 
ferent Animals  cleared. 


CHAP.  IX. 

Of  Substance  in  the  Scholastical  Consideration  of 
it.  Substance  what,  that  it  is  First  or  Second. 
Second  Substance  is  called  a  singular,  a  supposi- 
tum,  or  subsistent.  Of  the  Principle  of  Indi- 
viduation,  or  that  which  makes  a  singular  to 
be  so.  Dr.  Sherlock's  Notion  of  the  Individua- 
tion  of  Spirits.  Of  a  Person.  The  true  Idea 
of  it.  Laurentius  Valla  his  notion  of  a  Person, 
the  unusefulness  of  it  to  the  salving  of  the  Holy 
Trinity  shewed.  The  Trinity  a  Mystery,  and 
Doctrine  of  Faith;  not  a  Point  of  Philosophy; 
and  so  the  Idea  of  it  to  be  derived  only  from 
Revelation  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  not  from 
bare  Discourses  of  Reason. 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD. 


O  F    TH  E 

SOUL 

O  F    T  H  E 

O  R  L 

A  N  D    O  F 

Particular    Souls. 

I  N 

A  Letter  to  Mr.  LocA,  occafioned  by 
Mr.  Keifs  Reflexions  upon  an  Eflay  late- 
ly publifhed  concerning  Tfeafotr. 

®j  the  Author  of  that  Effay. 


Minttt.  Pal.  in  Offav. 
Vcritas  obvia,  fed  requirentibus. 

Erafmw  in  Hyperafpift.  I.  2. 
Verborum  umbris  territamur,  qu um  in  re  nihil 

fit  abfurdi. 


LONDON, 

Printed  for  Daniel  Brown,  at  the  Black  Swan 
and  Bible  without  Temple-Bar.  M.DC.XC.IX. 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD,  AND  OF 
PARTICULAR  SOULS. 

TO  JOHN  LOCK,  ESQ; 

SIR, 

It  may  seem  an  improper  way  of  making  satis- 
faction for  a  former  Trouble,  to  give  a  new  one :  yet 
since  you  have  pardoned  the  Confidence  that  made 
a  Present  to  you  of  my  Essay  concerning  Reason, 
and  that  some  very  sharp  Reflections  have  been  pub- 
lished on  a  part  of  that  Essay,  I  hold  myself  obliged 
to  send  you  my  Defence  of  it. 

My  Intention  in  this  Address  is  not  to  ingage 
you  in  the  Protection,  or  to  the  Countenance  of  any 
Opinion,  further  than  as  Reason  allows  it ;  nor  is  it 
to  insinuate  that  you  are  of  mine,  to  gain  it  the  more 
Authority :  For  though  I  could  not  procure  a  greater 
Advantage  to  any  Opinion  I  own,  M  than  to  have 
others  perswaded  that  you  are  of  it;  yet  I  must  do 
you  the  justice  to  profess  that  I  am  wholly  ignorant 
what  yours  is,  as  to  the  Point  in  debate. 

I  only  appeal  unto  you  now,  as  I  did  at  first,  as  to 
an  Arbiter  or  Judg,  for  which  your  excellent  penc  - 
trating  Understanding  highly  qualifies  you,  without 


142    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGK. 

inviting  you  as  a  Party  to  come  to  my  Assistance, 
which  at  this  time  I  hope  I  shall  not  need. 

Mr.  Keil50  in  the  Introduction  to  his  Examina- 
tion of  Dr.  Burnet's  Theory  of  the  Earth,51  hath 
done  me  the  Honor  (tho  I  am  not  sure  he  designed 
it  for  one)  to  mention  me  with  several  very  cele- 
brated Persons;  but  he  doth  it  in  that  manner,  and 
with  that  Abatement,  that  I  have  no  great  cause  of 
being  exalted  on  that  regard. 

After  he  had  instanced  in  Spinosa,  Dr.  More, 
and  Mr.  Hobbs,  as  Authors  of  great  Discoveries, 
which  might  well  demand  Esteem  and  Veneration, 
if  they  were  real,  he  picks  out  some  of  their  Opin- 
ions, which  he  believed  the  most  obnoxious,  that  by 
them  his  Readers  may  see  how  well  they  deserve 
such  a  Character.  He  then  adds,  "But  a  new  Phi- 
losopher (naming  me,  who  am  not  ambitious  of  that 
Title)  "has  much  outdone  any  I  have  yet  mentioned, 
"in  a  Book  lately  printed  concerning  Reason ;  there 
"fsl  he  assures  us  that  there  is  but  one  universal  Soul 
"in  the  World,  which  is  omnipresent,  and  acts  upon 
"all  particular  Organized  Bodies,  and  makes  them 
"produce  Actions  more  or  less  perfect,  in  proportion 
"to  the  good  Disposition  of  their  Organs.  So  that  in 
"Beasts  that  Soul  is  the  Principle  of  the  sensitive 
"and  vital  Functions;  In  Men  it  does  not  only  per- 
"form  these,  but  also  all  other  rational  Actions: 
"just  as  if  you  would  suppose  a  Hand  of  a  vast  Ex- 
"tention,  and  a  prodigious  number  of  Fingers,  play- 
"ing  upon  all  the  Organ-pipes  in  the  World,  and 
"making  every  one  sound  a  particular  Note,  accord- 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  143 

"ing  to  the  Disposition  and  Frame  of  the  Pipe:  So 
"this  universal  Soul  acting  upon  all  Bodies,  makes 
"every  one  produce  various  Actions,  according  to 
"the  different  Disposition  and  Frame  of  their  Or- 
"gans.  This  Opinion  he  as  confidently  asserts  to  be 
"true,  as  other  Men  believe  that  it  is  false ;  tho  it  is 
"impossible  he  should  any  other  way  be  sure  of  it 
"but  by  Revelation;  and  I  believe  he  will  find  but 
"few  that  will  take  it  upon  his  word". 

Mr.  Keil,  I  hope,  will  give  me  leave  to  tell  him 
without  offence,  that  the  Representation  of  my 
Opinion,  had  he  pleased  to  make  it  in  my  own 
Terms,  would  have  been  less  invidious,  and  withal 
more  just  W  than  it  appears  in  his.  However,  since 
he  hath  endeavoured  by  a  Comparison  to  illustrate, 
or  else  to  expose  [for  I  cannot  well  resolve  which 
'tis]  the  Sentiment  I  own,  and  that  this  Comparison 
is  capable  of  being-  applied  unto  it  to  good  purpose, 
I  will  my  self  make  use  of  it  my  own  way. 

But  first  I  must  give  a  Plan  of  my  true  Notion, 
which  in  short  is  this;  That  the  Mosaical  Spirit 
(called  Gen.  i.  v.  2.  the  Spirit  of  God)  being  a  Spirit 
of  Life,  and  present  every  where,  in  all  the  Parts  of 
the  Universe,  is  the  Original  of  all  the  Energy,  Mo- 
tion, and  Action  therein,  especially  of  that  which  is 
Animal.  And  that  particular  Souls  [for  such  T 
acknowledge  there  be]  are  Portions  of  that  Spirit 
acting  in  the  several  particular  Bodies  in  which 
they  are,  according  to  the  Capacities,  Dispositions, 
and  Qualities  of  those  Bodies.  A  Sentiment  con- 
formable to  two  received  Maxims:  Quicquid  re- 


144    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

cipitur,  recipitur  ad  modum  recipientis.  Act  us 
activorum  sunt  in  patiente  disposito. 

To  make  it  imaginable,  let  us  suppose  a  vast 
Organ,  consisting  of  innumerable  Pipes  of  different 
Sizes  and  Fabrick,  and  this  Organ  to  be  filled  with 
Wind  blown  into  it,  and  the  Wind  to  be  received, 
and  some  portion  of  it  appropriated  by  each  particu- 
f7Har  Pipe :  Imagine  also  innumerable  Fingers  play- 
ing upon  those  several  Pipes;  For  then  each  par- 
ticular Pipe  being  played  upon,  will,  by  means  of 
the  Wind,  be  made  to  sound  a  particular  Note,  dif- 
fering from  the  Notes  of  all  the  other  Pipes,  accord- 
ing as  its  Qualities,  Dispositions,  and  Fabrick  differ. 

The  World  is  as  such  an  Organ  [an  orderly 
Aggregate;]  and  the  several  Sorts  of  Bodies  that 
compose  it  are  as  the  several  Pipes  of  that  Organ ; 
the  Mosaical  Spirit  present  every  where  through- 
.out  the  whole  World,  is  as  the  Wind  (which  is) 
blown  into  the  Organ.  This  Spirit  is  received  and 
apportioned  by  the  several  particular  Bodies,  as  the 
Wind  in  an  Organ  by  the  several  particular  Pipes : 
and  as  these  inspired  with  Wind,  being  played 
upon,  do  sound  different  Notes  or  Tunes;  so  those 
animated  with  their  respective  Portions  of  the  Mo- 
saical Spirit,  being  impressed  and  acted  upon  by 
Objects,  do  perform  their  several  vital  Functions, 
according  to  their  several  Dispositions  and  Fabrick. 

Thus  far  the  Comparison  plainly  holds;  but  it 
may  be  carried  a  greater  length,  and  made  serve  to 
illustrate  what  I  say  in  my  Essay  concerning  the 
nature  of  Animals,  of  Spirits,  and  of  Souls.  For  it 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  145 

may  be  W  added,  that  as  the  power  of  making  an 
Organ  sound  at  all,  or  the  power  of  making  a  par- 
ticular Pipe  to  sound  a  particular  Note,  arises  not 
solely  from  the  frame  of  the  Organ,  or  from  that  of 
the  Pipe ;  for  the  Organ  sounds  not  at  all,  if  it  be  not 
inspired  with  Wind,  and  tho  inspired  with  Wind, 
and  consequently  tho  it  gives  a  Sound,  yet  it  will  not 
sound  to  such  and  such  a  particular  Tune,  if  it  be 
not  played  upon  with  the  Fingers.  In  like  manner, 
the  Power  of  making  a  Body  live,  or  of  any  partic- 
ular Instrument  of  it  exercise  any  particular  Action 
of  Cogitation,  as  of  Seeing,  or  of  Hearing,  arises 
not  solely  from  the  frame  of  the  Body,  or  from  that 
of  the  particular  Instrument,  the  Eye,  or  the  Ear: 
for  the  Body  lives  not,  if  it  be  not  animated  with 
some  Portion  of  the  Mosaical  Spirit;  and  if  it  be 
animated,  and  consequently  hath  Life,  as  the  in- 
spired Organ  hath  Sound,  yet  it  doth  not  exercise 
that  Life  in  this  or  that  particular  manner  of  Cogi- 
tation, by  its  several  Instruments,  as  in  seeing  by  the 
Eye,  or  hearing  by  the  Ear,  if  it  be  not  acted  upon, 
and  impressed  by  Objects,  any  more  than  an  Organ 
which  is  only  inspired,  tho  it  sound,  will  sound  to 
this  or  that  particular  Tune,  if  it  be  not  played  upon 
with  the  Fingers.  Thus  Life  originally  comes  from 
fpl  the  Soul :  I  say,  comes  from  the  Soul ;  for  that, 
speaking  properly,  it  is  not  in  the  Soul,  consider'd 
as  a  Soul,  any  more  than  Motion  is,  which  properly 
is  not  in  the  Soul,  but  from  it.  And  as  Life,  so  Cogi- 
tation, which  is  a  Species  of  Life,  proceeds  from 
the  Soul,  but  the  Specification  of  it  from  the  Body. 


146    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

And  for  the  actual  exercise  of  Cogitation  in  its 
several  Species,  whether  of  Sensation,  or  of  Intel- 
lection, it  comes  originally  from  the  Impressions 
and  Operations  of  Objects.  For  Images  and  Ideas. 
that  is  to  say,  the  Sentiments  of  the  Sense,  and  those 
of  the  Mind  or  Understanding  (they)  are  nothing 
but  different  Modifications  of  Cogitation;  the  for- 
mer, Modifications  of  Sensation,  the  latter  of  Intel- 
lection; after  the  same  manner  as  different  Notes 
or  Tunes  are  but  different  Modifications,  or  diverse 
Modulations  of  Sound. 

In  this  Way  of  conceiving,  the  Production  of  Im- 
ages and  Ideas  is  more  perspicuous  and  intelligible, 
as  well  as  more  connatural,  than  in  that  of  Mai- 
branch'*2  which,  methinks,  in  things  of  Nature,  in- 
stead of  having  recourse  to  natural  Causes,  doth  a 
little  too  unphilosophically,  too  soon  repair  unto  the 
first  Cause,  which  is  the  Author  of  Nature.  But 
(as  I  said)  in  the  way  before  set  out,  the  Conception 
of  it  is  very  easy:  t10!  For  Images  and  Ideas  being 
but  the  Modifications  of  Cogitation,  they  are  made 
by  Impressions,  and  made  different  by  different  Im- 
pressions of  Objects  upon  the  Faculties;  as  Notes 
and  Tunes  are  made  by  the  playing,  and  different 
Notes  and  Tunes  by  the  different  playing  of  the 
Fingers  upon  the  several  Pipes  of  an  Organ. 

This  Comparison  of  the  World  animated  with 
the  Spirit  of  God,  to  an  Organ  filled  with  Wind 
blown  into  it,  cannot  but  be  acknowledged  to  have 
much  of  Resemblance  and  Agreeableness ;  and  the 
more,  if  we  consider  that  this  Spirit  of  God  is  called 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  147 

Ruach  in  Hebrew,  a  word  signifying  Wind;  and 
likewise  that  Pneumatical  or  Wind-instruments  of 
Musick  are  said  (tho  but  metaphorically)  to  be  ani- 
mated, as  I  think  they  are  in  Psalm  150.  v.  last.  For 
here  it  is  said,  Let  every  thing  that  hath  Neshamah ; 
the  same  Word  that  is  used  for  the  Soul  of  Man, 
Gen.  2.  7.  when  God  is  said  to  breathe  into  him  the 
Breath  of  Life:  so  here,  Let  every  thing  that  hath 
Neshamah,  every  thing  that  is  animated  with  Wind, 
let  every  Wind-instrument  (for  the  Coherence 
plainly  carries  it  unto  Musical  Instruments)  Praise 
the  Lord.  And  as  Neshamah  comes  from  Nasham, 
Anhelare,  to  pant  or  breath,  so  likewise  Nephesh, 
another  Word  in  Hebrew  for  a  Soul,  de  thrives 
from  a  Root  of  the  like  signification,  and  often 
stands  for  Breath,  as  well  as  for  a  Soul. 

Nor  was  this  a  particular  Sentiment  only  of  the 
Jews,  but  both  the  Greeks  and  Romans  were  in  the 
same :  For  in  Greek  the  Name  for  Spirit  is  jtveujia, 
and  Jtveijfia  comes  from  JTVECO  to  blow ;  and  tyvxr\,  the 
Word  for  Soul,  derives  from  Tjnjxco  to  breathe.  With 
the  Romans,  the  word  for  Soul  is  sometimes  Anima. 
sometimes  Animus;  words  that  come  from  av£fio£, 
which  signifies  Wind,  as  in  like  manner  Spiritus 
does  from  Spiro. 

When  I  affirm  that  [Anima]  and  Animus  are 
often  used  promiscously  in  Latin  Authors,  I  have 
good  Authority  to  support  it,  since  Cotta  in  Cicero 
}.  3.  de  nat.  Deor.  saying,  Oui  magis  quam  praeter 
Animam,  unde  Animantium  quoque  const et  Animus, 
ex-  quo  Anima  dicitur™  intimates  the  same:  for 


148    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

there  he  calls  the  vital  Principle  of  inferior  Animals 
Animus,  and  in  effect  says,  both  that  it  consists  of 
Anima  or  Breath  (which  is  inspired  Air  or  Wind) 
and  that  for  this  reason  the  Breath  is  called  Anima, 
because  it  is  to  inferior  Animals  what  the  Animus  is 
to  Man;  [Animus  ex  quo  Anima  dicitur.]  Anima 
it  is  Animus  with  a  little  distinction;  Anima  is  the 
Animus  or  Soul  of  Brutes,  and  Animus  is  the  Anima 
or  Soul  of  Men ;  H2]  as  m  the  Holy  Scripture,  where 
St.  Paul  speaks  of  Body,  Soul,  and  Spirit,  what  he 
means  by  Soul  may  be  expressed  by  Anima,  what  he 
intends  by  Spirit  by  the  word  Animus-,  the  former 
word  importing-  the  sensitive  Principle,  which  is 
common  to  Beasts,  the  latter  the  rational  or  intel- 
lectual which  is  proper  to  Men. 

To  clear  this  Passage  further,  which  I  have 
quoted  out  of  Cicero,  and  the  sense  I  have  given  to 
it,  we  ought  to  consider  that  the  Stoicks  held  an 
opinion  that  all  Souls  were  Fire;  and  Balbus  (who 
was  one  of  them)  taking  it  for  granted,  is  told  by 
Cotta  that  he  was  too  forward  in  assuming  so  much ; 
for,  says  he,  'tis  the  probable  Opinion  that  the  vital 
Principle  or  Soul  is  not  Breath  only  as  most  think, 
or  Fire  only  as  Stoicks  think,  but  a  Complex  or 
Result  of  both;  probabilius  videtur,  tale  quiddam 
esse  Animum,  ut  sit  ex  igne  atque  anima  tempe- 
ratum." 

It  is  true  Julius  Scaliger*1  in  his  io?tk  Exer cita- 
tion against  Cardan,"  is  extream  severe  upon  that 
wonderfully  knowing  and  learned  Man  for  saying 
but  by  implication,  that  other  Souls  besides  the  hu- 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  149 

man  were  called  Animi.  For  Cardan  having  said. 
Animi  vires  praecipue  humani,  &c.  Scaliger  replies 
upon  him,  Quasi  verb  alius  sit  Animus  ab  fcw-l13! 
mono.  Insinuating  thereby,  that  to  hold  that  every 
(or  indeed  that  any)  Soul  might  be  called  Animus 
is  very  absurd,  as  in  truth  it  would  be,  if  what  he 
says  was  well  grounded,  to  wit,  that  all  wise  Men 
did  ever  understand  by  Animus  a  Faculty  of  the 
human  Soul,  which  he  says;  tho  at  the  same  time 
he  confesses  Cicero  (who,  it  seems,  for  this  reason 
he  thought  not  very  wise)  to  be  in  a  different 
Opinion:  Nam  tametsi  Cicero  (says  he)  Animal  ab 
Animo  dictum  scribit,  tamen  hominis  proprium  Ani- 
mum,  id  est,  Animae  vim,  sapientes  omnes  intel- 
lexere. 

And  to  lessen  Cicero's  Authority  in  this  particu- 
lar, he  impeaches  him  of  Inconstancy,  telling  us 
that  at  another  time,  speaking  of  Apronius,  he  uses 
such  Expressions  as  do  evidently  so  distinguish  be- 
tween Anima  and  Animus,  that  no  room  is  left  to 
imagine  but  that  he  took  the  latter  for  only  a  Power 
or  Faculty  of  the  former.  At  (says  Scaliger)  non 
servabit  [Cicero]  constantiae  opinionem  itwitis  doc- 
tis  viris,  ejus  enim  verba  de  Apronio  sunt,  qui  non 
modo  Animum  integrum,  sed  ne  Animam  guide  m 
puram  conservare  potuisset,  ubi  aperte  Animae  fa- 
cultatem  innuit  Animi  appellatione. 

But  our  Hypercritick  has  not  exercised  his  Tal- 
ent to  advantage  in  this  place:  for  tho  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  Animus  is  114J  very  often  used 
for  a  Faculty  of  the  Soul,  and  not  always  taken  for 


I5O    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

the  Soul  it  self ;  yet  when  Cicero  says  of  Apronius 
that  he  could  not  conservare  animam  puram,  he  does 
not  mean  by  Anima  his  Soul  (of  which  the  Animus, 
that  he  distinguishes  from  it  should  be  a  Faculty) 
but  he  understands  his  Breath,  which  was  impure, 
foul,  and  stinking.  This  is  evident  from  the  Orator 
himself,  who  in  V  err  em  lib.  3.  describing  this  Apro- 
nius, says  of  him,  that  his  Breath  was  so  fetid,  that, 
as  some  affirmed,  the  very  Beasts  could  not  endure 
its  Stink:  Ut  odor  Apronii  teterrimus  oris  &  cor- 
poris,  quern,  ut  aiunt,  ne  bestiae  quidem  ferre  pos- 
sent. 

In  truth,  nothing  more  surprizes  me  on  this  occa- 
sion, than  to  find  Scaliger  (a  very  extraordinary 
Man,  and  a  great  Critick)  so  positive  in  this  Opinion, 
that  none  of  the  Antients  who  had  any  Wit,  ever 
denominated  the  Souls  of  inferior  Animals  Animi, 
or  even  that  of  Man  Animus.  For  Seneca  Epist.  113. 
tells  it  to  Lucilius,  as  the  Opinion  of  the  Antients, 
that  the  Animus  is  an  Animal,  for  that  it  makes  us 
Animals;  and  that  Animals  receive  their  name  from 
ANIMUS :  Quae sint  (says  he)  quaeAntiquos move- 
rint  dicam;  Animal  constat  Animum  esse,  cum  ipse 
efficiat  ut  simus  Animalia,  &  cum  ab  illo  Animalia 
nomen  hoc  traxerint.52^] 

However  (to  note  it  by  the  by)  it  must  not  be 
said  neither  that  the  Antients  never  gave  the  name 
\Anima]  to  the  Soul,  or  that  Anima  of  old  did  only 
signify  the  Breath:  For  tho  Anima  was  us'd  to 
signify  the  Breath,  it  was  so  but  in  a  secondary 
Sense,  the  Breath  being  therefore  called  Anima, 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  1 5 1 

because  the  Anima  or  Soul  was  generally  under- 
stood to  be  contained  therein,  or  to  consist  thereof. 
This  is  manifest  not  only  from  what  is  said  already, 
but  (to  omit  others)  from  a  Passage  in  Seneca  1.  de 
provid.  where  As  he  says,  sive  haustus  ignis  cursum 
Animae  remeantis  inter scidit,  &c.  where  [Anima 
remeans]  signifies  Respiration  or  Breathing:  So  he 
likewise  says,  Id  quod  vocatur  MORI,  quo  Anima 
discedit  a  corpore,  &c.  For  here  [Anima}  is  taken 
for  the  Soul.  But  to  put  it  out  of  question,  that  even 
the  human  Soul  is  called  Anima  by  antient  Authors, 
I  need  to  cite  but  Seneca  his  117^/1  Epistle;  where, 
writing  of  the  Immortality  of  Souls,  and  saying  that 
the  Consent  of  Mankind  in  that  Point  is  a  cogent 
Argument  for  the  truth  thereof,  he  uses  the  Word 
[Anima]  not  [Animus}  for  a  Soul;  cum  de  ANJ- 
MARUM  aet  emit  ate  disserimus,  says  he,  non  leve 
momentum  apud  nos  habet  consensus  hominum,  aut 
timentium  Inferos,  aut  Colentium. 

I  have  a  fruitful  Subject  before  me,  and  (161 
could  add  a  great  deal  more,  if  I  believed  it  proper ; 
but  it  may  suffice  at  this  Time  to  have  shewed  that 
both  Anima  and  Animus  are  Names  for  a  Soul,  and 
that  both  derive  from  a  Word  that  signifies  Wind 
or  Breath:  for  this  evinces  that  the  Comparison  I 
have  made  between  the  animated  World  and  an  in- 
spired Organ,  is  not  any  remote  one,  or  (as  we 
usually  speak)  farfetch'd  but  very  fitting  and  agree- 
able. 

However,  tho  this  Comparison  between  the 
World  and  an  Organ  is  well  enough  imagined,  and 


152    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

carries  much  resemblance ;  yet  since  an  Organ  is  but 
a  Machin,  and  only  artificial,  and  that  Animals  are 
Works  of  Nature,  and  more  than  mere  Machins. 
I  chose  in  my  Essay  to  illustrate  and  set  out  my 
Notion  by  Comparisons  taken  from  Nature,  as  from 
Sound  and  Echo,  from  Light  and  Colours ;  but  more 
particularly  from  our  own  Souls,  and  their  different 
Operations  in  the  several  Organs  of  Human  Bodies, 
by  means  of  their  several  Faculties. 

In  that  Treatise  I  have  shewed  at  large,  that 
there  is  a  universal  vital  Principle  diffused  through- 
out the  World;  and  withal  have  shewed  how  that 
Principle  comes  to  be  singularized,  and  individuated, 
so  as  that  there  be  particular  Souls.  I  have  also  en- 
deavour'd  to  satisfy  Objections,  and  have  instanced 
in  the  Theodosian  and  Scotish  t17!  Monsters,  as 
sensible  Demonstrations  of  the  truth  of  what  I  affirm 
in  Reference  to  this  Subject. 

I  have  shewed  likewise  that  the  Jewish  Doctors, 
many  Philosophers,  some  Fathers,  and  several 
Schoolmen,  were  in  the  same  Sentiment  as  to  the 
main :  for  tho  perhaps  they  all  agreed  not  either 
each  with  other,  or  with  me,  as  to  particular  expli- 
cations ;  yet  all  held  a  vital  Principle  that  doth  per- 
meate the  whole  World;  and  that,  unto  the  Uni- 
verse, is  what  the  Soul  of  Man  is  to  his  Body.  And 
if  common  Language  does  signify  a  common  Senti- 
ment, this  must  be  owned  to  be  one.  For  why  else 
is  Man  called  a  Microcosm  or  little  World,  but  be- 
cause he  is  like  the  Great,  and  has  Soul  and  Body? 
And  tho  this  Expression  is  appropriated  unto  Man, 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  1 53 

yet  if  we  believe  Galen,  the  Antients  held  that  every 
Animal  is  a  Microcosm,  a  World  in  little;  and  then 
surely,  in  their  Opinion,  the  World  itself  is,  after  a 
sort,  an  Animal  in  great. 

Upon  the  whole  it  is  evident,  that  for  any  to  im- 
agine I  exclude  particular  Souls,  because  I  do  affirm 
a  general  (one,)  is  to  do  me  injury;  and  in  effect, 
the  same  as  to  infer  that  I  deny  there  are  Colours, 
because  I  affirm  there  is  Light ;  or  that  I  deny  there 
is  Echo,  because  I  affirm  there  is  1181  Sound.  In 
sum,  he  might  as  fairly  conclude  that  all  those  deny 
the  Powers  of  Seeing,  of  Hearing,  of  Feeling,  &c. 
to  be  in  any  Animal,  who  do  affirm  that  the  Animal 
has  a  Soul  which  is  the  Principle  of  those  Powers; 
for  those  Powers  in  divided  Bodies  would  be  so 
many  Souls,  that  in  the  same  Body  are  only  so  many 
Faculties  of  one  Soul.  This  way  of  Reasoning  goes 
on  the  same  Ground  that  Seneca's  does,  when,  in 
another  case,  he  says,  Epist.  113.  Animal  sum  & 
Homo,  non  tamen  duos  esse  dices:  Quare?  quia 
separati  esse  debent.  Ita  dico  alter  ab  altero  debet 
esse  diductus,  ut  duo  sint. 

Yet,  after  all,  it  has  pleased  Mr.  Keil  to  make 
a  sharp  Reflection  upon  me  for  this  Opinion  (but 
with  how  much  Equity  or  Candor,  our  Readers  must 
determine)  and  he  doth  it  in  these  Terms: 

"This  Opinion  he  as  confidently  asserts  to  be 
"true,  as  other  Men  believe  it  is  false;  though  it  is 
"impossible  he  should  any  other  way  be  sure  of  it 
"but  by  Revelation;  and  I  believe  he  ^vill  find  but  few 
"that  will  take  it  upon  his  Word. 


154    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

First  he  says,  /  confidently  assert,  &c.  As  for 
Confidence,  I  acknowledge  that  a  Confidence  like 
his  in  this  Reflection,  that  does  only  assert  but  not 
prove,  cannot  merit  a£19Jny  great  Commendation: 
But  otherwise  I  know  no  fault  in  being  of  any 
Opinion  or  in  a  confident  asserting  of  it,  (which 
however  I  am  no  way  conscious  of)  if  there  is  rea- 
son for  that  Confidence,  and  that  the  Opinion  be 
well  grounded. 

But  this  he  supposes  mine  is  not;  for  he  says,  / 
confidently  assert,  &c.  tho  it  is  impossible  I  should 
any  other  way  be  sure  of  it  but  by  Revelation.  If 
he  mean  it  is  impossible  I  should  be  absolutely  sure 
of  it  but  by  Revelation,  and  that  for  this  reason  'tis 
a  Presumption  in  me  to  assert  the  Opinion,  since  I 
am  not  assured  of  it  that  way,  he  must  excuse  me 
if  I  differ  from  him.  For,  in  the  first  place,  I  will 
take  the  liberty  to  tell  him  what  I  believe  most  others 
who  consider,  would  upon  occasion,  that  there  are 
many  Degrees  of  a  just  Confidence,  that  yet  do  all 
fall  much  beneath  Infallibility,  or  absolute  Certainty. 
Besides,  methinks  it  should  content  him,  as  being 
a  sufficient  ground  of  asserting  any  Opinion,  even 
with  Confidence,  that  there  is  Reason  for  the  Opin- 
ion, tho  he  that  asserts  it  cannot  be  absolutely  sure 
of  it  without  a  Revelation ;  especially  since  Mr.  Keil 
himself,  I  dare  say,  will  not  affirm  he  had  a  Revela- 
tion for  all  he  confidently  asserts  in  his  Book,  of 
which  yet  he  cannot  be  absolutely  sure  t2°l  without 
one ;  but  what  there  is  of  Revelation  in  the  Question 
between  him  and  me.  he  may  be  told  hereafter,  and 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  155 

might  have  learned  somewhat  of  it  from  the  Essay, 
where  also  he  might  have  seen  that  there  was  some 
reason  for  the  Opinion. 

And  whereas  he  says,  that  I  as  confidently  assert 
my  Opinion  to  be  true  as  other  Men  believe  that  it 
is  false:  If  I  should  yield  him  so  much,  what  would 
follow  but  this,  That  if  this  be  all,  'tis  only  Confi- 
dence on  either  side ;  I  confidently  assert  it  to  be  true, 
other  men  as  confidently  believe  that  it  is  false? 
And  when  equal  Confidence  and  nothing  else  is  in 
both  the  Scales,  what  shall  turn  them?  But  cer- 
tainly, tho  other  Men  (if  but  other  Men}  believe 
an  Opinion  to  be  false,  that  any  one  affirms  to  be 
true,  it  will  not  necessarily  follow  that  'tis  false  in- 
deed ;  for  if  it  should,  Mr.  Keil  himself,  who  writes 
in  opposition  to  other  Men  (and  those  very  worthy 
Men)  must  believe  himself  in  the  wrong  Box,  till 
he  can  convince  them,  ay,  and  all  the  rest  of  Man- 
kind that  think  otherwise  than  he  does ;  for  till  then 
other  Men  will  believe  that  what  he  says  is  false. 
Indeed,  if  my  Opinion  went  contrary  to  common 
Sense,  and  that  all  other  Men,  or  but  all  considerate, 
wise,  and  thinking  (211  Men  were  in  another  belief, 
I  should  be  very  apt  to  suspect  I  was  imposed  upon 
by  false  Appearances;  but  there  is  nothing  of  this 
in  the  matter,  as  will  be  manifest  presently. 

Mr.  Keil  closes  up  his  Censure  (for  all  he  says 
against  me  is  Censure  only,  not  Argument)  with 
telling  his  Readers  his  Belief,  which  is,  that  I  will 
find  but  few  that  will  take  the  Opinion  upon  my 
word.  In  truth  it  is  not  my  desire,  as  it  is  not 


156    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

reason  any  should;  nor  as  it  falls  out,  is  there  any 
need  they  should:  for  if  a  Revelation  in  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  if  the  Authority  of  some  of  the  most 
thinking  and  sagacious  Philosophers,  and  if  Reasons 
taken  from  the  Phaenomena  of  Nature,  can  put  any 
Sentiment  beyond  the  Misfortune  of  being  precari- 
ous, mine  is  safe  enough  from  that  Imputation. 

As  for  Revelation,  what  Interest  it  hath  in  this 
Opinion,  I  have  shewed  in  my  Essay  from  Genesis 
Ch.  I.  v.  2.  compared  with  Psalm  147.  v.  15,  16,  &c. 
which  I  will  not  repeat,  only  I  will  add  that  I  think 
it  abundantly  confirmed  by  an  Evidence  I  find  in  the 
Book  intituled,  The  Wisdom  of  Solomon,  where  it 
is  said,  Ch.  I.  v.  7.  The  Spirit  of  the  Lord  fillet h  all 
the  World;  and  the  same  that  maintaineth  all  things 
hath  Knowledge  of  the  Voice,  t22! 

This  Spirit,  as  it  hath  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  the 
Denomination  of  the  Spirit  of  God,  because  it  comes 
from  him,  and  is  his  hand  in  all  his  Influences  upon 
the  World;  so  it  hath  that  of  the  Spirit  [or  Soull 
of  the  Creatures,  whether  these  be  Plants,  Sensi- 
tives, or  Men,  as  being  that  vital  Principle  that  acts 
and  actuates  them  all.  Thus  in  Psal.  104.  v.  29. 
that  which  is  called  the  Breath  of  the  Creatures,  or 
the  immediate  Principle  that  makes  them  live,  and 
is  their  Soul,  upon  whose  Departure  they -are  said 
to  die,  and  to  return  to  their  Dust,  is,  in  the  30^/1 
verse  of  the  same  Psalm,  called  the  Spirit  of  the 
Lord,  which  being  sent  into  them,  makes  them  live: 
Thou  sendest  forth  thy  Spirit,  and  they  live;  and 
thou  renewest  the  face  of  the  Earth. 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  157 

This  is  particularly  affirmed  as  to  Man  by  Elihu. 
Job  33.  4.  The  Spirit  of  God  hath  made  me,  and 
the  Breath  of  the  Almighty  hath  given  me  Life: 
By  Job  himself,  Chap.  27.  v.  3.  All  the  while  my 
Breath  is  in  me,  and  the  Spirit  of  God  is  in  my 
Nostrils:  And  by  Elihu  again  more  comprehen- 
sively, Job.  Chap.  34.  v.  14,  15.  If  he  set  his  Heart 
upon  Man  [to  take  notice  of  him,  and  remark  his 
Iniquities]  and  [consequently]  gather  unto  himself 
his  Spirit  and  his  Breath;  all  Flesh  shall  perish 
together,  and  Man  shall  t23J  turn  again  unto  Dust. 
Plainly  intimating  that  the  Spirit  of  God  (as  if 
it  were  a  common  Soul)  is  the  Original  Principle 
of  Life  and  vital  Operation  in  Man,  as  well  as  in 
all  things  else  that  have  life.  See  Isa.  42.  5. 

The  Prophetical  Scheme  in  Esekiel,  Ch.  37. 
concerning  the  dry  Bones,  is  very  pertinent,  and  full 
to  the  same  purpose.  For  when  the  dry  Bones  are 
to  be  made  to  live,  God  is  introduced  saying  to  them, 
v.  5.  Behold,  I  will  cause  Breath  to  enter  into  you, 
and  you  shall  live.  And  he  effects  it  by  the  same 
steps,  and  in  the  same  manner  as  he  created  Man 
at  first.  For  first  he  organized  Bodies,  v.  7,  8. 
The  Bones  came  together,  Bone  to  his  Bone,  the 
Sinews  and  the  Flesh  came  upon  them,  and  the 
Skin  covered  them  above.  But  tho  the  Bodies  were 
organized,  yet  being  not  inspired,  [for  there  was 
no  Breath  in  them]  they  were  not  made  to  live  as 
yet ;  and  therefore  to  make  them  living  Bodies,  and 
put  Soul  into  them,  the  Prophet  had  a  Commission 
to  the  MUNDANE  SPIRIT  to  come  and  animate 


158    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

them,  v.  9,  10.  Then  said  he  unto  me,  Prophesy 
unto  the  Wind,  prophesy,  Son  of  Man,  and  say  to 
the  Wind,  Thus  saith  the  Lord  God,  Come  from  the 
four  Winds,  O  Breath,  and  breathe  upon  these  slain, 
that  they  may  live:  So  I  prophe&^sied,  as  he  com- 
manded me,  and  the  Breath  came  into  them,  and 
they  lived.  Where  it  may  be  observed,  that  the 
Spirit  that  quickneth  and  giveth  Life  to  those  Bodies 
is  compared  to  inspired  Wind  or  Breath;  that  this 
Spirit  of  Life  or  quickening  Breath  is  diffused 
throughout  the  Universe  in  all  the  Quarters  thereof ; 
and  that  it  is  intirely  at  the  Command  and  Beck  of 
God:  For  it  is  Breath  is  called  upon  to  come  and 
quicken  those  Bodies;  and  it  is  called  upon  to  come 
and  quicken  them  from  the  four  Winds;  and  it  is 
no  sooner  called  upon,  but  it  comes  forthwith,  and 
quickens  them. 

It  may  also  be  observed  that  the  Breath  or  com- 
mon Spirit  of  Life,  that  blew  upon  those  Bodies,  as 
it  came  upon  them  all,  so  it  was  apportioned  by  each ; 
for  the  Breath  must  be  in  them:  And  where  the 
Breath  is  in  all,  each  hath  his  Portion  of  it  in  par- 
ticular, and  then  may  say  as  Job,  Chap.  27.  v.  3.  All 
the  while  my  Breath  is  in  me,  and  the  Spirit  of  God 
is  in  my  Nostrils,  &c.  So  long  his  Breath  is  in  him. 
as  the  Spirit  of  God  is  in  his  Nostrils. 

Thus  every  Man  hath  his  own  Soul,  but  this 
Soul  is  only  a  Portion  of  the  Spirit  of  God  that,  as 
a  Soul,  does  permeate  the  Universe;  so  that  it  is  (as 
in  Pythagoras's  Expression,  which  I  find  in  Lucre- 
tius) f25]  'Ajroajuxajia  'Aiftepos,  a  Spark  of  Ether; 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  159 

or  as  others  choose  to  express  it,  particula  Aurae 
Divinae:  which,  according  to  the  grounds  that  I 
have  laid  in  my  Essay,  I  would  render  a  Portion 
of  Mind  in  Matter.  So  much  for  my  Opinion  from 
the  Authority  of  Revelation. 

As  for  that  of  Philosophy,  I  produced  in  my 
Essay  as  Vouchers  of  my  Hypothesis,  not  only  the 
great  Philosopher  last  named,  who  was  Founder  of 
the  Italick  Sect,  but  also  Zeno,  Seneca,  Plutarch. 
Marcus  Antoninus,  and  Apuleius.  To  all  which, 
from  as  many  as  would  fill  a  Volume,  I  will  add  a 
few  more. 

Thales  the  Father  of  the  lonick  Sect,  held  (as 
Laertius  tells  us)53  that  Water  was  the  Principle  of 
all  things,  and  that  the  World  was  animated  [EJI- 
t|n>xov]  In  which  Doctrines  (as  is  very  probable) 
he  was  instructed  by  the  Mosaick  Tradition  [of  the 
Waters,  and  the  Spirit  that  moved  upon  them]  for 
unto  this  his  Dogmata  are  very  conformable. 

There  are  in  Plato  so  many  Testimonies  of  a 
mundane  Soul,  and  his  Opinion  is  so  generally 
known,  that  it  were  to  overdo  to  instance  Partic- 
ulars. 

I  have  mentioned  Zeno  Citticus  in  my  Essay:** 
but  seeing  he  was  Founder  of  the  t26!  Stoick  Sect, 
and  that  I  find  in  Laertius,  who  wrote  his  Life,  a  ful- 
ler State  of  his  Opinion,  and  in  more  particulars  con- 
sonant to  mine  than  what  I  have  mentioned  already, 
I  will  produce  him  again.  He  then,  as  Laertius  tells 
us,  asserted  a  Mind  that  permeated  every  Portion 
of  the  World,  after  the  same  manner  that  the  Soul 


l6o    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

in  us  doth  permeate  the  Body,  eig  cbiav  avtov  [xoo- 
JIOTJ]  pieQog  8irjxovTog,  xaftdjiep  ecp'  i^cdv  tfjg  ^uyjig. 
But  through  some  more,  through  others  less  ak)C 
fj8r]  81'  cov  (xev  jiaXXov,  81'  cov  8e  fjrrov.  ]  For  instance 
some,  he  says,  it  pervaded  only  as  a  Habit  [cog  e^ig] 
as  through  the  Bones  and  Nerves;  but  through 
others  as  a  Mind  [cog  No-tig],  as  through  the  under- 
standing or  rational  part :  [cog  8icx  -coij  Y|y8[iovixoij]. 

This  Sentiment  of  a  Divine  Virtue  that  pervaded 
the  whole  Universe,  was  in  antient  time  so  generally 
received,  that  even  the  Tyrant  Phalaris,  in  an 
Epistle  Consolatory  written  by  him  to  the  Children 
of  Stesichorus  ( if  indeed  he  was  the  Author  of  those 
Epistles  passing  in  his  name)54  mentions  it  as  such 
an  one;  f|  yccQ  dftdvatog  TOTJ  Beox)  MOIQCX,  says  he, 
JiQog  TO  Ildv  oiiaa,  aim]  &c.  which  his  honoured  and 
very  learned  Translator  renders  thus:  Iminortalis 
quippe  Dei  vis,  quae  per  unwersum  diffunditur,  mihi 
nihil  t27]  nisi  haec  ipsa  harmonia  videtur.  He  is 
also  understood  by  that  excellent  Person  in  his  An- 
notations, to  mean  the  mundane  Soul  of  the  Pytha- 
goreans, when  in  his  104.  Epistle,  which  is  to  the 
Inhabitants  of  Catana,  he  says,  ei  y£  fteiag  tvxTJg, 
toajieQ  TCX  A.OIJICX  tf]g  cpvaecog  atoixeia,  &c.  Si  enim 
Divinae  fortis,  quemadmodum  caetera  naturae  ele- 
ment a,  &c. 

And  even  Aristotle,  tho  a  great  Opposer  of  the 
Platonick  Soul  (yet)  being  prevailed  upon  by  irre- 
sistible Experience  (he)  in  a  Paragraph  quoted  out 
of  him  by  Julius  Scaliger*1  in  his  26th  Exercitation 
against  Cardan*2  comes  somewhat  near  to  my  Opin 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  l6l 

ion:  For  there  he  affirms,  yivetai  8e  ev  TTJ  yfj  xai 
•uyQcb,  xal  10.  £(ba  xaxd  qpvtd,  8id  TO  ev  yfj  fiev  ujtapxeiv 
VVQOV,  ev  8e  ajSati  jtveajjia,  ev  8e  tqj  ;idvri  fteQuotriTa 
\jn»XixA,Y]v,  cog  TQOJTOV  tiva  jidvra  ^v/fjc;  elvai  jiA,TiQfj. 
That  both  Animals  and  Plants  are  produced  in  the 
Earth  and  in  the  Waters,  for  that  there  is,  as  in  the 
Earth  Moisture,  so  in  the  Water  Spirit,  and  through- 
out the  Universe  an  animating  [viinfick}  Heat;  in- 
somuch that  after  a  sort  [it  is  true  that]  all  things 
are  full  of  Soul.  W 

To  those  Philosophers  I  will  add  the  well-known 
Testimony  of  a  philosophical  Poet,  Virgil  AEn.  6. 

Principio  coelum,  ac  terras,  camposq;  liquentes, 
Lucent emq;  globum  lunae,  Titaniaq;  astra, 
Spiritus  intus  alit,  totamq;  infusa  per  Artus 
Mens  agitat  molem,  &  magno  se  corpore  miscet. 

Rendered  by  Eugenius  Philalethes55  thus: 

The  Heavens,  the  Earth,  and  all  the  liquid  Main, 
The  Moon's  bright  Globe,  and  Stars  Titanian, 
A  Spirit  within  maintains,  and  their  whole  Mass 
A  Mind,  which  through  each  Part  infus'd  doth  pass. 
Fashions  and  works,  and  wholly  doth  transpierce 
All  this  great  Body  of  the  Universe. 

I  begin  to  be  fatigued  with  the  unpleasant 
Drudgery  of  quoting  and  transcribing;  and  there- 
fore wholly  omitting  modern  Testimonies,  I  will 
add  but  one  more  of  the  antient,  and  that  shall  be 


l62    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTIIOGGE. 

from  Cicero,  who  /.  2.  de  natur.  Dear,  introduces 
Balbus  def29]monstrating  that  all  things  in  the 
World  are  subject  to  a  sentient  perceptive  nature, 
and  are  administered  and  governed  by  it.  This  he 
evidences  by  shewing,  that  particular  works  of  Na- 
ture have  infinitely  more  of  the  Beauties  of  Art  and 
Contrivance  than  the  most  noble  Productions  of 
Human  Skill,  and  yet  that  no  particular  Operation 
of  Nature,  for  example,  the  Production  of  a  Vine, 
of  a  Tree,  or  of  that  of  the  Body  of  any  Animal, 
can  shew  as  to  Conformation,  Order,  and  Situation 
of  Parts,  or  as  to  Adjustment  and  Fitness  of  them 
for  ends  and  uses,  that  wonderful  Sagacity,  that 
Subtilty  of  Invention,  or  that  wise  Contrivance  that 
shines  with  great  brightness  in  the  general  frame 
of  the  World;  whence  he  confidently,  but  justly  in- 
fers that  the  whole  World  is  under  the  Conduct  and 
wise  Administration  of  a  sentient  and  perceptive 
Nature,  or  else  that  nothing  at  all  is  so.  Aut  igitur. 
says  he,  nihil  est  quod  a  sentiente  Naturd  regatur, 
aut  mundum  regi  confitendum  est. 

This  last  Testimony,  as  it  is  an  Evidence,  so  it  is 
also  an  internal  Argument;  and  being  taken  from 
the  Phaenomena  of  Nature,  reminds  me  of  what  T 
undertook  to  do  in  the  third  place,  which  was  to 
shew  that  my  Opinion  had  Reasons  for  it  in  Nature, 
and  t30!  grounded  upon  things  themselves:  And 
these  I  will  now  produce. 

The  First  is  taken  from  the  Uniformity  even  in 
DifTormity,  the  mutual  Relation  and  the  Harmony 
of  Parts  that  is  in  the  World  in  its  general  Fabrick, 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  163 

if  it  may  be  allowed  to  make  a  judgment  of  the 
whole  Frame  by  that  of  a  particular  System,  which 
we  our  selves  belong  unto :  But  I  will  not  now  insist 
any  longer  on  this  Argument,  because  it  is  set  out 
at  large  in  my  Essay  in  many  Instances,  and  the 
learned  Reader  will  find  more  in  Nemesius  de  not. 
Humana. 

Again,  this  Hypothesis  accounts  for  another 
Phaenomenon  that  cannot  be  so  well  accounted  for 
any  other  way,  that  whenever  any  Matter  becomes 
disposed  for  Animal  Life,  this  is  presently  afforded 
to  it;  which  how  it  should  come  to  pass,  is  easily 
conceived,  on  supposal  of  a  mundane  Soul,  or  a 
Principle  of  vital  Energy  diffused  every  where ;  but 
otherwise  one  must  imagine  particular  Souls,  and 
those  too  to  be  Spirits  (that  are)  always  every 
where  in  waiting  for  an  Office,  which  is  hard  to  be 
admitted.  I  say  [and  those  too  to  be  Spirits]  for 
that  'tis  certain  that  mere  corporeal  Souls  (as  some 
call  them)  suffice  not  for  Animal  Operations,  even 
tho  we  should  conceive  t31l  them  (as  those  do)  to 
consist  of  Flame  for  vital  Actions,  and  of  Light  for 
the  sensitive  ones:  for  if  Matter  be  not  radically 
vital,  and  so  there  be  no  need  at  all  of  Spirit  or 
Mind,  and  then  there  is  no  such  thing,  it  will  be  ab- 
solutely unconceivable  how  Flame  and  Light  (which 
are  only  Matter  under  greater  comminution  of  its 
parts  of  a  particular  Texture,  and  in  rapid  Motion) 
can  of  themselves  be  vital  and  perceptive,  or  make 
other  things  become  so.  But  to  return. 

Mr.  Lewenhoec's"  Experiment  of  pepper'd  Wa- 


164    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

ter,  every  Drop  whereof  affords  (as  he  says)  so 
many  Thousands  of  Animalcules,57  is  a  sensible 
Demonstration  of  an  omnipresent  vital  Principle 
that  acts  as  occasion  is ;  and  a  sensible  Demonstra- 
tion too  of  spontaneous  equivocal  Generations:  for 
so  I  call  the  Productions  of  Animals  that  do  not 
come  from  Seeds  in  the  common  Acceptation  of  this 
word.  I  acknowledg  it  almost  a  Scandal  but  to 
name  equivocal  Productions  at  this  time,  they  are 
now  so  generally  disbelieved  and  exploded;  but  for 
my  part,  I  am  not  ashamed  to  confess  that  as  yet 
I  have  not  observed  so  much  said  by  the  excellent 
Redi™  or  by  any  other  Author  against  the  Reality 
of  them,  as  to  oblige  me  to  depart  from  a  Sentiment 
that  t32!  hath  been  the  common  Belief  of  most  In- 
quirers into  Nature,  in  all  Ages  before  this  last. 
And  the  Hypothesis  of  a  mundane  Soul  will  make 
Productions  of  that  kind  conceivable ;  without  which 
indeed  it  will  be  hard  to  apprehend  how  they  can  be. 
Dr.  Cox,  in  a  Process  of  extracting  volatile  Salt 
and  Spirit  out  of  Vegetables,  which  is  described  in 
the  Philosophical  Transactions,  intimates  this  Ob- 
servation; That  many  of  the  Herbs  putrefied  and 
fermented  after  his  way,  did  swarm  with  Maggots, 
especially  at  the  Bottom,  and  in  the  Middle,  where 
(he  tells  us)  Flies  and  other  Insects  could  have  no 
access  to  deposite  their  Eggs,59  and  where  the  Heat 
is  so  violent  that  they  could  not  possibly  subsist. 
Some  years  after  that  learned  Person,  I  find  an- 
other, the  experienced  funcken,  in  Processes  of 
much  a  like  nature,  making  the  like  Observation, 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  165 

that  in  the  Putrefaction  and  Fermentation  of  the 
Vegetables,  great  numbers  of  Insects  and  little  Ani- 
mals were  generated,  tho  (as  he  says)  the  Vessels 
were  never  so  close  stopp'd:  And  indeed  it  is  com- 
monly observ'd  that  Putrefactions  do  terminate  in 
Animals  of  one  sort  or  other.  133J 

The  Relations  of  Barnacles,  that  are  said  to  be 
Birds  arising  out  of  the  putrefied  Relicks  of  ship- 
wrack'd  Planks,80  which  Relations  have  been  con- 
firmed to  me  by  an  Eye-witness  of  unsuspected 
Credit,  are  further  confirmed  by  the  Testimony  of 
an  Eagle-eyed  Philosopher,  who  tells  us  he  hath 
seen  a  Creature  of  that  kind;  for  so  I  understand 
Julius  Scaliger*1  when  in  his  59  Exercitation  against 
Cardan92  he  says,  In  Oceano  Britannico  magis  mi- 
reris  ignotam  avem,  anatis  facie,  rostro  pendere  de 
reliquiis  putridis  naufragiorum,  quoad  absolvatur, 
atque  abeat  quaesitum  sibi  pisces,  wide  alatur :  hanc 
quoq;  vidimus  nos. 

To  the  former  Story  Scaliger  in  the  same  Exer- 
citation adds  another,  which  he  calls  miraculous; 
it  is  of  an  Oyster-shell  not  very  great,  that  was 
presented  unto  Francis,  King  of  France,  and  con- 
tained in  it  a  little  Bird,  almost  finished  with  Pin- 
ions, Feet,  and  the  Bill,  sticking  to  the  Extremities 
of  the  Shell.  This  Bird -he  says,  some  Learned  Men 
believed  a  Transformation  of  the  Oyster.  His  own 
words  are  these,  Singularis  nunc  Miraculi  subtex- 
enda  historia  est,  ubi  de  Aquis  agimus.  Allata  est 
Francisco  regi  opt.  max.  Concha  non  admodum 
magna,  cum  avicula  intus  pene  per  feet  a  alarum 


l66    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

fastigiis,  ro^stro,  pedibus,  haerente  extremis  oris 
ostraci.  Viri  docti  mutatum  in  aviculam  Ostreum 
ipsmn  existimarunt. 

My  Lord  Bacon,  in  his  natural  History,  Cen- 
tury 4th,  Exp.  228.  tells  us,  That  if  the  Spirits  be 
not  merely  detained,  but  protrude  a  little,  and  that 
Motion  be  confused  and  inordinate,  there  followeth 
Putrefaction,  which  ever  dissolveth  the  consistence 
of  the  Body  into  much  inequality,  as  in  Flesh,  rotten 
Fruits,  shining  Wood,  &c.  and  also  in  the  Rust  of 
Metals;  but  if  that  Motion  be  in  a  certain  order, 
there  followeth  Vivification  and  Figuration,  as  both 
in  living  Creatures  bred  of  Putrefaction,  and  in 
living  Creatures  perfect:  But  if  the  Spirits  issue 
out  of  the  Body,  there  followeth  Desiccation,  &c. 

In  Experiment  339,  his  Lordship  further  tells  us, 
that  all  Moulds  are  Inceptions  of  Putrefaction,  as 
the  Mould  of  Pyes  and  Flesh,  the  Moulds  of  Or- 
anges and  Lemmons ;  which  Moulds  afterwards  turn 
into  Worms,  or  more  odious  Putrefactions,  &c. 

And  methinks  the  Production  of  Plants  without 
Seed  affords  a  very  weighty  Arf35lgument  for  the 
like  Production  of  Animals.  My  Lord  Bacon'*  gives 
us  many  Instances  of  the  'former  in  the  6th  Century 
of  his  natural  History,  where  he  tells  us,  Experi- 
ment 563.  That  it  is  certain  that  Earth  taken  out 
of  the  Foundation  of  Vaults  and  Houses,  and  Bot- 
toms of  Wells,  and  then  put  into  Pots,  will  put  forth 
sundry  kinds  of  Herbs:  but  some  time  is  required 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  167 

for  the  Germination;  for  if  it  be  taken  from  a 
Fathom  deep,  it  will  put  forth  the  first  year,  if  much 
deeper,  not  till  after  a  year  or  two.  And  in  the 
565^  Experiment,  adds,  that  the  nature  of  the 
Plants  growing  out  of  the  Earth  so  taken  up,  doth 
follow  the  nature  of  the  Mould  it  self;  as,  if  the 
Mould  be  soft  and  fine,  it  putteth  forth  soft  Herbs, 
as  Grass,  Plantane,  and  the  like;  if  the  Earth  be 
harder  and  coarser,  it  putteth  forth  Herbs  more 
rough,  as  Thistles,  Furs,  &c. 

Scaliger,01  in  his  323d  Exercitation  against  Car- 
dan,02 speaking  of  the  Production  of  Frogs,84  that 
sometimes  have  been  rained  in  great  abundance,  of 
which  there  he  gives  several  Instances,  tells  Cardan. 
who  affirmed  them  to  be  bred  of  Frogs-Eggs  or 
Spawn,  that  they  were  spontaneous  or  equivocal,  as 
being  Productions  of  a  gene^ral  Nature,  and  not 
seminal  ones;  which  kind  of  Animal  Productions 
he  evinceth  to  be  possible  the  same  way  that  I  have, 
by  shewing  that  there  are  the  like  in  Plants:  Quid 
mult  a,  says  he,  nonne  quotidiana  foetura  coelestis 
genii,  quae  natura  est  potentiam  declarant  Plantae, 
nullis  ortae  seminiisf 

My  Lord  Bacon  assures  us  for  a  certain  truth, 
that  Toads  have  been  found  in  the  middle  of  a  Free- 
stone,85 where  it  cannot  be  imagined  that  an  Animal 
of  that  Kind  should  come  and  lay  her  Eggs;  and 
I  have  been  credibly  informed,  that  very  lately  a 
living  Toad  was  found  in  the  Heart  or  Middle  of 
a  large  Oak  when  it  was  felled. 


l68    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

The  Animation  of  Horse-hairs66  lying  in  the 
Summer  time  in  Pools,  has  been  observed  of  many, 
some  of  which  I  have  discoursed  concerning  it ;  and 
an  understanding  Man  of  my  acquaintance  assured 
me,  that  more  than  once  he  hath  made  an  Experi- 
ment which  very  much  confirms  the  truth  thereof. 
He  takes  a  Hair  with  the  Root,  pluck'd  from  the 
Main  or  Tail  of  a  Mare  that  is  proud,  and  in  a  warm 
Season  puts  it  into  a  wooden  Dish  full  of  Water, 
where  letting  it  lie  two  or  three  Days,  the  Hair  in 
that  space  will,  for  the  most  part,  be  t37^  come  quick- 
ned  with  a  strong  Motion,  and  a  Head  like  that  of 
a  Serpent  grow  out  of  its  Root. 

The  infectious  Water  of  the  Showers  that  ac- 
company the  Tornadoes  on  the  African  Coast,  stand- 
ing any  where,  do  (as  Mr.  Terry  tells  us  in  his 
Relation  of  a  Voyage  to  East-India)  presently  bring 
forth  many  little  offensive  Creatures ;  which  is  like- 
wise affirmed  by  Mr.  Herbert. 

The  termination  in  Human  (as  well  as  other 
Animal)  Bodies,67 of  which  there  are  innumerable  In- 
stances in  Medical  Writers,  as  in  Bartholinus's  Cen- 
turies, in  Borellus's,  in  Tulpius's  Observations,  &c. 
is  another  weighty  Argument  for  spontaneous  Gen- 
erations ;  but  I  will  mention  only  one :  A  Worm  of 
an  unusual  Figure,  with  Head  of  a  Serpent,  found 
in  the  left  Ventricle  of  the  Heart  of  a  Gentleman, 
whose  name  was  John  Pennant.  The  Relation  well 
attested,  together  with  the  Figure  of  the  Worm, 
was  in  the  year  1639.  printed  at  London  by  one 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  IOQ 

George  Miller,  to  which  Relation  I  refer  the  Reader. 
This  Phaenomenon  of  Vermination  is  a  good  Evi- 
dence of  SPONTANEOUS  GENERATION;  and 
this,  a  weighty  Confirmation  of  the  Existence  of  a 
mundane  Soul.  I38! 

Another  Argument  for  it  may  be  taken  from 
the  Difficulties  that  the  admittance  thereof  will  re- 
move, as  to  the  Production  of  Human  Souls ;  which 
some  conceive  to  come,  as  they  express  it,  ex  tra- 
duce; not  indeed  by  way  of  Eduction  from  the 
Power  of  the  Matter,  for  they  acknowledg  no  such 
Power  therein,  but  by  propagation.  But  others 
think  them  immediately  created  by  God,  either  all  at 
once,  as  those  do  who  hold  the  Doctrine  of  Prae- 
existence,  or  (as  most  imagin)  on  occasion,  accord- 
ing to  the  exigence  of  Matter. 

As  for  the  first  Opinion,  that  of  Traduction,  I 
find  it  in  Nemesius,  lib.  de  nat.  human,  cap.  2.  where 
he  tells  us,  it  was  the  Sentiment  of  Apollinarius, 
that  Souls  do  propagate  Souls,  as  Bodies  do  Bodies ; 
and  Julius  Scaliger  concurs  with  him,  affirming  that 
Souls  may  come  from  Souls,  ut  lumen  de  lumine, 
that  is,  that  Souls  do  propagate  one  another,  after 
the  same  manner  as  Candles  light  one  another. 
Poiret  believes  as  the  two  former,  that  Souls  are 
propagated,  but  extends  the  business  of  Propaga- 
tion somewhat  further  than  they  do,  and  upon  other 
Grounds.  For  in  his  Co^^gitat.  rational.  1.  i.  c.  5. 
in  Annot.  he  affirms  that  all  things  are  Prolifick, 
and  that  as  Matter  produces  Matter,  and  Motion 


I/O    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

is  productive  of  Motion,  so  in  like  manner  one  Soul 
or  Spirit  may  generate  and  produce  another. 

But  there  are  many  Difficulties  in  this  Opinion, 
of  all  which  I  will  insist  on  this  only;  That  a  Soul, 
if  it  be  an  immaterial  Substance  (as  most  conceive 
it  to  be)  is  as  uncapable  of  Propagation  (otherwise 
than  by  a  Metaphor)  as  it  is  of  Discerption  or  actual 
Division.  For  even  the  Propagation  of  Light  is  by 
Discerption;  some  EMuvia  or  Emanations  of  the 
enlightning  Candle  passing  into  that  which  is  light- 
ned.  And  for  the  Propagation  of  Motion,  the  way 
thereof  is  so  obscure,  it  cannot  afford  Light  to  this 
Subject.  Only  this  is  certain,  that  in  local  Motion 
derived  from  Body  to  Body,  so  much  of  it  as  is  im- 
parted unto  one,  departs  from  the  other;  which  (I 
suppose)  will  not  be  admitted  in  the  Propagation 
of  Spirits.  And  as  to  the  Prolifickness  of  Matter, 
I  should  think  but  few  will  allow  thereof,  who  con- 
sider, that  there  is  no  more  of  Matter  in  the  World 
now  than  ever  was,  and  that  Matter  is  ingenerable 
and  incorruptible,  being  a  Subject  of  I40!  all  sub- 
stantial Mutations,  but  not  the  Term  of  any:  So 
that  if  the  Generation  of  Souls  has  no  other,  or  no 
better  Foundation  than  this,  That  Soul  is  productive 
of  Soul,  as  Matter  is  of  Matter,  I  conclude  the  belief 
thereof  will  never  become  general  with  knowing 
Men. 

As  for  Creation  of  Souls  (an  Opinion  generally 
held  by  Divines,  and  among  our  late  Philosophers, 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD. 


particularly  embraced  by  des  Cartes}  many  Ob- 
jections lie  against  it  ;  of  which  I  will  touch  but  one 
or  two,  as  sticking  most  with  me. 

The  first  is,  that  it  seems  a  little  unphilosophical 
to  call  in  a  supernatural  Agent  for  a  Business  and 
Work  of  Nature,  such  as  is  (if  any  is)  the  Propa- 
gation of  Kind  :  My  full  consent  is  with  Julius  Sca- 
liger,  when  he  says  Nihil  quod  est  in  natura  praeter 
naturam  est:  Nothing  is  in  Nature  that  hath  not 
a  Cause  in  Nature. 

Again,  it  may  be  further  argued,  that  if  human 
Souls  are  immediately  created  by  God,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  those  of  Beasts  are  so  too,  since  noth- 
ing can  be  clearer,  even  to  Sense,  than  that  Men 
and  Beasts  do  propagate  their  kinds  the  same  way, 
f41!  whether  that  way  be  by  Creation,  by  Traduction. 
or  by  any  other  whatever.  There  is  in  Mankind, 
as  well  as  in  the  kinds  of  Beasts,  a  Distinction  of 
Sexes  for  the  Business  of  Generation;  a  Furniture 
and  Disposition  of  Organs  for  it  in  both;  and  in 
both  a  like  Use  and  Application  of  Organs.  All 
Men  and  Beasts  are  alike  conceived  in  their  respec- 
tive Wombs,  alike  nourished  and  augmented,  and 
both  come  out  in  the  same  manner:  and  therefore 
there  being  the  same  Evidence,  it  is  but  reason  to 
make  the  same  Conclusion  for  both. 

I  know  this  Argument  will  have  but  little  effect 
upon  Cartesians,  who,  against  the  testimony  of 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


Sense,  believing  that  Beasts  are  only  Machins,  with- 
out any  conscious  Perception  or  Knowledg,  do  not 
own  them  to  have  Souls  as  Men  have,  in  the  proper 
Sense  of  the  Word.  But  yet  it  cannot  want  its  due 
Weight  with  all  others,  who,  believing  their  own, 
refuse  not  Senses  unto  Beasts;  as  thinking  they 
have  reason  to  conclude  that  Beasts  see  and  hear, 
&c.  as  Men  themselves  do,  because  they  have  Eyes 
and  Ears,  &c.  as  Men  themselves  have,  and,  to 
all  appearance,  make  the  same  use  of  them  upon 
occasion,  as  Men  themselves  upon  the  like  would 
do.  And  all  these  will  find  the  same  f42!  reason  to 
infer  that  Men  and  Beasts  beget  their  like  the  same 
way,  because  there  are  the  same  Appearances  to 
make  us  think  they  should. 

These  Appearances  are  obvious,  and  they  ought 
to  be  considered;  nor  are  they  capable  (I  think)  of 
being  solved,  or  the  other  Difficulties,  that  do  lie  in 
both  the  ways  of  Creation  and  Traduction,  capable 
of  being  removed  otherwise  than  on  the  Hypothesis 
I  have  proposed,  by  acknowledging  a  Mundane 
Soul,  that,  according  to  the  Exigence  and  Disposi- 
tion of  the  Matter,  is  always  ready  with  a  Portion 
of  it  self  to  animate  and  actuate  it]  so  that  there 
is  no  need  of  any  new  Creation,  of  Praeexistence, 
or  of  any  Traduction  of  particular  Souls.  But  to 
proceed. 

There  is  another  Phaenomenon  very  obvious,  that 
is  better  solved  on  this  Hypothesis  of  a  mundane 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD. 


Soul,  than  it  can  be  on  any  other  ;  to  wit,  that  certain 
Animals  do  move  and  stir,  and  give  other  Tokens 
of  Life  and  Sensation,  tho  cut  in  several  pieces, 
such  as  Eels,  Snakes,  Earthworms,  Butterflies,  &c. 
This  in  the  common  way  is  hard  to  be  conceived, 
since  it  must  infer  either  that  there  is  a  Discerption 
and  actual  Divi^sion  of  Souls,  of  which,  if  Souls 
be  immaterial,  they  are  absolutely  uncapable;  or 
else  that  vital  Effects  may  remain  in  being  after 
that  the  Soul,  which  is  the  next  immediate  Cause 
of  those  Effects,  is  departed  ;  contrary  to  the  Maxim, 
Sublata  causa,  tollitur  effectus. 

But  the  Reason  of  this  Phaenomenon,  if  we  sup- 
pose an  universal  mundane  Soul,  will  be  very  plain  : 
for  since  the  Parts  of  those  divided  Animals  do  retain 
for  some  time  the  same  Qualities  and  Dispositions 
that  they  had  before  their  Separations,  there  not  be- 
ing in  them,  as  in  those  of  other  Animals,  that  sudden 
Dissolution  of  the  Texture,  or  of  the  Spirits;  it  fol- 
lows that  they  must  receive  the  same  Influences 
which  they  had  before  from  the  mundane  Soul,  and 
consequently,  that  for  some  Time  they  must  con- 
tinue to  live,  and  in  convenient  Circumstances  would 
longer  ;  for  like  Reasons  as  the  Parts  of  Vegetables 
do,  which,  tho  separated  from  their  Wholes,  yet  con- 
tinue to  live  in  Slips,  in  Buds,  in  Grafts,  when  in- 
serted into  other  Wholes.  Nor  do  I  see  but  that  the 
Parts  of  Animals  might  be  inoculated,  or  ingrafted 
into  Animals,  as  well  as  those  of  Vegetables  are  into 
Vegetables,  if  the  Qualities  and  Dispositions  of  Ani- 


174    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

mal  Parts,  when  separ allied,  could  be  as  well  pre- 
served as  those  of  Vegetables,  and  a  Coalition  of 
them  as  well  made:  a  Sentiment  that  is  confirmed 
by  the  Experiment  of  Taliacotius,  and  by  all  the 
others  that  the  Chirurgia  Curtorum  affords. 

Thus  I  have  instanced  in  a  few  Phaenomena  of 
Nature,  to  which  I  might  have  added  many  others 
of  a  higher  Quality;  but  these  sufficiently  confirm 
my  Hypothesis,  against  which  I  cannot  imagine  any 
Objection  of  moment,  capable  of  being  rais'd,  except 
this,  that  it  does  seem  to  render  the  Distinction  be- 
tween human  and  inferior  Souls  less  conceivable, 
and  in  consequence  the  Immortality  of  the  former. 

But  this  Objection  will  soon  vanish,  if  we  but 
suppose  there  is  a  firm  and  indissolvable  Union 
between  the  Spirit  of  God  and  its  Vehicle  in  Man, 
and  that  there  is  not  the  like  Union  between  it  and 
its  Vehicle  in  inferior  Animals.  And  this  Supposal 
is  not  without  ground.  For  such  a  firm  indissolv- 
able Union  betwixt  the  Spirit  of  God  and  its  Vehicle, 
must  be  admitted  to  be  in  Angels,  if  they  are  (as 
they  are)  immortal ;  and  then  the  Ligament  or  Bond 
of  that  Union,  provided  it  be  natural,  must  consist 
in  a  natural,  but  a  naturally  immul45!  table,  Con- 
gruity.  Now  the  System  of  Spirits,  that  in  Man 
is  the  Vehicle  of  the  mundane  Soul,  must  be  owned 
to  have  more  Alliance  unto  that  of  Angels  than  the 
Vehicles  of  it  in  inferior  Animals  have,  if  we  con- 
sider the  advantage  the  Human  Understanding  hath 


OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.  175 

in  excellency  of  Operations,  above  the  Imagination 
of  Beasts;  and  also  consider  that  the  Souls  of  Men 
are  capable  of  the  Divine  Image,  which  those  of 
Beasts  are  not:  for  thence  it  will  evidently  follow 
that  the  former  have  more  of  a  natural  congruity 
to  the  Spirit  of  God,  which  is  the  Soul  of  the  World, 
than  the  latter  have ;  those  as  to  their  Vehicles  being 
of  a  celestial,  but  these  of  a  terrestrial  and  elemen- 
tary matter.  No  wonder  then  if  the  Spirit  of  a  Man, 
when  he  dies,  goes  upward,  but  that  of  a  Beast  goes 
downward. 

Thus  Sir,  I  think  I  have  evinced  from  the  holy 
Scriptures,  and  from  several  Phaenomena  of  Na- 
ture, that  there  is  a  Principle  of  Life  diffused 
throughout  the  Universe;  and  I  have  likewise 
evinced  that  it  was  the  Sentiment  of  many  great 
Philosophers :  so  that  tho  I  am  not  very  fond  of  any 
Opinion,  I  hope  I  may  say  of  this,  without  Injustice 
to  Mr.  Keil,  that  what  he  hath  offered  in  contradic- 
tion to  it,  does  in  no  degree  impeach  its  Credit,  or 
lessen  mine  for  t46!  asserting  it.  However  I  do 
own  I  am  obliged  to  that  ingenious  Gentleman  for 
the  occasion  he  hath  given  me  of  further  explaining 
and  confirming  my  Hypothesis,  and  thereby  too  of 
professing  a  second  time  before  the  World,  that 

I  am  with  the  greatest  Respect,  Sir, 


Rich.  Burthogge 
June  13.  1698 


OUTLINE. 


OUTLINE  OF  BURTHOGGE'S  PHILOSOPHY. 
A.    THE  DOCTRINE  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


The  Faculties  of  Knowledge:  "Conceptive,  Cogitative  Faculties" 
(Essay,  Ch.  I,  Sect.  1,  pp.  3-4;  cf.  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  pp.  58-59. 
Organum,  Sects.  3,  10,  13). 

Si.  Sense,  affected  directly  by  the  external  thing  (Org.,  Sect.  24; 
Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  60),  furnishes  the  perceptual  element 
which  is  the  beginning  of  knowledge  (Org.,  Sects.  6,  24,  32; 
Essay,  Ch.  I,  Sect.  1,  pp.  9-10;  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  59)  : 

"I  am  apt  to  think  that  person  who  should  never  have  seen, 
nor  heard,  nor  tasted,  nor  smelt,  nor  felt  any  thing,  would 
have  his  minde  as  little  furnish'd  with  Idea's  or  Notions,  as 
his  Memory  with  Images,  and  would  understand  as  little  as 
he  had  sensed"  (Org.,  Sect.  74*). 

b.  Reason,  stimulated  by  sense  perception  (Org.,  Sect.  24;  Essay. 
Ch.  I,  Sect.  1,  p.  8),  apprehends  the  "meaning"  of  the  object 
through  the  notion  (and  in  no  other  way)  : 

" as  the  Eye  has  no   Perceivance  of  things  but  under 

Colours So  the  Understanding  Apprehends  not  things 

but  under  Certain  Notions"  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  57, 
cf.  Ch.  I,  Sect.  1,  p.  10;  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  62,  Sect.  2,  p.  68) 

n. 

The  Object  of  Knowledge  is 
a.  Complex,  made  up  of 

1.  The  sense  factor  (Org.,  Sects.  63,  74*;  Essay,  Ch.  I,  Sect  !. 
pp.  9-10;  Soul  of  the  World,  p.  10). 

2.  The  notional  factor   (Org.,  Sects.  6,  8,  63;  Essay,  Ch.  II. 
Sect.  1,  p.  23;  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  57;  Soul  of  the  World, 
p.  10). 

b. Dependent  upon  mind:  no  object  apart  from  the  knower. 


l8o   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


1.  The  parts  of  the  object  known  through  sense  (i.e.,  the  "senti- 
ments of  sense")  have  no  existence  apart  from  the  "cogitative 
powers" : 

"No  such  thing  as  Colour  but  in  the  Eye,  nor  as  Sound 

but  in  the  Ear, These,  though  they  seem  in  the  Objects, 

and  without  the  cogitative  Powers,  yet  are  no  more  in  them 
than  the  Image  that  seemeth  in  the  Glass  is  there  indeed" 
(Org.,  Sect.  10;  cf.  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  pp.  57-59). 

2.  The  parts  known  through  the  notion,  i.  e.,  the  notions  of 
things    (substance,    entity,    etc.)    and   about   things    (cause, 
effect,  etc.)  exist  in  the  mind  only: 

a)  If  it  be  admitted  that  "sentiments  of  sense"  have  no 
external  existence  it  must  be  admitted  also  that  notions 
have  none: 

1 )  Notions  are  dependent  upon  "sentiments" ;   "senti- 
ments  are   grounds  to   notions"    (Org.,   Sect.   24; 
Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  60). 

2)  Notions  are  themselves  "sentiments,"  i.  e.,  "Intel- 
lectual  Sentiments";    "Reason... is   refined,   Subli- 
mated Sensation"  (Essay,  Ch.  I,  Sect.  1,  p.  10;  Ch. 
Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  62). 

b)  If  notions  give  only  an  inadequate  knowledge  of  things 
(as  all  admit),  they  cannot  exist  in  things  themselves 
but  only  in  the  mind  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  60). 

c.  Phenomenal,  not  real : 

* the   immediate   Objects  of   Humane   Cogitation are 

Entia  Cogitationis,  All  Appearances;  which  are  not  properly 
in  the  things  themselves"  (Org.,  Sect.  10). 

". . .  .the  immediate  Objects  of  cogitation are  entia  cogita- 

Pionis,  all  Phaenomena;  Appearances  that  do  no  more  exist 
without  our  faculties  in  the  things  themselves,  than  the  Images 
that  are  seen  in  water,  or  behind  a  glass,  do  really  exist  in 
those  places  where  they  seem  to  be"  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1, 
p.  60). 

in. 
The  Thing  (or  Cause  of  Knowledge). 

a.  Real,  i.  e.,  independent  of  mind  : 

"That  which  is  without  the  thinking  of  any  one  upon  it,. ... 
is  a  real  Thing"  (Essay,  Ch.  IV,  Sect.  1,  p.  78;  cf.  Sect.  3, 
p.  90). 

b.  Virtually  Unknown :  we  have  only  a  very  inadequate  knowledge 
of  the  thing. 


OUTLINE.  l8l 

l.Our  senses  communicate  directly  with  the  external  object 
(Org.,  Sect.  24;  Essay,  Ch.  I,  Sect.  1,  p.  10;  Cn.  IV  [VI], 
Sect.  2,  p.  138),  but  do  not  give  even  a  true  copy  of  it  (Org., 
Sect.  9;  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect  1,  p.  59;  Sect.  2,  p.  66). 

2.  Reason  gives  us  notions  of  the  thing,  but  these  notions  are 
not  like  the  reality  itself: 

" few,  if  any,  of  the  Ideas  which  we  have  of  things  are 

properly  Pictures ;  our  Conceptions  of  things  no  more  re- 
sembling them. . .  .than  our  Words  do  our  Conceptions,  for 
which  yet  they  do  stand"  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  56; 
cf .  pp.  59,  63 ;  Sect.  2,  p.  66) . 

c.  Essential  to  Knowledge :  though  outside  the  realm  of  knowledge 
the  thing  directly  impressing  the  organs  of  sense  is  the  cause  of 
sensation : 

" things  without  us,  are  the  Causes  that  do  excite 

Images  and  Notions  in  us"  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  2,  p.  73 ; 
cf.  p.  70). 

B.   THE  DOCTRINE  OF  TRUTH. 


The  Definition  of  Truth. 
a.  Negative  Statements. 

1.  Truth  cannot  be  denned  as  that  which  corresponds  exactly 
with  its  original  model,  for 

a)  We  have  not  the  original  with  which  to  compare  the  copy 
(Org.,  Sect.  65)  : 
1)  The  original  is  in  the  mind  of  God   (Org.,  Sect. 

65). 

'  2)  We  have  no  "anticipations,"  no  innate  notions, 
either  of  God  (Org.,  Sect.  39),  or  of  things  (Org., 
Sect.  73)  : 

o)  If  we  did  have  innate  notions,  knowledge 
would  not  be  founded,  as  it  is,  on  impressions 
and  images  of  sense  (Org.,  Sect.  74* ;  cf 
Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  62). 
/3)  Although  immediate  assent  to  certain  prin- 
ciples and  immediate  action  under  certain 
circumstances  seem  to  indicate  "innate  no- 
tions," both  assent  and  action  are  really  due 
to  previous  learning  (Org.,  Sect.  74*;  Essay, 
Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  pp.  53-55). 


l82    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

7)  "Beings  are  not  to  be  multiplied  without  Ne- 
cessity" :  there  are  no  original  images  in  the 
eye  or  ear  and  there  is  no  reason  for  suppo- 
sing original  notions  in  the  mind  (Org.,  Sect. 
74s;  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  52). 

b)  Even  if  we  did  have  "anticipations"  or  innate  notions 
they  would  be  "particular"  and  therefore  too  narrow  a 
test  of  truth  which  is  infinite  (Org.,  Sect.  74s). 
2.  Truth  cannot  be  defined  as '  that  which  is  "congruous"  with 
our  faculties,  for 

a)  Congruity   between   object   and     faculty    gives    merely 
knowledge  of  the  object  (Org.,  Sect.  72). 

b)  A  "falsity"  as  well  as  a  truth  may  be  congruous  with  our 
faculties  (Org.,  Sects.  7,  63). 

b.  Positive  Definitions. 

1.  "Truth is  objective   Harmony,"   i.e.,  that  which   is  con- 
gruous with  itself  and  which  fits  in  with  the  whole  objective 
scheme  of  things  is  true  (Org.,  Sect.  75;  cf.  Sect.  17). 

2.  That  is  true  which  conforms  to  the  "notion"  or  "form"  of 
truth  which  is  in  the  mind,  independent  of  the  sensuous  per- 
cept to  which  it  is  applied  (Org.,  Sects.  63,  69,  72,  74s). 

n. 

The  Relation  of  Truth  to  Knowledge :  knowledge  of  the  object  as 
object  precedes  knowledge  of  the  object  as  true,  for 

a.  Knowledge  of  the  object  as  object  follows  bare  congruity  be- 
tween object  and  faculty  (Org.,  Sect.  72),  while 

b.  Knowledge  of  the  object  as  true  comes  only 

1.  After  the  reasoning,  i.  e.,  the  forming  of  a  judgment,  about 
the  object  already  known  (Org.,  Sects.  7,  56,  82,  83,  86). 

2.  After  the  "form"  of  truth  is  perceived  in  the  object  already 
apprehended  or  known  (Org.,  Sects.  63,  68,  69,  72,  74s). 

C.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  SUBSTANCE. 

NOTE  :  Burthogge's  teaching  about  substance  is  inconsistent.  He 
says  not  only  (1)  that  substance  is  a  notion  of  the  thing  (or, 
as  he  sometimes  phrases  it,  "a  thing  conceived  under  a  certain 
notion" — Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  97),  in  other  words,  that 
substance  is  merely  the  way  we  think  of  reality,  but  also  (2) 
that  substance  is  the  thing  itself,  the  reality  about  which  we 
have  notions. 


OUTLINE.  183 


Substance  as  Notion. 

"....Substance  and  Accident ;  what  are  they,  but  likewise 

Modi  concipiendi? notions,  that are  not  without  grounds, 

but  yet  that  have,  themselves,  no  Formal  being  but  only  in  the 
Mind,  that  frames  them;  there  being  no  such  thing  in  the 
World  as  a  Substance,  or  an  Accident"  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect 
1,  p.  64;  cf.  p.  57;  Sect.  2,  pp.  67,  69;  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  96). 


Substance  as  Thing. 
a.  Its  Nature : 

1.  In  itself  unknown :  what  substance  is  itself,  "stript  of  all 

Accidents,  is  no  wise  known"  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  97, 
cf.  p.  101). 

2.  Certain  facts  about  it  known  : 

a)  That  it  is  subject  of  accidents: 

"All  we  know  of  any  substance  is,  that  it  is  the  subject 
of  such  and  such  Accidents"  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1, 
p.  97;  cf.  pp.  99,  101 ;  also  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  2,  p.  67). 

b)  That  it  is  self-subsistent : 

" that  which  is  a  subject  of  Accidents  [i.e.,  sub- 
stance], is  it  self  in  no  subject;  that  is,  it  is  self-sub- 
sistent" (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  98;  cf.  p.  102). 

NOTE  :  Burthogge  often  implies  (Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect. 
1,  p.  64;  Sect.  2,  pp.  70,  71),  and  sometimes  posi- 
tively asserts  that  the  "attributes,"  (1)  of  being 
subject  of  accidents,  and  (2)  of  self -subsistence, 
are  only  notions;  and  that  we  can  not  say  whether 
substance  itself  is  possessed  of  these  attributes : 

" a  substance  is  nothing  but  a  subject,  or  a 

thing  that  has  other  things  in  it  as  Accidents ; 
whereas  in  truth,  neither  Accident,  nor  Substance 
hath  any  being  but  only  in  the  mind,  and  by  the 
only  vertue  of  cogitation  or  thought"  (Essay, 
Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  1,  p.  65;  cf.  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  98). 

c)  That  it  is  real,  i.  e.,  independent  of  mind   (Essay,  Ch. 
V,  Sect.  1,  p.  97;  cf.  p.  108). 

d)  That  there  are  two  kinds  of  substance,  (1)   Mind  and 
(2)  Matter: 

"That  which  is  without  the  thinking  of  any  one  upon 
it ....  is  a  real  Thing,  or  a  Reality ; . . . .  and  such  a 
thing  is  matter ....  and  such  a  thing  also  is  Mind" 


184    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

(Essay,  Gh.  IV,  Sect.  1,  p.  78).    "Mind is  Cogit* 

tive,    thinking substance,"    "Matter   is    Extensive, 

spacious,  substance"  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  106). 

NOTE:  There  are  passages  where  Burthogge  says  that 
we  distinguish  two  kinds  of  substance  only  "no- 
tionally,"  i.  e.,  as  phenomena  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect. 
1,  pp.  106,  107).  But  this  teaching  is  not  inconsis- 
tent with  his  general  teaching  about  substance  as 

-  thing.  Burthogge's  meaning  seems  to  be  that  there 
are  two  kinds  of  substance,  in  themselves  unknown, 
but  distinguished  "notionally,"  i.  e.,  in  our  represen- 
tations of  them,  as  mind  and  matter  (Essay,  Ch.  IV, 
Sect.  1,  p.  78;  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  107). 

k  Classification  and  Description  of  Substance. 

1.  Principles,  "substances  that  are  causes  of  other  things,  but  are 
themselves  uncaused"  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  p.  101)  : 

a)  Matter:  "Passive  substance"  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  pp. 

103,  106). 
fe)  Mind :  "Active  substance"   (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  pp. 

103,  106)  : 

1)  "Pure  Mind",  i.  e.,  God  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  2, 
pp.  110,  111,  112). 

2)  Mind  in  matter: 

a)  Soul  of  the   World    (Essay,  Ch.  IV    [VI], 

Sect.  3,  pp.  149,  150,  154f). 
/3)  Particular  Souls  (Essay,  Ch.  IV  [VI],  Sect. 

3,  pp.  149,  150,  154f). 

2.  Principiates,   "substances  that  are  caused"    (Essay,  Ch.   V, 
Sect.  1,  p.  101)  : 

a)  Matter  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  pp.  103,  106). 

b)  Mind  (Essay,  Ch.  V,  Sect.  1,  pp.  103,  106). 


NOTES. 


The  Notes  which  follow  to  Burthogge's  ORGANUM, 
ESSAY  UPON  REASON  and  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD,  are  histor- 
ical, bibliographical  and  philosophical  in  character.  The 
Pages  referred  to  by  the  Notes  are  those  of  the  original 
editions  (the  bracketed  numerals  of  the  present  edition). 
The  cases  in  which  a  given  note  elucidates  not  merely 
one  but  several  passages  are  shown  in  the  Index. 


NOTES. 

I.  NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  &  NOVUM." 

1.  (Note  to  p.  1.)  Andrew  Trevill  to  whom  the  Organunt 
is  addressed  is  undoubtedly  Burthogge's  father-in-law.     In 
Lyson's  Magna  Britannia,  London,  1814,  Vol.  Ill   ("con- 
taining Cornwall"),  p.  cxviii,  under  the  head  of  "Extinct 
Families."  appears  the  following  note:  "Treville  of  Ethy  or 
Tethe  in  St.  Winnow — extinct  in  the  latter  part  of  the  seven- 
teenth century.    The  coheiresses  married  Burthog,  Savery, 
and  Arscot."  Furthermore,  in  both  the  Organum  and  in  the 
Tayadov   (1670,   dedicated  also  to  Andrew  Trevill),   Bur- 
thogge  signs  himself  "Your  most  humble  Servant  and  Son." 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  year  1651  "Andreus  Tre- 
vill" was  "High  Sheriff  of  Cornwall"  (cf.  Hitchins.  History 
of  Cornwall,  Vol.  II.  p.  685). 

2.  (Note  to  pp.  2  et  a/.)    No  criticism  of  Burthogge's 
Causa  Dei  as  a  whole  could  have  called  forth  the  Organum 
in  reply.     The  Causa  Dei  is  a  long-drawn-out  attempt  to 
show  that  the  everlasting  torments  to  which  the  wicked  are 
condemned  are  not  inconsistent  with  God's  goodness.     (Cf. 
pp.  12-13  for  Burthogge's  statement  of  his  aim  in  writing.) 
The  book  is  a  fair  example  of  Burthogge's  theological  writ- 
ings embodying  the  current  views  of  his  day  and  bearing 
little  resemblance  to  his  more  original  philosophical  works. 
The  criticism  to  which  Burthogge  refers  may  have  been 


l88    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

made  upon  a  short  section  (pp.  395-407 )/  more  or  less  inci 
dental  to  the  main  purpose  of  the  essay,  in  which  Burthogge 
discusses  the  role  of  reason  in  conduct.  Reason,  he  says,  is 
an  "intellectual  Sense,"  a  "Light  within"  by  which  we  know 
good  and  evil,  just  as  white  and  black  are  "sensible  ones," 
by  which  we  recognize  things  as  white  or  black.  (Cf.  Bur- 
thogge's  theory  that  the  "form"  of  truth  is  an  innate  notion 
which  we  apply  to  objects  to  determine  whether  they  are 
true  or  false,  Organum,  Sects.  63,  69,  72,  74.)  Reason,  un- 
assisted, does  not,  however,  point  out  "duty."  To  know 
duty,  the  good  must  be  recognized  as  the  "will  of  a  Supe- 
rior." And  the  principle  which  shows  it  to  be  the  "will  of 
a  Superior"  is  "conscience,"  which  is  an  instinct. 

The  fact  that  the  Causa  Dei  was  written  in  answer  to  a 
still  earlier  essay,  TayaOov,  1670  (cf.  letter  following  "The 
Epistle  Dedicatory"  in  Causa  Dei),  lends  further  emphasis 
to  the  introductory  paragraph  of  the  Organum. 

3.  (Note  to  p.  6.)    Burthogge  can  not  mean  to  refer  to 
the  Jewish  historian  as  a  chronicler  of  the  persecutions  of 
the  Christians  by  the  Jews.     Josephus  mentions  the  Chris- 
tians but  once  throughout  his  writings,  and  that  in  a  merely 
casual  manner.     (Cf.  his  so-called  "Testimony,"  Antiquities 
of  the  Jews,  Bk.  XVIII,  Ch.  Ill,  par.  3,  translation  by  Wil- 
liam Whiston ;  in  some  of  the  older  translations  the  chapter 
divisions  differ,  and  the  "Testimony"  appears  in  Ch.  IV, 
par.    [2].)      Burthogge's  reference  is  evidently  merely  to 
Josephus  as  an  historian  who  "hath  left  on  Record"  "what 
manner  of  men"  the  "zealous"  Jews  were,  zealous  not  in 
persecuting  the  Christians  but   in  maintaining  their  own 
independence  of  Roman  authority.      (Cf.  Antiquities  and 
The  Jewish  Wars.) 

4.  (Note  to  p.  13.)  In  the  original  this  word  is  misprinted : 
Understanding. 

1  All  citations  are  from  the  first  edition,  noted  in  the  Bibliography 
pp.  227ff. 


NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM."      189 

5.  (Note  to  pp.   13  et  a/.)    Burthogge  uses  the  terms 
"formal"  and  "objective"  in  the  sense  generally  accepted  in 
the  seventeenth  century.    The  thing  itself  was  said  to  exist 
"formally,"  i.  e.,  independent  of  mind.    Cf.  Descartes,  Medi- 
tations, III  and  VI ;  cf .  also  Fleming's  "Vocabulary  of  Phi- 
losophy"   (in    Krauth's    Vocabulary    of   the   Philosophical 
Sciences,  New  York,  1878)  for  a  brief  history  of  the  use 
of  the  term  "objective." 

6.  (Note  to  pp.   19  et  a/.)    Jacob  Behmen,   1575-1624 
(variously  spelled  Behm.  Behme  and  Behmen  by  his  English 
translators  in  the  seventeenth  century).     For  a  clear  and 
sympathetic  treatment  of  the  significance  of  Behmen's  teach- 
ing as  an  outgrowth  of  the  Reformation  and  a  forecast  of 
the  Quaker  movement,  cf.  R.  M.  Jones,  Spiritual  Reformers 
in  the  i6th  &  ifth  Centuries,  London,  1914.     A  complete 
bibliography  of  first  editions  of  the  works  of  Behmen  will 
be  found  on  p.  xii  of  the  Everyman  edition  of  The  Signature 
of  all  Things.     For  a  bibliography  of  English  translations 
cf.  Jones,  op.  cit.,  p.  213. 

Burthogge  rightly  characterizes  the  works  of  Behmen  as 
obscure.  In  the  Aurora  (1612)  Behmen's  first  and  most 
widely  known  work,  he  frankly  admits  the  unintelligibility 
of  his  writings  even  to  himself,  when  the  dictating  "Spirit" 
has  left  him.  "....this  work,"  Behmen  says  (p.  54  of 
translation  by  Sparrow,  1656),  "comes  not  from  his  [the 
author's]  Reason,  but  from  the  impulse  of  the  Spirit,"  and 
" ....  if  the  Spirit  were  withdrawn  from  me,  then  I  could 
neither  know  nor  understand  my  own  Writings"  (p.  73). 

7.  (Note  to  pp.  20  et  al.)     Robert  Fludd,  Oxford,  B.A. 
1596,  M.A.  1598,  M.D.  1605,  is  perhaps  most  widely  known 
for  his  connection  with  the  fraternity  of  the  Rosicrucians. 
He  has  been  called  the  "English  Rosicrucian."     (H.  Jen- 
nings, The  Rosicrucians,  Their  Rites  and  Mysteries,  New 
York,  1879,  Ch.  38.)    He  probably  got  his  first  knowledge 


I9O    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

of  this  fraternity  of  mystics  from  his  friend  Michael  Maier 
who  introduced  Rosicrucianism  into  England.  (Cf.  A.  E. 
Waite,  The  Real  History  of  the  Rosicrucians,  New  York, 
1888.  Ch.  X.) 

On  two  points,  at  least,  the  biographers  of  Robert  Fltidd 
agree,  (1)  that  he  was  a  man  of  great  erudition,  but  (2) 
that  his  writings  are,  for  the  most  part,  so  obscure  as  to  be 
quite  unintelligible.  Granger  says  of  him  (Biographical  His- 
tory of  England,  London,  1775,  Vol.  II,  pp.  3-4)  :  "...  .a 
vein  of  unintelligible  enthusiasm  runs  through  his  works." 
In  Wood's  Athenae  Oxonienses,  London,  1815,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
618-19,  we  read:  "...  .as  he  [Fludd]  wrote  by  clouding  his 
high  matter  with  dark  language ....  so  he  spoke  to  his  pa- 
tients, amusing  them  with  I  know  not  what,  till  by  his  ele- 
vated expressions  he  operated  into  them  a  faith-natural, 
which  consequently  contributed  to  the  well  working  of 
physic."  And  again  Chalmers  (General  Biographical  Dic- 
tionary, London,  1814,  Vol.  XIV)  says  of  him:  "He  did  not 
begin  to  publish  until  1616,  but  afterwards  became  a  volu- 
minous writer,  being  the  author  of  about  twenty  works, 
mostly  written  in  Latin,  and  as  dark  and  mysterious  in  their 
language,  as  in  their  matter"  (p.  418).  "All  the  mysterious 
and  incomprehensible  dreams  of  the  Cabbalists  and  Para- 
celsians,  he  compounded  into  a  new  mass  of  absurdity.  . .  . 
he. . .  .describes  the  whole  mystery  of  production  and  cor- 
ruption, of  regeneration  and  resurrection,  with  such  vague 
conceptions  and  obscure  language,  as  leaves  the  subject  in- 
volved in  impenetrable  darkness"  (p.  419). 

For  an  annotated  bibliography  of  Fludd  cf.  F.  Leigh 
Gardner,  A  Catalogue  Raisonne  of  Works  on  the  Occult 
Sciences,  Vol.  I,  "Rosicrucian  "Books,"  London,  1903,  pp. 
23-28.  Other  bibliographies  will  be  found  in  (1)  Wood. 
Athenae  Oxonienses,  Vol.  II,  p.  619;  (2)  Dictionary  of 
National  Biography,  Vol.  XIX;  (3)  A.  E.  Waite,  Real 
History  of  the  Rosicrucians,  New  York,  1888,  pp.  287-88 ; 
(4)  H.  Jennings,  The  Rosicrucians,  Their  Rites  and  Mys- 


NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM. 


teries,  New  York,  1879,  pp.  363-64;  (5)  Chalmers,  General 
Biographical  Dictionary,  London,  1814,  Vol.  XIV,  pp.  418-19. 

8.2  (Note  to  p.  20.)  Gnosticism  (c.  100-300  A.D.)  is  a 
form  of  mystical  religion  grounded  in  dualism.  The  Gnos- 
tics believed  themselves  to  be  endowed  with  a  peculiar  and 
mysterious  sort  of  knowledge  hidden  from  the  uninitiated 
and  imparted  to  them  by  special  revelation. 

Burthogge's  knowledge  of  the  "Whims  of  Basilides,  of 
Valentinus  and  the  Gnosticks"  was  probably  not  first-hand. 
Very  little  of  the  writings  of  the  early  Gnostics  has  survived 
(for  an  annotated  collection  of  the  fragments  cf.  Hilgen- 
feld,  Ketzergeschichte  des  Urchristentums,  Leipsic,  1884, 
pp.  195-218).  And  Burthogge's  acquaintance  with  the  Gnos- 
tics was  made,  more  probably,  through  their  contemporary 
opponents:  Irenaeus,  Hippolytus,  Clement  of  Alexandria 
and  Tertullian.  There  were  three  early  systems  of  Gnos- 
ticism: (1)  the  Egyptian,  (2)  the  Asiatic,  (3)  the  Syrian. 
And  it  is  generally  conceded  that  although  these  early  sys- 
tems arose  simultaneously  with  Christianity  their  ideas  were 
borrowed  from  various  sources  much  older,  e.  g.,  from  Greek 
philosophy,  from  Buddhism,  from  Parseeism  and  from  Jew- 
ish-Alexandrine philosophy.  It  was  only  later,  when  Gnos- 
ticism was  declining  and  could  find  nothing  in  the  older 
philosophies  to  bridge  the  gap  between  spirit  and  matter, 
that  it  incorporated  Christian  beliefs  in  order  "to  bolster 
up  a  crumbling  fabric."  Gnosticism  began  to  wane  in  the 
second  half  of  the  third  century  running  more  and  more  into 
mysticism. 

Basilides  and  Valentinus  were  both  leaders  in  the  early 
Egyptian  school  of  Gnostics.  Basilides,  born  in  Alexandria. 
was  the  founder  of  that  form  of  Gnosticism  known  as  the 
"Abraxas"  religion,  based,  as  all  forms  of  Gnosticism  were, 
upon  a  fundamental  dualism.  For  an  exposition  of  the 

*  Notes  8  and  21,  in  part,  and  Notes  14,  17,  23,  27  and  42,  entire, 
were  written  by  Professor  Calkins. 


192    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

teaching  of  Basilides  cf.  Mansel,  Gnostic  Heresies  of  the 
First  and  Second  Centuries,  London,  1875,  Ch.  X,  and  for 
a  shorter  statement  of  his  theory  of  the  creation  of  the  world 
cf.  Kramer,  Sources  of  Gnosticism,  Princeton,  1896,  pp. 
8-10,  also  Irenaeus's  summary  in  C.  W.  King,  The  Gnostics 
and  Their  Remains,  London,  1864,  pp.  34-35.  Basilides 
died  about  133  A.  D.  He  published  twenty-four  volumes  of 
"Interpretations  upon  the  Gospels/'  besides  "Odes"  and 
"Spiritual  Songs." 

Valentinus,  born  also  at  Alexandria,  but  of  Jewish  origin, 
followed  Basilides  and  elaborated  his  system  of  emanation. 
Of  the  two,  Valentinus  was  the  more  prominent  leader  of 
the  Gnostic  movement.  He  was  the  founder  of  a  great 
number  of  subordinate  schools.  For  a  statement  of  the 
system  of  Valentinus  cf.  Mansel,  op.  cit.,  Chs.  XI  and  XII. 
Valentinus  died  in  158  A.  D. 

9.  (Note  to  pp.  20  et  al.)  The  religious  sect  known  as 
the  "Familists"  or  "Family  of  Love"  was  founded  about  the 
middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  by  Henry  Nicholas  (or 
Niclaes,  fl.  1502-80),  and  was  in  existence  as  late  as  the 
opening  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  teaching  of  these 
mystics  is  closely  allied  to  that  of  their  successors  the 
Quakers.  Many  of  the  doctrines  generally  supposed  to  have 
originated  with  the  Quakers  were  probably  borrowed  from 
the  "Familists."  The  central  idea  in  the  teaching  of  Nicho- 
las, called  by  Henry  More  "the  begodded  man  of  Amster- 
dam," is  that  real  righteousness  is  reached  not  through  con- 
formity to  any  external  law  or  ceremony,  but  through  the 
attainment  of  a  spiritual  union  with  God,  a  union  in  which 
the  man  becomes  "godded."  For  an  excellent  sketch  of  the 
life  of  Henry  Nicholas,  "Father  of  the  Familists,"  cf.  the 
Dictionary  of  National  Biography.  A  bibliography  of  his 
works  (all  written  originally  in  Low  German)  will  be  found 
there  also.  For  an  exposition  of  the  teaching  of  Nicholas, 
with  quotations  from  his  writings,  cf.  R.  M.  Jones,  Studies 


NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM 

in  Mystical  Religion,  London,  1909,  Ch.  18.  The  names  of 
the  various  contemporary  opponents  and  an  account  of  the 
charges  which  they  brought  against  the  "Family  of  Love" 
will  be  found  on  pp.  442-48  of  the  same  book. 

10.3  (Note  to  p.  20.)  The  terms  "demoniacal"  and  "com- 
plexional"  are  very  common  terms  for  types  of  enthusiasm, 
by  which  is  meant  the  claim  to  direct  divine  guidance.  I 
give  one  illustration  from  Cornelius  Agrippa's  Occult  Phi- 
losophy which  was  translated  into  English  in  1651.  Agrippa 
says,  in  speaking  of  "enthusiasm":  "Melancholy  men,  by 
reason  of  their  earnestness,  do  far  better  conjecture,  and 
quickly  conceive  a  habit,  and  most  easily  receive  an  impres- 
sion of  the  celestials.  And  he  [Aristotle]  in  his  Problems 
saith  that  the  Sibyls,  and  the  Bacchides,  and  Niceratus  the 
Syracusan  and  Ammon,  were,  by  their  natural  melancholy 
complexion,  prophets  and  poets.  The  cause,  therefore,  of 
this  madness,  if  it  be  anything  within  the  body,  is  a  mel- 
ancholy humor ;  not  that  which  they  call  black  choler,  which 
is  so  obstinate  and  terrible  a  thing,  that  the  violence  of  it  is 
said,  by  physicians  and  natural  philosophers  (besides  mad- 
ness which  it  doth  induce),  to  draw  or  entice  evil  spirits  to 
seize  upon  men's  bodies"  (p.  186). 

I  have  also  run  across  the  following  passage  in  Holland's 
translation  of  Plutarch's  Morals  (1603):  "The  Daemons 
use  to  make  their  Prophets  and  Prophetesses  to  be  ravished 
with  an  enthusiasm  or  divine  fury." 

A  great  number  of  writers  who  followed  Paracelsus 
used  "complexions"  for  combinations  of  the  so-called  four 
"humors,"  the  "choleric,"  "phlegmatic,"  "sanguine"  and 
"melancholic."  Dreams  and  revelations  of  one  sort  and 
another  were  believed  by  these  writers  to  be  the  result  very 
often  of  "complexions,"  or,  as  we  should  say  to-day,  of 
emotional  conditions.  From  the  time  of  the  Renaissance  it 

?  Extract  from  a  letter  from  Prof.  R.  M.  Jones,  of  Haverford 
College,  to  Miss  Calkins. 


194    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

was  customary  either  (1)  to  treat  "enthusiasm"  as  an  in- 
vasion by  a  good  or  bad  spirit,  or  (2)  to  consider  it  to  be 
a  result  of  "temperature"  or  "tincture"  or  "complexion," 
these  being  various  terms  which  cover  pretty  much  what 
we  mean  by  a  psychical  or  emotional  condition  of  the  sub- 
ject. Abundant  illustrations  can  be  found  in  the  writings, 
for  instance,  of  the  English  Platonists,  especially  in  those  of 
Henry  More. 

11.*  (Note  to  p.  21.)  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  be  ab- 
solutely sure  about  the  "upstart  sect."  There  are  three  sects 
to  which  Burthogge  might  be  referring:  the  Quakers,  the 
Behmenists  and  the  Muggletonians.  I  feel  very  sure  that 
he  is  referring  to  the  Quakers.  They  were  far  and  away 
the  most  numerous  and  they  had  aroused  far  greater  interest 
and  comment  than  any  other  "upstart  sect"  of  the  time. 
There  were  probably  thirty  thousand  Quakers  in  England 
at  the  time  this  tract  was  written  and  they  had  made  very 
sweeping  claims  to  the  possession  of  the  direction  of  the 
Spirit.  The  Muggletonians  came  into  notice  about  1652 
and  claimed  to  have  a  wholly  fresh  and  new  revelation  from 
God.  They  were,  however,  always  few  in  number  and  are 
not  nearly  as  likely  to  be  meant  as  are  the  Quakers.  I  hardly 
think  Burthogge  can  be  referring  to  the  Behmenists,  though 
they,  too,  claimed  to  have  full  guidance  of  the  Spirit,  and 
they  were  striking  examples  of  "enthusiasm."  The  "Fam- 
ilists"  and  the  "Seekers"  had  so  greatly  waned  in  numbers 
and  in  influence  by  1675  that  they,  I  think,  are  eliminated. 

12.5  (Note  to  p.  21.)  Despite  the  vast  amount  which  has 
been  written  in  praise  and  in  disparagement  of  Paracelsus. 
the  famous  iatrochemist  and  physician  (1493-1541),  the 
facts  definitely  known  regarding  his  life  are  few.  He  was 

4  Extract  from  a  letter  from  Prof.  R.  M.  Jones  to  Miss  Calkins. 

•For  this   Note  the   editor   is   indebted   to  Dr.   Charlotte   Fitch 
Roberts,  late  professor  of  chemistry  at  Wellesley  College. 


NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM. 


born  at  Einsiedeln  in  Switzerland,  led  for  the  most  part  a 
wandering  life,  though  he  was  settled  for  about  three  years 
at  Basel  as  city  physician  and  lecturer  in  the  University; 
and  he  died  in  Salzburg.  His  constant  attempts  at  reforms 
and  innovations  brought  him  many  enemies.  "That  you 
other  physicians  are  angry,"  Paracelsus  writes  (in  the  Pref- 
ace of  Das  Buck  Paragranum),  "because  I  write  differently 
from  your  books,  is  something  which  depends  upon  your 
unreasonableness,  not  mine.  No  one  cries  out  who  is  not 
wounded,  and  no  one  is  wounded  who  is  not  vulnerable. 
The  art  of  medicine  does  not  cry  out  against  me,  for  it  is 
invulnerable  and  immortal."  Though  ranked  as  an  al- 
chemist, his  principal  work  in  the  development  of  chemistry 
consisted  in  turning  away  attention  from  the  attempt  to  pre- 
pare gold  and  silver,  and  in  applying  chemistry  to  medicine, 
thus  founding  the  school  of  iatrochemists.  As  a  physician, 
many  brilliant  cures  were  attributed  to  him  in  his  lifetime, 
but  his  claim  to  recognition  now  lies  not  so  much  in  the  con- 
tribution of  new  discoveries  as  in  the  introduction  of  the  em- 
pirical method  in  the  study  and  practice  of  medicine.  "All 
things,"  he  writes,  "are  possible  to  science"  (De  Natura 
Rerum,  Huser  edition,  Basel,  1589-90).  He  did  a  real 
service  to  the  advancement  of  science  in  general  by  his  em- 
phasis on  investigation  and  on  independence  in  work.  This 
idea  of  independence  is  brought  out  in  the  motto  which  he 
adopted  for  himself,  which  appears  in  connection  with  many 
of  his  portraits:  "Alterius  non  sit  qui  suus  esse  potest." 
Another  favorite  saying  which  recurs  in  many  forms  in  his 
writings  is  :  "Lehren  und  nicht  tun,  das  ist  klein  ;  lehren  und 
tun,  das  ist  gross  und  ganz."  Again,  he  writes:  "At  the 
basis  of  a  good  physician  is  fidelity  —  not  halved  nor  divided. 
For,  as  little  as  the  truth  of  God  can  be  divided  or  limited, 
so  also  is  it  with  fidelity"  (Paramirum,  Strassburg  folio 
edition,  1616-18). 

A  vast  number  of  writings  on  many  and  varied  subjects 
arc  extant  which  have  been  published  under  the  name  of 


196    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Paracelsus,  but  in  many  cases  the  books  were  published  after 
his  death  and  are  of  doubtful  authenticity. 

13.  (Note  to  p.  21.)   Jean  Baptiste  van  Helmont  (1577- 
1644),  was  a  Belgian  chemist  and  physician  and  a  disciple 
of  Paracelsus,  although  he  repudiates  some  of  his  master's 
teachings.     (Cf.,  e.  g.,  his  "Nativity  of  Tartar  in  Wine," 
tr.  by  Charleton  in  A  Ternary  of  Paradoxes,  etc.,  London. 
1650,  Sects.  1,  13,  15  :  and  Oriatrike,  tr.  by  Chandler,  Lon- 
don, 1662,  Ch.  115,  on  "The  Arcanums  or  Secrets  of  Para- 
celsus.")    Helmont  was  a  curious  paradox,  both  mystic  and 
scientist.     He  was  "a  careful  observer  of  nature  and  an 
exact  experimenter  who  in  some  cases  realized  that  matter 
can  neither  be  created  nor  destroyed,"  yet  at  the  same  time 
he  resorts  to  supernatural  agencies  in  solving  his  physio- 
logical problems.    His  works  were  collected  by  his  son  and 
published  at  Amsterdam,  in  1668,  under  the  title  of  Ortus 
Medicinae.  For  the  facts  of  his  life  cf .  Encyclopaedia  Britan- 
nica,  llth  ed.,  also  the  Catholic  Encyclopedia.     A  bibliog- 
raphy of  French  and  German  works  on  Helmont  will  be 
found  in  the  former.     For  English  translations  cf.  Charle- 
ton, op.  cit.,  and  Chandler,  op.  cit. 

14.  (Note  to  pp.  24  et  a/.)    Burthogge's  "Light  of  Na- 
ture" is  only  roughly  parallel  to  Descartes's.   For  Descartes 
does  not  make  the  contrast  between  the  "Light  of  Revela- 
tion" and  the  "Light  of  Nature,"  whereas  he  distinguishes 
the  "natural  light" — by  which  he  means  self-evident  truth 
(cf.  Meditations,  III,  par.   [3]) — from  "natural  impulse'' 
which  he  describes  as  "only  a  certain  spontaneous  impetus 
that  impels  me  to  believe  in  a  resemblance  between  ideas 
and  their  objects,  not  a  natural  light  that  affords  a  knowl- 
edge of   its  truth"    (ibid.,  par.    [9]).     Natural  light,   not 
natural  impulse,  is  described  by  Descartes  as  "clear  and 
distinct  perception." 


NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM. 


15.  (Note  to  p.  32.)    The  gods  of  Epicurus  were  "un- 
known" in  the  sense  of  being  unrevealed,  which  is  apparently 
Burthogge's  meaning.     In  a  region  of  perpetual  calm  and 
serenity,  in  the  space  between  the  worlds,  they  lived  in  per- 
fect happiness,  aloof  from  men,  and  "not  concerned,  nor 
concerning  themselves   with   things   below   them."     These 
gods  resembled  men,  but  were  immortal  and  of  a  superior 
nature.     Like  men  they   feasted  and  conversed  together. 
And  their  bodies  were  of  human  form,  though  of  a  more 
ethereal  substance.     They  required  food  (of  a  kind  suited 
to  their  bodies),  but  no  sleep. 

This  conception  of  the  gods  was  a  result  of  Epicurus's 
attempt  to  prove  the  absurdity  of  the  two  opposing  views 
—  alike  intolerable  to  him  —  which  were  current  at  the  time, 
(1)  the  theory  of  divine  interference,  and  (2)  that  of  Stoic 
fatalism.  According  to  his  conception  of  the  gods,  both 
views  become  impossible.  The  gods  cared  nothing  for  men 
and  their  affairs,  and  were  content  to  let  them  guide  the 
course  of  nature  as  well  as  their  own  fortunes.  For  a 
statement  of  the  theology  of  Epicurus  cf.  Wm.  Wallace, 
Epicureanism,  London,  1880,  Ch.  IX  ;  E.  Zeller,  Stoics, 
Epicureans  and  Sceptics,  tr.  by  O.  J.  Reichel,  London, 
1892,  Ch.  XVIII;  and  R.  D.  Hicks,  Stoic  and  Epicurean, 
New  York,  1910,  Ch.  VII. 

16.  (Note  to  p.  33.)    It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the 
conception  of  God  as  unknown  is,  in  the  view  of  Hobbes, 
the  natural  outcome  of  a  materialistic  system  (cf.  Leviathan. 
Pt.  I,  Chs.  XI  and  XII  ;  Pt.  II,  Ch.  XXXI  ;  Pt.  Ill,  Ch. 
XXXIV).      Hobbes  conceived   of  the   whole  universe  as 
"corporeal  substance."     On  this  materialistic  view  of  the 
universe,  God  (if  he  exist  at  all)  must  be  either  "corporeal" 
or  unknown.     Unwilling  to  deny  His  existence,  but  un- 
willing also  to  make  Him  merely  a  part  of  the  material 
universe,  Hobbes  makes  God  the  unknown  "cause."  To  this 
unknown  God,  he  teaches,  we  apply  the  attributes  of  cor- 


PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


poreal  substance,  as  well  as  the  "indefinite"  attributes: 
"good,"  "just,"  "holy."  (Cf.  Leviathan,  Pt.  II,  Ch.  XXXI.) 
But  what  He  really  is  in  Himself  we  do  not  know.  The  doc- 
trine of  an  unknown  God  is  the  natural  development  of 
Burthogge's  doctrine  of  knowledge.  If  our  knowledge  of 
the  material  world  is  subjective,  that  is,  if  we  can  know 
objects  only  as  they  exist  in  the  mind,  and  never  as  things 
in  themselves  outside  of  the  mind,  how  much  more  true  must 
it  be  that  we  can  know  God  only  "as  He  stands  in  our 
Analogy,"  and  not  "as  He  is  in  Himself."  It  is  inconceiv- 
able that  our  "Notions"  which  are  inadequate  for  knowl- 
edge of  things,  should  be  adequate  for  a  knowledge  of  God. 

17.  (Note  to  p.   40.)     Prof.   Arthur   O.   Lovejoy  has 
pointed  out6  that  this  is  the  earliest  use  of  an  argument  best 
known  in  the  form  which  Kant  gave  it  in  his  Second  An- 
tinomy.    From  the  opposition  between  the  "common  No- 
tion" of  Quantity  and  "the  composition  of  the  Continuum," 
Burthogge  argues  that  quantity  is  a  "Phenomenon"  or  "Ap- 
pearance," not  a  "Reality."    For  Arthur  Collier's  use  of  the 
same  argument  cf  .  his  Clavis  Universal^,  p.  63  of  the  Open 
Court  edition,  edited  by  Ethel  Bowman,  and  also  A.  O. 
Lovejoy  in  his  essay  "Kant  and  the  English  Platonists"  (in 
Essays  Philosophical  and  Psychological  in  Honor  of  William 
James,  New  York,  1908). 

18.  (Note  to  p.  43.)    For  an  analysis  of  Aristotle's  logic 
and  the  history  of  its  use  cf.  Ueberweg,  System  der  Logik, 
Bonn,  1857,  par.  16  ;  Brandis,  Handbuch  der  Geschichte  der 
griechisch-romischen  Philosophic,   Berlin,   Vol.    II,   Pt.   II 
(1853),  Sect.  Ill,  pp.   148ff;  Zeller.  Die  Philosophic  der 
Griechen,  Leipsic,  Vol.  II,  Pt.  II  (3d  ed.,  1879),  pp.  67ff: 
Prantl,  Geschichte  der  Logik  im  Abendlande,  Leipsic,  Vol.  I 
(1855),  Sect.  IV;  Vol.  II  (1861),  Sects.  XIII-XIV;  Vol. 
Ill  (1867),  Sect.  XVII. 

8  In  a  private  letter. 


NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.         TO/) 

19.  (Note  to  p.  48.)    Burthogge  refers  here  to  Cicero's 
discussion,  in  the  second  book  of  his  Academica  (inscribed 
Lucullus  in  the  first  edition),  of  the  role  of  sense-perception 
in  knowledge.     The  chief  characters  in  the  dialogue  are 
Lucullus  and  Cicero  himself.    Cicero,  as  spokesman  of  the 
Academy,  upholds  the  view  that  the  senses  are  wholly  un- 
trustworthy, and  offers  in  support  of  his  position  the  old 
illustration  of  the  oar  in  water  and  the  colors  on  a  pigeon's 
neck.    Lucullus,  on  the  other  hand,  while  he  admits  that  the 
senses  can  not  under  all  circumstances  be  trusted,  holds  that 
there  is  the  "very  greatest  truth  in  the  senses,  if  they  are 
in  sound  and  healthy  order,  and  if  everything  is  removed 
which  could  impede  or  hinder  them."     Or,  as  Burthogge 
interprets  Lucullus,  r\ot  everything  that  is  perceived  through 
sense  is  true,  but  only  that  which  is  clearly  and  distinctly 
perceived. 

20.  (Note  to  p.  52.)   Edward,  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury 
(1583-1648)  was  the  author  of  the  first  purely  metaphysical 
treatise  written  by  an  Englishman.    The  De  Veritate  (pub- 
lished first  in  Latin,  Paris,   1624,  England,   1633,  and  in 
French   translation   1639,  and  criticized  by  Locke  in  his 
Essay,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  Ill,  pars.  15-19).  is  his  most  important 
philosophical  work,  embodying  not  only  a  methodology  for 
the  investigation  of  truth,  but  a  theory  of  knowledge  and  a 
scheme  of  natural  religion  as  well.    Truth,  according  to  Lord 
Herbert,  is  the  agreement  between  faculty  and  object.    For 
every  object  in  the  world  there  is  a  corresponding  faculty 
in  the  mind.    And  each  faculty  reacts  only  to  its  own  object. 
The  faculties  of  the  mind,  though  infinite  in  number,  may 
be  reduced  to  four  general  classes :  ( 1 )  natural  instinct ;  (2) 
internal  sense  or  conscience,  by  which  good  and  evil  are  dis- 
tinguished ;  (3)  external  sense;  (4)  reason.    Of  these  four, 
"natural  instinct"  is  the  most  reliable  and  reason  the  least 
reliable  in  determining  truth.   (Cf.  Spinoza's  theory  of  truth, 
Ethics,  Pt.  II.    According  to  Spinoza,  the  true  idea  is  the 


2OO   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

idea  which  "agrees  with  its  ideal"  or  "is  adequate."  And 
of  the  three  types  of  knowledge,  opinion,  reason  and  in- 
tuition, only  the  last  two  are  efficacious  in  determining  true 
ideas.  Prop.  XL,  Note  II,— Prop.  XLIII.) 

For  the  facts  of  his  life  and  for  an  introduction  to  Lord 
Herbert,  the  gallant  English  nobleman,  soldier  and  diplo- 
matist, the  reader  is  referred  to  his  autobiography.  In  his 
own  opinion  his  contributions  to  literature  and  philosophy, 
his  only  real  claim  to  fame,  were  merely  incidental  to  a 
career  filled  with  valiant  deeds  and  hairbreadth  escapes. 
Bibliographies  of  his  historical  and  philosophical  works  will 
be  found  in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  llth  ed.,  and  in 
the  Dictionary  of  National  Biography. 

21.  (Note  to  p.  55.)    Burthogge  here,  of  course,  refers 
to  the  theory,  then  current,  of  innate  ideas — the  theory  so 
sharply  criticized  twelve  years  later  by  Locke.     (Cf.  Essay, 
Bk.  I;  also  p.  xxiii  of  this  book.)     It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  Burthogge,  though  he  implies  that  the  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas  arose  from  a  conviction  that  we  have  certain  universal 
concepts  which  we  could  not  have  got  through  the  senses, 
had  another  account  also,  of  their  origin.     The  theory  of 
innate  ideas,  he  suggests,  was  the  invention  of  those  who, 
while  admitting  the  fallibility  of  the  senses,  were  yet  un- 
willing to  deny  the  possibility  of  knowledge.     Innate  ideas 
were  thus  hit  upon  as  the  deus  ex  machina,  to  be  relied 
upon  to  lend  assistance  to  knowledge  on  all  occasions  where 
the  senses  proved  incompetent. 

22.  (Note  to  p.  55.)    Modern  scholars  have  decided  that 
the  author  of  the  Celestial  Hierarchy  is  not  Dionysius  the 
convert  of   Paul,  but  a  pseudo-Dionysius   writing  in   the 
fourth  or  fifth  century.     (For  arguments  against  this  view 
cf.  Parker,  The  Celestial  and  Ecclesiastical  Hierarchy  of 
Dionysius,  the  Areopagite,  London,  1894,  Introduction.)  The 
works  of  the  pseudo-Areopagite  (  four  in  all :  Celestial  Hier- 


NOTES  TO  "ORGANUM  VETUS  ET  NOVUM.         2OI 

archy,  Ecclesiastical  Hierarchy,  Divine  Names  and  Mystic 
Theology)  were  probably  not  known  in  the  East  until  533 
A.  D.,  and  in  the  West  they  were  not  known,  to  any  extent, 
until  the  ninth  century  when  Erigena  made  a  Latin  trans- 
lation of  them.  Borrowing  from  Judaism,  from  Christian- 
ity and  from  Oriental  philosophy,  but  chiefly  from  neo- 
Platonic  philosophy,  Dionysius  combined  his  material  into 
a  system  which  had  an  enormous  influence  not  only  on  the 
philosophy  but  on  the  art  and  literature  of  the  Middle  Ages 
as  well.  In  poetry  his  influence  is  seen  in  Dante,  in  Spenser 
and  in  Milton ;  in  philosophy,  in  the  works  of  Albertus 
Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas.  Indeed,  so  faithfully  did 
Aquinas  reproduce  the  Dionysian  conceptions  that  it  has  been 
said  that  if  the  writings  of  Dionysius  had  been  lost  "they 
could  be  almost  reconstructed  from  the  works  of  Aquinas." 
A  good  summary  of  Dionysius's  conception  of  the  threefold 
hierarchy  of  celestial  beings  through  whom  man  rises  to  a 
mystic  experience  of  God,  and  a  statement  of  the  place  of 
Dionysius  in  the  history  of  medieval  thought,  will  be  found 
in  R.  M.  Jones,  Studies  in  Mystical  Religion,  London,  1909, 
Ch.  VI.  Cf .  H.  O.  Taylor,  Classical  Heritage  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  New  York,  1911.  For  an  English  translation  of  the 
Celestial  Hierarchy  and  the  Ecclesiastical  Hierarchy  cf. 
Parker,  op.  cit. 

23.  (Note  to  p.  57.)    Evidently  Burthogge  here  refers 
to  Locke;  and  Locke  (Essay,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  XXVII)  defines 
an  animal  as  a  "living  organized  body"  (loc.  cit.,  par.  8)  ; 
teaches  that  "the  same  successive  body  must,  as  well  as  the 
same  immaterial  spirit,  go  to  the  rriaking  of  the  same  man" 
(ibid.)  ;  and,  finally,  contrasts  both  spirit   (or  soul)   and 
man  with  person  (or  self)  which  he  conceives  as  "a  think- 
ing intelligent  being,  that.... can  consider  itself  as  itself" 
(ibid.,  par.  9). 

24.  (Note  to  p.  62.)    Claudius  Galen  (130-200  A.D.), 
the  greatest  of  the  ancient  medical  writers,  was  born  at 


2O2    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

Pergamus,  in  Mysia.  At  the  age  of  sixteen  he  began  to 
study  medicine  and  later  studied  at  Smyrna  under  the  anato- 
mist and  physician  Pelops.  About  160  he  went  to  Rome 
where  he  gained  great  reputation  for  his  learning  and  suc- 
cess in  the  medical  profession.  During  the  years  of  a  later 
visit  to  Rome,  at  the  invitation  of  the  emperor  Marcus 
Aurelius,  Galen  greatly  extended  his  already  wide  reputa- 
tion as  a  physician  and  wrote  at  this  time  most  of  his  im- 
portant works.  He  is  said  to  have  written  nearly  five 
hundred  treatises  on  various  subjects,  including  not  only 
medicine,  but  logic,  ethics  and  grammar  as  well.  Of  the 
original  works  on  logic,  only  one  remains:  the  treatise  on 
"Fallacies  in  dictione."  Many  points  of  logical  theory  are 
discussed,  however,  in  his  medical  and  scientific  writings. 
A  brief  statement  of  the  logical  theories  of  Galen  will  be 
found  in  Prantl,  Geschichte  der  Logik,  Vol.  I,  pp.  559-77. 
Down  to  the  seventeenth  century  the  Arabian  physicians, 
and  the  European  through  the  Arabian,  borrowed  largely 
from  Galen.  And  most  of  the  descriptive  terms  in  physiol- 
ogy, pathology  and  anatomy,  now  in  use,  were  employed  by 
Galen  in  the  sense  in  which  they  are  now  employed  by  mod- 
ern authors.  Burthogge's  reference  is  evidently  to  Galen's 
seventeen  books  De  Usu  Partium  Corporis  Humani  (cf. 
Opera  Omnia,  ed.  by  D.  Carolus  Gottlob  Kiihn,  Lejpsic. 
Vols.  ITI-IV,  1822).  For  a  bibliography  of  the  various 
translations  and  editions  of  Galen's  works  and  critical  works 
about  them  cf.  Encyclopedia  Britannica. 

25.  (Note  to  p.  64.)    In  the  original  this  word  is  mis- 
printed: enqure. 

II.  NOTES  TO  "ESSAY  UPON  REASON." 

26.  (Note  to  p.  6.)    The  quotation  is  from  the  passage 
(De  Natura  Deorum,  I,  29,  80)  on  facial  distinctions  among 
the  gods:  "Ecquos  si  non  tarn  strabones,  at  paetulos  esse 


NOTES  TO  "ESSAY  UPON  REASON."          203 

arbitramur?  ecquos  naevum  habere?  ecquos  silos,  flaccos, 
f  rontones,  capitones  ;  quae  sunt  in  nobis  ?  an  omnia  emendata 
in  illis  ?  Detur  id  vobis.  Num  etiam  una  est  omnium  f acies  ? 
nam,  si  plures,  aliam  esse  alia  pulchriorem  necesse  est :  igitur 
aliquis  non  pulcherrumus  deus.  Si  una  omnium  facies  est, 
florere  in  coelo  Academiam  necesse  est.  Si  enim  nihil  inter 
deum  et  deum  differt,  nulla  est  apud  deos  cognitio,  nulla 
perceptio." 

27.  (Note  to  p.  6.)    Cf.  Meditations,  II,  end:  " it  is 

now  manifest  to  me  that  bodies  themselves  are  not  properly 
perceived  by  the  senses  nor  by  the  faculty  of  the  imagination, 
but  by  the  intellect  alone." 

28.  (Note  to  p.  6.)    Honoratus,  or  Honore,  Fabri,  S.  J. 
(1607-88),  was  a  French  writer  and  teacher.    For  fourteen 
years  he  taught  philosophy  at  the  College  de  la  T  finite  at 
Lyons.     He  was  later  called  to  Rome  as  grand  penitencier, 
and  died  there.    The  works  of  Fabri.  many  of  which  were 
written  pseudonymously  (under  at  least  six  different  pseu- 
donyms), include  treatises  on  mathematics,  logic  and  medi- 
cine, as  well  as  on  philosophy.     Fabri  has  been  called  "the 
pleader  of  lost  causes."    He  is  recognized  as  a  great  worker 
but  one  whose  loud  promises  were  seldom  fulfilled,  and  one 
whose  writings  have  to-day  not  even  an  historical  signifi- 
cance.   A  bibliography  of  his  works  and  an  account  of  his 
life  will  be  found  in  Michaud's  Biographic  universelle :  also 
in  Jocher's  Allgemeines  Gelehrten-Lexicon. 

29.  (Note  to  p.  37.)  The  quotation  is  from  the  Leviathan. 
Pt.  I,  Ch.  IV,  and  reads :  " .  . .  .  words  are  wise  men's  coun- 
ter's, they  do  but  reckon  by  them;  but  they  are  the  money 
of  fools,  that  value  them  by  the  authority  of  an  Aristotle,  a 
Cicero,  or  a  Thomas,  or  any  other  doctor  whatsoever,  if 
but  a  man."    (Cf.   Concerning  Body.   Pt.   I.   Ch.   II,  "Of 
Names.") 


2O4    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

30.  (Note  to  p.  57.)    In  the  original  this  word  is  mis- 
printed: Enity. 

31.  (Note  to  p.  62.)    The  quotation  is  from  the  Aca- 
demica,  II,  10,  30.    The  chief  speakers  in  the  dialogue  are 
Lucullus  and  Cicero ;  the  subject  under  discussion  is  sense. 
Lucullus  has  argued  against  the  untrustworthiness  of  the 
senses,  but  for  the  sake  of  continuing  the  discussion,  he 
grants  to  the  Academicians  the  invalidity  of  sense  in  refer- 
ence to  knowledge  and  turns  to  a  consideration  of  sense 
in   relation   to  the  affections,   desires   and  thought:    "Sed 
disputari   poterat   subtiliter,   quanto   quasi   artificio   natura 
fabricata    esset   primum   animal    omne,    deinde    hominem 
maxime,  quae  vis  esset  in  sensibus,  quern  ad  modum  primo 
visa  nos  pellerent,  deinde  adpetitio  ab  his  pulsa  sequeretur, 
turn  ut  sensus  ad  res  percipiendas  intenderemus.    Mens  enim 
ipsa,  quae  sensuum  fons  est  atque  etiam  ipsa  sensus  est, 
naturalem  vim  habet,  quam  intendit  ad  ea,  quibus  movetur." 

32.  (Note  to  p.  68.)    In  the  original  this  word  is  mis- 
printed: perception. 

33.  (Note  to  p.  71.)    This  seems  to  be  Burthogge's  only 
suggestion,  in  any  of  his  philosophical  writings,  of  the  fact 
that  he  was  a  physician. 

34.  (Note  to  p.  74.)    For  Plato's  allegory  of  the  cave 
see  Republic,  Bk.  VII,  514-18. 

35.  (Note  to  p.  91.)  In  the  original  this  section  is  wrongly 
numbered  II. 

36.  (Note  to  pp.  94  et  al.)    Up  to  this  point  Burthogge 
has  referred  to  external  reality  simply  as  "the  Thing"  or 
"things  without  us,"  or  as  "grounds"  or  "cause"  of  sensa- 
tions (cf.  Essay,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  2,  pp.  73-75).     Here,  how- 


NOTES  TO  "ESSAY  UPON  REASON."  205 

ever,  in  discussing  this  reality  not  primarily  in  its  relation 
to  knowledge  but  in  and  for  itself,  he  names  it  substance. 
Burthogge's  conception  of  substance  is  Lockian  rather  than 
Spinozistic.  Self-subsistence,  the  essential  character  of 
Spinoza's  substance,  is,  according  to  Burthogge,  not  funda- 
mental, since  it  is  involved  in  or  derived  from  the  main 
character  of  being  "subject  of  accidents."  Burthogge  agrees 
with  Locke  in  holding  that  substance  is  primarily  the  un- 
known substratum  of  sense-phenomena,  "a  supposed  I  know 
not  what  to  support  those  ideas  we  call  accidents."  (Cf. 
Locke's  Essay,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  XXIII.)  The  idea  of  substance 
is  then  according  to  both,  a  "Relative  Idea"  only.  Substance 
is  known  only  as  that  which  is  related  to  its  accidents.  What 
it  is  absolutely  and  apart  from  those  accidents  can  never  be 
known.  (Cf.  Notes  41  and  44.) 

37.  (Note  to  p.  103.)    The  quotation  reads  more  fully. 
"Nempe  universa  ex  materia  et  ex  Deo  constant:  Deus  ista 
temperat,  quae  circumfusa  rectorem  sequuntur,  et  ducem. 
Potentius  autem  est  ac  pretiosius  est  quod  facit,  quod  est 
Deus,  quam  materia,  patiens  Dei.     Quern  in  hoc  mundo 
locum  Deus  obtinet,  hunc  in  homine  animus:  quod  est  illic 
materia,  id  nobis  corpus  est." 

From  Plato  directly,  but  not  improbably  from  Seneca's 
borrowed  Platonic  conceptions  as  well,  Burthogge  derives 
his  conception  of  God  as  "pure  mind,"  a  substance  utterly 
different  from  matter.  Burthogge  does  not,  however  (as 
he  himself  points  out,  p.  112),  follow  Seneca  in  identifying 
God  with  the  Soul  of  the  World. 

38.  (Note  to  pp.   103-04.)    The  quotation  is  from  the 
Lives  of  the  Philosophers  of  Diogenes  Laertius,  Bk.  VII, 

Ch.   I,   Sect  LXVIII,  par.   134:  Ao*£6  8'  avrols  dp^a?  dvai  T&V 

oA<DV    8vO,    TO    TTOIOVV    KO.I    TO    TTOCT^OV.        To    fjifV    OVV    7TCl(T^(OV,    flVai    TT1V 

O.TTOLOV  ovaiav  -njv  v\i)V  TO  8e  TTOIOVV,  rov  ev  av-ry  Aoyov  TOV  Oeov. 
TOVTOV  yap  OVTO.  atotov  Bia  Wo^s  avTijs  Brjftiovp-ytlv  I 


2O6    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

39.  (Note  to  p.  107.)   Descartes  does  not,  any  more  than 
Burthogge,  identify  cogitation  with  mind,  or  extension  with 
matter.     He  merely  holds,  with  Burthogge,  that  thinking  is 
the  principal  attribute  of  mind,  and  extension  that  of  matter. 
(Cf.  Descartes,  Principles  of  Philosophy,  Pt.  I,  LII-LIV.) 

40.  (Note  to  p.  108.)   Burthogge  probably  had  Hobbes  in 
mind,  for  the  polemics  of  the  seventeenth-century  idealists 
in  England  were  almost  sure  to  be  hurled  at  Hobbes.     A 
genuine  passion  for  the  revival  of  the  study  of  Plato  was. 
to  be  sure,  the  primary  factor  in  the  origin  of  the  Cambridge 
movement.    But  the  desire  to  refute  Hobbes  certainly  fur- 
nished an  added  impetus,  without  which  the  writings  of  the 
Platonists  would  have  lacked  definite  purpose.    (Cf.  Culver- 
wel,  Discourse  of  the  Light  of  Nature,  and  Smith,  Select 
Discourses. ) 

Cudworth,  and  More  only  less  violently,  attacked  the 
"atheistic  arguments"  of  Hobbes  against  the  existence  of 
"spiritual  substance."  Although  the  materialism  against 
which  Cudworth  argues  is  the  "atomic"  materialism  of  the 
ancient  philosophers,  Democritus  and  Epicurus,  he  has  in 
mind  constantly  his  contemporary  Hobbes.  He  scorns  even 
to  mention  his  name,  referring  to  him  simply  as  "a  modern 
writer,"  or  "a  late  writer,"  and  sometimes  as  "a  late  pre- 
tender to  Politics"  and  "the  author  of  the  Leviathan,"  who 
has  outdone  his  masters  in  the  "sottishness"  and  "impu- 
dence" of  his  atheism.  The  fury  of  the  Platonists  against 
Hobbes  is  easily  understood.  The  denial  of  the  existence  of 
spiritual  substance  was  a  teaching  long  made  familiar  to 
them  through  the  "Democritic  and  Epicurean  Atheists," 
whose  arguments,  based  on  the  "atomic"  theory,  appeared 
to  them  futile  and  antiquated.  But  the  denial  of  the  soul's 
existence  on  the  ground  that  it  can  not  be  perceived  by  sense 
was  a  new  and  startling  teaching,  and  one  which  to  the 
Platonists  was  simply  exasperating.  Sense,  according  to 
them,  never  could  be  the  criterion  of  any  truth,  and  least  of 


NOTES  TO  "ESSAY  UPON  REASON."  207 

all  of  spiritual  truth,  yet  here  was  "a  modern  atheistic 
writer"  boldly  asserting  that  we  must  deny  the  existence  of 
"spiritual  substance"  because  we  can  not  perceive  it  through 
sense. 

For  the  attitude  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists  toward 
Hobbes  cf.  Cudworth,  True  Intellectual  System  of  the  Uni- 
verse, Ch.  V.  "A  Confutation  of  Atheism."  and  More,  A 
Collection  of  Several  Philosophical  Writings,  esp.  Immortal- 
ity of  the  Soul.  Cf.  also  Tulloch.  Rational  Theology  and 
Christian  Philosophy  in  England  in  the  Seventeenth  Cen- 
tury, London.  1874,  Vol.  II. 

41.  (Note  to  p.  109.)    Whether  or  not  Spinoza's  defini- 
tion of  the  human  mind  as  the  "idea  of  a  thing  actually 
existing"  (cf.  Ethics,  Pt.  II.  Prop.  XI)  be  accepted,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  it  is  consistent  with  his  system  as  a  whole. 
As  thought  and  extension  are  but  two  attributes  of  one  sub- 
stance, God,  so  the  human  mind  and  body  are  but  two 
aspects  of  a  single  individual.    The  statement  that  the  mind 
is  the  "idea  of  the  body"  means  to  Spinoza  not  only  that  it 
is  the  idea  coexistent  with  the  body,  but  also  that  it  is  the 
idea  whose  object  is  the  body.     (Cf.  Ethics,  Pt.  II,  Prop. 
XXI,  Note:  also  Prop.  XV,  Proof.) 

42.  (Note  to  pp.  109  et  a/.)   Malebranche  teaches  that  we 
know  God  immediately ;  that  we  know  ourselves  "through 
internal  sense,"  and  other  selves,  as  well  as  "pure  intelli- 
gences," through  "conjecture"  (Recherche  de  la  verite,  Bk. 
Ill,  Pt.  II,  Ch.  VII)  ;  and,  finally,  that  we  have  ideas  of 
things  "in  God,"  i.  e..  that  God  by  his  will  continually  fur- 
nishes us  with  ideas  of  things.    Yet  Malebranche,  though  he 
can  not  argue  with  Descartes  that  an  extended  material 
world  exists  in  order  to  explain  our  perception,  none  the  less 
holds  that  an  extended  material  world  exists.  He  therefore 
protests  against  the  identification  of  his  teaching  with  that 
of  Spinoza,  who  makes  the  material  world,  with  all  its  "des- 


2O8    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

ordre,"  an  aspect  of  the  infinitely  perfect  Being,  God.  (Cf. 
Entretiens  sur  la  metaphysique ,  IX,  Sect.  II ;  also  (Euvres, 
ed.  by  Simon,  Vol.  I,  Introd.,  pp.  33f.) 

43.  (Note  to  pp.  112  et  a/.)  The  first  quotation  is  from 
Naturales  Quaestiones,  I,  Praefatio:  "Quid  est  Deus?  Mens 
universi.  Quid  est  Deus?  Quod  vides  totum,  et  quod  non 
vides  totum.  Si  demum  magnitudo  sua  illi  redditur,  qua 
nihil  majus  excogitari  potest,  si  solus  est  omnia,  opus  suum 
et  extra  et  intra  tenet.  Quid  ergo  interest  inter  naturam 
Dei  et  nostram  ?  Nostri  melior  pars  animus  est :  in  illo  nulla 
pars  extra  animum.  Totus  ratio  est.  ..." 

The  second  quotation,  from  Ep.  65,  reads :  "Sed  nos  mine 
primam  et  generalem  causam  quaerimus :  haec  simplex  esse 
debet ;  nam  et  materia  simplex  est.  Quaerimus,  quae  sit 
causa,  ratio  scilicet  f aciens :  ista  enim,  quaecumque  retulistis, 
non  sunt  multae  et  singulae  causae,  sed  ex  una  pendent,  ex 
ea  quae  faciet." 

Burthogge  agrees  with  Seneca  in  holding  that  God  is 
not  only  necessary  cause  of  the  universe  but  efficient  cause 
as  well.  He  denies,  however,  Seneca's  teaching  that  God 
is  immanent  cause.  The  Soul  of  the  World,  he  admits,  may 
be  the  immanent  cause,  but  God  must  be  the  transcendant 
cause  of  the  universe.  (Cf.  Note  37.) 

44.  (Note  to  pp.  116  et  a/.)  At  least  three  conceptions 
of  the  nature  of  substance  were  current  in  the  seventeenth ' 
century.  These  conceptions  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  and 
as  a  matter  of  fact  two  of  the  three  are  found  in  the  teach- 
ing of  most  of  the  seventeenth-century  philosophers.  The 
first  is  that  which  holds  substance  to  be  the  self-dependent. 
This  conception  is  suggested,  but  not  logically  carried  out, 
by  Descartes.  (Cf.  Principles  of  Philosophy,  Pt.  I,  LI ; 
cf.  also  Hobbes's  definition  of  substance  as  "any  thing 

that   has   existence   or   subsistence   in   itself in   which 

sense  God  is  properly ....  substance ....  ha  ving  subsistence 


NOTES  TO  "ESSAY  UPON  REASON/'  209 

not  only  in  himself,  but  from  himself,"  in  "An  answer  to 
Bishop  Bramhall,"  Works,  Molesworth  edition,  Vol.  IV,  p. 
308.)  This  doctrine  is  consistently  developed  by  Spinoza 
(Ethics,  Pt.  I,  Defs.  Ill  and  VI,  and  Props.  XIV  and  XV). 
The  second  conception  is  that  taught  by  Locke,  according  to 
which  substance  is  the  unknown,  "a  supposed  I  know  not 
what,  to  support  those  ideas  we  call  accidents"  (Essay,  Bk. 
II,  Ch.  XXIII,  par.  15).  According  to  the  third  conception, 
substance  is  that  which  is  subject  of  accidents.  This  last 
view  was  the  most  wide-spread  of  the  three.  It  was  held 
by  Descartes  and  by  Locke,  as  well  as  by  the  Cambridge 
Platonists.  The  Cambridge  Platonists,  to  be  sure,  do  not 
define  substance  as  the  subject  of  accidents,  but  their  char- 
acterization of  the  different  kinds  of  substance  implies  this 
conception.  Spinoza  and  Locke  also  hold  that  substance 
is  the  subject  of  accidents,  though  neither  regards  this  as 
the  fundamental  character  of  substance.  (Cf.  Burthogge's 
teaching  about  the  nature  of  substance.  Note  36.) 

As  regards  the  kinds  of  substance  and  the  characters 
which  differentiate  them,  there  are  again  three  doctrines 
which  were  current  in  the  seventeenth  century.  By  far  the 
most  common  was  the  dualistic.  Descartes,  Locke  and  the 
Cambridge  Platonists  hold  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  sub- 
stance: (1)  spiritual,  and  (2)  corporeal.  According  both 
to  Descartes  and  to  Locke,  the  chief  attribute  of  spiritual 
substance  is  thought,  but  Locke  also  regards  "a  power  of 
action"  as  one  of  the  "primary  qualities  or  properties  of 
spirit"  (Essay,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  XXIII,  par.  30).  The  attribute 
which  distinguishes  corporeal  substance  is  extension,  to 
which  Locke  adds  solidity,  and  the  "power  of  being  moved" 
(op.  cit.,  Ch.  XXIII,  par.  15).  More  teaches  that  all  sub- 
stance is  extended,  but  distinguishes  between  corporeal  and 
spiritual  substance  by  characterizing  the  first  as  "impene- 
trable" and  "discerpible,"  the  second  as  "penetrable"  and 
"indiscerpible"  (cf.  Note  46).  Cudworth  regards  "Life, 
Cogitation  and  Understanding"  as  the  "Peculiar  Attributes 


2IO    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

and  Charackteristicks  of  Substance  Incorporeal,"  as  con- 
trasted with  "Sensless  Matter"  (True  Intellectual  System  of 
the  Universe,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  Ill,  Sect.  XXXV,  pp.  145f ).  Hobbes 
holds  a  materialistic  view  of  substance.  All  substance,  he 
teaches,  is  corporeal ;  substance  is  synonymous  with  body ; 
to  speak  of  incorporeal  substance  is  meaningless.  Spinoza, 
finally,  holds  an  absolutistic  view  of  substance.  Substance, 
as  he  conceives  it,  is  one,  but  can  not  be  identified  either 
with  mind  or  with  body.  Extension  and  thought  are,  he 
teaches,  but  two  "attributes"  or  aspects  of  a  single  funda- 
mental substance  which  he  calls  God  (Ethics,  Pt.  I,  Props. 
XIV  and  XV). 

45.  (Note  to  pp.  117-18.)    The  reference  is  to  Cicero's 
De  Natura  Deorum,  II,  32,  82.    Lucilius  concludes  his  re- 
sume of  the  various  views  held  about  nature,  with  that  of 
Epicurus.     "Sunt  autem,"  he  says,  "qui  omnia  naturae  no- 
mine appellent,  ut  Epicurus;  qui  ita  dividet,  omnium,  quae 
sint,  naturam,  esse  corpora  et  inane  quaeque  his  accidant." 

46.  (Note  to  p.  119.)    For  More's  doctrine  of  substance 
cf .  especially  Epistola  Prima  H.  Mori  ad  R.  Cartesium,  also 
Immortality  of  the  Soul,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  2,  Axiomes  VIII-IX. 
All  substance,  More  held,  whether  corporeal  or  incorporeal, 
is  possessed  of  two  characters:  (1)  extension,  and  (2)  mo- 
tion.   To  deny  that  substance  is  extended  is  to  deny,  he  said, 
that  it  exists.     Incorporeal  substance,  however,  while  shar- 
ing with  corporeal  substance  the  attribute  of  extension,  is 
distinguished   from   it  by  being  "penetrable"   and   "indis- 
cerpible."     Corporeal  substance,  he  held,  is  "impenetrable 
and  "discerpible."     It  is  not  unlikely  that  the  Platonists  as 
a  whole  (though  none  but  More  includes  this  teaching  in 
his  writings)   held  that  incorporeal  substance  is  extended. 
It  was  the  common  belief  in  the  seventeenth  century  that 
spirits  have  bodies,  extended  but  of  a  more  ethereal  nature 
than  human  bodies.    Burthogge's  criticism  that  to  hold  that 


NOFKS  ro  "OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD."    211 

incorporeal  substance  is  extended  is  to  make  it  either  a 
"vacuum"  or  "matter,"  could  thus  have  been  easily  met,  in 
More's  opinion.  (Cf.  Notes  36  and  44.) 

47.  (Note  to  p.  123.)   It  will  be  noted  that  this,  the  sixth 
chapter,  is  wrongly  numbered. 


III.   NOTES   TO   "OF   THE   SOUL   OF   THE  WORLD." 

48.  (Note  to  title-page.)    The  quotation  is  made  from 
the  Octavius  of  Felix  Marcus  Minucius,  one  of  the  earliest 
Christian  apologists.    The  dialogue,  which  seems  to  be  mod- 
eled on   Cicero's  De  Natura  Deorum,   dates  back  to  the 
second  or  third  century  A.   D.     It  first  appeared  in  the 
Adversus  Gentes  of  Arnobius.    The  quoted  words  are  sup- 
posedly spoken  by  the  Christian  Octavius  who  accuses  pagan 
writers  of  corrupting  youth  by  fictitious  tales  of  the  origin 
of  the  Greek  gods.     The  passage  reads:  "His  atque  hujus 
modi  figmentis,  et  mendaciis  dulcioribus  corrumpuntur  in- 
genia  puerorum  et  hisdem  fabulis  in  haerentibus,  adusque 
summae  aetatis  robur  adolescunt  et  in  iisdem  opinionibus 
miseri  consenescunt :  cum  sit  veritas  obvia  sed  requirenti- 
bus"   (Arnobii  Disputationum  adversus  Gentes  Libri  Sep- 
tem:  M.  Minucii  Felicis  Octavius,  Paris,  1595,  p.  353;  cf. 
Octavius,  ed.  by  A.  Baehrens,  Ch.  23,  par.  8). 

49.  (Note  to  title-page.)    The  quotation  is  from  Eras- 
mus's "Hyperaspistes  Diatribae  adversus  servum  Martinii 
Lutheri,"  Lib.  II.    (Cf.  Opera  Omnia,  Leyden,  1706,  Vol.  X, 
p.  1531.)     "Et  si  poterat  Augustinus,"  he  says,  "per  vim 
Hberi  arbitrii  audire  concionantem  Ambrosium,  legere  libros 
sacros,  erogare  stipem  in  pauperes,  vacare  precibus  ac  medi- 
tationibus,  confabulari  cum  piis  hominibus,  eosque  rogare 
ut  Domino  salutem  ipsius  suis  precibus  commendarent,  quid 


212    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

est  cur  sic  exsibiletur  opinio  Scholasticorum,  quae  tradit 
hominem  per  opera  moraliter  bona  promereri  de  congruo 
gratiam  justificantem?  Verborum  umbris  territamur,  cum 
in  re  nihil  sit  absurdi." 

50.  (Note  to  p.  4.)  John  Keill  (1671-1721)  was  a 
mathematician  and  astronomer,  noted  mainly  for  his  expo- 
sition of  the  Newtonian  principles  and  for  his  opposition 
to  the  theory  of  "natural  philosophy"  upheld  by  Whiston 
and  Burnet.  Keill  -received  the  M.A.  degree,  with  "distinc- 
tion in  mathematics  and  natural  philosophy,"  from  the  Uni- 
versity of  Edinburgh  and  in  1694  was  "incorporated  M.A." 
at  Oxford.  Here  he  at  once  distinguished  himself  by  his 
lectures  on  Newton's  Principia.  His  Examination  of  Dr. 
Burnefs  Theory  of  the  Earth,  published  1698  (cf.  Note  51), 
increased  his  reputation,  although  the  seriousness  with  which 
he  opposes  the  "Theory,"  using  long  trigonometrical  proofs 
to  overthrow  some  fanciful  detail  of  the  "Hypothesis," 
appears  to  the  modern  reader  ridiculous.  Burthogge's  pro- 
test against  Keill's  presentation  (in  the  Introduction  of  his 
Examination}  of  Burthogge's  Soul-of-the-World  theory 
seems  rather  ill-founded.  Keill's  account,  so  far  as  it  goes, 
is  accurate,  and  Burthogge  himself,  in  presenting  his  theory 
anew,  finds  the  metaphor  of  the  "vast  Organ"  illuminating. 
In  1701  Keill's  Introductio  ad  Veram  Physicam,  considered 
at  that  time  his  "best  performance,"  was  published.  In  1712 
he  was  elected  Savilian  Professor  of  Astronomy  at  Oxford, 
and  in  1713  the  degree  of  D.M.  was  conferred  on  him  by 
the  University.  The  later  years  of  his  life  were  occupied 
mainly  in  a  defense  (begun  in  1705)  of  Newton  as  inventor 
of  fluxional  calculus  against  the  claims  of  Leibniz.  For  a 
more  detailed  account  of  Keill's  life,  cf.  Dictionary  of  Na- 
tional Biography.  An  interesting,  though  brief,  estimate  of 
his  personal  character  will  be  found  in  Thomas  Hearne's 
Remarks  and  Collections,  edited  by  C.  E.  Doble,  Oxford. 
1885,  Vol.  VII,  p.  273.  (Cf.  also  scattered  references  ibid.. 


NOTES  TO  "OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.        213 

Vols.  I-VI.)     For  a  bibliography  of  Keill's  works  cf.  the 
British  Museum  Catalogue. 

51.  (Note  to  p.  4.)  Thomas  Burnet  (1635P-1715)  was 
an  English  divine  educated  at  Northallerton  and  at  Clare 
Hall,  Cambridge,  where  in  1654  he  became  master.  In  1658 
he  received  the  M.  A.  degree  from  Christ's  College  and  in 
1667  became  senior  proctor  of  the  University.  He  was 
chosen  master  of  the  Charterhouse  in  1685.  Later,  Burnet 
became  "chaplain  in  ordinary  and  clerk  of  the  closet  of 
William,"  but  was  removed  in  1692  on  account  of  the  oppo- 
sition to  his  Archaeologia  Philosophicae  in  which  he  treats 
the  Mosaical  account  of  the  fall  of  man  as  allegorical  and 
professes  to  reconcile  his  own  "Theory  of  the  Earth"  with 
the  Mosaical  account.  Part  I  of  Burnet's  Theory  was  first 
published  in  Latin  in  1681  under  the  title  Telluris  Theoria 
Sacra.  An  enlarged  English  version  followed  in  1684.  The 
second  part  of  the  Theory,  together  with  a  second  edition 
of  the  first,  and  an  English  translation  of  the  whole  ap- 
peared in  1689.  The  work  passed  through  a  number  of 
later  editions,  the  seventh  appearing  in  1759. 

Burnet's  Theory  of  the  Earth  is  a  fanciful  account  of 
the  evolution  of  the  world,  originating  in  an  attempt  to 
explain  how  it  was  possible  for  the  Mosaical  deluge  to  have 
taken  place.  In  his  own  words,  it  "is  an  Account  of  the 
Original  of  the  Earth,  and  of  all  the  great  and  general 
Changes  that  it  hath  already  undergone,  or  is  hence  forwards 
to  undergo,  till  the  Consummation  of  all  things"  (p.  3). 
Burnet's  science  is  crude  even  for  his  own  time.  His 
"Hypothesis"  is  borrowed  from  Biblical  sources  and  is  bol- 
stered up  by  a  vivid  imagination.  The  present  world,  he 
holds,  is  but  the  "ruins"  of  an  antedeluvian  "Paradisiacal" 
world.  The  projections  of  the  broken  shell  of  that  first 
world  form  our  mountains,  and  our  seas  are  a  part  of  the 
great  "abyss"  uncovered  by  the  break.  As  the  first  world 
was  destroyed  by  water,  so  it  will  be  restored  by  fire  in  all 


214    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

its  "Paradisiacal"  perfection.  Like  the  Phoenix,  he  says,  "it 
will  be  consum'd  in  the  last  Fire :  And  from  its  Ashes .... 
will  arise  another  World." 

Burnet's  Theory,  taken  seriously  in  his  own  time,  al- 
though it  did  not  lack  supporters  (e.  g.,  Whiston),  met  with 
a  good  deal  of  opposition.  Two  of  the  most  formidable 
opponents  were  Erasmus  Warren  and  John  Keill  (cf.  Note 
50).  Burnet's  "Answer"  to  Warren's  Exceptions.  . .  .against 
the  Sacred  Theory  of  the  Earth  and  to  Keill's  Examination 
of  the  Theory  will  be  found  appended  to  the  fifth  edition  of 
the  Theory,  London,  1722. 

52.  ( Note  to  pp.  11  et  al. )   Burthogge  has  correctly  made 
and  interpreted  these  quotations. 

53.  (Note  to  p.  25.)    Cf.  August  Heinrich  Ritter  and 
Ludwig   Preller,   Historia   Philosophiae   Graecae,   7th   ed., 
Gotha,  1888,  "Thales,"  pp.  6-11. 

54.  (Note  to  p.  26.)    Phalaris,  tyrant  of  Agrigentum, 
Sicily   (c.  570-554  B.  C),  was  notorious  for  his  horrible 
cruelty.     According  to  tradition  he  was  entrusted  with  the 
building  of  the  temple  of  Zeus  and  took  advantage  of  his 
position  to   make  himself   despot.     Until   the   seventeenth 
century  it   was  generally  believed  that   Phalaris   was   the 
author  of  the  Epistles  which  bear  his  name.   Politian,  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  had,  to  be  sure,  attributed  the  Epistles  to 
Lucian.  Not,  however,  until  1690  when  Sir  William  Temple 
revived  the  interest  in  Phalaris  by  naming  his  Epistles  one 
of  the  greatest  masterpieces  of  antiquity,  was  any  serious 
question  of  their  genuineness  raised.    And  by  1698,  the  year 
in  which  Burthogge  published  his  Soul  of  the  World,  the 
controversy  between  Charles   Boyle  and  Richard   Bentley 
over  the  authorship  of  the  Epistles  was  at  its  height.     In 
the  Preface  of  his  new  edition  (1695)  of  the  Epistles,  Boyle 
presents  the  various  views  regarding  the  authorship  without 


NOTES  TO  "OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD."      215 

presuming  to  decide  in  favor  of  any.  In  1697  Bentley's 
Dissertation  on  the  Epistles  of  Phalaris  appeared,  appended 
to  Wotton's  Reflections  on  the  Ancient  and  Modern  Learn- 
ing. Bentley  believed  the  Epistles  to  be  spurious,  arguing 
mainly  from  the  anachronisms  to  be  found  in  them.  Towns 
are  mentioned,  for  example,  which  were  not  in  existence 
until  long  after  the  time  of  Phalaris,  and  men  are  spoken  of 
who  lived  centuries  later.  Early  in  1698  Boyle  replied  with 
Doctor  Bentley's  Dissertation.  ..  .examined.  And  later  in 
the  same  year  Bentley  published  a  reply  to  Boyle  in  a  second 
enlarged  edition  of  his  Dissertation.  A  full  account  of  the 
controversy  will  be  found  in  R.  C.  Jebb's  Richard  Bentley, 
New  York,  [1882].  The  epistle  to  which  Burthogge  makes 
reference  is  numbered  103. 

55.  (Note  to  p.  28.)  The  Eugenius  Philalethes  referred 
to  is  probably  Thomas  Vaughan  (1621-66),  twin-brother 
of  the  poet  Henry  Vaughan.  The  pseudonym  Philalethes 
was  fashionable  in  the  seventeenth  century  and  Anthony  a 
Wood  names  three  others,  all  contemporary  with  Vaughan, 
who  use  it.  Yet,  although  it  has  been  impossible  to  verify 
the  quotations,  there  are  several  considerations  which  make 
it  almost  certain  that  Thomas  Vaughan  is  the  poet  referred 
to  by  Burthogge.  For  Thomas  Vaughan  more  consistently 
than  any  one  else,  wrote  under  the  pseudonym  Eugenius 
Philalethes.  Moreover,  he  wrote  both  English  and  Latin 
verse  and  translated  several  of  the  Latin  poets. 

56.7  (Note  to  p.  31.)  Leeuwenhoek,  Antony  van  (1632- 
1723).  A  Dutch  naturalist  and  microscopist,  perhaps  best 
known  as  the  investigator  who  completed  Harvey's  work 
on  the  circulation  of  the  blood  by  the  discovery  in  1686  of 
the  capillary  connection  between  arteries  and  veins.  Leeti- 
wenhoek's  enthusiasm  in  the  use  of  the  newly  invented 

T  For  Notes  56  and  58-67  the  editor  is  indebted  to  Dr.  Alice  Robert 
son,  formerly  professor  of  zoology  at  Wellesley  College. 


2l6    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

microscope  led  him  to  experiment  in  grinding  lenses,  so  that 
he  possessed  the  best  microscopes  of  his  day  with  powers 
ranging  from  forty  to  two  hundred  and  seventy  diameters. 
In  1675  he  discovered  the  protozoa,  the  one-celled  animals 
so  abundant  in  water  containing  decaying  organic  substance, 
his  so-called  "peppered  water."  Twelve  years  later  he  dis- 
covered bacteria. 

Belief  in  spontaneous  generation  had  declined  somewhat 
during  the  seventeenth  century.  The  experiments  of  Redi 
(cf.  Note  58)  had  confirmed  the  truth  of  Harvey's  epigram, 
"Omne  vivum  ex  ovo."  After  the  discovery  of  these  one- 
celled  organisms,  however,  although  spontaneous  generation 
could  no  longer  be  affirmed  of  the  larger  animals,  belief  in 
its  possibility  was  revived  in  regard  to  these  minute  animals. 
And,  indeed,  it  must  be  admitted  that  such  a  theory  of  gene- 
ration was  not  wholly  unreasonable  as  long  as  the  life 
histories  of  protozoa  and  bacteria  were  unknown.  For  the 
life  and  work  of  Leeuwenhoek  the  reader  is  referred  to 
W.  A.  Locy,  Biology  and  Its  Makers,  New  York,  1908, 
pp.  77-88. 

57.  (Note  to  p.  31.)    In  the  original  this  word  is  mis 
printed:  Animalcles. 

58.  (Note  to  p.  31.)    Redi,  Francesco   (1626-97).    An 
Italian  physician  living  at  Arentine.     In  1668  he  first  per- 
formed an  experiment  which,  in  the  minds  of  scientists, 
dispelled  all  doubt  of  the  untenability  of  the  theory  of  spon 
taneous  generation.     The  experiment  was  so  simple  that  it 
is  astonishing  that  it  had  not  been  tried  before.     He  set 
three  jars  containing  fresh  meat  in  a  place  where  all  would 
be  subjected  to  the  same  environmental  conditions.     One 
jar  remained  uncovered,  a  second  was  covered  with  parch- 
ment, a  third  with  wire-netting.     The  first  soon  showed 
signs  of  putrefaction  accompanied  with  visible  animal  life. 
The  second  also  putrefied  but  no  animal  life  was  apparent. 


NOTES  TO  "OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD. 

On  the  wire-netting  covering  the  third  jar  flies  had  deposited 
many  eggs,  but  the  putrefying  meat  in  the  jar  gave  no  signs 
of  life.  The  conclusion  was  evident  that  the  organisms 
found  in  the  first  jar  were  not  spontaneously  generated, 
but  had  hatched  from  eggs  which  flies  had  laid  on  the  meat. 
This  experiment  weakened  the  belief  in  spontaneous  gene- 
ration revived  by  the  discoveries  of  Leeuwenhoek.  Cf. 
Locy,  Biology  and  Its  Makers,  pp.  277-82. 

59.  (Note  to  p.  32.)    The  larvae  of  insects  that  feed  on 
fermenting  material   instinctively   seek   darkness.     Hence, 
although  such  larvae  (maggots)  were  found,  as  reported,  at 
the  bottom  of  the  fermenting  mass,  the  eggs  were  probably 
laid  on  the  top,  the  larvae,  after  hatching,  seeking  the  darker 
places.     It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  assume  that  the 
adult  flies  had  to  endure  the  high  temperature  of  fermen- 
tation, since  the  eggs  were  laid  before  or  at  the  beginning 
of  fermentation.    The  eggs,  however,  require  a  high  degree 
of  heat  in  order  to  incubate  and  hatch  rapidly,  and  the  larvae 
are  adapted  to  endure  this  high  temperature.     Redi's  ex- 
periments with  meat,  both  shielded  and  unshielded  from  flies, 
apply  to  any  putrefying  or  fermenting  masses,  and  the  as- 
sumption of  spontaneous  generation  in  such  cases  as  the 
above  is  thus  shown  to  be  invalid. 

60.  (Note  to  p.  33.)    The  myth  of  birds  arising  from 
barnacles  is  extremely  old  and  wide-spread,  dating  back  to 
the  twelfth  century  and  extending  from  Britain  to  Ceylon. 
Max  Miiller  has  studied  this  myth  and  gives  an  interesting 
and  amusing  account  of  his  research  in  the  second  volume 
of  Science  and  Language  (New  York,  1891),  pp.  659-82. 

61.  (Note  to  pp.  33  et  a/.)   Julius  Caesar  Scaliger  (1484- 
1558)  was  an  ardent  believer  in,  and  supporter  of,  the  theory 
of  spontaneous  generation.    He  is  best  known  to-day  as  the 
author  of  an  unwarranted  attack  upon  Cardano  (cf.  Note 


2l8    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

62)  in  a  brilliantly  written  Latin  work  entitled  Exorteri- 
carum  Exercitationum  Liber  XV  de  Subtilitate  ad  Hierony- 
mwn  Cardanum,  first  published  in  1557,  and  followed  by 
numerous  later  editions:  1576,  1592,  1612,  1634  and  1665. 
At  the  time  of  this  attack  Scaliger  was  a  physician  of  repute 
living  in  the  home  of  the  Archbishop  of  Agen  as  his  medical 
adviser.  Roused  by  envy  at  Cardano's  success,  and  jealous 
of  the  attentions  he  received  on  his  triumphal  return  to 
Milan,  it  is  said  that  Scaliger  aspired  to  be  talked  of  as  the 
rival  of  Cardano.  Much  color  is  given  to  this  belief  when 
it  is  remembered  that  Scaliger  wrote  his  book  three  years 
after  the  second  edition  of  Cardano's  work  was  printed, 
without  ever  reading  this  second  edition,  in  which  Cardano 
had  laboriously  expunged  many  erroneous  statements.  G. 
Naude,  who  had  no.lpve  for  Cardano,  says,  writing  of 
Scaliger's  attack:  "Scaliger  undertook  this  work  not  in  the 
interest  of  learning,  but  rather  for  disputation,'  and  a  com- 
parison of  the  works  of  the  two  men  will  show  that  Scaliger 
committed  more  errors  in  his  than  he  found  in  Cardano's." 
According  to  this  authority,  Scaliger's  purpose  seemed  to  be 
to  deny  all  that  Cardano  affirmed  and  to  affirm  all  that 
Cardano  denied.  This  quarrel  seems  to  have  been  widely 
known  and  the  dogmatic  nature  of  Scaliger's  criticisms  fully 
appreciated,  especially  in  the  countries  Cardano  had  so  re- 
cently visited.  In  one  of  his  Commonplace  Books,  Sir 
Thomas  Browne  quaintly  observes,  "If  Cardan  saith  a  par- 
rot is  a  beautiful  bird,  Scaliger  will  set  his  wits  on  work- 
to  prove  it  a  deformed  animal."  Cardano  kept  his  temper 
admirably  during  the  whole  dispute.  He  published  a  short 
and  dignified  reply,  Actio  prima  in  Calumniator  em,  in  which 
the  name  of  Scaliger  never  once  occurs.  His  attitude  of 
dignified  indifference  won  him  approval  by  contrast  to  the 
raging  fury  of  his  adversary. 

62.  (Note  to  pp.  33  et  a/.)     Cardano,  Girolamo  (1501- 
1576).     A  notable  and  picturesque  personality  of  the  six- 


NOTES  TO  "OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD."      219 

teenth  century.  Possessed  of  a  highly  imaginative  mind  as 
well  as  of  a  highly  emotional  nature,  he  was  as  a  child 
moody,  misunderstood  and  neglected.  In  youth  he  early 
showed  unusual  power  of  abstract  thought  and  distinguished 
himself  in  mathematics,  dialectics  and  philosophy.  Much 
against  the  desire  of  his  father,  who  wished  him  to  follow 
the  profession  of  law,  he  entered  the  University  of  Padna 
in  1520,  bent  on  the  study  of  medicine,  and  in  1524  received 
his  degree.  An  eager  student,  a  voracious  reader,  greedy 
for  knowledge  of  all  kinds,  he  grew  to  manhood  self-asser- 
tive, irascible,  disregarding  the  conventions  of  society,  and 
what  was  more  important,  neglecting  the  cultivation  of  the 
rich  and  powerful.  Few  patients  called  on  the  services  of 
the  young  physician  who  started  on  his  medical  career  of- 
fending his  colleagues  in  Milan  by  the  publication  of  a 
book  entitled  De  Malo  Recentiorum  Medicorum  Medendi 
Usu.  This  book  proved  a  great  financial  success  but  brought 
the  enmity  of  the  medical  profession.  Turning  to  mathe- 
matics, a  favorite  study,  he  published  works  in  arithmetic 
and  algebra  which  early  carried  his  fame  far  beyond  the 
bounds  of  Italy.  He  not  only  raised  algebra  to  a  point  it 
had  never  before  reached,  but  his  name  as  a  mathematician 
became  known  throughout  Europe  and  the  success  of  his 
mathematical  writings  was  remarkable. 

Between  1547  and  1551,  holding  a  professorship  in 
Pavia,  teaching  besides  several  young  men  in  company  with 
his  own  son,  he  brought  out  his  great  work,  De  Subtilitate. 
(Later  editions  appeared  in  1554,  1560,  1563  and  1582.) 
In  this  treatise  the  author  ambitiously  wished  to  treat  of  the 
cosmos.  It  is  said  that  he  produced  the  richest  and  at  the 
same  time  the  most  chaotic  collection  of  the  facts  of  natural 
philosophy  that  had  yet  issued  from  the  press.  The  book 
displays  amazing  erudition  and  industry,  for  not  only  did 
Cardano  collect  vast  masses  of  information,  but  much  of  it 
he  verified  by  experiment.  Thus  he  was  one  of  the  earliest 
scientists  to  use  the  experimental  method.  In  speaking  of 


22O    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

one  of  his  discoveries  in  medicine  he  remarks,  "In  the  matter 
of  invention  Reason  will  be  the  leader,  but  Experiment  the 
Master."  Cardano,  paradoxically  enough,  was  an  earnest 
student  of  astrology,  even  though  the  fact  of  his  indulging 
in  this  study  was  quoted  by  his  enemies  as  reflecting  on  his 
fair  name  as  a  physician.  However,  Cardano's  medical  fame 
arose  partly  out  of  his  literary  effort  in  De  Subtilitate,  and 
partly  out  of  his  knowledge  of  astrology  and  his  power  to 
cast  horoscopes. 

In  1551,  through  the  reading  of  De  Subtilitate,  which 
inflamed  him,  it  is  said,  with  a  desire  to  become  acquainted 
with  everything  Cardano  had  ever  written,  Cassanate,  a 
Franco-Spanish  physician  who  was  in  attendance  upon 
Archbishop  Hamilton  of  St.  Andrews,  invited  Cardano  to 
meet  the  Archbishop  in  Paris  in  order  to  prescribe  for  the 
prelate's  asthma.  Eventually  Cardano  went  to  Edinburgh 
and  there  staid  five  weeks  in  attendance  upon  his  illustrious 
patient.  The  fame  of  Cardano  spread  rapidly  and  the  nobil- 
ity of  Scotland  flocked  to  him  paying  him  most  liberally 
for  his  advice.  On  leaving  Scotland  he  was  entreated  to 
visit  England  to  give  an  opinion  on  the  health  of  Edward 
VI,  and  to  cast  his  horoscope.  His  journey  homeward  was 
a  continuous  ovation,  and  on  his  return  to  Milan  he  stood 
the  acknowledged  head  of  his  profession.  He  was  flooded 
with  invitations  from  the  wealthy  and  powerful,  each  de- 
siring his  exclusive  attention.  All  of  these  invitations  he 
steadily  refused,  being  satisfied  to  hold  an  honored  place  in 
his  favorite  city,  Milan. 

His  own  words  written  on  his  return  from  this  famous 
journey  reveal  the  spirit  of  the  man :  " ....  I,  who  was  born 
poor,  with  a  weakly  body,  in  an  age  vexed  almost  inces- 
santly by  wars  and  tumults,  helped  on  by  no  family  in- 
fluence, but  forced  to  contend  against  the  bitter  opposition 
of  the  College  at  Milan,  contrived  to  overcome  all  the  plots 
woven  against  me,  and  open  violence  as  well.  All  the 
honours  which  a  physician  can  possess  I  either  enjoy,  or 


NOTES  TO     OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD.        221 

have  refused  when  they  were  offered  to  me ....  What  I  have 
written  has  been  lauded  ;  in  sooth,  I  have  written  of  so  many 
things  and  at  such  length  that  a  man  could  scarcely  read 
my  works  if  he  spent  his  life  therewith.  . .  .1  have  refused 
always  to  flatter  the  great ;  and  over  and  beyond  this  I  have 
often  set  myself  in  active  opposition  to  them.  . .  .1  have  been 
most  fortunate  as  the  discoverer  of  many  and  important 
contributions  to  knowledge,  as  well  as  in  the  practice  of 
my  art  and  in  the  results  obtained;  so  much  so  that  if  my 
fame  in  the  first  instance  has  raised  up  envy  against  me, 
it  has  prevailed  finally  and  extinguished  all  ill  feeling." 

Cardano,  unlike  his  adversary  Scaliger,  opposed  the  doc- 
trine of  spontaneous  generation  as  held  in  his  day,  main- 
taining that  the  facts  urged  in  support  of  this  theory  could 
be  better  explained  by  natural  than  by  supernatural  processes. 
For  the  life  and  work  of  Cardano  cf.  Henry  Morley,  Life 
of  Girolamo  Cardano  of  Milan,  1822,  and  William  George 
Waters,  Jerome  Cardan:  a  Biographical  Study,  1898.  Cf. 
also  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  llth  ed. 

63.  (Note  to  p.  35.)  Whether  Lord  Bacon  believed  that 
plants  may  be  spontaneously  generated  it  is  difficult  to  say. 
As  Burthogge  quotes,  Bacon  mentions  instances  in  which  he 
says  that  plants  were  produced  without  seeds.  (For  Bacon's 
experiments  cf.  his  Sylva  Sylvarum:  or  a  Natural  History 
in  Ten  Centuries,  London,  1627.  Burthogge's  reference  to 
experiments  in  Century  IV  are  wrongly  numbered  228  and 
339  instead  of  328  and  329.)  Considering  Bacon  as  an 
authority  not  to  be  questioned,  our  author  reasonably  infers 
the  possibility  of  animal  production  without  eggs.  However, 
the  instances  cited  can  not  be  urged  as  evidence  of  spontane- 
ous generation.  It  is  well  known  that  ants,  earthworms  and 
other  burrowing  animals  disseminate  seeds  long  distances 
under  the  ground,  and  it  is  further  known  that  seeds  retain 
their  vitality  for  long  periods  of  time,  and  may  even  with- 
stand unfavorable  environments.  The  instances  cited  bv 


222    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGK. 

Bacon  may,  therefore,  be  accounted  for  by  normal  and 
natural  processes.  As  to  the  power  of  seeds  to  withstand 
unnatural  environment,  it  will  be  remembered  that  a  few 
ounces  of  mud,  collected  by  Darwin  from  under  the  water 
of  a  pond  where  no  vegetation  was  visible,  when  brought 
into  his  study  and  given  suitable  environment  produced  no 
fewer  than  537  plants.  As  evidence  of  the  vitality  of  seeds, 
Professor  Cowles  of  the  University  of  Chicago  reports  ex- 
periments in  which  dried  seeds  not  less  than  twenty-five 
years  of  age,  have  germinated,  and  refers  to  other  ex- 
periments in  which  seeds  have  been  shown  to  retain  their 
viability  for  150  to  250  years. 

64.  (Note  to  p.  35.)  No  instance  of  a  rain  of  frogs  or 
of  other  creatures  can  be  accepted  as  proof  of  spontaneous 
generation.  Although  some  apparently  authentic  stories 
are  told  of  such  occurrences,  even  these  must  be  received 
with  incredulity.  If  true,  the  animals  must  have  been  trans- 
ported by  the  wind  from  some  near-by  body  of  water,  and 
it  is  not  impossible  perhaps  that  such  transportation  might 
take  place  during  or  following  a  severe  storm.  This  may 
be  especially  true  in  tropical  regions.  The  phenomenon  of 
the  sudden  appearance  of  a  surprisingly  large  number  of 
animals,  frogs  or  fish,  is  not  uncommon  after  heavy  rains 
in  the  tropics.  In  these  regions,  during  the  dry  season, 
many  kinds  of  aquatic  animals  are  known  to  bury  them- 
selves in  the  mud  from  three  to  twelve  or  sixteen  inches, 
and  on  the  return  of  the  rainy  season  to  reappear  with  such 
rapidity  and  in  such  multitudes  that  it  is  not  surprising  that 
mythical  stories  have  arisen.  For  an  account  of  instances 
of  the  belief  that  fishes  fall  during  heavy  showers  and  for 
the  probable  explanation  of  the  phenomenon  cf.  Edward 
Terry's  A  Voyage  to  East  India,  London,  1777,  p.  6;  also 
Sir  J.  E.  Tennent's  Ceylon,  an  Account  of  the  Island,  Phys- 
ical, Historical  and  Topographical,  London,  1860,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  21  Iff  and  Notes  (A)  and  (B),  pp.  226-27. 


NOTES  TO  "OF  THE  SOUL  OF  THE  WORLD."      22.3 

65.  (Note  to  p.  36.)    The  hibernation  of  toads,  their 
ability  to  do  without  food  for  long  periods  if  temperature 
conditions  are  relatively  cool  and  constant,  together  with 
the  natural  credulity  of  the  ignorant,  have  contributed  to 
the  longevity  and  persistence  of  this  myth.     Actual  exper- 
ment  has  shown  that  toads  may  live  for  over  a  year  in  sand- 
stone hermetically  sealed  and  buried  three  feet  in  the  ground 
In  more  porous  stone,  such  as  limestone,  they  live  a  few 
months  longer.    If  permitted  an  almost  infinitesimal  amount 
of  food  and  air.  in  a  cool  place  where  escape  is  impossible, 
they  might  live  a  much  longer  time,  but  not  indefinitely. 
For  further  details  regarding  the  hibernation  of  toads  and 
tortoises  the  reader  is  referred  to  Hans  Gadow's  Amphibia 
and  Reptiles  (Vol.  VIII  of  The  Cambridge  Natural  History, 
London,  1901),  esp.  pp.  68,  347,  354,  363,  369,  376;  also  to 
Sir  J.  E.  Tennent's  Ceylon,  Vol.  I,  p.  218. 

66.  (Note  to  p.  36.)   The  horse-hair  myth,  like  those  of 
the  goose  barnacle  and  toad-in-hole,  is  difficult  to  eradicate 
since  even   to-day  there   are   people   who   regard    it   with 
credulity.     The  so-called  "horse-hair"  worm  is  threadlike, 
five  or  six  inches  long,  found  in  water-troughs,  ditches  and 
pools  of  stagnant  water  and  known  to  science  as  Gordius. 
The  life  history  of  Gordius  comprises  three  distinct  stages: 
two  of  them  are  larval  and  parasitic,  the  third  is  adult, 
aquatic  and  free  living.     The  eggs  are  laid  in  water  and 
hatch   into   minute   larvae   possessing  an   effective  boring- 
apparatus.     Gordius  larva  bores  its  way  into  the  body  of 
the  larva  of  an  insect,  that  of  the  Alder  fly,  and  passes 
into  a  resting-stage  in  its  muscles  or  fat  body.     During 
the  next  few  months  the  Alder  fly  larva  metamorphoses 
into  the  adult  fly,  and  Gordius  larva  then  passes  over  into 
its  body.     The  Alder  fly  falls  an  easy  prey  to  a  certain 
predacious  beetle  which  haunts  its  habitat,  and  which  thus 
becomes  the  host  for  the  second  larval  stage  of  Gordius. 
Here  it  lives  several  months  and  after  consuming  a  large 


224    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

part  or  all  of  the  internal  organs  of  the  beetle,  it  bores  its 
way  out  and  becomes  adult.  If  the  beetle  host  has  chanced 
to  fall  into  water  or  has  been  carried  into  water  by  the 
wind,  Gordius  lives  a  free  life  as  the  "horse-hair"  worm. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  beetle  host  falls  on  dry  land,  as 
doubtless  often  happens,  Gordius  dies. 

For  the  classification,  anatomy  and  life  history  of  Gor- 
dius the  reader  is  referred  to  Arthur  E.  Shipley,  Nemathel- 
minthes  &  Chaetognatha  (Vol.  II  of  The  Cambridge  Nat- 
ural History,  London,  1910). 

67.  (Note  to  p.  37.)  Modern  biological  investigation  has 
shown  that  worms  of  various  kinds  may  infest  the  organs 
of  persons  living  under  unsanitary  conditions,  or  eating 
infested  food  not  properly  cooked.  The  hookworm  infesta- 
tion of  certain  regions  of  this  country,  and  the  sporadic 
cases  of  trichina  in  man  are  modern  examples. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

THE  WORKS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

NOTE:  The  appended  lists  of  libraries  in  which  each  book  may  be 
found  are  based  on  inquiries  addressed  to  about  fifty  university  and 
city  libraries  in  the  United  States.     (The  British  Museum  Library  is 
the  only  European  library  to  which  reference  is  made.)     The  follow 
ing  abbreviations  have  been  used : 

Amh.  Amherst  College  Library. 

Ath.  Athenaeum  Library,  Boston. 

B.  M.  British  Museum. 

C.  U.  Columbia  University  Library. 
Chic.  Chicago  Public  Library. 
Cor.  U.        Cornell  University  Library. 
H.  U.  Harvard  University  Library. 
L.  C.            Library  of  Congress. 

Lib.  Co.  Library  Company,  Philadelphia. 

P.  I.  Peabody  Institute,  Baltimore. 

U.  P.  University  of  Pennsylvania  Library. 

U.  Theol.  Union  Theological  Seminary  Library. 

Y.  U.  Yale  University  Library. 

I.  PHILOSOPHICAL  WORKS. 

1678  Organum  Vetus  &  Novum,  or  a  Discourse  of  Reason 
and  Truth;  Wherein  the  Natural  Logick  common  to 
Mankinde  is  briefly  and  plainly  described. 

London,  Printed  for  Sam.  Crouch,  at  the  Princes 
Arms  a  Corner-shop  of  Popeshead  ally  in  Corn- 
hil.  Pp.  73.  Ath.,  B.  M.,  H.  U.,  L.  C.,  U.  Theol. 


228    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 

1694    An  Essay  upon  Reason,  and  the  Nature  of  Spirits. 

London,  Dunton.  Pp.  280.  Amh.,  B.  M.,  Cor.  U., 
H.U.,  L.C.,  Lib.  Co.,  P.  I..  U.P..  Y.  U.,  U. 
Theol. 

1699  Of  the  Soul  of  the  World;  and  of  Particular  Souls. 
In  a  Letter  to  Mr.  Lock,  occasioned  by  Mr.  Keil's 
Reflections  upon  an  Essay  lately  published  concerning 
Reason. 

London,  Printed  for  Daniel  Brown  at  the  Black 
Swan  and  Bible,  without  Temple-Bar.  Pp.  46. 
B.  M.,  C.U.,  H.U.;  1748  (in  [Somers  Tracts] 
A  Collection  of  Scarce  and  Valuable  Tracts, 
Vol.  II),  C.U.,  H.U.,  U.  Theol.,  Y.U.;  1809 
(in  Somers  Tracts,  Vol.  XII),  B.  M. ;  1814  (in 
Somers  tracts,  Vol.  XII),  Ath.,  C.U..  Chic., 
Cor.  U.,  L.  C,  Y.  U. 

II.   WORKS  ON  RELIGIOUS  SUBJECTS. 

1670  Divine  Goodness  explicated  and  vindicated  from  the 
Exceptions  of  the  Atheist;  wherein  also  the  Consent 
of  the  gravest  Philosophers,  with  the  holy  and  in- 
spired Penmen,  in  many  of  the  most  important  Points 
of  Christian  Doctrine  is  fully  vindicated? 

London,  1671  (Pp.  133+) ,  H.  U. ;  1672,  B.  M.  (The 
title  in  the  editions  of  1671  and  1672  reads :  Taya- 
6ov,  or  Divine  Goodness,  etc.) 

1675  Causa  Dei,  or  an  Apology  for  God:  Wherein  the 
Perpetuity  of  Infernal  Torments  is  Evinced,  and 
Divine  both  Goodness  and  Justice  (that  notwithstand- 
ing) Defended.  The  Nature  of  Punishments  in  Gen- 
eral, and  of  Infernal  ones  in  Particular  Displayed. 
The  Evangelical  Righteousness  Explicated  and  Setled. 
The  Divinity  of  the  Gentiles  both  as  to  things  to  be 


BIBLIOGRAPHY.  22C) 

Believed,  and  things  to  be  Practiced,  Adumbrated; 
and  the  wayes  whereby  it  was  Communicated,  plainly 
Discovered. 

London,  Imprinted  for  Lewis  Punchard  Bookseller 

in  Totnes  in  Devon Pp.  422.    B.  M.,  L.  C, 

U.Theol. 

1683  An  Argument  for  Infants'  Baptism,  deducted  from 
the  Analogy  of  Faith  and  Harmony  of  the  Scriptures: 
in  which,  in  a  Method  wholly  new,  and  upon  Grounds 
not  commonly  observed,  both  the  Doctrine  of  Infant- 
Baptism  is  fully  asserted,  and  the  Objections  against 
it  are  obviated? 

London. 

1685  Vindicia  P&do-Baptismi:  or,  a  Confirmation  of  an 
Argument  lately  emitted  for  Infant-Baptism.1 

London. 

1687  Prudential  Reasons  for  repealing  the  Penal  Laws 
against  all  Recusants,  and  for  a  general  Toleration.'2 

London. 

1691  ?  The  Nature  of  Church-Government,  Freely  Discussed 
and  set  out.  In  Three  Letters. 

London.     Pp.   (4),  52.     U.Theol. 

1702  Christianity  a  Revealed  Mystery:  or,  The  Gracious 
Purpose  of  God  toward  the  Gentiles,  set  in  a  clear 
Light,  in  some  Reflections  on  Rom.  viii.  28,  29,  30. 
To  which  is  added,  A  Brief  Discourse  concerning 
Perseverance  in  Grace. 

London.     B.  M. ;  1755,  Ath.,  H.  U. 

1  Title  taken  from  Athenae  Oxonienses,  Vol.  IV,  p.  581. 

2  The  following  note  is  added  after  the  title  in  the  Athenae  Oxo- 
nienses :  "There  is  no  name  set  to  it,  only  said  in  the  title  to  have  been 
pen'd  by  a  protestant  person  of  quality." 


230    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


III.  MEDICAL  WORK. 

1662     Disputatio  de  Lithiasi  et  Calculo. 
Leyden.    B.  M. 

OTHER   WORKS    TO   WHICH    REFERENCE   IS    MADE   IN 
THE  INTRODUCTION. 

Smith,  John  (1618-52), 
Select  Discourses. 

London,  1660. 

More,  Henry  (1614-87), 

A  Collection  of  Several  Philosophical  Writings  of 
Dr.  Henry  More,  Fellow  of  Christ's  College  in  Cam- 
bridge. As  Namely 

Antidote  against  Atheism 

Appendix  to  the  said  Antidote 
-pj.    i  Enthusiasmus  Triumphatus 
]  Letters  to  Des-Cartes  &c. 
j  Immortality  of  the  Soul 
I  Conjectura  Cabbalistica 

2d  ed.,  London,  1662. 

Culverwel,  Nathaniel  (d.  1651?), 

An  Elegant  and  Learned  Discourse  of  the  Light  of 
Nature. 

Oxford,  1669. 

Cudworth,  Ralph  (1617-88), 

The  True  Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe. 

London,  1678. 

Locke,  John  (1632-1704), 

Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding. 

London,  1690.     (Quotations  from  Bohn  edition.) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY.  23! 

Kant,  Immanuel  (1724-1804). 

Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

1781,  1787.     (Quotations  are  from  Max  Mullet's 
translation.  New  York,  1896.) 

Calkins,  Mary  Whiton, 

The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  4th  rev.  ed. 

New  York,  1917. 

Lovejoy,  Arthur  O., 

"Kant  and  the  English  Platonists,"  in  Essays  Philo- 
sophical and  Psychological  in  Honor  of  William 
James. 

New  York.  1908. 

Lyon,  Georges, 

L'idealisme  en  Angleterre  au  XVIlle  siecle. 

Paris,  1888. 

Ueberweg,  Friedrich, 

History  of  Philosophy  from  Tholes  to  the  Present 
Time,  tr.  by  G.  S.  Morris.  Vol.  II. 

New  York,  1892. 

Wood,  Anthony  a  (1632-95). 

Athenae  Oxonienses,  an  Exact  History  of  all  the 
Writers  and  Bishops  who  have  had  their  Education 
in  the  University  of  Oxford,  to  which  are  added  the 
Fasti,  Annals  of  the  said  University.  A  new  edition, 
with  additions  and  a  continuation  by  Philip  Bliss. 
Vol.  IV. 

London,  1820. 
Dictionary  of  National  Biography. 


INDEX. 


INDEX  OF  PERSONS. 


[This  Index  does  not  make  reference  to  the  Bibliography.] 


Agrippa,   Cornelius,  193. 

Antoninus,  Marcus  Aurelius,  159,  202. 

A  poll  in  ari  us,    169. 

Apronius,   149,   150. 

Apuleius,    159. 

Aquinas,   201,   303. 

Aristotle,  30,  160,  193,  198,  203. 

Arnobius,   211. 

Arscot,   187. 

Augustine,  St.,  135,  211. 

Austin,  St.,  135. 

Bacon,  Francis,   166,   167,  22if. 

Baehrens,  A.,  211. 

Balbus,    148,    162. 

Bart  hoi  inus,    168. 

Basilides,    16,    191,    192. 

Behmen,  Jacob,   16,   17,   189. 

Bentley,    Richard,    214^. 

Rorellus,    168. 

Bowman,   Ethel,   198. 

Boyle,   Charles,   2i4f. 

Brandis,  C.  A.  B.,   198. 

Browne,   Sir  Thomas,   218. 

Burnet,    Thomas,    142,    212,    213,    214. 

Calkins,    M.    W.,    xviii,    xix,    xx,    191, 

>93.    '94- 
Cardano,  Girolamo,  148,  149,  160,  165, 

167,   2i7fF. 
Cissanate,   220. 

Chalmers,  Alexander,    190,    191. 
Chandler,    1 96. 
Charleton,   Walter,    196. 
Cicero,   34,    36,    44,    59,    79,    114,    147, 

148,    149,    150,    162,    199,    202,    203. 

204,    210,    211. 

Clement  of  Alexandria,  191. 
Collier,  Arthur,   198. 


Cotta,   59,    147,    148. 

Cowles,  H.  C.,  222. 

Cox,   164. 

Cudworth,   Ralph,  xiii,  xiv,  xvii,  xviii, 

206,  207,  210. 
Culverwel,   Nathaniel,   xiii,   xv,   206. 

Dante,  20 1. 

Dai  win,   Charles,  222. 

Democritus,    206. 

Descartes,  Rene,  xvii,  55,  59,  105,  171. 

189,    196,   206,   207,   208,  209. 
Dionysius,  convert  of  Paul,  200. 
Dionysius,    Pseudo-,    38,    200. 
Doble,  C.  E.,  212. 

Edward,    Lord    Herbert   of   Cherbury, 

35,   168,    199*. 

Kdward  VI,  of  England,  220. 
Epicurus,   23,    114,    197,   206,   210. 
Erasmus,  139,  ait. 
Erigena,  200. 

Fsbri,   H.,   55,   59,   203. 

Felix  Marcus  Minucius,  see  Minuciu* 

Felix. 

Fleming,  William,  189. 
Fludd,  Robert,   16,  17,  69,  189,  190. 

Gadow,  Hans,   223. 

Gage.   '33- 

(ialen.   Claudius,   42,    153,   201,   aoa. 

Gardiner,   F.   L.,   190. 

Granger,  James,    190. 

Hamilton,    Archbishop    of    St.    An- 
drews,  220. 
Harvey,   21  sf. 
Hearne,  Thomas,  212. 


236   PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


Helmont,  J.  B.  van,  17,  196- 
Henry  VIII,  of  England,  46- 
Herbert,  Lord.  See  Edward,  Lord 

Herbert  of  Cherbury. 
Hicks,  R.  D.,   197- 
ITilgenfeld,    191. 
Hippolytus,   191. 
Hitchins,   187. 
Ilobbes,    Thomas,    65,    68,    113,    132, 

142,    197,    3O3,    206,    20-,    208,    210. 

Holland,  Philemon,   193. 
Irenxus,    191,    192. 

James  II,  of  England,  xii. 

Jebb,  R.  C,  215. 

Jennings,  H.,  189,   190. 

Jocher,  C.  G.  J.,  203. 

Jones,  R.  M.,   189,  192,  193.   '94.  201. 

Josepbus,  8,  1 88. 

Juncken,   164. 

Kant,  Immanuel,  Burthogge's  relation 

to,  xiii,  xvff,  xxii,    198. 
Keill,  John,    142,   143,    153,    155,    175. 

212,  214. 

King,  C.  W.,  192. 
Kramer,  192. 
Krauth,  C.  P.,   189. 
Kuhn,  D.  C.  G.,  202. 

Laertius,  Diogenes,  103,  159,  205. 
Leibniz,  Gottfried  Wilhelm  von,  212. 
Leeuwenhoek,  Antony  van,   163,  zisff. 
Lccke,  John,   Burthogge's  relation  to, 

xi,    xvff;    139,    141,    199,    200,    201, 

205,  209. 

Locy,  W.  A.,  2i6f. 
Lovejoy,  A.  O.,  xviif,   198. 
Ltician,   214. 
Lucilius,    114,    150,   210. 
Lucretius,    1 58. 
Lucullus,   34,    199,   204. 
Lyon,   Georges,   xi. 
Lyson,    187. 

Magnus,    Albertus,    201. 

Maier,   Michael,    190. 

Malebranche,  Nicolas,   107,  207. 

Mansel,  H.  L.,   192. 

Marcus    Aurelius    Antoninus.      See 

Antoninus. 

Michaud,   L.   G.,   203. 
Miller,  George,    169. 


Milton,   John,    201. 
Minucius   Felix,    Marcus,    139,    211. 
More,  Henry,  xiii,  xiv,  xvii,   115,  118, 
142,    192,    194,    206,    207,    209,    210, 

211. 

Morley,   Henry,   221. 
Muller,   Max,   217. 

Naude,  G.,  218. 
Nemesius,    163,    169. 
Newton,   212. 
Nicholas,  Henry,  17,  192. 

Paracelsus,  17,   193,   194,  195,  196. 
Parker,   200,   201. 
Pelops,   202. 
Pennant,  John,    168. 
Phalaris,    160,   214,   215. 
Philalethes,    Eugenius,    pseud.      See 

Vaughan,  Thomas. 
Plato,  xiv,  88,   159,  204,  205,  206. 
Pliny,   the  Younger,    133. 
Plutarch,    159,    193. 
Poiret,   169. 
Politian,  214. 
Pi  ant  1,    198,   202. 
Preller,    Ludwig,   214. 
Pythagoras,  158,  160. 

Raleigh,   Sir.   W.,    133. 

Redi,  Francesco,   164,  216,  217. : 

Reichel,   O.  J.,    197. 

Ritter,  A.   H.,   214. 

Roberts,  C.  F.,   194. 

Robertson,  Alice,  215. 

Savery,    187. 

Scaliger,  Julius,  148,  149,  150,  160, 
165,  167,  169,  171,  217,  218,  221. 

Seneca,  102,  109,  113,  150,  151,  153, 
'59.  205,  208. 

Sherlock,    136. 

Shipley,  A.   E.,  224. 

Simocatto,   133. 

Smith,  John,  xv,   206. 

Sparrow,  John,    189. 

Spenser,   Edmund,   201. 

Spinoza,  Baruch  de,  Substance  as  con- 
ceived by,  92f,  95,  971,  205,  209f; 
mind  as  conceived  by,  107,  207; 
God  as  conceived  by,  108,  ii3f, 
208;  truth  as  conceived  by,  I99f. 

Stephen,   Leslie,   xi. 

Stesichorus,    160. 


INDEX.  237 


Taliacotius,   174.  Vaughan,  Thomas,  161,  215. 

Taylor,  H.  O.,  aoi.  Virgil,   161. 

Temple,  Sir  William,  214. 

Tennent,  Sir  J.  E.,  aaaf.  Waite,  A.  E.,  190. 

Terry,  Edward,  168,  222.  Wallace,    William,    197. 

Tcrtullian,    191.  Warren,    Erasmus,    214. 

Thales,  xi,   159.  Waters,  W.  G.,  aai. 

Trevill,  Andrew,  5,  187.  Whiston,  William,   188,  212,  214. 

Tulloch,   John,  207.  William  the   Conqueror,   46. 

Tulpius,    168.  William  III,  of  England,  xii. 

Wolff,  Christian,  xviii. 

Ueberweg,   xi,   xiii,    198.  Wood,  Anthony  a,  xi,   190,  215. 

Wotton,  William,  215. 
Valentinus,    1 6,    190,    192. 

Valla,   Laurent  ius,    136.  Zeller,   Eduard,    197,    19!. 

Vaughan,   Henry,   215.  Zeno  of  Citium,  103,  159. 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS. 

Accidents,  Phenomenal  nature  of,  24,  60,  68,  75,  77,  798,  85,  gofi,  978,  106, 
iii,  112,  183,  205,  209;  Spinoza's  conception  of,  92',  93,  95,  205,  209; 
Locke's  conception  of,  205,  209;  the  Cambridge  Platonists'  conception  of, 
209.  See  Attributes. 

Action  (or  Activity),  the  fundamental  attribute  of  mind,  ioaf,  io6f,  135,  142, 
M3»  '45,  163,  184.  See  Energy. 

Affection,  of  apprehension,  19,  25,  27,  66;  conceived  as  emotion,  23,  72,  no, 
204;  conscious  sense  affection,  S7ff,  91,  127,  129. 

Analogy,  12,  33,  38,  48,  71;  regarded  as  test  of  truth,  35,  43.  See  Congruity 
and  Harmony. 

Angels,  132,  174. 

Animals,  Faculties  of,  10,  134;  souls  of,  i2sff,  i43f,  148,  150  iS2f,  i6if,  i?2ff; 
kinds  of,  132;  spontaneous  generation  of,  i63ff;  Locke's  definition  of, 
201;  sensations  of,  like  those  of  man,  6of. 

Anticipations,  28,  37,  39,  40,  71.     See  Innate  ideas. 

Apparitions  (appearances),  84,  93;   (spectra  or  spirits),   132(1.     See  Appearance. 

Appearance,  contrasted  with  "grounds"  or  reality,  12,  24,  28f,  41  f,  47,  76,  77, 
82,  85,  87,  88,  93,  in,  155,  1 80,  198.  See  Phenomena  and  Apparitions, 

Apprehension,  an  act  of  the  understanding  or  reason,  loff,  I7ff,  65,  69,  74;  the 
object  of,  i8f,  66,  7of,  75,  80;  clearness  and  distinctness,  the  affections  of, 
19,  24,  25f,  66;  conditions  of  clearness  and  distinctness  in,  27 ft;  not  a 
criterion  of  truth,  33ff,  40. 

Apriorism,  xx,  xxiii. 

Assent,  an  act  of  judgment,  n,  30,  32,  37;  as  related  to  truth,  33f,  36,  37,  41, 
45f,  48;  as  related  to  falsity,  48. 

Attention,  necessary  for  conception  or  understanding*  29,  61,  64. 

Attributes,  of  God,  24,  iiaf,  114,  ip/f,  207,  210;  of  things,  26;  phenomenal 
nature  of,  84,  112;  as  related  to  substance,  98,  183,  209;  Spinoza's  con- 
ception of,  95,  113,  207,  210;  thqught  and  extension  conceived  as  at- 
tributes, 206,  207,  210.  See  Accidents. 

Barnacle  myth,   165,  217,  223. 

Being,  Objective  or  cogitable,  14,  33,  80,  82,  94,  183;  formal  or  real,  13,  14,  80, 

82,  94,    183,   cf.   99f,    ii3f;   mind  and   matter   as  related  to,    I2off.     See 

Existence. 
Body,  99,   i68f,   170,   197,  201,  203;  as  related  to  mind  or  soul,   107,    118,   i2$f. 

I28ff,  134,  M2ff,  I52ff,  I57ff,  207,  cf.  123,  125,   148,   166,  211;  as  related 

to  external  objects,   I26ff;   Hobbe's  identification  of  substance  with,   210. 
Breath,  identified  with  soul,   I47ff,   is6ff.  . 


240    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


Cambridge  Platonists,  The.  xiii  ff,  194,  2o6f,  209,  210;  Burthogge's  relation  to, 
xiii  ff ;  Soul  of  the  world  as  conceived  by,  xiv ;  human  souls  as  conceived  by, 
xiv;  nature  of  truth  as  conceived  by,  xv;  materialism  opposed  by,  zo6f; 
substance  as  conceived  by,  2ogf. 

Cause,  34,  72,  76,  107,  109,  114,  n8f,  135,  146,  171,  173;  a  notion  of  the  mind, 
'3.  75.  84,  85,  91,  92,  94,  180;  of  sensations  and  notions,  regarded  as 
things,  87,  181,  204;  Principles  conceived  as  uncaused  causes,  loif,  184; 
God  conceived  as  primary,  197,  208. 

Clear  and  distinct  perception,  see  Perception. 

Clearness,  an  affection  of  apprehension,  19,  24,  27,  28,  66.  See  Perception,  clear 
and  distinct. 

Cogitables  (or  Cogitable  beings),   13,   14,  Sgff. 

Cogitation,  68,  n8f,  128;  includes  sensation  and  intellection,  12,  13,  18,  ssff, 
6if,  76,  77,  81,  Ssff,  92,  123;  as  related  to  mind,  iosff,  206;  gives  knowl- 
edge of  phenomena  only,  12,  77,  180,  183. 

Cogitative  Faculties,  see  Faculties. 

Coherence,  see  Congruity. 

Colour,  xvi,  H2,  i2off;  related  to  eye  as  meaning  is  to  understanding,  nff, 
15,  18,  24,  32,  34,  58,  67f,  71,  74f,  77,  SjS,  88,  p2ff. 

Conception,  16,  29,  6s,  80,  97,  100,  146;  role  of,  in  knowledge,  12,  i3f,  25,  26, 
S7ff,  67,  70,  74,  77f,  82,  117,  181. 

Conduct,  Role  of  Reason  in.   188. 

Congruity,  between  the  object  and  the  understanding,  15,  36,  42,  182;  cf.  174, 
175;  objective  congruity  as  test  of  truth,  4iff,  182.  See  Aanalogy  and 
Harmony. 

Conscience,  48,   188. 

Consciousness,  Relation  of,  to  knowledge,  s8ff. 

Consistence,  see  Congruity. 

Continuum,  29,  198. 

Creation,  of  souls,   i7off. 

Deity,  5,  23.     See  God. 

Discerption,   conceived  as  attribute  of  material   substance,    170,    173,   by   More, 

209,  210. 

Dissent,  an  act  of  judgment,  30,  32,  41,  45. 
Distinctness,  an  affection  of  apprehension,   19,   2sff,  66.     See  Perception,  clear 

and  distinct. 
Duration,   124,   125;  eternity  conceived  as  permanent  duration,   124. 

F.ffect,  conceived  as  a  notion  of  the  mind,   13,  75,  84,  85,  90,  91,  92,  94,   180, 

cf.  45.  72,  87.  101,  173- 
Energy,    Vital,    distinguished   from   mechanical,   xv,    i2sf,    130,    131,    143,    163. 

See  Action. 

English  Platonists,  see  Cambridge  Platonists. 
Enthusiasm,   i6f,  69,   112,   190,   193,   194. 
Entity,  of  sense,  13;  of  reason  or  understanding,  13,  75,  80,  85,  89,  90,  91,  92, 

i  So. 

Epistemology,  see  Knowledge. 

Errour,  6,  8,  24,  25,  26,  28,  34,  35,  37,  45,  48,  49.     See  Falsity. 
Essence,  80,   117.  , 

Evil,  a  notion  of  the  mind,  13,  Si;  distinguished  from  good  by  reason,   188. 
Existence,  80,  96,   169,   197,  206,  207;  objective,   13,   75,   180;  real,  75,  84,  93, 

99,   ioo,  122,  209.     See  Being. 
Experience,   Role  of,  in  knowledge,   Burthogge's  teaching  compared  with  that 

of  Locke,  xvii,  xx  f. 


INDEX.  241 


Extension,  conceived  as  attribute  of  matter,  9$f,  99,   too,    105,   io6f,   116,  206, 

209;   Spinoza's  conception  of,  95,  207,  210;  substance  conceived  as,  99; 

God  conceived  as,   108,  by  More,   nsff,  209. 
Eye,    The,    15,  19,  20,  21,  24,  38,  32,  33,  34,  37,  39,  40,  145,  172;    related   to   seeing 

as  the  understanding  is  to  meaning,   nff,  37,  60,  63,  66,  72,  74f,  87,  88; 

an  organ  of  sense,  64,  76,  83,  84,  123,   129. 

Faculties,  13,  20,  26,  31,  36,  42,  77,  82,  93,  94,  102,  104,  105,  107,  119,  129,  134, 

'35t   146,   149,   152,   153,   182;  of  sense   (i.  e.,  perceptive),   10,   12,   13,  56. 

76,  77,    180;  of  reason  (i.  e.,  conceptive  and  cogitative),   10,   12,   13,    14. 

56f,  76,  86,  91,   180,   199.     See  Powers. 

Faith,  opposed  to  reason,  10,  21,  47,  48.     See  Light,  of  Faith. 
Falsity,  13,  326%  37,  41,  43ff,  48,  69,   182.     See  Errour. 
Familists,   16,   17,  I92f,  194. 

Form  (or  Notion),  of  truth,  35,  37,  40,   182,   188. 
Formal  (or  formally),  n,  12,  13,  14,  80,  82,  94,  183;   Burthogge's  use  of  the  term, 

189. 

Gnostics,  1 6,   igif. 

God,  7,  99,  103,  192,  201;  nature  of,  8,  19,  28,  47,  48,  94,  102,  io8ff,  118,  120, 
i23ff,  134,  135,  143,  I46f,  is6ff,  169,  171,  I74f,  181,  184,  187,  195.  205; 
Burthogge's  teaching  about,  compared  with  that  of  Cambridge  Platonists. 
xiv;  according  to  Malebranche,  107,  108,  iiaf,  to  Spinoza,  108,  Hjff, 
zo7f,  209,  to  More,  nsff,  to  Hobbes,  ig/f,  209,  to  Seneca,  208;  revelation 
of,  ipff,  28,  194;  purpose  of,  21,  23;  conceived  as  unknown,  24,  inf, 
197,  as  source  of  truth,  33. 

Good,  conceived  as  a  notion,  13,  81,  as  the  "will  of  a  Superior,"  188. 

Goodness,  an  attribute  of  God,   19,  108,   nsf,  198. 

Gordius,  see  Horse-hair  myth. 

Grounds,  reality,  or  things-in-themselves,  conceived  as  "grounds"  or  cause  of 
Notions,  14,  18,  80,  85,  87,  93,  180,  of  sentiments,  17,  19,  88,  93,  in, 
121 ;  reason,  the  "ground"  of  judgment,  30,  31,  objective  harmony,  of 
Assent,  33,  34,  41,  falsity,  of  dissent,  41;  of  truth,  36,  40. 

Harmony,   External,  the  test  of  truth,  xxiii  f,    15,  418,    162,    182;  of  things  to 

our  faculties,  conceived  as  test  of  truth,  ssf,  42,  199.     See  Congruity. 
Horse-hair  myth,  168,  223f. 

Idealism,  of  seventeenth  century,  xiii  ff ;  of  eighteenth  century,  xv  ff. 

Ideas  (or  Notions),  the  objects  of  understanding,  18,  626*,  73,  78,  90,  '46,  179. 
196;  derived  from  sensation,  39;  original,  in  the  mind  of  God,  33;  role 
of,  in  knowledge,  57f,  74,  181,  205,  207;  innate,  xviii,  xxiii,  200.  Ideas 
of  substance,  92,  205;  mind  and  matter,  92,  966*.  107;  cogitation  and 
extension,  106,  116;  God,  108,  112;  accidents,  209.  See  Notions. 

Image,  13,  14,  35,  39,  57.  S8,  60,  62,  63,  64,  73,  77,  84,  87,  88,  129,  146,  175, 
179,  1 80,  181,  182.  See  Phenomena  and  Representation. 

Imagination,  12,  13,  14,  17,  39,  76,  96,  117,  175;  a  Conceptive  Cogitative  Power, 
55.  57*;  a  Mental  and  Spiritual  Power,  6if;  conceived  as  internal  sen- 
sation, 55,  62f,  119;  acts  of,  65;  role  in  knowledge,  77;  inadequacy  of, 
for  knowledge,  according  to  Descartes,  203. 

Impressions,  of  sense,  12,  I7f,  24,  26,  34,  39.  60,  62,  63,  76,  87,  88,  119,  127, 
128,  146,  181;  see  Representation  and  Image;  of  the  mind,  34,  35,  59, 
119;  see  Notions. 

Innate  Ideas  (or  Innate  Notions  or  Native  Notions),  xviii,  xxiii,  70,  71,  181, 
182,  188,  200.  See  Anticipations  and  Notions. 


242    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


Instinct,  warding  off  of  blow  not  an  instinct  but  habit,  7  iff;  conscience  con- 
ceived as,  1  88;  "natural  instinct,"  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  199. 

Intellect,   u,  33,  42,  203.     See  Mind. 

Intellection,  55,  57,  76,  130,  146.     See  Reasoning. 

Intuition,  as  criterion  of  truth,  xv,  xxiii;  God  sees  universe  in  single,  124: 
conceived  as  a  type  of  knowledge,  by  Spinoza,  I9$f. 

Jews,  7,  147,  152,  1  88. 

Judgment,  an  act  of  reason  or  understanding,  n,  20,  zgfi,  37,  44,  45,  65,  69, 
163,  182;  of  sense,  20. 

Knowledge,  6,  7,  26,  33,  40,  43,  48,  66,  73,  156;  Burthogge's  doctrine  of,  com- 
pared with  that  of  Kant  and  Locke,  xv  ff;  role  of  notions  in,  18,  80,  82, 
90,  i79<f;  role  of  sense  in,  20,  47,  57ff,  61,  I79ff,  198,  200,  204;  reason 
and,  55;  inadequacy  of  human,  i2f,  67,  76,  80,  82ff,  no,  inf,  198,  205, 
221,  cf.  106;  faculties  of  knowledge  or  understanding,  10,  12,  14,  $6ff 
76f,  179;  relative  of  truth  to,  182;  Spinoza's  true  types  of,  200. 


Life,  derived  from  motion  in  the  soul,  isoff,  145;  God,  the  original  principle 
of,  J57f;  of  the  universe,  163,  175;  conceived  by  Cudworth  as  attribute 
of  incorporeal  substance,  209-210. 

Light,  of  Revelation  or  Faith,  igtt,  24$,  196,  cf.  10;  of  Nature  or  Reason,  igff, 
241,  188,  196;  intellectual,  19;  of  Discourse,  27;  innate  notions  conceived 
as  light  of  understanding,  37ff;  necessary  for  vision,  74,  83,  84,  88,  I52f, 
for  sensitive  actions,  163;  God,  conceived  as  source  of,  i2off,  134;  nature 
of  propagation  of,  170. 

Logic,  a  method  of  reasoning,  30  f!,  44;  subject  of,  66. 

Matter,    191,    196,    211;    nature   of,    24,   91,    g6f,    loaff,    in,    113,    iisff,    izoff, 

128,  131,  169,  170,  172,  175,  iSjf,  205,  206,  210;  "mechanik  and  material" 

powers  of,  61;  as  related  to  mind,   io8ff,   118,   i26f,   163. 
Meaning,   the   immediate   object   of   the   mind,    nff,    isf,    27,    64,    66,    68.      See 

Sense. 

Metaphysics,  Subject  of,  66.     See  Philosophy. 
Mind,  27ff,  446%   59,  60,   198,    199,  210;  nature  of,  of,   55,  61,  64,   65,  91,  g6f, 

100,    io2ff,    184,   206;   faculties  of,    12;   apprehension,   an   act  of,    n,    19; 

notions  of,   I2ff,  24,  32ff,  38ff,  70,  73,  7sf,  78,  8of,  85,  90,  92,  146,  I79ff; 

pure   mind    (i.    <•.,    God),    nof,    iisf,    n6f,    I22ff,    184,    205;    in    matter, 

i  i8ff,  I2$f,   isgff.   184;  Spinoza's  conception  of,  207. 
M«saical  Spirit,  xiv,  ito,   118,   i28ff,  143  ft-     See  Spirit,  of  the  universe. 
Motion,   17,  36;  a  reality,  24,   103,   104,   in;  conceived  as  related  to  mind  and 

matter,   72,    n8f,    i22ff,    i27f,    i3of,    163,  by  More,   210;   source  of,    143; 

conceived  as  related  to  soul,   145;   necessary  for  spontaneous  generation, 

1  66,  1  68;  self-perpetuating,  i69f. 
Muggletonians,  194. 
Mysticism,  of  Rosicrucians,   iSgf;  of  Gnostics,   191;  of  Familists,    \gzi:  of  Hel- 

inunt,   196. 


INDEX.  243 


Notions,  Burthogge's  teaching  about,  compared  with  that  of  Kant,  xvi  ft;  kinds 
of,  gf,  1 8,  21,  28,  73  f,  89,  92;  role  of,  in  knowledge,  izff,  aaff,  27,  29, 
33,  62,  67,  73,  75,  77,  79,  83,  105,  179,  181;  dependent  upon  sense,  17, 
18,  20,  82,  179,  180;  as  objects  of  apprehension,  19,  25,  66,  70;  innate, 
xviii,  xxiii,  38ff,  7of,  i8if,  188;  of  reason  or  understanding,  58,  62f,  70, 
75,  78f,  90,  181;  subjective  nature  of,  14,  68,  748,  8of,  848,  92,  93ff, 
105,  1 80,  198;  of  sense,  79,  85,  92;  things  conceived  as  cause  of,  45,  87, 
89,  93,  181.  Notions  of  truth,  xxiii  f,  35,  37,  41,  44f,  48f,  182,  188; 
entity,  xvi,  75,  85,  90,  180;  substance,  xvi,  75,  77,  80,  82f,  84,  85,  90, 
92,  93f,  95,  96ff,  100,  180,  182,  183,  as  conceived  by  Spinoza,  95;  acci- 
dent, xvi,  75,  77,  80,  82f,  85,  90,  92,  93,  94,  as  conceived  by  Spinoza, 
95;  whole  and  part,  xvi,  13,  39,  75,  84,  85,  90;  cause  and  effect,  xvi,  13, 
75,  84,  85,  90,  92,  94,  180;  quality,  77,  8zf,  84,  93,  94;  action,  77;  subject. 
So;  adjunct,  80;  thing,  89,  90,  180;  reality,  go;  time,  92,  124;  place,  92; 
relations,  13,  93,  94;  measuse,  94;  God,  no,  ii2ff,  198;  eternity,  124; 
self-subsistence,  183;  good  and  evil,  13. 

Object,  of  knowledge,  182,  Burthogge's  teaching  about  compared  with  that  ot 
Kant  and  Locke,  xv  ff,  phenomenal  nature  of,  izff,  57,  74,  77,  84^  180. 
198,  complex  nature  of,  179,  when  judged  as  true,  182,  188,  199;  of 
apprehension,  cogitation  or  understanding,  nf,  i8f,  2?f,  31,  36,  40,  44, 
•61,  66,  70,  88,  179;  "meaning,"  dependent  upon  congruity  of,  with  the 
faculties,  15,  36,  182;  regarded  as  external,  13,  18,  24,  57,  59,  60,  62, 
75.  80,  97,  125,  127,  129,  144,  180,  181,  and  cause  of  sensations  and 
notions,  18,  21,  76,  80,  86f,  119,  121,  145,  146;  of 'sense  or  perception. 
*°f  32>  34.  57.  59.  60,  69,  128,  180;  basis  for  judgment  of  congruity 
between  ideas  and,  according  to  Descartes,  196. 

Objective,  as  opposed  to  formal,  13,  74,  84,  90,  91,  92,  94;  Burthogge's  use  01 
the  term*  189. 

Passivity,  an  attribute  of  principiates,  io2f,  of  matter,  '102,   105,   106,   184. 

Perception,  of  the  understanding,  18,  68,  75;  clear  and  distinct,  34^  37,  68, 
196,  cf.  199;  faculties  of,  56;  as  related  to  knowledge,  57,  Saf,  179,  199, 
cf.  60,  106;  of  sense,  71,  -t,i,  127,  I3sf,  172,  179,  199,  207. 

Phenomena,  opposed  to  realities  or  things-in-themselves,  xix  ff,  12,  24,  29,  49, 
68,  77,  88,  133,  180,  184,  198,  205;  of  Nature,  156,  162,  163,  169,  172, 
>73i  I~4>  i?S-  See  Appearance  and  Apparitions. 

Philosophy,  Fludd's  "Mosaick  Philosophy,"  16;  enthusiasts  in,  17;  cause  ot 
errors  in,  26;  authority  for,  I59ff. 

Platonists,  The.     Sec  Cambridge  Platonists. 

Powers,  Cogitative  and  conceptive,  13,  55,  57,  58,  59,  60,  82,  87,  123,  135,  180; 
mental  and  spiritual,  55,  57,  61 ;  of  the  soul,  149;  mechanick  and 
material,  55,  57,  61,  169;  perceptive,  appetitive  and  motive,  104,  153. 
See  Faculties. 

Principle,  see  Vital  principle. 

Principles,  159,  181;  innate  notions  of  the  mind,  37ff,  cf.  188;  uncaused  sub- 
stances, 96,  10  iff,  107,  119,  122,  124,  184. 

Principiates,  Nature  of,  96,  101,  184. 

Proportion,  as  test  of  truth,  4if,  44f.    See  Congruity  and  Harmony. 

Quakers,  189,   192,   194. 

Ratiocination,  Nature  of,  38;  kinds  of,  48. 

Reality,  opposed  to  phenomena,  iafl,  17,  24,  28f,  38,  76,  8off,  88f,  91,  93, 
no,  182,  183,  108,  204f;  a  notion,  90. 


244    PHILOSOPHICAL  WRITINGS  OF  BURTHOGGE. 


Reason,  j,  13,  37,  42,  46,  48,  50,  86,  141,  142,  189,  199.  200,  202,  220;  nature 
of,  9f>  3<>.  49.  55^.  6off,  6sf,  72,  109,  117,  179,  180,  188;  notions  or 
ideas  of,  18,  75,  80,  179,  181;  light  of,  igff,  188;  kinds  of,  3if. 

Reasoning,  28,  33,  40,  98,  153;  nature  of,  30,  32,  44,  45,  ssff,  81,  182;  methods 
of,  31.  43*.  48f;  impertinent,  a  cause  of  error,  6,  8f. 

Religion,  7,  9,  25,  115;  as  related  to  reason,  48;  in  England  in  the  i7th  cen- 
tury, xii,  xv ;  Christian,  2off;  Abraxas  religion,  191;  natural,  199. 

Remembrance,  sensible  and  intellectual,  63,  64. 

Representation,  12,  22,  27,  63,  76,  77,  in,  184.  See  Appearance  and  Phe- 
nomena. 

Revelation  as  related  to  sense,  xvi,  143,  issff,  and  reason,  xvi,  10,  I9ff,  48. 
M3.  i53ff. 

Rosicrucians,   69,    iSgf. 

Science,  Unitary  nature  of,  43;  47. 

Sensation,  of  sense,  18,  S7.  76,  123,  130,  146,  173;  nature  of,  6off,  127,  181, 
204;  of  understanding  (internal  or  "sublimated"),  55,  63,  180;  role  of, 
in  knowledge,  59.  See  Sense. 

Sense,  External,  19,  42,  90,  92,  94,  101,  104,  107,  130,  134,  I7if,  199,  203, 
nature  of,  55,  S7ff,  role  of,  in  knowledge,  20,  39,  47,  60,  76,  79,  83f, 
89,  in,  I79ff,  199,  200,  204,  2o6f,  object  of,  13,  17,  24,  58,  69,  77<f, 
146,  I79f,  Burthogge's  teaching  about,  compared  with  that  of  Kant  and 
Locke,  xvi  ff;  intellectual  or  internal,  32,  35,  78,  92,  119,  188,  199;  or 
"meaning,"  9,  nff,  2sff,  36,  64,  66,  68,  70.  See  Sensation  and  Senti- 
ment. 

Sentiment,  of  sense,  12,  13,  i7ff,  58,  62,  7of,  7$f,  77ff,  82ff,  85,  87,  89,  92, 
93f,  in,  146,  180;  of  understanding,  66,  71,  78,  79,  80,  82ff,  146,  180. 
See  Sense. 

Soul,  of  World,  126,  I28ff,  134,  Miff,  152,  158,  ijgff,  163,  164,  169,  173,  175. 
180,  205,  208,  212,  214,  Burthogge's  teaching  about,  compared  with  that 
of  Cambridge  Platonists,  xiv  f ;  particular  souls,  i$2f,  156,  163,  180, 
human,  135,  Miff,  147,  156,  158,  169,  172,  I74f,  201,  206,  as  related  to 
body,  38,  I2sf,  i28f,  152;  perceptions  of,  127;  of  animals,  142,  156, 
172;  as  related  to  life,  145,  i47ff;  of  plants,  156,  Burthogge's  teaching 
about,  compared  with  that  of  Cambridge  Platonists,  xiv  f ;  creation  of, 
I7of.  See  Spirit. 

Spirit,  38,  133,  134,  173,  189,  191,  193,  194;  demoniacal,  cause  of  enthusiasm. 
16;  of  passion,  8;  nature  of  oof.  134  148,  163,  170,  209,  211;  of  God. 
19.  i°3.  iO9f,  115,  118,  123,  146,  is6f,  174,  175;  abstract,  123,  125,  132: 
of  the  universe  xiv,  118,  126,  I28ff,  I43ff,  158,  161:  of  man.  126,  201: 
of  animals,  126,  131,  166;  mechanical,  132.  See  Soul. 

Spontaneous  generation,  of  animals,  i63ff,  216,  217,  221,  222. 

Stoics,  102,  148,  197. 

Subject,  of  accidents,  Substance  conceived  as,  81,  85,  95,  97ff,  106,  107,  183, 
205,  209. 

Substance,  a  Notion,  xvi,  75,  77,  79,  8off,  88,  90,  91,  93,  94,  95,  180,  i82f; 
conceived  as  subject  of  accidents,  81,  85,  95.  97ff,  106,  107,  183,  205, 
209;  Spinoza's  conception  of,  criticized,  92f,  95,  98,  101,  108,  nsf:  kinds 
of,  96,  99,  loi,  104,  105,  134,  136,  184;  in  itself  unknown,  97.  .106, 
i82f;  universe  conceived  as  corporeal  substance  by  Hobbes,  197. 


INDEX.  245 


Things-in-themselves,  n,  13,  45,  67,  89;  Burthogge's  doctrine  of,  compared 
with  that  of  Kant,  xviii  ff;  unknown,  12,  74,  77,  83,  84,  97,  inf,  180, 
iSsf,  198;  ground,  or  cause  of  knowledge,  85,  87f,  93,  130,  179,  181. 
204;  formal  existence  of,  189. 

Thought,  or  conception,  61,  65,  70,  74,  81,  100,  105,  106,  116,  183,  204,  206, 
207,  209,  210. 

Time,  a  notion,  92,  124;  God  conceived  as  independent  of,   125. 

Truth,  5,  6,  24,  49,  50,  88;  interpretation  of  Burthogge's  doctrine  of,  xiv, 
xv,  xxiii  f ;  as  related  to  reason  or  mind,  9,  n,  32,  36,  44ff;  relation  of 
sense  to,  20,  47,  199;  definition  of,  33,  181;  criterion  of,  20,  34ff,  406, 
182,  188,  207. 

Understanding,  Function  of,  in  knowledge,  i3f,  18,  43,  58,  60,  63f,  66,  75ff, 
90,  93ff,  97f,  179,  Burthogge's  teaching  about,  compared  with  that 
of  Kant,  xvi  ff;  function  of,  in  knowledge  of  truth,  6,  32,  36f,  40;  na- 
ture of,  i off,  19,  21,  agf,  55,  6iff,  65,  74,  78,  82,  1 16,  119,  146,  160, 
174,  210;  inadequacy  of,  for  knowledge  of  reality,  6,  70,  7sff,  83,  85, 
89;  innate  notions  of,  71;  of  God,  23,  no. 

Universe,  God  not  to  be  identified  with,  113;  Vital  Principle  or  Spirit  of,  1288, 
«43>  158,  conceived  as  Spirit  of  God,  158. 

Unknown  substance,  or  thing,  12,  97,  106,  i82f,  209;  Burthogge's  teaching  about, 
compared  with  that  of  Kant,  xviii  ff. 

Upstart  Sect,  17,  194. 

Verity,  6,  n,  13,  32,  33,  36.     See  Truth. 

Vital  principle,  or  soul,  125,  128,  129,  i3if,  134,  135,  142,  148,  152,  153,  156, 
iS7,  i63f,  175.  See  Soul. 

Words,  as  carriers  of  "meaning,"   i4ff,    18,  26f,  6sff,  73f,  203. 
World,   24,  38,   132;  ratiocination,  the  power  of  interpreting  the,   48;   God  not 
to  be  identified  with,   113,  205;  Soul  of,  113,   131,  i42ff,   179,   184,  211. 


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